Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

No. 5:25-cv-03257-WLH-PVC Date February 25, 2026

Title Cameron Parker vy. St. Mary Medical Center et al

Present: The Honorable WESLEY L. HSU, United States District Judge

Lesbith Castillo None

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:

None None

Proceedings: (INCHAMBERS) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

TO REMAND AND DENYING MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’

FEES [13]

The Court 1s in receipt of Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (the “Motion’”).

(“Plaintiff's Motion to Remand,” Dkt. No. 13). No party filed a written request for oral

argument stating that an attorney with five years or less of experience would be arguing

the matter. (See Standing Order, Docket No. 10 at 16). Further, pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Rule 7-15, the Court finds this matter appropriate for

decision without oral argument. The hearing calendared for February 27, 2026 is

VACATED, and the matter taken off calendar. For the reasons explained herein, the

Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Cameron Parker (‘Plaintiff’) brought this suit against Defendants St.

Mary Medical Center, Providence Health and Services and Aaron Flores (“Defendants”)

alleging the following causes of action: (1) Associational Disability Discrimination in

Violation of FEHA; (11) Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Harassment in Violation of

FEHA: (iii) Failure to Accommodate; (iv) Failure to Engage in Good Faith Interactive

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Process; (v) Retaliation in Violation of FEHA; (vi) Retaliation for Exercising CFRA

Leave; (vii) Retaliation in Violation of California Labor Code § 1102.5; (viii) Wrongful

Termination in Violation of Public Policy; (ix) Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation;

(x) Failure to Pay Minimum Wage; (xi) Failure to Provide Meal Periods; (xii) Failure to

Provide Rest Breaks; (xiii) Failure to Pay Wages Due Upon Termination; Waiting Time

Penalties; (xiv) Failure to Issue Accurate and Itemized Wage Statements; and (xv)

Unlawful Business Practices in Violation of CA B&P Code 17200. (“Complaint,” Dkt.

No. 1-2) (“Compl.”). Plaintiff served as an Executive Chef for Defendants beginning on

September 29, 2014. (Mot. at 2). Throughout his employment, Plaintiff alleges that he

was “a high-performing employee whose culinary expertise and commitment to patient

care were consistently praised by management.” (Id.). In his 2022 annual performance

review, Plaintiff’s supervisor, Defendant Flores, described him as a “very valuable

member of the team.” (Id.).

On March 25, 2025, Plaintiff’s mother suffered a “catastrophic” injury resulting in

a disability. (Id. at 3). As a result Plaintiff requested intermittent leave under the

California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”) to care for her. (Id.). In early April of 2025,

Plaintiff requested “a reasonable accommodation” from Defendant Flores to periodically

extend his meal periods to afford him time to care for his mother. (Id.). Plaintiff

alleges Defendant Flores explicitly approved this request by informing Plaintiff to “do

what you have to do.” (Id.). Plaintiff subsequently extended four meal periods by ten

to thirty minutes each, having been allegedly assured by his supervisor that these

absences were authorized. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that despite Defendant Flores’ express

verbal authorization, Defendants used these four instances as the sole basis for an

attendance investigation. (Id.). During a meeting with Human Resources, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Flores admitted that he had granted Plaintiff’s request for the

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accommodation. (Id.). On April 17, 2025, however, Defendants terminated Plaintiff

for “taking extended meal breaks.” (Id.). Defendants’ official records characterize this

as an “involuntary discharge for a policy violation.” (Id.).

Nearly a month before his termination, Plaintiff became subject to a Collective

Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) that was effective beginning on March 28, 2025.

(“Declaration of Katie Taylor,” Dkt. No. 15-1, Ex. C) (“Taylor Decl.”). Under the CBA,

Plaintiff’s regular hourly base rate was $24.32 (id. at 56) and Plaintiff worked eight-hour

shifts (Compl. ¶ 13). Additionally, as it relates to Plaintiff’s meal break provision, the

CBA states, “[m]eal periods are provided so employees may obtain nourishment and

relaxation from their work duties. Meal periods are provided to employees as follows:

employees are eligible for one unpaid half hour (½) meal period, inclusive of travel time,

for each work period of more than five (5) hours per workday. As examples, an

employee who works either a full eight (8) or ten (10) hour shift is entitled to one

(1) meal period per workday.” (Taylor Decl., Ex. C, at 31). The relevant overtime

provision asserts, “[a]n employee who is regularly scheduled to work eight (8) hour shifts

is assigned to an ‘8 and 80 work schedule and will be paid one and one half (1½) times

his/her regular rate of pay for all hours worked after the first eight (8) hours in a workday

or over eighty (80) hours in a fourteen (14)-day biweekly pay period and two (2) times

his/her regular rate of pay for all hours worked after the first twelve (12) hours in a

workday.” (Id. at 29). The CBA’s rest period provision states, “[r]est periods are

provided so employees may have the opportunity to relax during their work shift.

