McBride

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

STEVEN MCBRIDE,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 3:26-cv-801-MMH-SJH

J.P. MORGAN CHASE, et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on review of Plaintiff’s Complaint for a Civil

Case (“Complaint”). Doc. 1.

I. Background

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed the Complaint against J.P. Morgan Chase

(“Chase”), Joshua Webb (“Webb”), Courtney Keller (“Keller”), and Savannah Young

(“Young”). Id. Plaintiff also sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Doc. 2.

On April 29, 2026, the court entered an Order allowing Plaintiff to proceed IFP and

staying the service-of-process provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and the service-of-

process period in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), pending further Order following review of the

Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Doc. 3.

II. Standard

The Court is obligated to review the Complaint and to dismiss it if the Court

determines the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Brown v. Hall, No. 3:23-cv-537-

BJD-LLL, 2023 WL 5069482, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 16, 2023).

A pleading stating “a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and plain

statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction …; (2) a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief

sought ….” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In addition, a party must state its claims “in numbered

paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 10(b).

In considering whether a party has sufficiently stated a claim under §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the same standards applicable under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule(s)”) apply. See Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252

(11th Cir. 2008). A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Labels and

conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” that

amount to “naked assertions” will not do. Id. Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Rule 8(a)

demands “more than an unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me

accusation.” Id. The well-pled allegations must nudge the claim “across the line from

conceivable to plausible[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Courts accept “all factual

allegations in the complaint as true” but “need not apply this rule to legal conclusions.”

Anthony v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 626 F.3d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 2010).1

Though pro se pleadings are construed liberally: (i) such liberal construction does

not permit a court “to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise

deficient pleading in order to sustain an action”; and (ii) pro se litigants must “comply

with the rules of procedure.” LaCroix v. W. Dist. of Ky, 627 F. App’x 816, 818 (11th Cir.

2015);2 Carvel v. Godley, 404 F. App’x 359, 361 (11th Cir. 2010).

III. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Applying the foregoing standard,3 Plaintiff alleges as follows:

Plaintiff was party to an arbitration case against Chase based on allegations of

fraudulent activity on Plaintiff’s checking account (“Arbitration”). Doc. 1, Statement

of Facts, at ¶¶ 2, 3–4. Keller and Young are attorneys who represented Chase in the

Arbitration. Id. at ¶ 2. On December 6, 2024, Chase offered through its attorneys to

settle the Arbitration for $3,000, which Plaintiff accepted. Id. at ¶¶ 4–4-a. The

1 “A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading

for all purposes.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); see also Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1205

(11th Cir. 2007). And “when the exhibits contradict the general and conclusory allegations of

the pleading, the exhibits govern.” Griffin Indus., 496 F.3d at 1206; see also Marquez v.

Amazon.com, Inc., 69 F.4th 1262, 1269 (11th Cir. 2023); Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1292

(11th Cir. 2009).

2 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent; however, they may be cited when

persuasive on a particular point. See United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1289-90 (11th Cir.

2000); 11th Cir. R. 36-2.

3 Given the standard of review, these may not be the actual facts, or the facts for other

purposes.

Arbitration was closed the following day. Id. at ¶ 4-b. Following some

communications about the status of the settlement, on December 18, 2024, Young

emailed Plaintiff a “revised” settlement agreement, which included a provision

conditioning payment on Plaintiff providing a W-9 tax form. Id. at ¶¶ 5–5-b.4 Plaintiff

objected to this provision, but Chase insisted on it and made clear that it would not

pay Plaintiff until he agreed to provide a W-9 form. Id. at ¶¶ 5-c–5-e, 8-b. After months

of wrangling over the W-9, Webb was retained to represent Keller and Young; Webb

reiterated that Plaintiff would not receive any settlement check until he agreed to the

W-9 provision. Id. at ¶¶ 2-a, 6–6-a.

On March 19, 2025, one week after Webb entered the picture, Chase sent the

$3,000 settlement check to Webb, who delivered it to Plaintiff on April 2, 2025. Id. at

¶¶ 6-b–6-c. Plaintiff is black; Keller, Young, and Webb are white (and Chase is

“controlled by” white persons). Id. at ¶¶ 1–1-c. The release agreement resolving the

Arbitration is attached as Exhibit “C” to the Complaint (“Agreement”). See id. at ¶ 3;

Doc. 1-1 at 10–13.5 It does not specify a time for payment but makes clear that payment

is “subject to and conditioned upon Chase’s receipt of this Release signed by [Plaintiff]

and a current, properly executed IRS W-9 form signed by” Plaintiff. Doc. 1-1 at 10.

4 Though the pleading describes the “revised” settlement agreement, it does not

describe or attach any prior draft(s) of the agreement.

5 The date Plaintiff signed the Agreement is not entirely legible from the copy attached

to the Complaint, but it appears to have been in December 2024. See Doc. 1-1 at 13.

IV. Applicable Law

Plaintiff alleges three claims: discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (“§ 1982”),

discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“§ 1981”), and retaliation under § 1981. Doc.

1 at 9–10.

