The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
JUSTIN DWANE HELMUTH,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:25-cv-722-KKM-CPT
UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
Defendant.
___________________________________
ORDER
Justin Helmuth challenges the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services’ (USCIS) decision denying his I-600 Petition to Classify
Orphan as an Immediate Relative as arbitrary and capricious under the
Administrative Procedure Act. See Compl. (Doc. 1). Helmuth and USCIS filed
cross motions for summary judgment. After careful consideration, USCIS’s
decision denying the petition survives the narrow limits of judicial review
under the APA. Accordingly, I grant USCIS’s motion for summary judgment
and deny Helmuth’s cross-motion for summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a United States
citizen may file an application on behalf of an orphaned child adopted abroad.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(i), 1101(b)(1)(F)(i). “The application, known as an I-
600 petition, requests that the orphaned child be classified as an ‘immediate
relative’ and granted a visa to permanently reside in the United States.”
Skalka v. Kelly, 246 F. Supp. 3d 147, 149 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(i)); see also Blanford v. United States Citizenship & Immigr.
Servs., 741 F. Supp. 3d 778, 785–86 (N.D. Ind. 2024).
In adjudicating an I-600 petition, USCIS is tasked with determining
whether the child qualifies as an “orphan.” See Skalka, 246 F. Supp. 3d at 150.
As relevant here, the INA provides:
[A] child, under the age of sixteen at the time a petition is filed in
his behalf to accord a classification as an immediate relative under
[8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)], who is an orphan because of the death or
disappearance of, abandonment or desertion by, or separation or
loss from, both parents, or for whom the sole or surviving parent is
incapable of providing the proper care and has in writing
irrevocably released the child for emigration and adoption; who
has been adopted abroad by a United States citizen and spouse
jointly, or by an unmarried United States citizen who is at least 25
years of age, at least 1 of whom personally saw and observed the
child before or during the adoption proceedings . . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(F)(i). USCIS’s regulations governing adoptions from
countries not a party to the Hague Convention dictate that a child is
“abandoned” if the birth parent has “willfully forsaken all parental rights,
obligations, and claims to the child, as well as all control over and possession
of the child, without intending to transfer, or without transferring, these rights
to any specific person(s).” 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(b). Relatedly, “[d]esertion by both
parents means that the parents have willfully forsaken their child and have
refused to carry out their parental rights and obligations and that, as a result,
the child has become a ward of a competent authority in accordance with the
laws of the foreign-sending country.” Id.
To apply for a visa, the petitioner submits the I-600 petition to USCIS
along with supporting documentation to demonstrate both that he can provide
proper care for the child and that the child meets the statutory definition of an
orphaned child. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(a)(1)(i)–(ii). For the latter proposition,
supporting documentation includes the “orphan’s birth certificate, or if such a
certificate is not available, an explanation together with other proof of identity
and age,” evidence that the child is an orphan, and evidence of a full and final
adoption abroad. See id. § 204.3(d)(1). In the case of abandonment or desertion,
“[p]rimary evidence . . . is a decree from a court or other competent authority
unconditionally divesting the parent(s) of all parental rights over the child
because of such abandonment . . . [or] desertion.” USCIS Policy Manual Vol. 5,
Part C, Chapter 7(B)(4), https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-5-part-c-
chapter-7. “The non-existence or other unavailability of required evidence
creates a presumption of ineligibility.” 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(2)(i).
Submission of the I–600 petition and accompanying evidence “triggers a
consular officer to conduct what is called an I–604 investigation into the
veracity of the child being orphaned (i.e., verifying documentation, researching
the child’s age, hometown, etc.).” Skalka, 246 F. Supp. 3d at 150. A consular
officer must complete this investigation “in every orphan case,” and
“[d]epending on the circumstances surrounding the case, the I–604
investigation shall include, but shall not necessarily be limited to, document
checks, telephonic checks, interview(s) with the natural parent(s), and/or a
field investigation.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(k)(1). When confronted with a foreign
court decree, order, or certificate, an officer “[s]hould consider all evidence
regarding the circumstances of the child’s eligibility,” and may “question the
validity of a decree or order for various reasons,” including “[l]ack of parental
consent to the adoption; [n]o or improper notice of termination of parental
rights; [e]vidence of corruption, fraud, or material misrepresentation; [l]ack of
due process or appropriate safeguards in the country or jurisdiction issuing the
order; or [o]ther credible and probative evidence to question the reliability of
the documentation.” USCIS Policy Manual Vol. 5, Part C, Ch. 8(C)(2); see 8
C.F.R. § 204.3(k)(2) (“The consular officer’s adjudication includes all aspects of
eligibility for classification as an orphan under section 101(b)(1)(F) of the
Act . . . .”).