Employees are authorized and permitted to take rest periods as follows: employees are

eligible for one paid rest period for each four (4) hours worked daily, or major fraction

thereof, except that no rest periods are due if an employee works less than three and one

half (3½) hours in a workday.” (Id. at 30).

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Plaintiff filed the instant Motion on January 19, 2026, arguing that removal is

improper. (Mot., Dkt. No. 13). On February 6, 2026, Defendants opposed the Motion

(Opp’n., Dkt. No. 15), and Plaintiff replied to the Opposition (Reply, Dkt. No. 16).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power

authorized by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013)

(citations and quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant

may remove a civil action filed in state court to federal court only where the district court

would have original jurisdiction. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).

“A defendant seeking removal must file in the district court a notice of removal

‘containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal.” Ibarra v. Manheim

Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)).

Although “a defendant’s notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation

that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold,” when the allegation

is challenged, “[e]vidence establishing the amount is required.” Id. “[B]oth sides submit

proof,” and the court decides whether the defendant has demonstrated, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy requirement has been

satisfied. Id. at 1198. Such evidence may include “affidavits or declarations, or other

summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of

removal.” Id. at 1197 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Singer v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997)). Whether the defendant satisfies

this requirement is “to be tested by consideration of real evidence and the reality of what

is at stake in the litigation, using reasonable assumptions underlying the defendant’s

theory of damages exposure” as “mere speculation and conjecture, with unreasonable

assumptions” cannot suffice. Id. at 1197-98.

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In their Notice of Removal, Defendants assert that this Court has jurisdiction

because a federal question exists under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations

Act (“LMRA”) of 1947 (29 U.S.C. § 185), which provides: “[s]uits for violation of

contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an

industry affecting commerce as defined in this [Act], or between any such labor

organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having

jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard

to the citizenship of the parties.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (“Section 301”).

In general, “[t]he presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed

by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only

when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded

complaint.” Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th

Cir. 2000). Thus, removal is usually not appropriate for “[a] defense of pre-emption,

even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both parties

concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue.” Caterpillar Inc, 482

U.S. at 393. “A corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule is the ‘complete

preemption’ doctrine, which applies in cases in which ‘the preemptive force of a statute is

so extraordinary that it converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating

a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.’” In re NOS Commc’ns,

MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at

393). One such statute is § 301 of the LMRA. In Curtis v. Irwin Industries, Inc., the

Ninth Circuit expressly found that § 301 was an exception to the general rule that

“federal preemption is a defense that does not authorize removal to federal court,

[because] § 301 has such ‘extraordinary pre-emptive power’ that it ‘converts an ordinary

state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-

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pleaded complaint rule.’” 913 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2019). As a result, “a civil

complaint raising claims preempted by § 301 raises a federal question that can be

removed to a federal court.” Id.

B. Analysis

Plaintiff moves to remand under the argument that removal is jurisdictionally

defective as claims arise solely under independent state statutes and complete diversity1

does not exist. (Mot. at 2). Plaintiff also requests attorneys’ fees. (Id. at 6). For the

reasons set for below, the Court disagrees. Thus, the Motion is DENIED.

1. Preemption of Plaintiff’s Overtime Claim

Plaintiff moves to remand claiming that Plaintiff’s wage and hour claims arise

directly from the protections of the California Labor Code and exist independently of a

union contract. (Id. at 5). Thus, Plaintiff alleges that his state law claims are not

preempted “where the resolution requires only a mere reference to the terms of a CBA.”

(Id.).

To determine if a claim is preempted by Section 301, the courts rely on a two-step

test. Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1152. First, the court must determine whether the asserted cause

of action involves a “right [that] exists solely as a result of the CBA.” Id. (quoting

Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007)). As to this first step

the courts ask, “[d]oes the claim seek ‘purely to vindicate a right or duty created by the

CBA itself[?]’” Id. (quoting Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 920-21 (9th

1 Defendants removed on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, not diversity jurisdiction.

(See “Notice of Removal,” Dkt. No. 1 at 2) (“Plaintiff Cameron Parker’s (‘Plaintiff’) claims

substantially depend on the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement (‘CBA’) and are

preempted under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (‘LMRA’), 29

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Cir. 2018)). If so, “then the claim is preempted, and [the] analysis ends there.” Id.

