CASTELLI

Not for Publication

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

NICOLA CASTELLI,

Civil Action No.: 23-1198 (ES) (AME)

Plaintiff,

OPINION

v.

AMERICAN RED CROSS, JILL

MULLANE, OMER ANGUN, et al.,

Defendants.

SALAS, DISTRICT JUDGE

On September 17, 2025, Plaintiff Nicola Castelli (“Plaintiff”) filed the First Amended

Complaint alleging various claims against defendants the American Red Cross (“ARC”), Jill

Mullane (“Mullane”), and Omer Angun (“Angun”) (together, “Defendants”). (D.E. No. 54

(“FAC”)). Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). (D.E. No. 55 (“Motion” or “Mot.”)). The Court has

carefully reviewed the First Amended Complaint and the parties’ submissions in support of and in

opposition to the Motion (see generally D.E. No. 55-1 (“Mov. Br.”); D.E. No. 58 (“Opp. Br.”);

D.E. No. 59 (“Reply Br.”)), and decides the matter without oral argument, see Fed. R. Civ. P.

78(b); L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in-

part and DENIED in-part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations1

From on or around October 10, 2020, to on or around March 14, 2022, non-party Dropoff,

Inc. (“Dropoff”) employed Plaintiff as a medical courier. (FAC ¶¶ 11–13). Plaintiff maintains

that Dropoff unlawfully terminated his employment on March 14, 2022. (Id. ¶ 12). Bernard

Melton, Plaintiff’s supervisor, directed Plaintiff’s pickup and delivery schedule for Dropoff. (Id.

¶¶ 15 & 37). “[A]pproximately three to four times per day,” Plaintiff conducted pickups and

deliveries at ARC’s Fairfield, New Jersey office, as directed by Dropoff. (Id. ¶¶ 16–17). Plaintiff

alleges Dropoff unlawfully terminated his employment after he experienced sexual harassment

from an ARC employee, defendant Mullane, whom he encountered “approximately three to four

times per week” while performing his job duties at ARC. (Id. ¶¶ 18–19 & 78).

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that after beginning his position with Dropoff, while onsite

at ARC during the workday, Mullane asked Plaintiff out on a date, which made him feel

uncomfortable. (Id. ¶ 22). Although Plaintiff “politely declined” Mullane’s request, she continued

to ask Plaintiff on dates during his pickups and deliveries at ARC and “made other sexually

motivated comments towards Plaintiff at least once or twice per week.” (Id. ¶¶ 22–24; see also id.

¶¶ 25–26 (alleging that Mullane would often ask Plaintiff the following questions: (i) “Will you

go out with me?” (ii) “How would you rate me in attractiveness?” and (iii) “Don’t you fine me

attractive?”). Plaintiff continued to decline Plaintiff’s advances, and made clear that he would not

date women that he worked with. (Id. ¶ 27). Plaintiff maintains that he “made verbal complaints”

about Mullane’s conduct to his supervisor and ARC’s manager, Angun. (Id. ¶ 28). Angun advised

1 The factual background is taken from the allegations in the First Amended Complaint. For purposes of the

instant Motion, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court assumes the parties’

familiarity with the procedural posture of this matter and recites only the history applicable to the instant Motion.

Plaintiff to “ignore” Mullane and to “keep ‘hush’ about the situation.” (Id. ¶ 29). Angun allegedly

did nothing to address Mullane’s behavior; nor did he conduct an investigation regarding

Plaintiff’s complaints. (Id. ¶ 30).

Meanwhile, Mullane continued to pursue Plaintiff, which caused Plaintiff embarrassment,

stress, and anxiety each time he went to ARC on behalf of Dropoff. (Id. ¶ 32). For example, in or

around June 2021, Mullane allegedly harassed Plaintiff in front of a female FedEx driver, by asking

the driver whether she thought Plaintiff was “attractive” and suggesting that the pair should “go

out on a date.” (Id. ¶¶ 33–35). Next, on or about July 31, 2021, Plaintiff picked up an order from

ARC and “denied a sexual advance made by” Mullane. (Id. ¶ 36). Shortly thereafter, Melton

informed Plaintiff that his employment at Dropoff had been suspended—without an explanation—

until ARC reviewed its security camera footage. (Id. ¶¶ 37–38). Melton further advised Plaintiff

that ARC did not want him on site because of a complaint lodged by Mullane. (Id. ¶ 38). Plaintiff

contacted Angun, who informed him that Mullane “complained to [ARC] that Plaintiff was loud

and slammed his trunk when performing [a] pickup.” (Id. ¶ 39). Plaintiff refuted Mullane’s

allegations. (Id. ¶ 40). ARC “cleared” Plaintiff of “all wrongdoings” after it reviewed the its

security camera footage. (Id. ¶ 41). Consequently, Plaintiff asserts that the video footage

“demonstrated that Plaintiff did not engage in the behavior [ ] Mullane falsely accused him of.”

(Id. ¶ 42). Thereafter, Dropoff lifted Plaintiff’s suspension effective August 2, 2021. (Id. ¶ 43).

Plaintiff missed two days of work and income as a result “Mullane’s false allegation.” (Id.).

