The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:25-cv-10157-JLS-SSC Date: February 23, 2026
Title: Luis Hernandez v. Pacific Bell Telephone Company et al
Present: Honorable JOSEPHINE L. STATON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Kelly Davis N/A
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF: ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANT:
Not Present Not Present
PROCEEDINGS: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER (1) DENYING MOTION TO
REMAND (Doc. 17) AND (2) GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS (Doc. 15)
Before the Court are a Motion to Remand filed by Plaintiff Luis Hernandez and a
Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Pacific Bell Telephone Company. (MTR, Doc. 17;
MTD, Doc. 15.) Defendant opposed the Motion to Remand, and Plaintiff replied;
Plaintiff opposed the Motion to Dismiss, and Defendant replied. (Opp. to MTR, Doc. 19;
Reply for MTR, Doc. 23; Opp. to MTD, Doc. 20; Reply for MTD, Doc. 22.) Having
taken these matters under submission, and for the following reasons, the Court DENIES
Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 8, 2025, Plaintiff Jose Luis Hernandez filed this putative class
action in Los Angeles County Superior Court. (Ex. A to NOR, Compl., Doc. 1-1.)
Plaintiff, who has been employed by Defendant since 1999, alleges that the “action arises
out of . . . Defendants’ failure to pay their employees a fixed relief differential of ten
dollars ($10.00) a day.” (Id. ¶¶ 1, 4.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that a “contract
between [Defendant] and communications workers of America” provides as follows:
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:25-cv-10157-JLS-SSC Date: February 23, 2026
Title: Luis Hernandez v. Pacific Bell Telephone Company et al
A fixed relief differential of ten dollars ($10.00) a day will be
paid to any employee in any title who, in addition to normal
duties or in the performance of new assignment, temporarily
relieves or assists a manager for a quarter tour or more. The
assignment may involve planning, distributing, directing,
coordinating, and training responsibilities other than induction
o[r] orientation. . . .
(Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff alleges that he “has been involved in training new employees,
which can last between 2–3 years.” (Id. ¶ 11.) Thus, pursuant to this contract, “[t]he
company should be paying $10.00 per day for conducted training of new employees,” but
“Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and Class members for all earned wages.” (Id. ¶¶ 12–
13.) Thus, Plaintiff brings claims on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
defined as “[a]ll current or former employees of Defendants who worked in California
who were involved in training activities in addition to their normal duties,” for (1) failure
to pay all overtime and double time wages in violation of California Labor Code §§ 510
and 1194; (2) failure to pay all wages owed every pay period in violation of California
Labor Code § 204; (3) failure to furnish timely and accurate wage statements in violation
of California Labor Code §§ 226 and 226.3; (4) failure to pay all wages due at separation
in violation of California Labor Code § 203; and (5) violation of California’s Unfair
Competition Law (“UCL”). (See Compl.)
Defendant was served on September 23, 2025, and removed the action to federal
court on October 22, 2025, invoking this Court’s federal question subject matter
jurisdiction. (See NOR, Doc. 1.) Defendant argues that the action is “based entirely on
an alleged violation” of the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between Defendant
and the Communications Workers of America, a union representing Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 18.)
Defendant therefore contends that Plaintiff’s claims are completely preempted by Section
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:25-cv-10157-JLS-SSC Date: February 23, 2026
Title: Luis Hernandez v. Pacific Bell Telephone Company et al
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), giving rise
to federal question jurisdiction. (Id. ¶¶ 17–21.) Defendant also filed a motion to dismiss
on November 20, 2025, arguing that because Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by the
LMRA, and because Plaintiff failed to exhaust the procedures set forth in the CBA, his
claims should be dismissed. (See generally MTD.)
On November 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand, arguing that this Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the LMRA does not preempt his state law
claims. (See generally MTR.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Federal Jurisdiction Under the LMRA
Defendants may remove a case that was filed in state court to a federal court in the
same district and division if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction over
the action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441; Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
The removal statute is to be strictly construed against removal jurisdiction, and the
party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing its propriety. See, e.g., California
ex. rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). “To protect the
jurisdiction of state courts, removal jurisdiction should be strictly construed in favor of
remand.” Langston v. 20/20 Companies, Inc., 2014 WL 5335734, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct.
17, 2014) (citing Harris v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005)).
“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal.”
Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (cleaned up). “Th[is] ‘strong
presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the
burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Id. (cleaned up).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:25-cv-10157-JLS-SSC Date: February 23, 2026
Title: Luis Hernandez v. Pacific Bell Telephone Company et al
“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-
pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a
federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.”
Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. However, “there is a corollary to the well-pleaded
complaint rule under the complete preemption doctrine, applied primarily under § 301 of
the LMRA.” Stearns v. Davis Wire Corp., 2016 WL 3008167, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 23,
2016) (cleaned up).
Even when only state law claims have been pleaded, “complete pre-emption” is a
sufficient basis for removal. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393. And Section 301 of the
LMRA is a federal statute that has complete preemptive force. Id. at 393–94; see also
Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Loc. 302 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 109 F.3d
1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that Section 301 “preempts any state cause of
action based on a collective bargaining agreement or whose outcome depends on analysis
of the terms of the agreement” and “has been construed quite broadly to cover most state-
law actions that require interpretation of labor agreements”). “The Supreme Court
decided early on that in enacting this statute, Congress charged federal courts with a
mandate to fashion a body of federal common law to be used to address disputes arising
out of labor contracts.” Burnside v. Kiewit Pacific Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir.
2007) (cleaned up). “The preemptive force of section 301 is so powerful as to displace
entirely any state cause of action for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization.” Id. (cleaned up). Thus, once preempted under LMRA § 301, any
claim purportedly based on state law is “considered, from its inception, a federal claim,
and therefore arises under federal law.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393.
Courts in the Ninth Circuit use a two-step analysis to determine whether claims
are preempted under Section 301. First, the court evaluates the “‘legal character’ of the
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:25-cv-10157-JLS-SSC Date: February 23, 2026
Title: Luis Hernandez v. Pacific Bell Telephone Company et al
claim by asking whether it seeks purely to vindicate a right or duty created by the CBA
itself”—i.e., whether the CBA is “‘only source’ of the right the plaintiff seeks to
vindicate.” Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 920–21 (9th Cir. 2018) (en
banc) (cleaned up). The question is “whether the asserted cause of action involves a right
conferred upon an employee by virtue of state law, not by a CBA.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at
1059. “If the right exists solely as a result of the CBA, then the claim is preempted, and
[the] analysis ends there.” Id. “[C]laims are not simply CBA disputes by another name,
and so are not preempted under this first step, if they just refer to a CBA-defined right;
rely in part on a CBA’s terms of employment; run parallel to a CBA violation; or invite
use of the CBA as a defense.” Alaska Airlines, 898 F.3d at 921 (cleaned up). At the
same time, claims “style[d] as state law claims” can still be preempted by the LMRA.
Curtis v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 913 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2019). “Artful pleading cannot
sidestep Section 301 preemption.” Loaiza v. Kinkisharyo Int’l, LLC, 2020 WL 5913282,
at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2020).
Second, if the court determines that the claim is not grounded in a CBA, it “must
still consider whether [the claim] is nevertheless substantially dependent on analysis of a
collective-bargaining agreement.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059 (cleaned up). A state law
right is “substantially dependent” on the terms of a CBA if a court must interpret, as
opposed to merely “look to,” the collective bargaining agreement to resolve the plaintiff's
claim. Id. at 1060. In this context, “interpretation” is “construed narrowly” and a state
claim may “avoid preemption if it does not raise questions about the scope, meaning, or
application of the CBA.” Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1153. “[C]laims are only preempted to the
extent there is an active dispute over ‘the meaning of contract terms.’” Id. (quoting
Alaska Airlines, 898 F.3d at 921). If “resolving the state law claim requires a court to
refer to the CBA and apply its plain or undisputed language—for example, to discern that
none of its terms is reasonably in dispute; to identify bargained-for wage rates in
computing a penalty; or to determine whether the CBA contains a clear and unmistakable
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:25-cv-10157-JLS-SSC Date: February 23, 2026
Title: Luis Hernandez v. Pacific Bell Telephone Company et al
waiver of state law rights”—that is not enough for preemption. Alaska Airlines, 898 F.3d
at 922 (cleaned up).
When applying this two-step analysis, the Court may consider documents that are
extrinsic to the complaint. See Coria v. Recology, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 3d 1093, 1097 (N.D.