(quoting Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059).

When an asserted labor code or wage order claim is covered by an available

collective bargaining agreement exemption, such that there exists no valid underlying

state law claim, the inquiry is resolved in favor of preemption at the first step. See, e.g.,

Jones v. Sysco Ventura Inc., 2021 WL 6104193, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 1, 2021) (overtime

and meal period claims preempted where Labor Code §§ 512 and 514 exemptions

applied); see also Giles v. Canus Corp., 2022 WL 3370793, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16,

2022) (meal period claim preempted where Labor Code § 512 exemption applied).

California Labor Code Section 514 asserts, “Sections 510 and 511 do not apply to an

employee covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement if the agreement expressly

provides for the wages, hours of work, and working conditions of the employees, and if

the agreement provides premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked and a regular

hourly rate of pay for those employees of not less than 30 percent more than the state

minimum wage.” A CBA satisfies the requirements of Section 514 if it expressly

provides for “the wages, hours of work, and working conditions of the employees, and . .

. premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked and a regular hourly rate of pay for

those employees of not less than 30 percent more than the state minimum wage.” Cal.

Lab. Code § 514. The Ninth Circuit established that if plaintiffs’ CBAs meet the

requirements of Section 514, the plaintiffs’ right to overtime “exists solely as a result of

the CBA,” and therefore is preempted under Section 301. Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1154

(quoting Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg'l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir.

2016)). Section 512(a), the general meal break statute, also contains an exemption and it

is identical to that of Section 514, except that it only exempts certain types of employees

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and also requires the CBA to expressly provide for meal periods and binding arbitration

of disputes about the meal period provisions. Jones, 2021 WL 6104193, at *7.

If the claim cannot satisfy the first step, the court proceeds to the second step to

determine “whether a plaintiff’s state law right is substantially dependent on analysis of

[the CBA],” which turns on whether the claim cannot be resolved by simply “look[ing]

to” versus “interpreting” the CBA. Kobald, 832 F.3d at 1033. At this second step of the

analysis, “claims are only preempted to the extent there is an active dispute over ‘the

meaning of contract terms.’” Alaska Airlines, 898 F.3d at 921; see Allis-Chalmers Corp.

v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985) (“[W]hen resolution of a state-law claim is

substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the

parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim, or dismissed

as preempted by federal labor-contract law”) (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, a

state law claim may avoid preemption if it does not raise questions about the scope,

meaning or application of the CBA. Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1153.

Here, Defendants assert that Section 301 preempts Plaintiff’s overtime and rest

period claims, and thus this Court has original jurisdiction, because the Complaint

includes claims that can only be brought as contractual claims under a CBA due to

express CBA exemptions in the California Labor Code. (See generally Opp’n.).

Pursuant to the first step in the Curtis analysis, claims that fall within these exemptions

“convert” into federal claims because the state laws underlying the claims, as pled, do not

apply. Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1152. Plaintiff’s overtime claim is preempted by Section 301

pursuant to step one of the Curtis analysis because Plaintiff’s overtime claim is covered

by the exemption Section 514 because the relevant CBA meets the requirements of

Section 514. (See generally Taylor Decl., Ex. C). Specifically, the relevant CBA

provides for: the wages, hours of work and working conditions of employees (Taylor

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Decl., Ex. C, at 1, 29, 56), the premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked (id. at

29) and the regular hourly rate of pay for covered employees was greater than 30% above

the state minimum wage (see id. at 56) (Plaintiff’s hourly rate of $24.32 was greater than

30% of the then-state minimum wage rate of $16.50).

Other courts have agreed with this position. For example, in Hussein v. Marin

Gen. Hosp., No. 24-CV-06296-KAW, 2025 WL 56416, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2025),

the court found that the relevant CBA satisfied Section 514’s requirements and thus held

that the court had federal question jurisdiction over the overtime claim as plaintiff’s right

to overtime existed as a result of the relevant CBA. See Campos v. Green Diamond Res.

Co., No. 25-CV-00663-AMO, 2025 WL 1518319, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 28, 2025)

(“Because the CBA meets the requirements of Section 514, Campos’s right to overtime

exists solely as a result of the CBA and is thus preempted under Section 301.”); Clee v.