Sometime later in August 2021, Plaintiff “complained to Melton of the ongoing sexual

harassment and subsequent retaliation he faced from [ ] Mullane.” (Id. ¶ 44). In particular,

Plaintiff told Melton about Mullane’s “constant sexual advances, the incident with the FedEx

driver, as well as [ ] Mullane’s inappropriate inquiries into Plaintiff’s nonexistent relationship with

the FedEx employee.” (Id. ¶ 45). Furthermore, Plaintiff “complained” that Mullane “retaliated

against him by making a false complaint/report for denying her sexual advances.” (Id.). Plaintiff

also made similar complaints to Angun around the same timeframe. (Id. ¶ 46). Again, Angun told

Plaintiff to “avoid” Mullan because she “suffers from bipolar disorder.” (Id. ¶ 47). ARC never

investigated Plaintiff’s complaints; nor did it support Plaintiff regarding his complaints. (Id. ¶ 48).

“For the remainder of his employment [at Dropoff], . . . Plaintiff remained fearful of how [ ]

Mullane would retaliate against him, what she was capable of, and the potential effect of her

causing an end to his employment with Dropoff due to her false retaliatory complaints.” (Id. ¶

49).

Thereafter, on or about October 31, 2021, Mullane allegedly hid plastic snakes in Plaintiff’s

truck in an attempt to both “frighten and/or intimidate him.” (Id. ¶ 50.). Plaintiff maintains that

Mullane used “these pranks as an excuse to speak with, and further harass [him].” (Id. ¶ 51). Then

Mullane’s “attitude toward Plaintiff changed.” (Id. ¶ 52). For example, in November 2021,

Plaintiff alleges he “again brought [ ] Mullane’s conduct to the attention of both Dropoff and

[ARC],” by telling Melton and Angun that he “was being sexually harassed by [ ] Mullane and he

believed she was retaliating against him for denying her advances.” (Id. ¶ 53). Dropoff and ARC

ignored Plaintiff’s complaints and he “was told not to inform anyone else of the treatment he was

facing.” (Id. ¶ 54).

That same month, Plaintiff asserts Dropoff directed him to take certain boxes from St.

Joseph’s University Medical Center (“St. Joseph’s”) to ARC; about ten minutes later, Dropoff

directed Plaintiff to take boxes from ARC back to St. Joseph’s. (Id. ¶¶ 55–56). Plaintiff noted his

confusion about these reverse directives to Mullane, who met Plaintiff when he picked up boxes

at ARC. (Id. ¶ 57). Mullane responded by “scold[ing]” Plaintiff and “slamm[ing] the door on

him.” (Id. ¶ 58). “Soon thereafter,” Dropoff suspended Plaintiff pending ARC’s investigation of

a complaint made against him by Mullane. (Id. ¶ 59). Although Plaintiff maintains that he did not

know the “substance of the complaint,” ARC’s investigation revealed that “Plaintiff did not engage

in any wrongdoing.” (Id. ¶ 60).

Plaintiff additionally asserts that on March 12, 2022, Dropoff directed him to pick up boxes

from ARC for delivery to Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 64). Plaintiff refused, but Plaintiff ultimately agreed

to perform the pickup and delivery. (Id. ¶ 65). When he arrived in Fairfield, no one from ARC

answered the doorbell, which he rang twice. (Id. ¶ 66). While waiting for ARC to answer the

doorbell, he contacted a Dropoff dispatcher, who asked Plaintiff to wait while it contacted ARC.

(Id. ¶ 67). An ARC employee eventually told Plaintiff that “there was no order for him to pick

up.” (Id. ¶ 68). Plaintiff immediately contacted Dropoff to relay the development and his

departure from ARC’s premises, citing his “concern” about “Mullane’s erratic, harassing, and

retaliatory behavior.” (Id. ¶¶ 69–70). About an hour later, Dropoff suspended Plaintiff pending

an investigation by ARC. (Id. ¶ 71). Dropoff did not respond to Plaintiff’s inquiry regarding the

reason for his suspension. (Id. ¶ 72). Angun told Plaintiff that Mullane “reported Plaintiff for

allegedly using a volunteer entrance and entering the building” at ARC “during the [March 12,

2022] pickup, which was prohibited and in violation of protocols, and a violation of Plaintiff’s

duties as a courier.” (Id. ¶ 73). Plaintiff maintains he never entered the ARC building and that

Mullane fabricated her report. (Id. ¶ 74). Plaintiff alleges that ARC never investigated Mullane’s

“several clearly false reports” about Plaintiff’s purported conduct. (Id. ¶ 75). Moreover, Plaintiff

claims that during each of his suspensions from performing courier services at ARC, Angun and

Dropoff asked him to perform night delivers to ARC when Mullane was off duty. (Id. ¶ 62). Thus,

Plaintiff believes that ARC knew Mullane’s complaints were “frivolous” because he had

permission to conduct courier services when Mullane was not present, “which he did without

issue.” (Id. ¶ 63).