If the consular officer determines the application is “not clearly
approvable,” he refers it to the USCIS office in the jurisdiction. 8 C.F.R.
§ 204.3(k)(2). The USCIS office then reviews the findings and makes a final
determination on the I–600 petition after providing the parents with notice
and an opportunity to present contrary evidence. See id.; 8 C.F.R.
§ 103.2(b)(11) (“In response to a request for evidence or a notice of intent to
deny . . . the applicant or petitioner may: submit a complete response
containing all requested information at any time within the period afforded.”).
Ultimately, “[t]he standard of proof for establishing eligibility for orphan
petitions is that of a preponderance of the evidence. The [prospective adoptive
parent] meets this standard if the evidence permits a reasonable person to
conclude that the claim that the child is an orphan is probably true.” USCIS
Policy Manual Vol. 5, Part C, Ch. 8(B).
B. Factual Background
Plaintiff Justin Helmuth and his wife, Drew Helmuth, are United States
citizens and residents of Sarasota, Florida, who engaged an accredited
adoption service provider to help them adopt a child from Living Fountain
Orphanage in Lagos, Nigeria. See Joint Statement of Material Facts (JSMF)
(Doc. 24) ¶¶ 1–2 (citing Certified Administrative Record (CAR) (Doc. 19-3) at
128, 135, 342, 349)); see CAR at 390. In 2021, with the consent of the
orphanage’s founder, the Helmuths adopted the child and renamed him S-J-H.
JSMF ¶¶ 3, 8, 14–15 (citing CAR at 175, 292, 346–47, 369, 375–80). S-J-H was
released to the Helmuths for a two-week bonding period, after which the Yaba
Magisterial District Court “finalized the child’s adoption, conferring legal
custody to the Helmuths.” Id. ¶¶ 19–20 (citing CAR at 292, 377–80).
1. First I-600 Petition
The Helmuths filed their first Form I-600 petition with USCIS on
November 4, 2021. Id. ¶¶ 4, 22; see CAR at 340–56. The petition represented
that S-J-H was an orphan because “he . . . has no parents due to the death or
disappearance of, abandonment or desertion by, or separation or loss from both
parents.” CAR at 346. Just over a month later, USCIS issued a Request for
Evidence (RFE), requesting (among other things) a police report referenced in
the original submission and the “Orphanage Intake Report for the child.” Id.
at 336. As relevant here, the Helmuths submitted (1) a Nigerian Police
Incident Report Form, dated September 5, 2019, (2) a Lagos State Government
Medical report regarding S.J.H., dated January 28, 2022, and (3) Living
Fountain Orphanage’s “Introduction of [S-J-H] 2 Years Old,” dated August 25,
2021. JSMF ¶ 28; CAR at 326, 329–34.
On May 17, 2022, the Fraud Prevention Manager at the U.S. Consulate
General in Lagos, Nigeria, submitted to USCIS a Form I-604 and
accompanying memorandum concluding that the Helmuths “failed to satisfy
their burden that the child is an orphan under any of the sub definitions in
[the INA].” CAR at 322–25; JSMF ¶¶ 29–30. The memorandum first explained
that, “though the child was alleged to have been abandoned at a maternity
home, no government officials attempted to visit the maternity home until 19
months after the initial [police] report.” JSMF ¶ 31 (citing CAR at 323).
Additionally, the memorandum “noted an absence of information concerning
investigation into claims that the owner of the maternity home had stolen the
baby,” that “the date of birth on [S-J-H’s] birth certificate . . . was after the date
on which [he] was allegedly first encountered,” that “there was a 13-day
timeframe during which it is unclear where the child resided,” and finally “that
the maternity home no longer existed and . . . may never have.” Id. ¶¶ 31–35
(citing CAR at 323).