Benson Industries, Inc., Case No. 2:24-cv-01529-DAD-AC, 2024 WL 4462337, at *4

(E.D. Cal. Sep. 30, 2024) (“When the requirements of § 514 are satisfied by a CBA, the

right to overtime compensation exists solely as a result of the CBA and is preempted

under § 301.”).

Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ argument on two separate grounds. First, Plaintiff

contends that the CBA that Defendants rely on is inadmissible evidence as it was

provided within a declaration of Defendant Providence Health & Services’ Chief Human

Resources Officer who allegedly lacks the requisite personal knowledge. (Reply at 6).

Plaintiff also fails to cite any authority to support his argument.

The Court finds this argument unpersuasive for multiple reasons. First, parties

may submit evidence outside of the complaint, such as declarations, to establish

jurisdictional facts. See Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding

that defendants challenging plaintiffs’ jurisdictional allegations may introduce evidence

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outside the pleadings). “The CBAs are also properly considered not to be in reasonable

dispute under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) because they ‘can be accurately and

readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.’”

Marquez v. Toll Glob. Forwarding (USA) Inc., No. 218CV03054ODWASX, 2018 WL

3218102, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)).

Second, the Court concludes that the Chief Human Resources Officer is a

competent corporate representative to authenticate and submit the CBA in connection

with the pending motion.

Plaintiff also refutes the preemption of the overtime claim because “Defendants

have not provided a detailed analysis showing that the specific wage schedules applicable

to Plaintiff meet this threshold.” (Reply at 6). The Court disagrees on this score as well.

Plaintiff does not cite any authority to support this argument that Defendants had to

provide a detailed analysis. In addition to Defendants’ presentment of the CBA (Taylor

Decl., Ex. C at 56) that demonstrated that Plaintiff’s wages were greater than 30% of the

then-state minimum wage rate, Plaintiff presents his regular hourly rate of pay in the

Complaint (Compl. ¶ 20), which also supports Defendants’ position.

“[T]o ignore statutory exemptions like section 514 would encourage the type of

‘artful pleading’ that the Ninth Circuit discourages.” Padilla v. Ames Constr., Inc., No.

2:25-CV-03522-AH (ASX), 2025 WL 1738656, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2025); see

Young v. Anthony’s Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 1987) (encouraging

courts to “look[ ] beyond the face of the complaint to determine whether the contract

claim [is] in fact a § 301 claim for breach of a collective bargaining agreement ‘artfully

pleaded’ to avoid federal jurisdiction.”). Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s

overtime claim is preempted under § 301.

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2. Preemption of Plaintiff’s Rest Period Claim

Further, Plaintiff’s rest period claim is preempted by Section 301 pursuant to the

second step of the preemptive analysis because it requires interpretation of the relevant

CBA. If the claim cannot satisfy the first step of the preemption analysis, the court

proceeds to the second step to determine “whether a plaintiff’s state law right is

substantially dependent on analysis of [the CBA],” which turns on whether the claim

cannot be resolved by simply “look[ing] to” versus “interpreting” the CBA. Kobald, 832

F.3d at 1033. Here, the rest break provision of the CBA “permit[s]” employees to “have

the opportunity to relax during their work shift.” (Taylor Decl., Ex. C at 30). The court

in Marquez v. Toll Glob. Forwarding (USA) Inc., No. 218CV03054ODWASX, 2018 WL

3218102, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2018), found, while analyzing a similar provision, that

“it is not entirely clear what it means to ‘permit’ an employee to take a break.” Likewise,

it is not entirely clear what it means to “have the opportunity to relax” (Taylor Decl., Ex.

C at 30) during a work shift.

Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges Defendants scheduled him in a way that failed to

reasonably ensure he could take rest breaks during his shift. (Compl. ¶ 150). In

Marquez, the court relied on materially similar allegations in concluding that the relevant

CBA provision satisfied the second step of the preemption analysis. 2018 WL 3218102,

at *3. The Court finds that reasoning persuasive here as well. Therefore, adjudication of

this claim will require analysis of Defendants’ scheduling policies, combined with

analysis of what it means under the CBA to “permit” an employee to take a break.

Indeed, “[t]he question will hinge on how Defendants’ policies prevented employees

from taking the breaks he was permitted.” Marquez, 2018 WL 3218102, at *3.

Addressing Plaintiff’s rest break claim will require more than merely applying the terms

of the CBA because it will require interpretation, “and the parties will likely dispute the

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meaning of these terms.” Id. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s rest period claim

is also preempted under § 301. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)

(“extraordinary pre-emptive power” of Section 301 “converts an ordinary state common

law complaint into one stating a federal claim”).

