Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

ARIEL CASTILLO OLIVA,

Petitioner,

v. Case No.: 2:26-cv-01172-SPC-DNF

WARDEN, ALLIGATOR

ALCATRAZ,

Respondents,

/

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are petitioner Ariel Castillo Oliva’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) and the government’s response (Doc. 5). For the below

reasons, the Court grants the petition.

Castillo Oliva is a native of Cuba who entered the United States on

November 20, 2016. He was detained at the border and placed in removal

proceedings. On March 28, 2017, an immigration judge ordered Castillo Oliva

removed to Cuba. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) released

Castillo Oliva under an order of supervision on June 29, 2017, after

unsuccessfully attempting to execute the removal order. ICE made another

unsuccessful attempt to remove Castillo Oliva to Cuba in 2019, after he was

arrested for carrying a concealed weapon. ICE released him under another

order of supervision on April 24, 2019. Castillo Oliva has complied with its

terms.

On January 12, 2026, Castillo Oliva reported to ICE for a check-in

appointment. ICE revoked his order of supervision and detained him at

Alligator Alcatraz. In February 2026, ICE took a group of noncitizens,

including Castillo Oliva, to the Mexican border and instructed them to

disembark and cross into Mexico. Castillo Oliva remained seated, and ICE

returned him to Alligator Alcatraz.

“Once a noncitizen’s order of removal becomes administratively final, the

Government ‘shall’ remove the person within 90 days.” Singh v. U.S. Attorney

Gen., 945 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)).

The government must detain the noncitizen during the 90-day removal period,

which begins when the removal order becomes administratively final. Id.

Detention may continue after the removal period, but not indefinitely.

In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held, “if removal is not

reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention

unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.” 533 U.S. 678, 700-01

(2001). If removal is not practically attainable, detention no longer serves its

statutory purpose of “assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.”

Id. at 699. The Court found it unlikely Congress “believed that all reasonably

foreseeably removals could be accomplished in [90 days].” Id at 701. So, “for

the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts,” it established a

“presumptively reasonable period of detention” of six months—the 90-day

removal period plus an additional 90 days. Id. Courts use a burden-shifting

framework to judge the constitutionality of additional post-removal detention:

After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe

that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence

sufficient to rebut the showing.

Id.

The government argues Castillo Oliva’s petition is premature because

his current detention has not exceeded 180 days. They assume a six-month

presumptively reasonable period of detention starts each time a noncitizen is

detained. That assumption is inconsistent with Zadvydas. It would effectively

allow DHS to detain noncitizens indefinitely and avoid judicial scrutiny by

releasing and re-detaining them every 180 days. As the Eleventh Circuit

recognized, “[t]he Supreme Court’s stated rationale for establishing a

presumptively reasonable ‘6-month period’ for detention pending removal

supports our conclusion that this period commences at the beginning of the

removal period.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 n.3 (11th Cir.

2002).

Because the six-month period for presumptively reasonable detention

has expired, Zadvydas’s burden-shifting framework applies. Castillo Oliva has

carried his initial burden by showing a good reason to believe there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. ICE was

unable to remove him to Cuba in 2017 and 2019, and there is no change in

circumstances that makes removal more likely now

The burden thus shifts to the government. ICE points to its February

2026 attempt to send Castillo Oliva to Mexico. But the evidence before the

Court suggests that was an informal effort to compel voluntary departure, not

an above-board removal attempt that complied with statutory and

constitutional requirements. See Andriasian v. Immigr. and Naturalization

Servs., 180 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Failing to notify individuals who

are subject to deportation that they have the right to apply for asylum in the

United States and for withholding of deportation to the country to which they

will be deported violates both INS regulations and the constitutional right to

due process.”); see also D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, --- F. Supp.

3d ---, 2026 WL 521557 (D. Mass. Feb. 25, 2026) (setting aside DHS’s current

third-country removal policy because it violates noncitizens’ right to seek fear-

based relief under the Convention Against Torture). ICE makes no attempt to

show it can lawfully remove Castillo Oliva in the reasonably foreseeable future.

The Court finds no significant likelihood Castillo Oliva will be removed

in the reasonably foreseeable future. He is entitled to release from detention

under Zadvydas. If removal becomes likely in the reasonably foreseeable

future, ICE can detain Castillo Oliva to “assur[e] [his] presence at the moment

of removal.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 680.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

Ariel Castillo Oliva Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is

GRANTED.

1. The respondent shall release Castillo Oliva within 24 hours of this

Order and provide him telephone access so he can arrange his

transportation from the facility.

2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions and

deadlines, enter judgment, and close this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on April 28, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTMP-1

Copies: All Parties of Record