On July 26, 2022, USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID) the
Helmuths’ I-600 petition. Id. ¶ 41. In response, the Helmuths submitted
additional documentation, including “Lagos State Magistrate Court
documentation, photographs, letters, affidavits, the transcript of an interview
with the founder of Living Fountain Orphanage, and a police report.” Id. ¶ 45
(citing CAR at 286–312). Among other credibility concerns with the later-
submitted evidence, USCIS found it not “plausible that had this information
been available and valid prior to issuance of the NOID that it would not have
been submitted at the time the Form I-600 was filed or at an earlier time.”
CAR at 42. USCIS ultimately denied the I-600 petition for failure to
demonstrate that S-J-H satisfied the INA’s definition of an “orphan” under any
sub-definition, including abandonment or desertion. JSMF ¶ 46; CAR at 37–
43.
2. Second I-600 Petition
On May 3, 2023, the Helmuths filed a second Form I-600 petition to
classify S-J-H as an immediate relative and submitted additional
documentation not previously provided to USCIS. JSMF ¶¶ 47, 49; see CAR at
126–42. Again, the petition represented that S-J-H was an orphan because
“he . . . has no parents due to the death or disappearance of, abandonment or
desertion by, or separation or loss from both parents.” CAR at 132; see id. at 24
(arguing that “the child was left at a clinic by an unknown person, and no one
claimed the child for nearly five years. This child was abandoned.”).
On May 10, 2024, the Fraud Prevention Manager at the U.S. Consulate
General submitted a Form I-604 and accompanying memorandum finding that
the Helmuths’ additional evidence, when considered alongside the previous
evidence, failed to show that S-J-H was an orphan under any of the INA’s sub-
definitions. See CAR at 10; id. at 11 (“The facts cited by the Consulate in our
initial NCA memo hold.”). Ultimately, “[k]nowing the amount of human
trafficking and child buying that occurs in the area where the child allegedly
originated, and thus the distinct possibility that the child may have originated
from one of these rings,” the consular officer wrote that he could not in “good
conscience approve the I-604 without sufficient credible evidence to support
the child’s orphan status under the INA.”1 Id. at 12.
On July 16, 2024, USCIS issued another NOID, listing the over fifty
pieces of documentary evidence submitted and explaining the bases for the
intended denial. See CAR at 117–25. Specifically, there was insufficient
evidence that S-J-H was abandoned. See id. at 121–22. On that score, a
September 3, 2019 police report “states the child was reportedly abandoned at
a maternity home in Lagos on August 25, 2019,” but no records confirm the
birth mother’s name or identity, and “[n]o government officials attempted to
visit the maternity home until 19 (nineteen) months after the initial report.”
Id. at 121. Further, the police report lists “an incident that occurred on August
25, 2019, and states that the action taken was a ‘Petition on official corruption
and unlawful detention and threat to life was approved and referred to Anti-
Human trafficking D10 Section for further Investigation and report.’ ” Id. But
the Helmuths “provided no follow-up information to this incident report,” and
thus “[t]here is a question as to whether the child was kidnapped or abducted.”
1 The consular officer’s discussion accords with the State Department’s advice to
“prospective adoptive parents to reconsider intercountry adoptions from Nigeria” due
to “concerns about the systemic fraud and lack of oversight in the adoption processes
in Nigeria.” U.S. Department of State, Intercountry Adoption Notice (Mar. 13, 2024),
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/News/Intercountry-Adoption-News/the-
department-of-state-continues-to-advise-prospective-adoptive.html
[https://perma.cc/DF4P-FV9Z]. Notably, USCIS denied over seventy percent of
Nigerian Form I-600 petitions in 2023. See id.
Id. Further, “[i]t is unclear who decided on the date of birth for the child or how
the stated date of birth could be possible since the listed date of birth on the
birth certificate and the Ministry paperwork . . . is over a week after the child
was first encountered on August 28, 2019.” Id. Finally, “[i]t is also unclear
where the child was between September 3, 2019, when the police report was
taken, and September 16, 2019, when the Living Fountain Orphanage received
the child from the Ministry.” Id.
Likewise, the NOID concluded that S-J-H did “not meet the definition of
orphan by any other sub definition of orphan,” including desertion,
disappearance, or loss from both parents. Id. at 122. To satisfy the definition
of desertion in particular, the notice advised the Helmuths to “submit[]
evidence that the child’s natural parents have deserted the child; meaning that
the parent(s) have willfully forsaken the child and have refused to carry out
normal parental rights and obligations, and as a result, the child has become
a ward of a competent authority in accordance with the laws of the foreign-
sending country.” Id.