Following Mullane’s last complaint, ARC informed Plaintiff that it did not want him on its

“premises due to the complaints made by [ ] Mullane.” (Id. ¶ 76). Plaintiff asserts that on or about

March 14, 2022, Dropoff terminated his employment because he “was no longer authorized to

enter [ARC’s] premises, where he completed a majority of his work for.” (Id. ¶ 77). Plaintiff

alleges that ARC “utterly failed to investigate and/or remedy the sexual harassment complaint of

by Plaintiff and fostered an environment of unlawful activity.” (Id. ¶ 79; see also id. ¶ 61 (noting

that Plaintiff was “terrified to perform his job duties” at ARC because of Mullane’s conduct and

both Dropoff and ARC’s “failure to investigate and/or remediate his complaints”)). He believes

that ARC did not want him “on their premises due to his numerous complaints of sexual

harassment and retaliation against a[n] [ARC] employee.” (Id. ¶ 80). As a result, Plaintiff alleges

that he “suffered, and continues to suffer, from severe physical and emotional distress, humiliation,

mental anguish, and economic loss.” (Id. ¶ 81).

Finally, Plaintiff maintains that before his interactions with Mullane, he never had any

disciplinary action by Dropoff. (Id. ¶ 20). Nor had he ever been the subject of a complaint or

investigation “by Dropoff or a customer of Dropoff.” (Id. ¶ 21). Furthermore, Plaintiff “was a

highly relied upon employee who excelled in performing his job duties and responsibilities” at

Dropoff. (Id. ¶ 14).

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint alleges five causes of action against Defendants,

including: (i) violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J.S.A. §

10:5-1 et seq., specifically retaliation and aiding and abetting retaliation (Counts I and II); (ii)

defamation (Count III); (iii) tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage (Count

IV); and (iv) negligence (Count V). (FAC ¶¶ 82–120). On October 1, 2025, Defendants filed a

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Mot.). The

Motion is fully briefed. (See generally Mov. Br.; Opp. Br.; Reply Br.).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint include “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This

pleading standard does not require detailed factual allegations; it does, however, demand “more

than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (internal citation omitted). In addition, the plaintiff’s short and plain statement of

the claim must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which

it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

For a complaint to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), it “must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S.

at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is plausible on its face when “the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and conclusory statements” are all disregarded.

City of Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Altisource Asset Mgmt. Corp., 908 F.3d 872, 878–79 (3d Cir. 2018)

(quoting James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 681 (3d Cir. 2012)). Further, a complaint

may be considered frivolous where it relies on an “‘indisputably meritless legal theory’ or a

‘clearly baseless’ or ‘fantastic or delusional’ factual scenario.” Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523,

530 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s NJLAD Claims (Counts I & II)

Under the NJLAD, an employer may not retaliate against an employee because that

employee “has opposed any practices or acts forbidden under [NJLAD] or because that person has

. . . filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under [NJLAD].” N.J. Stat. Ann. §

10:5-12(d); see also Cortes v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 391 F. Supp. 2d 298, 314 (D.N.J.

2005). “To state a prima facie case for retaliation under the NJLAD, a plaintiff must show that

[]he (1) engaged in protected activity, (2) that []he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3)

that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment

action.” Nuness v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 3d 596, 605 (D.N.J. 2016) (first citing

Sanchez v. SunGard Availability Servs. LP, 362 F. App’x 283, 287 (3d Cir. 2010); and then citing

Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 70 A.3d 602, 619 (N.J. 2013)).

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff cannot maintain his NJLAD claims against Defendants

because they did not employ Plaintiff. (Mov. Br. at 6–8). Plaintiff argues that the statute “is not

limited to one’s employer, but rather applies to the conduct of ‘any person.’” (Opp. Br. at 6–7

(citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(d) and Cottrell v. J & R Disc. Liquor Gallery, Inc., No. 08-5418,

2009 WL 1085729, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2009)); see also id. at 8–9). For the reasons set forth

below, the Court agrees with Defendants and need not reach the balance of their arguments.

As noted by Plaintiff, (see Opp. Br. at 6–7), NJLAD retaliation claims are rooted in Section

10:5-12(d) of the statute, which provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t shall be an unlawful

employment practice, or, as the case may be, an unlawful discrimination”:

d. For any person to take reprisals against any person because that

person has opposed any practices or acts forbidden under P.L.1945,

c. 169 (C.10:5-1 et seq.) . . . .

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(d). By the provision’s plain terms, retaliation can occur if reprisals are

carried out by “any person” against an individual who opposes conduct that is prohibited under

the NJLAD, i.e., any forbidden act as defined under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-1, et seq. See id.

(emphasis added). Indeed, this is the theory Plaintiff pursues as reflected in both his First Amended

Complaint and opposition brief. (See FAC ¶¶ 82–96; see also, e.g., Opp. Br. at 9 (arguing that

“Plaintiff’s complaints to ARC opposing the practice of one of its employees is a protected

activity” under NJLAD “and therefore, the retaliation claim against Defendants is cognizable”)).

Plaintiff broadly alleges that the prohibited practice or act he opposed under the NJLAD is

Mullane’s alleged “sexual harassment” that Plaintiff experienced on a weekly basis when he

performed his job duties for Dropoff on ARC’s premises. (FAC ¶¶ 23–24, 44, 78–80, 91, 93 &

95).

