Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

CARLOS ALEXI LOPEZ ORDONEZ,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:26-cv-629-TJC-MCR

TODD LYONS, Acting Director of

Immigration and Customs Enforcement,

et al.,

Respondents.

ORDER

On March 23, 2026, Petitioner Carlos Alexi Lopez Ordonez, an

immigration detainee at Baker Correctional Institute, initiated this action

through counsel by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 1; Petition).

The Federal Respondents filed a Response. (Doc. 9; Response). Respondent

Warden, Baker Correctional Institute filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition.

(Doc. 10). The case is now ripe for review.

I. Background

Petitioner, a citizen of Honduras, entered the United States without

inspection on or around October 10, 2022. Petition at 5. Since his entry, “he has

lived in Jacksonville, Florida, as a law-abiding member of his community, he

has earned a living as a construction worker, and he has no criminal record.”

Id. On March 17, 2026, Petitioner was stopped in a vehicle by a law enforcement

officer, who then transferred him to the custody of Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (ICE). Id. at 6. Petitioner notes that during his encounter with law

enforcement, he had not “engaged in any traffic infraction or any criminal

conduct.” Id. On March 19, 2026, ICE issued Petitioner a Notice to Appear

before an immigration judge on April 15, 2026 (Response at 2), but there is no

information in the record confirming whether that hearing occurred.

II. Analysis

The Petition contains three counts, alleging: (1) Respondents have

violated the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and

implementing regulations; (2) Respondents have violated Petitioner’s Fourth

Amendment right against unreasonable seizures; and (3) Respondents have

violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Accardi doctrine by failing

to follow their own custody and parole regulations. Petition at 7–10. As relief,

Petitioner requests, inter alia, immediate release or an order directing

Respondents provide him with a bond hearing before an immigration judge. Id.

at 11.

The Court has recently addressed nearly identical issues in Orozco Torres

v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 3:26-cv-646-TJC-LLL, 2026 WL 947955

(M.D. Fla. April 8, 2026). The Court incorporates the reasoning in Orozco Torres

into this Order. A difference between the two cases is that Orozco Torres had a

bond hearing at which the immigration judge determined he had no jurisdiction

to consider bond, whereas Petitioner likely has not. But his efforts to secure a

meaningful hearing would likewise be futile, given Respondents’ position that

he is being held under § 1225(b)(2) and that statute “mandates his detention.”

Response at 15.

Accordingly, the Court rejects the Federal Respondents’ arguments that

two statutory provisions, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) and (b)(9), deprive this Court of

jurisdiction to adjudicate Petitioner’s claims and that he failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies prior to filing this case. Regarding the merits of his

claim, the Court finds, in line with Orozco Torres, that Petitioner is not properly

detained under § 1225(b)(2). Thus, his Petition is due to be granted. See 2026

WL 947955, at *6.1

1 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently came to a similar

conclusion. See Cunha v. Freden, No. 25-3141-pr, 2026 WL 1146044 (2d Cir.

April 28, 2026) (“Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to noncitizens, such as

Petitioner, who are present in the United States after entering the country

without inspection and admission, and who were not apprehended at or near

the border at the time of entry. This result is dictated by the plain text of these

provisions, and further confirmed by the statute’s context, structure, history,

and purpose. It likewise comports with the Supreme Court’s established

understanding of Sections 1225 and 1226. It reflects Executive Branch practice

over thirty years and across five Presidential administrations. Moreover, it

explains why Congress has never challenged that settled practice despite

making numerous amendments to the immigration laws. Finally, even if the

government’s newfound interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) were

plausible—and it is not—we would nonetheless reject it based on our obligation

to construe these statutes in a manner that would avoid the serious

constitutional questions attendant to what would be the broadest mass-

III. Remedy

The Court considered requiring an individualized hearing before an

immigration judge on Petitioner’s detention. However, the Board of

Immigration Appeals decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216

(BIA 2025), which is binding on all immigration judges, held that such judges

lack authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) to consider bond requests for

individuals who entered the United States without admission. Thus, if the

Court were to require a hearing, the immigration judge would be bound to find,

under Hurtado, that he or she lacks jurisdiction to provide Petitioner with a

meaningful hearing. Additionally, Respondents argue that § 1225(b)(2)

“mandates [Petitioner’s] detention.” Response at 15. Respondents fail to argue

in the alternative that Petitioner is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226,

which would require a meaningful bond hearing. Id. at 1 (requesting that the

Court “deny the writ and dismiss this action”).

For these reasons, the Court finds ordering an individualized hearing

would not afford relief and would be futile. See, e.g., Rivero v. Mina, No. 6:26-

cv-66-RBD-NWH, --- F. Supp. 3d --- , 2026 WL 199319, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26,

2026) (explaining that when the government “asserted no lawful basis” for

petitioner’s detention, allowing his continued detention while waiting for a

detention-without-bond mandate in our Nation’s history for millions of

noncitizens.”)

hearing “would gut the purpose of habeas review”) (citations omitted). Without

any lawful basis for his detention at this time, and unable to access a

meaningful bond hearing, the Court can only find that Petitioner is entitled to

immediate release.

Since the Court will grant the Petition because Petitioner is not properly

detained under § 1225(b)(2), it does not, and need not, address his other claims

and arguments. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 689 n.10 (2004) (declining

to address an additional claim in a habeas petition after granting relief on

another claim because “any relief [petitioner] could obtain on that claim would

be cumulative”).2

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

1. Carlos Alexi Lopez Ordonez’s Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (Doc. 1) is GRANTED as to Count One; the Petition is

otherwise denied without prejudice as moot. Respondents shall

release Petitioner within 48 hours of the entry of this Order.

Respondents shall facilitate Petitioner’s transportation from the

detention facility by notifying his counsel when and where he can

be collected.

2 For example, the Court declines to address Petitioner’s Fourth

Amendment and Administrative Procedure Act arguments.

2. No later than May 8, 2026, Respondents shall FILE a notice with

the Court confirming that Carlos Alexi Lopez Ordonez has been

released from custody.

3. Respondent Warden, Baker County Correctional Institute’s Motion

to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 10) is DENIED

as moot.

4, The Clerk shall enter judgment granting the Petition as to Count

One and close the file.

5. The Court retains jurisdiction to effectuate this Order.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida this 4th day of May,

2026.

yr & Cimotbeg g. Corrig □□

TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN

STACI Senior United States District Judge

hms

Copies:

Counsel of record