Cal. 2014) (citing Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Because
complete preemption often applies to complaints drawn to evade federal jurisdiction, a
federal court may look beyond the face of the complaint to determine whether the claims
alleged as state law causes of action in fact are necessarily federal claims.”).1
B. Motion to Dismiss
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must accept as true all
“well-pleaded factual allegations” in a complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679
(2009). Furthermore, courts must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. See Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992,
998 (9th Cir. 2010). However, “courts ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
The complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the
1 Defendant requests judicial notice of the CBA and Plaintiff does not oppose the request
or question the authenticity of the document. (RJN, Doc. 16; see Opp. to MTD (“The court may
notice the existence of the CBAs[.]”).) Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201,
the Court grants Defendant’s request and takes judicial notice of the CBA. (See Ex. A to RJN,
CBA, Doc. 16-1.)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:25-cv-10157-JLS-SSC Date: February 23, 2026
Title: Luis Hernandez v. Pacific Bell Telephone Company et al
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“Generally, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in
ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896
F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990) (cleaned up). Yet a court may consider material
which is properly submitted as part of the complaint and matters which may be judicially
noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201 without converting the motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., id.; Branch v. Tunnel, 14 F.3d
449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994).
When courts find that a complaint fails to state a claim, they are to “freely give
leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see also Eminence
Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (indicating that leave
to amend is granted with “extreme liberality”). But Rule 15’s “liberality does not apply
when amendment would be futile.” Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 968 (9th Cir.
2016). A proposed amendment is futile if “no set of facts can be proved under the
amendment that would constitute a valid claim or defense.” Abels v. JBC Legal Grp.,
P.C., 229 F.R.D. 152, 157 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
III. ANALYSIS
A. LMRA Preemption
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the California Labor Code and the UCL
by failing to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees who performed training
responsibilities the “fixed relief differential” of ten dollars per day set by the CBA. (See
generally Compl.) Plaintiff argues that, under the first Burnside step, the California
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:25-cv-10157-JLS-SSC Date: February 23, 2026
Title: Luis Hernandez v. Pacific Bell Telephone Company et al
Labor Code furnishes the independent right for Plaintiff to be paid the CBA’s “fixed
relief differential” as a wage. (MTR at 14–17; Opp. to MTD at 13–16.) Assuming
without deciding that Plaintiff is correct on this point, Plaintiff’s claim to the “fixed relief
differential” will still be “substantially dependent” on interpreting the terms of the CBA.
Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059. Thus, the Court concludes that under the second Burnside
step, Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by the LMRA.
As discussed above, the LMRA may preempt state law claims under the second
Burnside step when “litigating the state law claim . . . requires interpretation of a CBA,”
Alaska Airlines, 898 F.3d at 921—that is, where the claim is “substantially dependent” on
an analysis of the CBA, Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060. “Interpretation” is construed
narrowly in this context: for the claim to be preempted, there has to be an “active
dispute” over the meaning of the CBA’s terms. Alaska Airlines, 898 F.3d at 921–22.
Interpreting the CBA “means something more than” merely “looking to,” “considering,”
“referring to,” or “applying” the CBA. Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832
F.3d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations modified).
Citing to Kobold, Defendant argues that litigating Plaintiff’s state law claims will
require interpretation of the CBA. 832 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2016). In Kobold, the
plaintiff was a nurse whose employment was subject to a CBA, which provided that
nurses who work extra shifts would receive premium pay rather than regular pay. Id. at
1034. However, the CBA also provided that nurses would not receive premium pay
“when there is a change of schedule agreed upon by the Medical Center and nurse.” Id.
at 1036. Kobold signed up to work certain vacant shifts and received only regular pay.
Id. at 1034. Kobold then sued under Oregon state law for failure to pay wages owed,
alleging that she had not received the premium pay to which she was entitled under the
CBA. Id. at 1035. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, under the second Burnside step,
Kobold’s claims were preempted because they required a determination of whether her
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:25-cv-10157-JLS-SSC Date: February 23, 2026
Title: Luis Hernandez v. Pacific Bell Telephone Company et al
work qualified her for premium pay. Id. at 1035–36. The Ninth Circuit explained that a
court must interpret the meaning of the CBA terms “change of schedule” and
“agreement” before deciding whether Kobold was entitled to premium pay, so Kobold’s
state law claims were preempted by the LMRA. Id. at 1036.