Relevant here, Plaintiff’s allegations with respect to his reports of alleged “sexual

harassment” are vague and conclusory at best. (See FAC ¶ 28 (alleging that Plaintiff made verbal

complaints about Defendant Mullane’s conduct to Melton and Red Cross manager, Angun); id. ¶

45 (claiming that “Plaintiff informed Melton of Defendant Mullane’s constant sexual advances”

and mentioning one encounter with a FedEx driver); id. ¶ 45 (“Plaintiff also complained that he

believed [ ] Mullane retaliated against him by making a false complaint/report for denying her

sexual advances”)). Similarly, Plaintiff seems to allege, in a circular fashion, that Defendants

retaliated against him under the NJLAD because Plaintiff complained about Defendants’

“retaliation” to Angun and Melton. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 44, 78 & 80). These allegations are also

conclusory.2 Sapp v. Trenton Bd. of Educ., No. 24-10360, 2026 WL 636828, at *10 (D.N.J. Mar.

6, 2026) (dismissing NJLAD claim where the court could not determine whether plaintiff engaged

in protected activity by “opposing a practice rendered unlawful by NJLAD” because Plaintiff

2 The vague complaints and reports made by Plaintiff are distinguishable from the alleged questions Mullane

asked Plaintiff on a weekly basis (see FAC ¶¶ 22–26); however, those allegations are likewise sparse at best.

failed to “allege any facts regarding the substance of [his] complaints” to the department of

education).

Despite these pleading deficiencies, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint also fails to cite

or reference the underlying NJLAD provision(s) that forms the basis of the alleged “sexual

harassment” and “retaliation” that Plaintiff allegedly opposed as conduct that is prohibited under

the NJLAD. (See generally FAC; see also Opp. Br.). For example, as it relates to sexual

harassment, the NJLAD provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice, or, as the

case may be, an unlawful discrimination”:

a. For an employer, because of the race, creed, color, national origin,

ancestry, age, marital status, civil union status, domestic partnership

status, affectional or sexual orientation, genetic information,

pregnancy or breastfeeding, sex, gender identity or expression,

disability [and other protected statuses] . . . to discriminate against

such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges

of employment . . . .

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(a). This provision plainly applies to discriminatory conduct by “an

employer.” See id. (emphasis added). Plaintiff concedes that neither ARC, Angun, or Mullane

employed him during the relevant period. (See FAC ¶ 11 (alleging that “Plaintiff, at all times

relevant to this Complaint, was employed by Dropoff, Inc.”)). Accordingly, it is unclear how

Plaintiff could have opposed ARC, Angun, or Mullane’s conduct under Section 10:5-12(a)—

applicable only to “an employer.” See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(a) (emphasis added). To the

extent Plaintiff maintains that ARC acted as an “employer-controller of the worksite,” (see Opp.

Br. at 8), he does not expand on this or any other joint-employer theory of liability in his opposition

brief or First Amended Complaint (see id.; see also FAC).

Furthermore, it is unclear whether Plaintiff has sufficiently invoked any other provision of

the NJLAD that would permit a retaliation claim under Section 10:5-12(d) in the absence of an

employer-employee relationship. Relevant here, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s attempt to amend his

pleading in opposition to Defendants’ Motion by transforming Count I into a public

accommodation retaliation claim under Section 10:5-12(f)(1). (See Opp. Br. at 8).3 On this score,

the Court agrees that Plaintiff does not allege that ARC’s Fairfield location is “open to the public,”

(see Reply Br. at 6). When read as a whole, Mullane’s alleged sexual harassment forms the basis

of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim—not ARC’s failure to accommodate Plaintiff in a public space. (See

generally FAC (omitting any reference to “public accommodation” or “Section 10:5-12(f)(1)”)).

Thus, even if construed broadly, the First Amended Complaint does not put Defendants on notice

of a public accommodation retaliation claim under NJLAD. (See generally id.).

For these reasons, the Court finds this matter distinguishable from cases that hold an

employer-employee relationship is not required to pursue an NJLAD retaliation claim. See, e.g.,

Cottrell v. J & R Disc. Liquor Gallery, Inc., No. 08-5418, 2009 WL 1085729, at *4 n.6 (D.N.J.

Apr. 21, 2009) (noting that the NJLAD is “not limited to employer/employee relationships” where

plaintiffs brought an NJLAD relation claim premised on their reporting of defendants’ alleged

“failure to make accessible handicapped parking for the disabled liquor store patrons” under the

public accommodations prong of the NJLAD, Section 10:5-12(f)). Accordingly, Defendants’

motion to dismiss Count I is GRANTED. See, e.g., Turner v. Johnson, No. 17-0541, 2024 WL

4891773, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 26, 2024) (dismissing plaintiff’s retaliation claim where no employer-

employee relationship existed among the parties and noting that “[t]o the extent [p]laintiff has an

NJLAD claim against [d]efendants, it would be based on NJLAD’s prohibition on discrimination

3 Plaintiff may not amend his First Amended Complaint through arguments raised in an opposition brief. See,

e.g., Pa. ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a court considering a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion must limit its review to the allegations in the complaint, and “[i]t is axiomatic that the complaint

may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss” (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor

Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir.1984))).

in public accommodations”). Count I is DISMISSED without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to

amend his complaint and clarify the basis of his NJLAD retaliation claim. In doing so, Plaintiff

shall identify how the conduct he opposed is prohibited by the NJLAD and identify the specific

provision(s) that forbid the opposed conduct by the non-employer Defendants. In addition, to the

extent Plaintiff continues to maintain an NJLAD retaliation claim premised on alleged sexual

harassment, he shall allege the details surrounding the alleged sexual harassment, including all

reports made in relation thereto, with the appropriate specificity.4

Finally, because the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for the principal violation

of NJLAD retaliation, he cannot maintain a separate claim for aiding and abetting the same under

Section 10:5-12(e). See Taylor v. Lincare, Inc., No. 15-6284, 2016 WL 3849852, at *7 (D.N.J.

