Opinion

RUSNAK

Court: District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
Filed: Jun 8, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 41.3%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

_________________________________________

BENJAMIN J. RUSNAK and :

ASHLEY N. RUSNAK, in their own right, :

C.R., a Minor, by and through his parents, :

Plaintiffs, :

v. : No. 5:25-cv-6354

WILSON SCHOOL DISTRICT, :

Defendant. :

_________________________________________

O P I N I O N

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, ECF No. 10 – Granted

Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. June 8, 2026

United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Benjamin and Ashley Rusnak bring the present action against the Wilson

School District on behalf of themselves and their son, C.R. Plaintiffs allege that the District

permitted its teachers to harass C.R. because his grandmother was running for school board as a

conservative candidate. Plaintiffs also allege that C.R. was subject to unnecessary discipline.

Plaintiffs, pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, allege violations of the First Amendment, the

Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States

Constitution. The District brings the present Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.

For the following reasons, the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended

Complaint.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

This case arises out of a series of incidents occurring at Wilson West Middle School

(“West”). See Am. Compl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 9. The now-17-year-old plaintiff, C.R., was a student at

West at the time. See id. In Fall 2022, C.R.’s grandmother, who is now deceased, “declared her

intent” to run for a seat on the Wilson School District School Board. Id. ¶ 8. C.R.’s grandmother

filed papers to begin her candidacy in early 2023. See id. ¶ 9. She espoused “conservative-

leaning” political views. Id. ¶ 11.

Also in Fall 2022, C.R.’s father, Benjamin Rusnak, received a telephone call from West’s

School Resource Officer (“the SRO”). See id. ¶ 13.1 The SRO told Mr. Rusnak that there had

been vandalism with “some racist connotations” at the school, and C.R. was the alleged

perpetrator. Id. (“the vandalism incident”). After speaking with C.R., Mr. Rusnak contacted the

SRO, who told Mr. Rusnak that there were cameras which captured C.R. in the “area” of the

vandalism, “but there was no definitive nexus between C.R. and the alleged vandalism.” Id. ¶¶

14–15. Nothing happened further. See id. ¶ 16.

In January 2023, Mr. Rusnak received a phone call from West’s Vice Principal, Steve

Rhoads, regarding allegedly sexual photographs of a female student on C.R.’s cell phone. See id.

¶ 17 (“the phone incident”). Vice Principal Rhoads told Mr. Rusnak that C.R.’s phone “had been

confiscated.” Id. ¶ 18. Mr. Rusnak picked up C.R., who said that he was involved in a group chat

where the female student sent the photograph, and a photograph of C.R. “was distributed” to the

chat.2 Id. ¶¶ 20–21. C.R. told Mr. Rusnak that he asked the SRO, who was also present for the

1 The SRO was a police officer with the Sinking Spring Police Department. See id.

2 It is unclear who sent the photograph of C.R. to the group chat.

questioning, to let him speak to his father (Mr. Rusnak), but the SRO refused. See id. ¶ 22. C.R.

told Mr. Rusnak that “he was forced to surrender his cell phone along with all passwords to the

cell phone.” Id. ¶ 23. The next day, Mr. Rusnak confronted Vice Principal Rhoads about the

seizure of the phone and password sheet and why the SRO denied C.R.’s request to call Mr.

Rusnak. See id. ¶ 24. The SRO told Mr. Rusnak “that the cell phone was being sent for

evaluation” and that he could not return either the cell phone or the password sheet. Id. ¶¶ 27–29.

The SRO told Mr. Rusnak that West “operated under different rules that allowed school officials

to question C.R. without parental consent or attendance.” Id. ¶ 32. Later that day, “[Mr. Rusnak]

received a phone call from the SRO informing him that no one involved wanted to press charges

and telling Mr. Rusnak that he could stop by the school and pick up the cell phone.” Id. ¶ 33. Mr.

Rusnak picked up the cell phone and password sheet the next day. See id. ¶ 34. “Following these

incidents and during this time, C.R. began to exhibit a noticeable change in behavior and

struggling with his mental health.” Id. ¶ 36.

C.R. attended alternative school at KidsPeace for two weeks in February 2023 and

returned to West in March 2023. See id. ¶¶ 37–40. Upon his return to West, C.R. alleged that two

teachers—Michelle Simotas and Paula Wenger—made “harassing” comments to him in the

hallways during breaks between classes. Id. ¶ 41 (collectively, “the teasing incidents”). These

comments referenced C.R.’s grandmother, Mr. Rusnak, and Mrs. Rusnak, and included

comments that the teachers would contact them regarding C.R.’s behavior. See id. ¶ 42.

Additionally, Mr. Rusnak found that the teachers were members of an online group that made

negative comments about C.R.’s grandmother and other school board candidates. See id. ¶¶ 44–

45. Mr. Rusnak emailed the District superintendent on March 4, 2023, West’s principal, and

West’s guidance counselor about the comments. See id. ¶ 47. “The email mentioned that [Mr.

Rusnak] was aware of certain teachers making disclosures and comments on social media sites,

and that multiple teachers had made [negative] comments regarding the candidacy of [C.R.’s

grandmother] and that he felt it inappropriate for any school staff to discuss political matters with

students.” Id. ¶ 48. Mr. Rusnak never received a response from any of the District personnel. See

id. ¶ 49.

