Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 25-10870-DMG (Ex) Date February 25, 2026

Title Yul Gevargis v. AmGUARD Insurance Company, et al. Page 1 of 5

Present: The Honorable DOLLY M. GEE, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DEREK DAVIS NOT REPORTED

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter

Attorneys Present for Plaintiff(s) Attorneys Present for Defendant(s)

None Present None Present

Proceedings: IN CHAMBERS—ORDER RE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND [16]

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Yul Gevargis, a resident of Los Angeles County, is the named insured under a

business owner policy issued by Defendant AmGUARD Insurance Company (“AmGUARD”).

[Doc. # 1-2 at ¶ 1 (“Compl.”).] Gevargis alleges that on August 20, 2023, severe wind conditions

caused by Tropical Storm Hilary shifted debris that obstructed the roof drainage system on his

business property. Id. at ¶¶ 10–11. The obstruction caused water to pool on the flat roof and

created “hydrostatic pressure that led to roof failure.” Id. Water entered the building causing

substantial damage. Id. at ¶ 12. Repair estimates total $65,410.92, exclusive of the deductible.

Id. at ¶ 16. Gevargis notified AmGUARD of the damage. Id. at ¶ 13. AmGUARD inspected the

property and ultimately issued a letter on December 21, 2023, denying all coverage for the flat

roof and interior water damage. Id. at ¶ 19.

On August 20, 2025, Gevargis filed a Complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court

against AmGUARD alleging the following state law claims: (1) breach of written contract; (2)

breach of implied covenant of good faith; (3) declaratory relief under California Code of Civil

Procedure section 1060; (4) elder financial abuse; and (5) unfair competition. See generally

Compl. On November 13, 2025, AmGUARD removed the action to this Court, asserting diversity

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1332. [Doc. # 1 (“NOR”).] AmGUARD claims its principal

place of business is in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania and that it is incorporated under the laws of

Nebraska. Id. at ¶ 5. AmGUARD further claims that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000,

exclusive of interest and costs. Id. at ¶ 8.

On January 23, 2026, Gevargis filed a Motion to Remand, arguing that AmGUARD failed

to establish complete diversity and the requisite amount in controversy. [Doc. # 16 (“MTR”).]

The motion is fully briefed. [Doc. ## 19 (“Opp.”), 20 (“Reply”).] For the reasons set forth below,

the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s MTR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 25-10870-DMG (Ex) Date February 25, 2026

Title Yul Gevargis v. AmGUARD Insurance Company, et al. Page 2 of 5

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. section 1332, a district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action

where “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000” and there is complete

diversity of citizenship between the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Complete diversity between

the parties means that “each defendant must be a citizen of a different state from each plaintiff.”

Diaz v. Davis (In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig.), 549 F.3d 1223, 1234 (9th Cir. 2008). There

is a “strong presumption against removal jurisdiction,” and courts must reject it “if there is any

doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of

Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d

564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Luther v. Countrywide

Home Loans Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008) (any “doubt is resolved against

removability”). The party seeking removal has the burden to establish that removal is proper and

the “burden of establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction.” Marin Gen. Hosp. v. Modesto &

Empire Traction Co., 581 F.3d 941, 944 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Toumajian v. Frailey, 135 F.3d

648, 652 (9th Cir. 1998)).

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Complete Diversity

Gevargis does not dispute that he is a citizen of California. See Compl. at ¶ 1; see generally

MTR and Reply. Corporations have dual citizenship based on the entity’s state(s) of incorporation

and principal place of business. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). AmGUARD is organized under the

laws of Nebraska and has its principal place of business located in Pennsylvania. Declaration of

Andrew Dempster (“Dempster Decl.”) at ¶¶ 4–5 [Doc. # 19-1]. Instead of challenging these facts,

Gevargis argues complete diversity is defeated because AmGUARD is “licensed and does

substantial business operations in California.” MTR at 4.1

Gevargis offers no authority to support the notion that licensure and “substantial business”

are probative of corporate citizenship. Indeed, a corporation has only one principal place of

business. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93 (2010). A corporation’s principal place of

business is the “nerve center” where its “officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s

1 All page references herein are to page numbers inserted by the CM/ECF system.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 25-10870-DMG (Ex) Date February 25, 2026

Title Yul Gevargis v. AmGUARD Insurance Company, et al. Page 3 of 5

activities.” Id. at 92–93. The nerve center test is an objective inquiry that focuses on the

corporation’s “place of actual direction, control, and coordination.” Id. at 97. Here, AmGUARD

has presented sufficient evidence that its principal place of business is in Pennsylvania. See

Dempster Decl. at ¶¶ 5–7 (corporate headquarters located in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania where

all business functions, executive-level decision making, and board meetings are performed).

Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that AmGUARD has met its burden to show complete

diversity exists between the parties.