July 15, 2016) (“Therefore, ‘because [p]laintiff’s underlying causes of action fail, there can be no

claim for aiding and abetting in violation of the NJLAD.’” (quoting Haddix v. Camden Cty. Youth

Det. Ctr., 2015 WL 3755023, at *6 (D.N.J. June 16, 2015))). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Count II is GRANTED and Count II is DISMISSED without prejudice.5

B. Plaintiff’s Defamation Claim (Count III)

“To establish defamation under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must show the defendant (1)

made a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) communicated the statement

to a third party, and (3) had a sufficient degree of fault.” Mangan v. Corp. Synergies Grp., Inc.,

834 F. Supp. 2d 199, 204 (D.N.J. 2011) (citing Singer v. Beach Trading Co., 379 N.J. Super. 63,

4 Relevant here, an amended pleading should include all allegations within Plaintiff’s knowledge, including,

but not limited to, the time the alleged sexual harassment began, and any and all details regarding: (i) Plaintiff’s

complaints to Angun and Melton regarding Mullane’s alleged sexual harassment; (ii) Mullane’s allegedly false

complaints/reports regarding Plaintiff; and (iii) the extent and breadth of Mullane’s alleged sexual advances, “sexually

motivated comments,” or similar behavior. (See, e.g., FAC ¶ 24).

5 Because the Court dismisses Counts I and II for the reasons stated above, it need not address Defendants’

remaining arguments in support of dismissal.

79, 876 A.2d 885 (N.J. App. Div. 2005)).

As a preliminary matter, in opposing Defendant’s Motion, Plaintiff clarifies that his

“defamation claim is solely against Mullane.” (Opp. Br. at 20 & 21 n.1). Thus, the Court need

not address Defendants’ defamation arguments that pertain to Angun or ARC.6 (See Mov. Br. at

20–21). For this reason, Count III is DISMISSED as to Angun and ARC with prejudice.

On the merits of Count III, Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead facts

“to identify the defamatory words, their utterer[,] and the fact of their publication” such that his

“vague and conclusory allegation[s] [are] not enough.” (Mov. Br. at 21–22 (quoting Langley v.

United Airlines, Inc., No. 23-20602, 2024 WL 3219295, at *4 (D.N.J. June 28, 2024))).

Defendants also encourage the Court to dismiss Count II “because the alleged words do not rise to

the level of defamatory.” (Id. at 23). Specifically, Defendants argue that the only statement

Mullane made that is pled with “any semblance of particularity” (see id. at 24), is that Plaintiff

“used a volunteer entrance and enter[ed] the building of [ARC] during the pickup, which was

prohibited and in violation of protocols, and a violation of Plaintiff’s duties as a courier,” (see FAC

¶ 73; see also id. ¶ 104). They contend that this statement “does not convey anything that would

subject Plaintiff to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, nor would it deter third persons from associating

or dealing with him.” (Mov. Br. at 24). At most, Defendants suggest that Mullane’s statement

reflects “a trivial mistake” Plaintiff made when “carrying out his duties.” (Id.).

Plaintiff opposes, arguing that he alleged “a concrete accusation by Mullane” which

consisted of her report that he “used a volunteer entrance” and “entered ARC’s building during a

pickup” combined with the allegations that Mullane uttered the statement to “ARC management”

6 Plaintiff fails to explain—in his First Amended Complaint and opposition brief—how Count III is pled as to

ARC “in the alternative based on publication through workplace channels” under a vicariously liability theory, (see

Opp. Br. at 21 n.1). Thus, the Court will not assess Plaintiff’s purported alternative theory against ARC.

that was subsequently “relayed to Dropoff” on “March 12, 2022 at ARC’s Fairfield facility.” (Opp.

Br. at 21 (quoting FAC ¶ 73); see also id. at 22 (noting that “employment-related reports about a

person’s honesty, fitness, or compliance with workplace rules are ‘published’ when they are made

to management”)). Plaintiff further asserts that Mullane’s statement was disparaging because the

alleged conduct defied ARC’s policies and procedures and “intended to harm Plaintiff’s reputation

with his employer and in the community.” (Id. at 21 (citing FAC ¶¶ 104–05)). In addition, Plaintiff

maintains that he need not plead the “precise defamatory statements” Mullane made at the motion

to dismiss stage. (Id. at 22). For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion

to dismiss Count III as it pertains to Mullane’s statement regarding Plaintiff’s improper use of

ARC’s volunteer entrance.

While “a defamation pleading does not need to cite precise defamatory statements, it must

. . . provide sufficient notice to the other party of the allegations made against [it].” Cristelli v.

Filomena II, Inc., No. 99-2862, 1999 WL 1081290, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 1999) (emphasis added).

The “pleading must allege the elements of defamation . . . to a degree of sufficient specificity.”