On April 18, 2023, Ms. Simotas emailed Mr. Rusnak and told him that C.R. exhibited

behavioral issues in class. See id. ¶ 50. C.R. told his grandmother that Ms. Simotas “harassed and

heckled” him at the local Wawa store after school. See id. ¶ 52. Mr. Rusnak sent another email to

the same District officials as before, addressing the “comments and the direct [emotionally

distressing] effect that the comments were having on C.R.” See id. ¶ 55. Although Mr. Rusnak

requested that the District remove C.R. from Ms. Simotas’ Spanish class, and West initially

complied, two weeks later, Mr. Rusnak learned “that C.R. was back in Ms. Simotas’ Spanish

class.” Id. ¶¶ 56–59. Mrs. Rusnak also “attempted to call West to get answers to the concerns

raised in Mr. Rusnak’s email but likewise received no response.” See id. ¶ 58. Mr. and Mrs.

Rusnak transferred C.R. to Berks Catholic High School for the 2023-24 school year. See id. ¶ 60.

C.R.’s school records for the 2022-23 school year did not mention “the problems or allegations

experienced throughout the year.” Id. ¶ 62.

1. Plaintiffs’ Allegations

In Plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation and viewpoint discrimination claim, they allege

that “District personnel repeatedly referenced, reacted to, and harbored hostility toward political

viewpoints expressed by C.R.’s grandmother,” and “attributed these viewpoints to [C.R.], despite

his status as a minor whose views were neither expressed nor demonstrated to be at issue.” Id. ¶

67. Plaintiffs contend that the District’s employees singled out C.R. because of his grandmother’s

campaign, including “heightened scrutiny, accusatory interactions, public confrontations, verbal

admonitions, disproportionate disciplinary interest, insinuations of wrongdoing, and ongoing

monitoring not imposed upon similarly situated students” as a result of his grandmother’s

conduct. Id. ¶¶ 68–73. “District employees subjectively disapproved of, disagreed with, or took

offense to political positions publicly associated with C.R.’s grandmother and imputed such

positions to C.R.” Id. ¶ 69. Plaintiffs allege that “District personnel deliberately linked their

negative treatment of C.R. to political viewpoints, thereby engaging in unconstitutional

viewpoint-based discrimination;,]” which “is presumptively invalid and violates clearly

established constitutional protections.” Id. ¶ 71.

In Plaintiffs’ claim for unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment,

they allege that “District personnel seized C.R.’s personal cell phone, compelled him to unlock it,

demanded access to private content, reviewed unrelated digital material, and denied his repeated

requests to contact a parent during the process.” Id. ¶ 79. Plaintiffs allege that District staff

“lacked individualized, articulable facts establishing reasonable suspicion that C.R.’s phone

contained evidence of wrongdoing,” and the search “was far broader in scope than

constitutionally permissible.” Id. ¶¶ 80–81. Plaintiffs assert that “District personnel reviewed

digital content not tied to any allegation, opened private files, and accessed personal information

without limitations.” Id. ¶ 82.

Regarding Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment coercive interrogation claim, Plaintiffs contend

that C.R. “was summoned to an administrative office, isolated from peers, confronted by

multiple adults, and questioned without parental presence,” which “was inherently coercive.” Id.

¶ 91. Plaintiffs allege that District officials, including Vice Principal Rhoads and the SRO,

questioned C.R. about the phone incident until C.R. “was forced to surrender his cell phone

along with all passwords to his cell phone.” Id. ¶¶ 17–23. Plaintiffs maintain that the SRO’s

“involvement amplified the custodial nature of the interrogation” and “signaled that the

interrogation had law-enforcement implications, causing C.R. to feel he had no choice but to

comply.” Id. ¶ 92. Plaintiffs also allege that “District personnel denied C.R.’s request to contact a

parent, which is a pivotal factor in assessing the coerciveness of a minor interrogation,” and

“engaged in accusatory, leading, and pressure-laden questioning.” See id. ¶¶ 93–94.

Also, Plaintiffs bring a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim under both the

“class of one” theory. Under the “class of one” theory, Plaintiffs allege that “C.R. was

intentionally singled out for harsher treatment than other students who engaged in comparable or

lesser conduct.” Id. ¶ 100. Furthermore, Plaintiffs contend that the “District imposed scrutiny,

discipline threats, interrogation, and searches uniquely upon C.R.” and “District personnel did

not subject any similarly situated students to comparable treatment. Other students engaged in

similar or substantially greater conduct were not searched, interrogated, or monitored with the

same intensity.” Id. ¶¶ 100–01. Plaintiffs argue that the alleged disparate treatment “stemmed

from hostility toward political views attributed to C.R.’s grandmother.” Id. ¶ 102. Allegedly,

“District personnel treated C.R. as a stand-in for viewpoints they disfavored, creating an

illegitimate basis for punitive treatment.” Id. ¶ 103.