B. Amount in Controversy

If it is “unclear or ambiguous from the face of a state-court complaint whether the requisite

amount in controversy is pled,” then the removing defendant must prove, by a preponderance of

the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional amount. Guglielmino v.

McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (citing Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d

398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996)). Courts may consider the complaint, facts in the removal petition, and

“summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.”

Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

In the Complaint, Gevargis alleges he suffered repair damages “in excess of $65,410.92,

plus interest, lost rents or business income, and other consequential damages.” Compl. at ¶ 34.

Gevargis also seeks damages for emotional distress, punitive damages under California Civil Code

section 3294, and treble damages under California Civil Code section 3345. Id. at ¶¶ 39, 50, 53.

Lastly, Gevargis asserts he is entitled to attorneys’ fees under Brandt v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d

813 (1985) and California Welfare & Institutions Code section 15657.5. Id. In its Opposition,

AmGUARD points to two demand letters sent by Gevargis that includes: (1) a demand for $6,000

for the forensic engineering report; and (2) a demand for $7,500 in attorneys’ fees for work

performed as of August 13, 2025. Opp. at 4–5; Compl., Exs. 7 (demand letter dated July 7, 2025),

8 (demand letter dated August 13, 2025). AmGUARD contends that between the allegations in

the Complaint and Gevargis’ demands, the amount in controversy is a minimum of $78,910.92.

Opp. at 5.

Gevargis does not dispute that the repair costs at issue total $65,410.92. Reply at 2.

Instead, Gevargis argues that AmGUARD has not met its burden to show that the $6,000 for the

engineering report and $7,500 in attorneys’ fees are recoverable. Id. at 2–3. Gevargis’ arguments

are unavailing. The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] settlement letter is relevant evidence of the

amount in controversy if it appears to reflect a reasonable estimate of the plaintiff’s claim.” Cohn

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 25-10870-DMG (Ex) Date February 25, 2026

Title Yul Gevargis v. AmGUARD Insurance Company, et al. Page 4 of 5

v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2002). The amount in controversy includes attorneys’

fees awarded under fee-shifting statutes or contract. Fritsch v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, LLC,

899 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2018). Gevargis seeks attorneys’ fees under (1) Brandt for his

insurance bad faith claim and (2) Section 15657.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code for his

elder financial abuse claim. See Compl. at ¶¶ 39, 53. California law permits a plaintiff to recover

attorneys’ fees “[w]hen an insurer’s tortious conduct reasonably compels the insured to retain an

attorney to obtain the benefits due under a policy[.]” Brandt, 37 Cal.3d at 817. Gevargis’ demand

letter requested “$7,500 to date, subject to continuing accrual” specifically for “attorney’s fees

incurred to obtain policy benefits[.]” Compl. Ex. 8.2 Thus, AmGUARD presents sufficient

evidence that there is at least $7,500 worth of attorneys’ fees in controversy.3

Gevargis cursorily asserts AmGUARD failed to show that reimbursement for the $6,000

engineering report is legally recoverable. Reply at 3. Notably, Gevargis does not disavow the

amount claimed for the engineering report. Moreover, Gevargis cites no authority that would

prevent the Court from including the report in the amount in controversy. “The amount in

controversy is simply an estimate of the total amount in dispute, not a prospective assessment of

defendant’s liability.” Lewis v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 2010);

Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase Co., 888 F.3d 413, 414–15 (9th Cir. 2018) (amount in controversy

“encompasses all relief a court may grant on [the] complaint if the plaintiff is victorious.”). Even

if the Court assumed the engineering report was a “cost” excluded from the amount in controversy

under 28 U.S.C. section 1332(a), the amount in controversy for the repairs and Brandt fees alone

is $72,910.92. This amount does not include the “continuing accrual” of Brandt fees, attorneys’

fees under the Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5(a), or damages relating to Gevargis’

claims for emotional distress, punitive damages, and treble damages.

AmGUARD has met its burden to show that it is more likely than not that the amount in

controversy is in excess of $75,000, and thus removal was proper.

2 The language in Gevargis’ own demand letter negates his argument in Reply that “Defendant relies on a

single, lump-sum figure referenced in a pre-suit demand letter, without any showing that the amount represents fees

incurred exclusively to obtain policy benefits rather than mixed or non-recoverable attorney work.” Reply at 2–3.

Gevargis makes no argument that his own estimate was unreasonable, and the Court has no reason to believe that it

is.

3 Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5(a) also provides for “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs”

in addition to compensatory damages. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 15657.5(a).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 25-10870-DMG (Ex) Date February 25, 2026

Title Yul Gevargis v. AmGUARD Insurance Company, et al. Page 5 of 5

IV.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that it has diversity jurisdiction over this

action under 28 U.S.C. section 1332. The Court therefore DENIES Gevargis’ MTR and

VACATES the February 27, 2026 hearing.

IT IS SO ORDERED.