3. Plaintiff’s Derivative Claims

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claims of (i) failure to pay wages due upon

termination, (ii) failure to issue accurate and itemized wage statements and (iii) unlawful

business practices are derivative of Plaintiff’s overtime and rest period claims, and thus,

should be preempted. (Opp’n. at 17-18). The courts have concluded that derivative

claims are preempted where the underlying claims were preempted by the LMRA. See,

e.g., Giles, 2022 WL 3370793 at *6 (finding derivative claims for wage statement

violations, waiting-time penalties and UCL violations were preempted where underlying

minimum wage, overtime, and meal period claims were preempted by the LMRA);

Vasquez v. Packaging Corp. of Am., Case No. 19-cv-1935 PSG (PLAx), 2019 WL

4543106, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2019) (finding, where an overtime claim was

preempted by LMRA, remaining claims for wage statement violations, waiting-time

penalties, and UCL violations likewise were preempted “to the extent they [were]

derivative of [the] overtime claim”); Padilla, 2025 WL 1738656, at *7 (“to the extent the

underlying claims are preempted, as discussed above, the Court finds that these claims

are also preempted.”).

Here, Plaintiff’s claims of failure to pay wages due upon termination, failure to

issue accurate and itemized wage statements and unlawful business practices derive from

Plaintiff’s preempted overtime and rest period claims. For example, Plaintiff asserts his

failure to pay wages due upon termination claim by contending that Defendants failed to

compensate all due wages and all premium wage penalties associated with his rest breaks

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(Compl. ¶ 159). Plaintiff also contends, related to this same claim, that Defendants failed

to properly compensate him at the appropriate overtime rate of pay for overtime work

completed during his employment (id. ¶ 160). As for Plaintiff’s claim regarding

Defendants’ failure to issue accurate wage statements, Plaintiff alleges, “Defendants’

failure to provide or maintain an accurate record of overtime hours worked and minimum

wages earned specifically injured Plaintiff by depriving Plaintiff of all wages and

earnings earned. (Id. ¶ 165). Related to this claim, Plaintiff also asserts, “Defendants

have willfully and intentionally violated California Labor Code § 226(a) by failing to

show the total hours worked, failing to show the applicable overtime rates paid or owed,

failing to record overtime hours worked, and failing to pay overtime rates.” (Id. ¶ 166).

Finally, Plaintiff’s UCL claim relies on Defendants’ alleged failure to properly tender

Plaintiff his overtime wages and provide enough time for rest periods. (See generally

Compl.). As such, the Court finds that these claims are likewise preempted by the

LMRA as these claims are derivative of Plaintiff’s overtime and rest period claims. See

Padilla, 2025 WL 1738656, at *7 (concluding that plaintiff’s failure to pay wages due at

termination, wage statement violations and UCL claims were preempted as the

underlying overtime claim was preempted).

4. Supplemental Jurisdiction

The Court finds that it may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

claims of (i) Failure to Pay Minimum Wage and (ii) Failure to Provide Meal Periods.

“[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district

courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to

claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case

or controversy[.]” Rodriguez v. USF Reddaway Inc., 2022 WL 18012518, at *6 (E.D.

Cal. Dec. 30, 2022) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)). The Ninth Circuit held that “a district

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court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims that are brought in conjunction

with claims that are preempted by the LMRA.” Brown v. Brotman Med. Ctr., Inc., 571 F.

App’x 572, 576 (9th Cir. 2014). Thus, “the preemption of one claim is sufficient to

establish original jurisdiction over those claims and a basis for supplemental jurisdiction

as to all other claims.” Jimenez v. Young’s Mkt. Co., LLC, No. 21-CV-02410-EMC, 2021

WL 5999082, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2021). “Nonfederal claims are part of the same

‘case’ as federal claims when they derive from a common nucleus of operative fact and

are such that a plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them in one judicial

proceeding.” Kuba v. 1-A Agr. Ass’n, 387 F.3d 850, 855 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Trs. of

the Constr. Indus. & Laborers Health & Welfare v. Desert Valley Landscape & Maint.,

Inc., 333 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 2003)).

These two claims “arise from the same working conditions and relationship with

Defendant during the same period as Plaintiff’s overtime and rest period claims.” Gay v.