With regard to the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim based upon the

state-created danger exception, Plaintiffs allege that “District personnel affirmatively created and

increased the risk of emotional and psychological harm to C.R. by repeatedly isolating him,

interrogating him, searching his devices, and publicly identifying him as a disciplinary concern

without cause.” Id. ¶ 108. Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he District knew or reasonably should have

known that repeated targeting, coercive questioning, and aggressive treatment of a minor would

cause foreseeable harm[,]” yet the “District personnel continued the conduct,”3 and “shock[ed

]the conscience.” Id. ¶ 109–11. C.R. “suffered damages including anxiety, humiliation, fear of

returning to school, and measurable emotional harm.” Id. ¶ 112.

In support of a Monell claim, Plaintiffs allege that the District had a custom of targeting

students based on political viewpoints, see id. ¶ 115 and likewise failed to train its employees or

adopt a policy to prevent such targeting. See id. ¶¶ 116–17.

Finally, Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief “to ensure that the District adopts

policies prohibiting viewpoint-based retaliation, ensures constitutionally compliant interrogation

practices, implements proper digital search protocols, and trains staff consistent with the

requirements of the United States Constitution.” Id. ¶¶ 123–25.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed the Amended Complaint on November 17, 2025. See Am. Compl., ECF

No. 9. All counts relate to Mr. and Mrs. Rusnak individually and on behalf of C.R. See id. Count

I is a First Amendment retaliation and viewpoint discrimination claim. Count II is a Fourth

Amendment claim based upon an unreasonable search and seizure. Count III is a Fifth

Amendment claim based upon coercive interrogation. Count IV is a Fourteenth Amendment

claim based upon equal protection claim. Count V is a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due

process claim based upon the state-created danger exception. Count VI is a Monell claim for

policy, custom, and failure to train and supervise. Count VII seeks declaratory and injunctive

relief.

3 It is unclear what exact conduct is at issue. Ostensibly, it appears to be the phone incident

and the teasing incidents. The Court considers both incidents in the substantive due process

claim based upon the state-created danger exception.

The District filed the present Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint on December 1,

2025. See Mot., ECF No. 10. The District raised the following concerns: (1) Plaintiffs fail to state

a First Amendment retaliation claim for failure to plead any action that would deter C.R.’s

grandmother from running for office, as well as for lack of adverse action or causation; (2) the

school’s search and seizure of C.R.’s phone was justified and reasonable; (3) “there is no clearly

established federal constitutional right for a parent to be present during school or even police

questioning of a minor on school grounds”; (4) Plaintiffs failed to allege incidents involving

similarly situated students, nor any other equal protection allegations; (5) Plaintiffs fail to state a

state-created danger claim by failing to allege an affirmative act. Id.

Plaintiffs filed their Response in Opposition on December 15, 2025. See Resp., ECF No.

11. The District filed its Reply on December 22, 2025. See Reply, ECF No. 12.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss – Review of Applicable Law

In rendering a decision on a motion to dismiss, this Court must “accept all factual

allegations as true [and] construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”

Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche

Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Only if

“the ‘[f]actual allegations ... raise a right to relief above the speculative level’” has the plaintiff

stated a plausible claim. Id. at 234 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 540, 555

(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true

all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id.

(explaining that determining “whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief ... [is] a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense”). “[I]n light of Twombly, Rule 8(a)(2) requires a ‘showing’ rather than a blanket

assertion of an entitlement to relief. We caution that without some factual allegation in the

complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the requirement that he or she provide not only ‘fair notice,’

but also the ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555 n.3). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (requiring the complaint to contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). “In deciding a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint,

matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims

are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). Also, “a

document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered.” In re

Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotations

omitted).

The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a plaintiff has failed to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005)

(citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).

B. Section 1983 – Review of Applicable Law

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be

brought in federal court. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a

right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.

42, 48 (1988).

C. Monell – Review of Applicable Law

“Local governing bodies ... may be sued where ‘the action that is alleged to be

unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision

officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers.’” Lebie v. Borough, No. 13-6819,

2014 WL 2085518, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 2014) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 690 (1978)). “Liability is imposed when the policy or custom itself violates the

Constitution, or where the policy or custom is the ‘moving force’ behind a constitutional

violation by an employee of the local body.” Id. (citing Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d

1017, 1027 (3d Cir. 1991)).

“A policy is made ‘when a decisionmaker possessing final authority to establish

municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.’” Id.

(quoting Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)). “A custom may exist

when, ‘though not authorized by law, such practices of state officials are so permanent and well

settled that they operate as law.’” Id. (quoting Regan v. Upper Darby Twp., 363 F. App’x 917,

923 (3d Cir. 2010)). “Custom requires proof of knowledge and acquiescence by the

decisionmaker.” Robinson v. City of Phila., No. 15-1574, 2015 WL 5965003, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct.

13, 2015) (quoting McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 657 (3d Cir. 2009)).

“It is incumbent upon a plaintiff to show that a policymaker is responsible either for the

policy or, through acquiescence, for the custom.” Id. (quoting Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1481); see

also id. (concluding Third Circuit case law “unequivocally imposes on [p]laintiff an ‘obligation

to plead in some fashion that [a natural person] had final policy making authority, as that is a key

element of a Monell claim’” (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 135 n.11 (3d

Cir. 2010))).