Mangan, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 204. As such, a plaintiff “‘must plead facts sufficient to identify the

defamatory words, their utterer[,] and the fact of their publication. A vague[,] conclusory

allegation is not enough.’” Robles v. U.S. Env’t Universal Servs., Inc., 469 F. App’x 104, 109 (3d

Cir. 2012) (quoting Zoneraich v. Overlook Hosp., 514 A.2d 53, 63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.

1986)); see also F.D.I.C. v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850, 875 (3d Cir. 1994). “In other words, a plaintiff

must plead facts sufficient to identify ‘when, where, by which defendants and by what words,

written or oral, plaintiff was defamed.’” Russomanno v. Sunovion Pharms., Inc., No. 22-5032,

2023 WL 2649453, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2023) (quoting Cruz v. HSBC, No. 10-0135, 2010 WL

2989987, at *3 (D.N.J. July 26, 2010)), aff’d, No. 23-1587, 2023 WL 6374191 (3d Cir. July 17,

2023). “A plaintiff can bolster a defamation cause of action through discovery but not [ ] file a

conclusory complaint to find out if one exists.” Printing Mart–Morristown v. Sharp Elec. Corp.,

563 A.2d 31, 46 (N.J. 1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Although Defendants correctly note that a defamatory statement must be pled with

specificity, the Court disagrees that Plaintiff has failed to do so here with respect to Mullane’s

statement about Plaintiff’s use of ARC’s volunteer entrance. For example, Defendants are on

adequate notice that Mullane allegedly reported Plaintiff’s use of a volunteer entrance at ARC on

or about March 12, 2022. (FAC ¶¶ 64 & 73). Plaintiff identifies Mullane as the person who uttered

the allegedly defamatory statement and it can easily be inferred that Mullane made the statement

sometime between March 12, 2022—the date of the incident in question—and March 14, 2022,

the day Dropoff terminated Plaintiff. (See FAC ¶¶ 64 & 95). When viewing the allegations in the

non-movant’s favor, the Court can infer that Mullane made the allegedly false report to

management because Angun, an ARC supervisor, informed Plaintiff about Mullane’s report. (See

id. ¶ 73). Indeed, “while it would be more clear had the First Amended Complaint been more

specific about which employees and/or management at ARC”7 Mullane made the allegedly false

statements to, “the Court believes that the First Amended Complaint describes the alleged facts of

publication with enough particularity to provide ARC with knowledge of the circumstances.” See

Cruz, 2010 WL 2989987, at *3 (quotation modified).8 However, to the extent Plaintiff maintains

7 The fact that Mullane allegedly made the defamatory statement to ARC—not Plaintiff’s employer—is of no

moment in the context of a defamation claim. See Mangan, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 206 (“New Jersey courts have instead

addressed whether the statement was protected by a qualified privilege.” (citing Abella v. Barringer Res., Inc., 615

A.2d 288, 291 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1992) (“A defamatory statement is published when it is communicated ... to one other

than the person defamed.”))).

8 Defendants’ cited cases are distinguishable from the instant matter because those complaints either fail to

provide any subject matter regarding the alleged defamatory statements or they broadly attribute vague and conclusory

criminality to the plaintiff. (See Mov. Br. at 21–22 (citing cases)). In addition, for the reasons noted above, the Court

rejects Defendants’ argument that “[v]erifiability of Plaintiff’s allegations is also questionable because Plaintiff

that Mullane made any other “knowingly false statements concerning [him]” (FAC ¶ 104), the

Court agrees that these purported statements are vague and conclusory; thus, they lack the requisite

specificity to survive Defendants’ Motion.

Next, while also a closer call, the Court disagrees that the alleged statement regarding

Plaintiff’s use of ARC’s volunteer entrance is not defamatory as it pertains to ARC and Dropoff.

“A defamatory statement is one that is (1) false and injures another person’s reputation, or (2)

subjects a person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or (3) causes others to lose good will or

confidence in that person.” Castillo v. Viso, No. 17-5255, 2024 WL 3594351, at *12 (D.N.J. July

31, 2024) (quoting Morgan v. Maxwell, No. A-3157-19, 2021 WL 1605989, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct.

App. Div. Apr. 26, 2021)). Thus, a defamatory statement “is one that . . . deter[s] others from

wanting to associate or deal with [the subject of the statement].” Read v. Profeta, 397 F. Supp. 3d

597, 650–51 (D.N.J. 2019) (alterations in original) (quoting G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300, 310 (N.J.

2011)). To determine whether a statement is defamatory, the Court assesses the statement

“according to the fair and natural meaning which it would be given by persons of ordinary

intelligence.” Id. at 651 (citation omitted).

Based on the allegations, which the Court must accept as true, Plaintiff maintains that

Mullane’s false reporting of his use of a volunteer entrance damaged his reputation with both ARC

and Dropoff such that both entities lost confidence in his ability to perform his job duties as a

courier. (See FAC ¶¶ 103–06). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that use of the volunteer entrance

“was prohibited and in violation of protocols, and a violation of Plaintiff’s duties as a courier.”

(Id. ¶ 73; see also id. ¶ 104). As a result, Plaintiff learned that ARC no longer wanted him on its

provides no precise words actually spoken.” (Id. at 24). Indeed, the Court finds that Mullane’s allegedly defamatory

statement has been pled with sufficient particularity for identification purposes.

premises in Fairfield, New Jersey. (Id. ¶ 76). And Dropoff terminated Plaintiff shortly thereafter.