Pac. Steel Grp., No. 20-cv-08442-HSG, 2021 WL 2917095, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 15,

2021). As such, the Court finds Plaintiff’s remaining predicate claims derive from a

“common nucleus of operative fact” and the Court asserts supplemental jurisdiction over

the remaining claims. See Padilla, 2025 WL 1738656, at *7 (concluding that the court

could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s minimum wage claim as this

claim and plaintiff’s preempted claims “derive from a common nucleus of operative

fact”). Therefore, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these two

claims.

The Court also finds that it may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

remaining claims of Associational Disability Discrimination in Violation of FEHA,

Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Harassment in Violation of FEHA, Failure to

Accommodate, Failure to Engage in Good Faith Interactive Process, Retaliation in

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Violation of FEHA, Retaliation for Exercising CFRA Leave, Retaliation in Violation of

California Labor Code § 1102.5 and Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy.

In Bridget v. Telecare Corp., No. 219CV01224ABJCX, 2019 WL 1931740 (C.D. Cal.

May 1, 2019), the relevant complaint asserted the following causes of

action: (i) Violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t

Code § 12900, et seq., (ii) Breach of Express Oral Contract not to Terminate

Employment without Good Cause (iii) Breach of Implied-In-Fact Contract not to

Terminate Employment without Good Cause, (iv) Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and

Retention, (v) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy, (vi) Violation of

California Labor Code Section 1102.5 and (vii) Intentional Infliction of Emotional

Distress (“IIED”). The court found that two of the claims were preempted by Section

301. Id. at *3. As to the remaining claims, the court exercised supplemental jurisdiction

over these claims because these claims were brought in conjunction with claims that were

preempted by the LMRA. Id. at *4. The court stated, “[t]he Court finds that Plaintiff’s

remaining claims are within the supplemental jurisdiction of this Court.” Id.; See Brown

v. Brotman Med. Ctr., Inc., 571 F. App’x 572, 576 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A] district court

may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims that are brought in conjunction with

claims that are preempted by the LMRA.”). “Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff’s

remaining claims fall outside the scope of preemption, the Court exercises supplemental

jurisdiction.” Bridget, 2019 WL 1931740, at *4. Another court in this District supports

the position that this Court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining

claims. In Saxe v. Cast & Crew Payroll, LLC, No. CV1501872SJOVBKX, 2015 WL

4648041, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2015), the court states, “in order for this Court to have

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s non-preempted FEHA claim, the FEHA claim

must form part of the same case or controversy as the claim preempted under § 301. In

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the § 301 context, a preempted claim need only be asserted within the same complaint as

a non-preempted claim to satisfy this requirement.”

Here, these remaining claims were asserted within the same complaint as the

preempted claims and there is some overlap in operative facts. Thus the “same case or

controversy” requirement of supplemental jurisdiction has been satisfied. See Exxon

Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005) (“[i]f the court has

original jurisdiction over a single claim in the complaint, it has original jurisdiction over

a ‘civil action’ within the meaning of § 1367(a), even if the civil action over which it has

jurisdiction comprises fewer claims than were included in the complaint.”). Accordingly,

the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these remaining claims.

5. Attorneys’ Fees

Plaintiff moves for attorneys’ fees under the argument that Defendants’ removal

was unreasonable. (Mot. at 6). “Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award

attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively

reasonable basis for seeking removal. Conversely, when an objectively reasonable basis

exists, fees should be denied.” Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005).

In applying this rule, “district courts retain discretion to consider whether unusual

circumstances warrant a departure from the rule in a given case.” Id. The Court finds

that Defendants’ preemption arguments establish that Defendants had an objectively

reasonable, and ultimately meritorious, basis for removal.

In opposition, Plaintiff asserts, “[b]ecause the resolution of Plaintiff’s claims

centers on a factual inquiry into Defendants’ retaliatory motive and the specific conduct

of supervisor Aaron Flores rather than an interpretation of the . . . CBA, Defendants had

no reasonable grounds to conclude that preemption applied.” (Mot. at 6). Defendants’

Notice of Removal, however, does not challenge Plaintiff’s first eight causes of action

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pertaining to Defendants’ alleged retaliatory motive and the supervisor’s conduct. (See

generally Notice of Removal). Instead, Defendants’ notice of removal challenges

Plaintiff’s seven causes of action pertaining to wage and hour claims that this Court

found were either preempted by Section 301, establishing federal question jurisdiction, or

were derived from preempted claims, establishing supplemental jurisdiction. Thus,

Defendants did have an objectively reasonable basis for removal. The Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to

Remand in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.