In limited circumstances, a local government’s decision not to train certain employees

about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights may rise to the level of an official

government policy for purposes of Section 1983. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61

(2011) (recognizing that a pattern of violations is generally necessary to demonstrate deliberate

indifference in failure to train claims); see also Bd. of Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520

U.S. 397, 409 (1997). Failing to train municipal employees can also be a source of liability, but

only where “the failure amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of persons with whom

those employees will come into contact.” Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d

Cir. 2014). A municipality's culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a

claim turns on a failure to train. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 822–823 (1985)

(plurality opinion) (“[A] ‘policy’ of ‘inadequate training’” is “far more nebulous, and a good deal

further removed from the constitutional violation, than was the policy in Monell”). The plaintiff

must show that “the deficiency in training actually caused the [injury].” City of Canton v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989). To prove that a municipality's failure to train or supervise amounts to

deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must show that “(1) municipal policymakers know that

employees will confront a particular situation; (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a

history of employees mishandling; and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently

cause deprivation of constitutional rights.” Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir.

1999).

D. First Amendment Retaliation – Review of Applicable Law

“Retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights is itself a violation of

rights secured by the Constitution actionable under section 1983.” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d

103, 111–12 (3d Cir. 1990).

In order to set forth a cognizable claim for First Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff

must allege that ‘(1) he engaged in a constitutionally protected activity; (2) he

suffered, at the hands of a state actor, adverse action sufficient to deter a person of

ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) the protected

activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the state actor’s decision to take

adverse action.’

Washington v. Barnhart, No. 17-00070, 2020 WL 2425797, at *6 (W.D. Pa. April 20, 2020)

(quoting Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2015)). “Further, to establish the critical

element of causation, a plaintiff usually must allege ‘either (1) an unusually suggestive temporal

proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of

antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal link.’” Barnhart, 2020 2020 WL 2425797,

at *6 (quoting Lauren W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007)).

In Heffernan v. City of Paterson, the Supreme Court held that a defendant may be liable

for retaliation under the First Amendment when the defendant takes a retaliatory action against a

plaintiff based on the defendant’s mistaken belief that the plaintiff has engaged in protected

activity. See 578 U.S. 266, 268 (2016).

E. Viewpoint Discrimination – Review of Applicable Law

Viewpoint discrimination is an “egregious form of content discrimination.” Rosenberger

v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). Rather than focusing on a subject,

it “targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers[.]” Id. “The government

must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or

perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.” Id. (citation omitted); see

also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 111–12 (2001). “[T]he test for

viewpoint discrimination is whether—within the relevant subject category—the government has

singled out a subset of messages for disfavor based on the views expressed.” Matal v. Tam, 582

U.S. 218, 248 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.

Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (“[T]he government violates the First Amendment when it

denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise

includible subject”)). Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed

unconstitutional. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–643 (1994).

“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government

may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive

or disagreeable.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). “[T]hat is viewpoint

discrimination: Giving offense is a viewpoint.” Matal, 582 U.S. at 243. The Supreme Court has

“said time and again that ‘the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because

the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.’” Id. (quoting Street v. New York, 394

U.S. 576, 592 (1969)) (additional citations omitted).

F. Fourth Amendment – Review of Applicable Law

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const.

amend. IV. A seizure occurs “when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement

through means intentionally applied.” Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596–97 (1989);

Ashton v. City of Uniontown, 459 F. App’x 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2012) (stating that a “seizure occurs

whenever a government actor terminates an individual’s ability to move freely”).

In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the United States Supreme Court recognized that “special needs”

exist in the public-school context and that “the school setting requires some easing of the

restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject ... [and] some

modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search.” 469 U.S. 325,

334 n.2, 340 (1985). The Court reasoned that requiring school officials to obtain a warrant before

searching a student “would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal

disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.” Id. The Court noted that courts must balance

“privacy interests of schoolchildren” against the “substantial need of teachers and administrators

for freedom to maintain order in the schools.” Id. at 341. The Court articulated a two-part test to

determine whether a search of a student by a public-school official is reasonable: the search (1)

must be “‘justified at its inception’” and (2) must be “‘reasonably related in scope to the

circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’” Id. at 341–42 (quoting Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1986)). With respect to the first element, a search is “‘justified at its

inception’ when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence

that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school.” Id.; see

also Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371 (2009) (“The lesser standard

for school searches could as readily be described as a moderate chance of finding evidence of

wrongdoing.”). Regarding the second element, “a search will be permissible in its scope when

the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively

intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” T.L.O., 469

U.S. at 342.

G. Fifth Amendment – Review of Applicable Law

Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona adopted a set

of prophylactic measures to safeguard the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. See

384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda warnings are not required when school officials question students

for disciplinary purposes. See K.A. ex rel. J.A. v. Abington Heights Sch. Dist., 28 F. Supp. 3d 356,

366 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Jarmon v. Batory, No. 94-284, 1994 WL 313063, at *11 (E.D. Pa. 1994)

(“Under the federal constitution, students facing disciplinary action in public schools are not

entitled to Miranda warnings.”) (citation omitted). Moreover, “a Miranda violation is remedied

by the suppression of evidence of any self-compelled incrimination, not a civil action[.]” K.A.,

28 F. Supp. 3d at 366–67. There is also no constitutional right to receive a Miranda warning. See

Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134, 150 & n.6 (2022) (holding that Miranda warnings are prophylactic

rules and do not confer substantive constitutional rights, so failure to provide them does not

violate the Fifth Amendment); see also Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 1256 (3d Cir. 1994)

(“[V]iolations of the prophylactic Miranda procedures do not amount to violations of the

Constitution itself. The right protected under the Fifth Amendment is the right not to be

compelled to be a witness against oneself in a criminal prosecution, whereas the ‘right to

counsel’ during custodial interrogation recognized in Miranda v. Arizona . . ., is merely a

procedural safeguard, and not a substantive right.”) (citations omitted).