(Id. ¶¶ 77 & 107).9 For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion to dismiss Count III is DENIED. The

Court recognizes, however, that Defendants may move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

defamation claim after the close of discovery.

C. Plaintiff’s Tortious Interference with a Prospective or Existing Economic

Advantage Claim (Count IV)

Under New Jersey law, to establish tortious interference with a prospective or existing10

economic advantage, a party must establish:

(1) a reasonable expectation of economic advantage from a

prospective contractual or economic relationship; (2) the defendant

intentionally and maliciously interfered with the relationship; (3) the

interference caused the loss of the expected advantage; and (4)

actual damages resulted.

Am. Leistritz Extruder Corp. v. Polymer Concentrates, Inc., 363 F. App’x 963, 967 (3d Cir. 2010).

In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that “Mullane interfered with Plaintiff’s reasonable

expectation of economic advantage by intentionally sabotaging Plaintiff’s reputation and

succeeding in having Plaintiff terminated from his employment with Dropoff.” (FAC ¶ 111). He

further asserts that each of “Mullane’s complaints to [ARC] were fabricated and made in

furtherance of [ ] Mullane’s attempt to have Plaintiff terminated.” (Id. ¶ 112; see also id. ¶ 113).

Thus, Plaintiff believes that “Mullane tortiously interfered with [his] prospective economic

relationship,” which directly and proximately resulted in Plaintiff’s damages. (Id. ¶¶ 114–15).

First, Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Count IV against Angun and ARC because the

allegations in Count IV pertain only to Mullane. (Mov. Br. at 25). Plaintiff fails to refute this

9 For clarity, the Court agrees with Defendants in that Plaintiff has not pled how Mullane’s allegedly

defamatory statement damaged his reputation in the greater community. (See Mov. Br. at 24).

10 Although pled as “tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage,” (FAC at 19), Defendants

seemingly accept that Count IV relates to Plaintiff’s then-existing economic relationship with his prior employer,

Dropoff. (See Mov. Br. at 25–26).

argument and essentially confirms that he seeks to hold only Mullane liable under Count IV. (See

Opp. Br. at 23–24 (arguing that “Plaintiff can demonstrate [ ] Mullane tortiously interfered with

[his] contract and/or prospective economic advantage with Dropoff); see also id. at 25–26

(maintaining that but-for “Mullane’s intentional[ ] and malicious[ ] interfere[nce]” with Plaintiff’s

relationship with Dropoff, he would not have been terminated; nor would he have suffered

economic damages or emotional distress (emphasis added))). In addition, the allegations in Count

IV recounted above relate only to Mullane. (See FAC ¶¶ 108–15). Thus, Count IV is

DISMISSED without prejudice as to Angun and ARC.

As it relates to Mullane, Defendants’ sole argument in support of dismissal is that Mullane

never “complained to Plaintiff’s employer, Dropoff,” nor did she ever “communicate[] with

Dropoff management.” (Mov. Br. at 26). Rather, Defendants note that Mullane only “complained

to ARC, her employer,” which they say is fatal to Count IV because Plaintiff fails to allege “facts

showing th[at] [ ] Mullane specifically intended to interfere with his employment with Dropoff.”

(Id.). Defendants cite to Angrisani v. Capital Access Network, Inc., 175 F. App’x 554, 557 (3d

Cir. 2006) in support of its position because there, “the Third Circuit upheld dismissal of a tortious

interference claim” where the plaintiff “could not demonstrate specific intent to interfere.” (Mov.

Br. at 25). Plaintiff opposes, noting, among other things, that Mullane made “frivolous, unfounded

complaints” with malice and “with the goal of having Plaintiff terminated.” (Opp. Br. at 25).

Accepting all facts pled as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-

movant, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint states sufficient facts to satisfy the elements of a

tortious interference claim against Mullane. Relevant here, “malice is defined to mean that the

harm was inflicted intentionally and without justification or excuse.” Printing Mart-Morristown,

563 A.2d at 37. Plaintiff alleges that Mullane purposefully “sabotage[d]” his reputation by lodging

false reports and complaints to ARC regarding Plaintiff’s conduct during the course of his

employment. (See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 45–46, 86 & 111). He also alleges that Mullane fabricated her

complaints in furtherance of her “attempt to have Plaintiff terminated.” (Id. ¶ 112). In addition,

Plaintiff maintains that ARC cleared him of “wrongdoing in response to each false complaint”

filed by Mullane. (Id. ¶ 88). At this juncture, the Court finds the allegations sufficient to establish

intentional and malicious interference with Plaintiff’s economic advantage, i.e., his employment

relationship with Dropoff.

Defendants cite no authority that compels the Court to find that Mullane had to file

complaints directly with Dropoff—Plaintiff’s employer—to establish a tortious interference claim.

(See Mov. Br. at 25–26). Although Defendants acknowledge that “it is equally plausible—if not

more plausible—that [ ] Mullane . . . complain[ed] to her own employer to try to minimize her

contact with Plaintiff,” (Mov. Br. at 26 (emphasis added)), it is thus also equally plausible that she

complained for the purpose alleged in the First Amended Complaint—to sabotage Plaintiff’s

economic relationship with Dropoff.