To state a discrimination claim under either § 1981 or § 1982, a plaintiff must

plausibly allege, among other things, that the defendant intentionally subjected the

plaintiff to racial discrimination. See Humphrey v. United Parcel Serv., 200 F. App'x 950,

952 (11th Cir. 2006) (“For a successful claim under § 1981, [the plaintiff] was required

to demonstrate that [the defendants] intentionally discriminated against him because

of his minority status with regard to certain enumerated activities. Similarly, for a

§ 1982 claim, [he] was required to demonstrate that he was deprived of his property

interest because of an intentional act based on racial animus.” (internal citations

omitted)); see also Woods v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, No. 5:26-cv-13-JSS-PRL, 2026 WL

445041, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2026). Under § 1981, a plaintiff must also allege that

“the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in” § 1981,

which include the right “to make and enforce contracts[.]” Jimenez v. Wellstar Health

Sys., 596 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2010); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Under § 1982, a

plaintiff must also allege that the discrimination interfered with the plaintiff’s rights or

benefits connected with the ownership of his property. See Woods, 2026 WL 445041,

at *6; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1982. Thus, § 1981 and § 1982 are similar, with the former

focusing on rights to make and enforce contracts and the latter on rights related to the

ownership of property. See CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 446 (2008);

Woods, 2026 WL 445041, at *6. “To state a retaliation claim under § 1981, a plaintiff

must allege a defendant retaliated against him because the plaintiff engaged in

statutorily protected activity. As with other statutory retaliation claims, such a claim

under § 1981 requires that the protected activity involve the assertion of rights

encompassed by the statute.” Jimenez, 596 F.3d at 1311 (internal citations omitted).

V. Discussion

Even liberally construed, Plaintiff fails to plausibly state a claim for relief. His

allegations of discrimination and retaliation are wholly conclusory and insufficient.

See Jackson v. BellSouth Telecommunications, 372 F.3d 1250, 1270–74 (11th Cir. 2004);

Woods, 2026 WL 445041, at *6.

In addition, Plaintiff does not plausibly alleged any statutorily protected

conduct or interference with any contractual or property rights. Rather, as discussed,

the crux of Plaintiff’s Complaint is that the payment of settlement proceeds was

conditioned on his providing a W-9 form.6 But the Agreement Plaintiff signed and

attached to the Complaint expressly conditions the settlement payment on his

providing a W-9 form. That provision is valid and enforceable, and there is nothing

improper about insisting on its inclusion in the Agreement and/or insisting on

compliance with it as a condition to payment. See Christopher v. Santander Consumer

USA Inc., No. 3:23-cv-1608-JAH-DEB, 2025 WL 3251573, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 21,

6 It is not entirely clear whether Plaintiff takes issue with the insistence that a W-9

provision be included in the Agreement or the enforcement of that provision before payment.

Regardless, as set forth herein, his allegations are insufficient.

2025) (“Defendant’s request for Plaintiff’s W-9 tax form is not frivolous or harassing,

but instead clearly reasonable. Plaintiff is incorrect in his argument that Defendant has

violated law, or engaged in ‘bad faith and unmerited requests’ when the Defendant

requires Plaintiff to provide his W-9 tax form as a condition of settlement.”); see also

Ramos v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:15-cv-1444-VAB, 2018 WL 1368905, at *4 (D. Conn.

Mar. 16, 2018); Watson v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 13-cv-81137, 2015 WL 5011947, at

*5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 13776954

(S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2015).7

VI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint is deficient. Plaintiff will be

given an opportunity to file an amended pleading curing the deficiencies described

above, if possible.8 Plaintiff should note that an amended complaint will supersede

7 Indeed, such provisions are routine and flow from federal tax requirements—and

even where they are not expressly included in an agreement, courts may in certain

circumstances imply such a provision, see Floyd v. Saber Fitness Hegenberger, LLC, No. 24-cv-

1278-TSH, 2026 WL 523406, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2026), or find compliant a payment

made subject to backup withholding, see Escano v. Innovative Fin. Partners, LLC, No. 23-cv-277

MLG/GJF, 2024 WL 243558, at *5 (D.N.M. Jan. 23, 2024), report and recommendation

adopted, 2024 WL 943958 (D.N.M. Mar. 5, 2024); Childers v. Receivables Performance Mgmt.

LLC, No. 13-cv-697JLR, 2013 WL 1944511, at *1–3 (W.D. Wash. May 9, 2013).

8 Before preparing any amended complaint and any future filings, Plaintiff may wish

to visit the Court’s website (www.flmd.uscourts.gov). Under the tab titled “For Litigants,”

there is a section titled “Litigants without Lawyers.” In this section, there are resources

available to pro se parties, including link to a Handbook called “Guide for Proceeding Without

A Lawyer.” The Court’s website also contains links to civil forms for pro se parties, including

for asserting a complaint, at the following hyperlink:

www.flmd.uscourts.gov/forms/all/litigants-without-lawyers-forms. Plaintiff may also wish

to consider consulting with a legal aid organization that offers free services. For example, the

Jacksonville Federal Court Bar Association operates a Legal Information Program through

which pro se litigants may meet with a lawyer for free to ask general questions about

the Complaint and become the operative pleading. See Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811

F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2016). Thus, his amended complaint must be complete and

must include all related claims he wishes to pursue, as well as all facts in support and

relief sought, in a single submission. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in

compliance with this Order and all applicable rules and law, the undersigned will likely

recommend that the District Judge dismiss this case.

Accordingly, it is ordered:

1. On or before May 20, 2026, Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint in

compliance with this Order and all applicable rules and law.

2. Plaintiff's failure to do so will likely result in a recommendation that this

action be dismissed.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, on April 29, 2026.

[Z J. Horovitz

United States Magistrate Judge

Copies to:

Pro Se Plaintiff

procedures governing cases in federal court. More information about the program is available

on the Court’s website at www.flmd.uscourts.gov/legal-information-program.