H. State-Created Danger – Review of Applicable Law

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not impose an affirmative

duty on the state to protect its citizens from harms caused by private actors. See DeShaney v.

Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). An exception to this rule is

known as the state-created danger doctrine. See Kneipp by Cusack v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1211

(3d Cir. 1996). To assert a state-created danger claim under the Fourteenth Amendment Due

Process Clause, a plaintiff must plead:

(1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct;

(2) a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience;

(3) a relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such that the plaintiff

was a foreseeable victim of the defendant's acts, or a member of a discrete class of

persons subjected to the potential harm brought about by the state's actions, as

opposed to a member of the public in general; and

(4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her authority in a way that created a danger

to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger than had the

state not acted at all.

Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 281–82 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).

The more-specific-provision rule mentioned in relation to substantive due process claims also

applies to claims brought under the state-created-danger doctrine. See Wheeler v. City of Phila.,

367 F. Supp. 2d 737, 747 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (explaining why Graham applies to claims under the

state-created-danger theory). The Third Circuit recognizes three possible standards can be used

to determine whether state action shocked the conscience: (1) deliberate indifference; (2) gross

negligence or arbitrariness that indeed shocks the conscience; or (3) intent to cause harm. See

Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 306 (3d Cir. 2006).

I. Equal Protection Clause – Review of Applicable Law

“If the action does not involve a suspect classification, the plaintiff may establish an

equal protection claim by showing that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated

differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.” Henry v. Buskirk, No.

08-1348, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109567, at *22–23 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 26, 2011); see also Village of

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)). Under the “class of one” theory, “a plaintiff

must allege that (1) the defendant treated him differently from others similarly situated, (2) the

defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”

Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006).

IV. ANALYSIS

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights or impose obligations on government

officials but provides a cause of action by which persons may seek relief for governmental

violations of rights protected by the United States Constitution or federal law. See Albright v.

Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). Therefore, the Court must consider whether Plaintiffs suffered

any constitutional violations.

The Court finds that they did not. Plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Rusnak cannot state claims for

constitutional violations under Section 1983 in their individual capacities. Plaintiffs also fail to

allege any constitutional violations under the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Fifth

Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the Court dismisses the entire Amended

Complaint for failure to state a claim.

A. Mr. and Mrs. Rusnak’s Claims in their Individual Capacities

Plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Rusnak fail to state claims for constitutional violations in their

individual capacities. Generally, “[i]njuries to a parent resulting from violations of their child’s

constitutional rights are not sufficiently personal for purposes of the parent’s individual

standing.” Howard v. Chester Cnty. Off. of Juv. Prob. & Parole, 365 F. Supp. 3d 562, 571 (E.D.

Pa. 2019) aff’d, No. 19-1697, 2019 WL 13131142 (3d Cir. Nov. 27, 2019) (citation omitted). In

the Amended Complaint, Mr. and Mrs. Rusnak do not plead facts relating to their own injuries,

only C.R.’s injuries. Therefore, Mr. and Mrs. Rusnak fail to state individual-capacity claims for

constitutional violations. See George v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Millburn, 34 F. Supp. 3d 442,

464 (D.N.J. 2014) (finding that parents could not recover in their individual capacities for

alleged violations of their child’s equal protection rights). They are dismissed from the case in

their individual capacities.

B. First Amendment Retaliation

Plaintiffs fail to state a First Amendment retaliation claim. Initially, Plaintiffs fail to plead

the first element of a First Amendment retaliation claim: constitutionally protected activity.

Plaintiffs allege that the District retaliated against C.R. for his grandmother’s political campaign,

which the First Amendment protects. See Am. Compl. ¶ 69; see also Elliott v. Pa. Interschol. Ath.

Ass’n, 486 F. Supp. 3d 838, 851 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53

(1982)) (“[A] candidate, no less than any other person, has a First Amendment right to engage in

the discussion of public issues and vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his own election and the

election of other candidates.”). Yet, Plaintiffs fail to identify the constitutionally protected

activity that C.R. himself engaged in. The Court is unaware of any case permitting a plaintiff to

sue for First Amendment retaliation based on the constitutionally protected activity of another.

Plaintiffs cannot state a First Amendment retaliation claim because of C.R.’s grandmother’s

protected activity.

Plaintiffs contend that imputed political discrimination can be the basis of Section 1983

liability in a First Amendment retaliation claim. Yet, Heffernan is inapposite. See Heffernan, 578

U.S. at 268, 273. There, the Supreme Court held that a government official demoting an

employee because the official believed, incorrectly, that the employee had supported a particular

candidate for mayor, deprived the employee of his First Amendment rights. See id. at 268. Here,

however, there are no factual allegations showing that the District’s employees believed C.R.

held his grandmother’s beliefs. Rather, the Amended Complaint includes only conclusory

allegations that the employees “imputed such positions to C.R.” and targeted C.R. based on

“perceived political viewpoints,” see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 69, 72, 115, but conclusory allegations are

insufficient, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686 (holding that “the Federal Rules do not require courts to

credit a complaint’s conclusory statements without reference to its factual context”).