Similarly, here, Plaintiff’s California Labor Code claims for failure to pay wages
require determining the wages Plaintiff is owed. This in turn requires evaluating the
extent to which Plaintiff is entitled to the “fixed relief differential” of ten dollars per day
in the CBA. Just as determining the amount of premium pay Kobold was due turned on
whether she had agreed to a “change of schedule” as defined in the CBA, determining the
total amount of “fixed relief differential” Plaintiff is due turns on whether he
“temporarily reliev[ed] or assist[ed] a manager” in performing “training” or other
assignments as defined in the CBA. (CBA § 5.02.) Importantly, the CBA does not
clearly define “training responsibilities” or “temporary relief or assistance”—Section
5.02 of the CBA states only that qualifying assignments may include “training
responsibilities other than induction or orientation,” leaving open the question of whether
other activities may constitute training. (Id.) Thus, deciding whether Plaintiff has
performed a qualifying activity requires more than merely “looking to” the CBA and
routinely applying its terms. Cf. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 125 (1994)
(reasoning that merely consulting the CBA for terms whose meanings are not in dispute,
like terms defining the rate of pay, would not warrant preemption (citing Lingle v. Norge
Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 286 U.S. at 413, n.12)). Rather, to determine whether Plaintiff
and other class members, “in addition to normal duties or in the performance of a new
assignment, temporarily relieve[d] or assist[ed] a manager,” which “may
involve . . . training responsibilities” (CBA § 5.02), a court must interpret the meaning of
these all terms within the CBA. See Kobold, 832 F.3d at 1036 (“The GS CBA does not
directly and clearly explain what constitutes a ‘change of schedule,’ nor how an
agreement between Good Samaritan and a nurse is to be made. . . . Ultimately, then, a
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:25-cv-10157-JLS-SSC Date: February 23, 2026
Title: Luis Hernandez v. Pacific Bell Telephone Company et al
court must interpret the meaning of the agreement exception to resolve Kobold’s state
law claims[.]”).
Plaintiff argues that “‘[t]raining’ is a common term with a common meaning:
instructing a new employee in how to perform the job,” and that no interpretation of the
term would therefore be required. (Opp. to MTD at 21.) But Plaintiff’s proffered
definition only exposes the term’s ambiguous nature. Even under this definition, a court
must interpret the meaning of “instructing,” and how long an employee remains “new”
such that instruction counts as training, to decide whether to credit, for instance,
Plaintiff’s contention that “training new employees . . . can last between 2–3 years.”
(Compl. ¶ 11.) Because all of Plaintiff’s claims rely on his contention that he was
entitled to a “fixed relief differential” under Section 5.02 of the CBA, which requires
interpretation of the terms within Section 5.02, all of his claims are preempted by the
LMRA.
Accordingly, this Court possesses federal question jurisdiction over this action.
See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393.
B. Dismissal
“[F]ederal labor policy requires that individual employees wishing to assert
contract grievances must attempt use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by
employer and union as the mode of redress.” Renteria-Hinojosa v. Sunsweet Growers,
Inc., 150 F.4th 1076, 1086 n.7 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,
379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965)). Where a state law claim is preempted by the LMRA, “the
exhaustion requirement applies to the converted claim,” requiring “the dismissal of the
federal claims.” Id.; see also Alaska Airlines, 898 F.3d at 920 (“In evaluating . . . LMRA
§ 301 preemption, we are guided by the principle that if a state law claim ‘is either
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:25-cv-10157-JLS-SSC Date: February 23, 2026
Title: Luis Hernandez v. Pacific Bell Telephone Company et al
grounded in the provisions of the labor contract or requires interpretation of it,’ the
dispute must be resolved through grievance and arbitration.” (internal citation omitted)).
Here, the CBA provides for a grievance and arbitration procedure. (CBA § 7.) As
discussed above, all Plaintiff’s claims substantially depend upon the CBA and therefore
are preempted by the LMRA; however, Plaintiff does not allege that he exhausted the
procedures detailed in the CBA. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed. See
Kobold, 832 F.3d at 1036–37; Lee v. AT&T Servs., Inc./Pac. Bell, 2018 WL 5849936, at
*8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2018). Because Plaintiff, in opposition to Defendant’s motion to
dismiss, does not deny that he has failed to exhaust the procedures required under the
CBA, the Court concludes that amendment would be futile. See Corlew v. Superior Duct
Fabrication, Inc., 2022 WL 17834201, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2022) (Staton, J.).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is DENIED, and Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. All claims in this action are DISMISSED WITHOUT
LEAVE TO AMEND.
Initials of Deputy Clerk: kd
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