Moreover, Angrisani is distinguishable from the instant matter. There, the Third Circuit

upheld the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on plaintiff’s tortious interference claim in

favor of the defendant because plaintiff “failed to produce any evidence suggesting that [the

defendant] acted to induce [plaintiff’s employer] to terminate him, or that [defendant] prevented

[plaintiff] from performing his job.” 175 F. App’x at 557. First, this matter is on an entirely

different procedural posture at the motion to dismiss stage and does not yet have the benefit of a

full evidentiary record. Second, the allegations here, taken as true as the Court must at this stage,

state that Mullane did act to induce Dropoff to terminate his employment relationship and that her

actions did prevent Plaintiff from performing his job duties for Dropoff—first during brief

suspensions and then in perpetuity following his termination. Moreover, Plaintiff also alleges that

ARC ultimately “cleared” him of Mullane’s accusations, and he further asserted that before

encountering Mullane, Plaintiff (i) never had an complaint or investigation lodged against him by

“either Dropoff or a customer of Dropoff,” and (ii) never had any prior disciplinary action from

Dropoff. (FAC ¶¶ 20–21 & 88).11

For these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to dismiss Count IV as it

pertains to Mullane. See, e.g., Tonkinson v. Byrd, No. 17-6162, 2018 WL 1919829, at *6 (D.N.J.

Apr. 24, 2018) (noting that “[p]laintiff’s lack of knowledge about what exactly [defendant] said to

her new employer d[id] not cause her claim to fail at this motion to dismiss stage”).

D. Plaintiff’s Negligence Claim (Count V)

To establish negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant (i) owed the

plaintiff a duty; (ii) breached that duty; and (iii) that the breach caused a “foreseeable resulting

injury.” Anderson v. Sammy Redd and Assocs., 650 A.2d 376, 378 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1994).

In Count V, Plaintiff maintains that ARC “negligently created a discriminatory and/or

harassing workplace” and that ARC “breached its duty of care by failing to exercise due care with

respect to sexual harassment in the workplace.” (FAC ¶¶ 117–18). As a result of ARC’s alleged

breach of its duty, Plaintiff claims that he “suffered harm” (id. ¶ 119) and “damages,” (id. ¶ 120).

Plaintiff then broadly seeks an array of damages from all “Defendants.” (Id.).

As with the preceding count, Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Count V as it pertains to

Mullane and Angun because the “allegations under this count relate only to ARC.” (Mov. Br. at

11 Although Defendants argue Plaintiff failed to allege that Mullane “directly caused Dropoff to terminate him”

in their reply brief (see Reply Br. at 13–14), the Court will not entertain arguments made for the first time in response

to an opposition brief. See, e.g., Spence v. New Jersey, No. 19-21490, 2021 WL 1345872, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 12, 2021)

(“[I]t is well-established that new arguments cannot be raised for the first time in reply briefs.” (quoting Pitman v.

Ottehberg, No. 10-2538, 2015 WL 179392, at *9 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2015))).

26 n.5). Indeed, as reflected above, the First Amended Complaint alleges that only ARC owed

Plaintiff a duty of care. (FAC ¶¶ 118–19). Plaintiff does not respond to this point in his opposition

brief and confines his arguments to ARC’s alleged duty and breach. (See Opp. Br. at 26–27).

Accordingly, Count V is DISMISSED without prejudice as to Mullane and Angun.

As it relates to ARC, the Court further agrees with Defendants in that the allegations

regarding the parties’ relationship “falls far short of establishing any cognizable duty of care.”

(See Mov. Br. at 27). Akin to his NJLAD claim, Plaintiff’s argument in opposition hinges on

liability applicable to employers for “torts committed by an employee[s]” who act within “the

scope of their employment.” (See Opp. Br. at 26). Based on Plaintiff’s own concessions regarding

the lack of any employer-employee relationship amongst the parties, this avenue of relief fails for

the same reasons noted above with respect to Plaintiff’s NJLAD claim. (See Opp. Br. at 24

(arguing that “Plaintiff was part of an existing contractual relationship with his employer, Dropoff,

and [ ] Mullane indisputably knew Plaintiff was employed by Dropoff”); see also FAC ¶¶ 11 &

111). In addition, Plaintiff does not cite any authority for the proposition that ARC—a third-

party—owed him a duty of care as an employee of ARC’s “regular vendor,” i.e., Dropoff. (See

Opp. Br. at 27 (arguing that [t]he failure to investigate known risks, mishandling and forwarding

unfounded reports, and using site-access control in a way that foreseeably harms a known, regular

vendor, are classic breach averments that precipitated Plaintiff’s suspensions and termination”)).

Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff attempted to amend his negligence claim in his opposition brief

to assert claims for negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and/or negligent training, the Court

finds that those claims are not apparent on the face of the First Amended Complaint. (Compare

Opp. Br. at 26, with FAC). Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to dismiss Count V is GRANTED

and Count V is DISMISSED without prejudice. To the extent Plaintiff chooses to file an amended

pleading, he shall clearly set forth the basis of his negligence claim, including any and all specific

negligence theories.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in-part and DENIED in-

part. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

Dated: July 2, 2026 s/ Esther Salas

Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.