Regardless, even if there were sufficient allegations that District’s employees imputed

C.R.’s grandmother’s political beliefs to C.R., Plaintiffs nevertheless fail to plausibly plead the

other two elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim. Plaintiffs fail to plead the second

element of a First Amendment retaliation claim: adverse action. First, the teachers’ comments

alone do not present an adverse action because verbal threats generally do not constitute adverse

actions. See Chruby v. Kowaleski, 534 F. App’x 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[V]erbal threats alone

do not constitute adverse action for the purposes of establishing a prima facie retaliation

claim.”). Second, the investigations into both the phone incident and the vandalism incident are

not adverse actions because the District’s employees did not discipline C.R.4 Rather, C.R.’s

school record did not even mention any of the alleged incidents. See Am. Compl. ¶ 62. Thus, he

suffered from no adverse actions as a result of the investigations.

Ultimately, Plaintiffs fail to plead the third element of a First Amendment retaliation

claim: causation. Plaintiffs fail to allege causation between any of the alleged incidents and

C.R.’s grandmother’s campaign.

First, Plaintiffs fail to plausibly plead causation regarding the vandalism incident.

Plaintiffs appear to allege that the District’s employees investigated C.R. for the vandalism

incident because C.R.’s grandmother was running for office. Yet, Plaintiffs do not allege any

facts that District employees investigated C.R. for the vandalism incident because of his

grandmother’s campaign or her political views. Rather, the Amended Complaint only alleges that

4 The parties do not present, and the Court is unaware of, any case involving an adverse

action based upon a school investigating a student for violating school rules that does not result

in discipline of the student. But see D.C., by and through A.T. v. Pittsburgh Pub. Schs., No. 19-

12, 2022 WL 267359, at *13 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2022) (noting that school discipline, including

suspensions and detentions, was sufficient to plead adverse action in a discrimination claim).

However, in employment cases, courts have held that an investigation without discipline is not

an adverse action. See Tomaszewski v. City of Phila., 460 F. Supp. 3d 577, 600 (E.D. Pa. 2020)

(“[R]eporting an employee for internal investigation is not alone an adverse employment

action.”); see also Burton v. Pa. State Police, 990 F. Supp. 2d 478, 505 (M.D. Pa. 2014), aff'd,

612 F. App’x 124 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[A] mere investigation is not an adverse employment

[action].”).

the school investigated C.R. because he was seen in the area of the vandalism. See Am. Compl.

¶¶ 13–15. Plaintiffs thus fail to plead causation with regard to the vandalism incident.

Second, Plaintiffs fail to plausibly plead causation with regard to the phone incident.

Plaintiffs ostensibly allege that the District investigated C.R. for the phone incident based upon

disagreement with his grandmother’s campaign (and the alleged belief that C.R. shared her

views). Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts that the District personnel investigated him because of

his grandmother’s campaign. Rather, Plaintiffs themselves concede that District employees

investigated C.R. because C.R. was allegedly part of a group chat where a minor female student

allegedly sent a sexual photograph. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17–21. Plaintiffs therefore fail to plead

facts tying the investigation into the phone incident to C.R.’s grandmother’s campaign or her

political views.

Third, Plaintiffs fail to plausibly plead causation with regard to the teasing incidents.

Plaintiffs allege that the teachers only made the comments about telling C.R.’s grandmother

about his behavior because the teachers disagreed with his grandmother’s political positions and

believed that C.R. espoused the same views. Although C.R.’s teachers did mention his

grandmother when saying that they would tell his grandmother and parents about his bad

behavior, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 41–42, 52, such comments alone do not directly relate to the

grandmother’s campaign. Instead, the comments relate to C.R.’s own behavior. That the teachers

were allegedly members of an online forum that criticized conservative candidates, including

C.R.’s grandmother, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 44–45, does not distract from the fact that the Amended

Complaint only alleges that the teachers’ comments discussed C.R.’s behavior and only C.R.’s

behavior. Therefore, Plaintiffs do not plausibly plead facts tying any of the three incidents to

C.R.’s grandmother’s campaign or her political views.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ allegation that all three incidents in the same school year,

considered together, present a “pattern of antagonism,” still fails to plausibly plead causation.

DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d at 267. Although the Amended Complaint alleges three incidents occurring

in a school year, the Amended Complaint fails to tie any of the incidents to C.R.’s grandmother’s

campaign or her political views. Thus, Plaintiffs present no pattern of antagonism sufficient to

plead First Amendment retaliation.

Therefore, the Court dismisses the First Amendment retaliation claim.

C. Viewpoint Discrimination

Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for implied viewpoint discrimination. Plaintiffs contend that

District personnel attributed C.R.’s grandmother’s views to him and discriminated against him on

the basis of political viewpoint. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 71–72.

Plaintiffs provide no case law, nor does the Court find case law, supporting a viewpoint

discrimination claim based upon imputing another’s views. Plaintiffs likewise provide no factual

support for their contention that the District discriminated against C.R. on the belief that he

shared her conservative views. Plaintiffs do not “single out a subset of messages for disfavor

based on the views expressed.” Matal, U.S. at 248 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted).

Instead, Plaintiffs refer to numerous incidents (including the vandalism incident, the phone

incident, and the teasing incidents) allegedly involving C.R. and allege that those incidents

occurred because District personnel believed that C.R. was conservative, like his grandmother.

Such conclusory allegations fail to state a claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiffs fail to

allege any facts sufficient to support a viewpoint discrimination claim.

The Court dismisses Count I.

D. Unreasonable Search and Seizure

Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth

Amendment. Plaintiffs allege that the District did not have reasonable suspicion that C.R.’s cell

phone contained evidence of wrongdoing to seize the phone and search it. However, Plaintiffs

concede that the District was investigating “allegedly sexual photographs of a [minor] female

student on C.R.’s cellular phone,” Am. Compl. ¶ 17, the seriousness of which is balanced against

C.R.’s expectation of privacy. See TLO, 469 U.S. at 341. Here, the seizure of the cell phone and

subsequent search of the cell phone, based upon the allegedly explicit photographs of a minor

student, was reasonable. See Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141,

148–49 (3d Cir. 2005) (concluding that it was reasonable for the school to detain the student “to

investigate the incident of sexual misconduct” given the “purpose of [the] detainment” and the

“serious nature of [the victim’s] allegations” and “determine an appropriate punishment”); see

also Piechowicz v. Lancaster Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 17-845, 2022 WL 22782841, at *15

(W.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 17-845, 2022 WL 17540648

(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2022) (dismissing a Fourth Amendment claim because the seizure of the

student plaintiff and search of his cell phone, which was limited with regard to the picture, were

reasonable based upon another student’s complaint that the plaintiff had an illicit picture on his

cell phone).

To the extent that Plaintiffs allege District personnel reviewed unrelated material on

C.R.’s phone and the search was excessive in scope, Plaintiffs provide no factual allegations

about what District staff reviewed on C.R.’s phone. With regard to Plaintiffs’ allegation that

District staff reviewed “private files” on the phone, see Am. Compl. ¶ 82, Plaintiffs do not allege

what the files contained. Without additional facts alleging how the District staff exceeded the

search of the phone beyond the explicit photograph or discussion in the group chat, Plaintiffs fail

to state a Fourth Amendment violation.

The Court dismisses Count II.

E. Coerced Interrogation

Plaintiffs fail to plead any facts that the District’s questioning of C.R. regarding the phone

incident was coercive and violated the Fifth Amendment.

Plaintiffs allege that the questioning was coercive because the SRO denied C.R.’s request

to contact his parents, yet no court within the Third Circuit has found that a child has a right to

have a parent present at a school’s questioning of a student. Rather, a court in the Eastern District

of Pennsylvania found that there is no Fifth Amendment right to “the presence of a parent or

lawyer when a student is being questioned about conduct that may violate school rules.” G.C. v.

Bristol Twp. Sch. Dist., No. 05-4800, 2006 WL 2345939, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2006) (noting

that there was no right under the Fifth Amendment to have a parent present at questioning); see

also K.A., 28 F. Supp. 3d at 364–67 (dismissing a Fifth Amendment claim where the school

never told the student that he could contact his parents); Brian A. ex rel. Arthur A. v. Stroudsburg

Area Sch. Dist., 141 F. Supp. 2d 502, 511 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (dismissing a Fifth Amendment claim

and finding that students have no right to receive a Miranda warning when being questioned by

school officials for disciplinary infractions).

Plaintiffs also fail to plead how the District staff’s questioning in an “inherently coercive”

environment violated C.R.’s Fifth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs contend that the environment of

the questioning was coercive and that District staff asked “accusatory” questions which

intimidated C.R. and forced him to comply. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 91–94. The Fifth Amendment

provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against

himself[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V. Generally, Fifth Amendment claims relate to one being

coerced into providing a statement, but Plaintiffs do not plead whether C.R. confessed to

anything during the questioning. 5 Plaintiffs have cited no case law, nor can the Court find case

law, supporting a Fifth Amendment claim for a coercive environment alone. In sum, Plaintiffs

fail to plead whether an “inherently coercive” environment alone violates the Fifth Amendment,

how the questioning was coercive, and whether it resulted in a confession. Plaintiffs thus fail to

state a Fifth Amendment violation.

The Court dismisses Count III.

F. Equal Protection: Class of One

Plaintiffs fail to state an equal protection claim under the “class of one” theory because

Plaintiffs fail to identify any similarly situated West students who faced similar treatment as C.R.

To state an equal protection class of one claim, courts have required plaintiffs to identify specific

instances where similarly situated individuals were treated differently. Here, Plaintiffs do not

plead whether the District’s employees investigated other students for the vandalism incident,

whether the District’s employees questioned the other members of the group chat regarding the

phone incident, or whether the teachers teased other students. In addition to failing to identify

any other students, Plaintiffs do not specify how the District treated C.R. differently from any

other students. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 243 (“[T]o state a claim for class of one equal protection,

a plaintiff must at a minimum allege that he was intentionally treated differently from others

similarly situated by the defendant and that there was no rational basis for such treatment.”)

(citation omitted); Hill, 455 F.3d at 239 (affirming dismissal of a complaint pursuing a “class of

5 Plaintiffs cannot bring a Fifth Amendment claim under Section 1983 for the District

staff’s failure to provide C.R. with a Miranda warning during his questioning because there is no

constitutional right to receive a Miranda warning. See Vega, 597 U.S. at 150.

one” equal protection claim because the plaintiff failed to “allege the existence of similarly

situated individuals,” and the only allegedly similarly situated coworker faced the same

treatment as the plaintiff). Consequently, Plaintiffs fail to state an equal protection claim under

the “class of one” theory.

The Court dismisses Count IV.

G. Substantive Due Process – State-Created Danger

Plaintiffs fail to state a state-created danger claim.

Initially, Plaintiffs fail to plead that C.R. suffered the requisite harm sufficient to state a

state-created danger claim. Plaintiffs maintain that C.R. suffered emotional distress, including

anxiety and humiliation, but the Amended Complaint contains no allegations that he suffered

physical harm as a result of the questioning in the phone incident and the teasing incidents.

“[M]ental or emotional distress alone” (without physical manifestation of symptoms) “is

insufficient to constitute the requisite harm needed to state a state-created danger claim.” Carey

v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 410 F. App’x 479, 483 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the plaintiff’s alleged

anxiety did “not rise to the level of foreseeable and fairly direct harm,” and “the emotional

distress alleged by [the plaintiff] is not a cognizable harm”); see also Moore v. Solanco Sch.

Dist., 471 F. Supp. 3d 640, 667 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (dismissing a state-created danger claim for

failing to plead physical harm).

The Court also notes that the District’s two alleged acts do not shock the conscience.

First, in alleging that the District personnel questioned C.R. about the phone incident, Plaintiffs

fail to plead any facts about District staff’s conduct during the questioning, much less how such

conduct shocks the conscience. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998); see

also Sanford, 456 F.3d at 311 (holding that a school guidance counselor’s failure to contact the

school psychologist or the student’s parents after a student wrote a note implying that he may die

by suicide, and then later did so, did not shock the conscience).

Second, to the extent Plaintiffs base their state-created danger claim upon the teasing

incidents, they fail to plead conscience-shocking behavior. Rather, the teachers made comments

about how they would tell C.R.’s grandmother about his behavior. Although potentially

inappropriate, the teachers’ comments do not shock the conscience. See M.M. v.

Tredyffrin/Easttown Sch. Dist., No. 06–1966, 2006 WL 2561242, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2006)

(finding that a teacher’s regular mocking of a student’s handwriting did not shock the

conscience); Bridges ex rel. D.B. v. Scranton Sch. Dist., 66 F. Supp. 3d 570, 585 (M.D. Pa. 2014)

(noting that a teacher’s calling a student “stupid” and a “dummy” and throwing the student’s

desk on the floor did not shock the conscience); Doe v. Gooden, 214 F.3d 952, 955 (8th Cir.

2000) (holding that a teacher’s yelling and screaming at students and referring to them as

“bimbos,” “fatso,” and the “welfare bunch” did not shock the conscience); Abeyta v. Chama

Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., 77 F.3d 1253, 1255 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that a teacher’s regularly

calling a student a prostitute did not shock the conscience nor constitute a substantive due

process violation).

The Court dismisses Count V.

H. Additional Claims

Since the Court dismisses the Amended Complaint for failure to plead facts concerning

constitutional violations, Plaintiffs’ Monell claim in Count VI fails. See Bagley v. Upper Darby

Twp., No. 23-1747, 2024 WL 3678979, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2024) (“In the absence of a

constitutional violation, [the plaintiff’s] Monell claim necessarily fails.”). Additionally, many of

Plaintiffs’ allegations in their Monell claim appear deficient. The Court dismisses Count VI

without prejudice.

The Court dismisses Count VII with prejudice because declaratory and injunctive relief

are remedies, not independent causes of action. See Haque v. Swarthmore Coll., No. 15-1355,

2016 WL 11812329, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2016) (“A claim for injunctive relief pleads for a

remedy, but does not constitute an independent cause of action.”) (citations omitted).

I. Amendment

The Court dismisses Counts I, II, III, IV, V, and VI of the Amended Complaint without

prejudice. See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that a court should

allow amendment of a complaint unless doing so would be inequitable or futile).

However, to the extent Plaintiffs allege a constitutional violation based upon the District’s

failure to provide C.R. with a Miranda warning, such a claim is dismissed with prejudice

because it fails as a matter of law. See Vega, 597 U.S. at 150. Additionally, the Court dismisses

Mr. and Mrs. Rusnak’s individual capacity claims with prejudice because they fail as a matter of

law. See Harper v. Dinella, 589 F. App’x 67, 69 (3d Cir. 2015) (finding that allowing amendment

would be futile because the claims failed as a matter of law).

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the District’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended

Complaint is granted, and Counts I, II, III, IV, V, and VI of the Amended Complaint are

dismissed without prejudice. To the extent Count III is based upon a Miranda violation, it is

dismissed with prejudice. Count VII of the Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice

because it fails as a matter of law. All claims by Plaintiffs Benjamin and Ashley Rusnak in their

individual capacities are dismissed with prejudice.

A separate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.

JOSEPH F. LEESON, JR.

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.