Although the Helmuths submitted additional documentation in response
to the NOID, USCIS denied the second I-600 petition on February 4, 2025.
JSMF ¶ 56; CAR at 1–9. USCIS’s decision listed all pieces of documentary
evidence submitted by the Helmuths but again concluded that there was
“insufficient evidence that the child meets the abandonment definition of
orphan, or is an orphan by any of the other sub definitions of orphan as defined
by INA [§] 101(b)(1)(F)(i).” CAR at 5. Raising concerns over inconsistent or
absent pieces of evidence, USCIS explained that “the origin story presented is
not credible” and the agency therefore “cannot determine the true origins, age,
or identity of the child,” or the child’s parents. See id. at 6–8. Due to USCIS’s
denial of the visa petition, “S-J-H continues to reside at the Living Fountain
Orphanage in Lagos, Nigeria.” JSMF ¶ 21; CAR at 348.
Justin Helmuth filed the present action alleging that USCIS’s final
decision is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. Compl. ¶¶ 106–
128. Helmuth asks this Court to hold the decision unlawful, set it aside, and
“[d]eclar[e S-J-H] an orphan and [Helmuth’s] immediate relative under the
[INA].” See id. at 20 (Prayer for Relief). The government moves for summary
judgment on Helmuth’s APA claims, U.S. MSJ (Doc. 23), and Helmuth
responds in opposition, Helmuth Resp. (Doc. 26). Helmuth also moves for
summary judgment on his APA claims, Helmuth MSJ (Doc. 25), and the
government responds, U.S. Resp. (Doc. 27).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Challenges to agency action under the APA are properly adjudicated on
cross motions for summary judgment. See Fla. Fruit & Vegetable Ass’n v.
Brock, 771 F.2d 1455, 1459 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The summary judgment
procedure is particularly appropriate in cases in which the court is asked to
review . . . a decision of a federal administrative agency.”). Ordinarily, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs review of a motion for summary judgment.
But “when a party seeks review of agency action under the APA, the district
judge sits as an appellate tribunal,” and “[t]he ‘entire case’ on review is a
question of law.” Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C.
Cir. 2001). Thus, the substantive standard in Rule 56—whether there is a
genuine dispute as to any material fact—does not apply here. See Fulbright v.
McHugh, 67 F. Supp. 3d 81, 89 (D.D.C. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Fulbright v.
Murphy, 650 F. App’x 3 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (per curiam). Instead, “[s]ummary
judgment is the mechanism for deciding whether as a matter of law the agency
action is supported by the administrative record and is otherwise consistent
with the APA standard of review.” See CS–360, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans
Affairs, 101 F. Supp. 3d 29, 32 (D.D.C. 2015) (citation modified).
Under the APA, a reviewing court must “hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A). In reaching its determination, “a court reviews legal issues de
novo, including by applying its ‘independent judgment’ to statutory-
interpretation questions.” Lopez-Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 149 F.4th 1202,
1207 (11th Cir. 2025) (citing Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369,
391–92, 412 (2024)). The challenger to agency action ultimately carries the
“heavy burden” to show that such action was arbitrary and capricious. Legal
Env’t Assistance Found., Inc. v. EPA, 276 F.3d 1253, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001).
III. ANALYSIS
The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment require me to
determine whether USCIS’s decision denying Helmuth’s second petition to
classify S-J-H as an immediate relative was arbitrary and capricious or
otherwise unlawful under the APA.
Judicial review under the APA is “narrow” and deferential. FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009) (citation modified). The
Court may not “substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Id. Rather, “[a]n
agency’s decision will not be overturned as long as the agency examined the
relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action including
a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Ga. Dep’t
of Educ. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 883 F.3d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation
modified). In doing so, “it is well established that the [agency] need not address
specifically each claim the petitioner made or each piece of evidence the
petitioner presented.” Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 779 F.3d 1284, 1302 (11th
Cir. 2015) (citation modified). But while courts must “uphold a decision of less
than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned,” they “may
not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has
not given.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
Helmuth brings two claims challenging USCIS’s decision as arbitrary
and capricious. First, Helmuth contends that “USCIS failed to consider the
[Nigerian] Magistrate Court’s decision to identify and declare S-H- a ‘ward of
the state’ in accordance with Section 1 of the Child’s Rights Law of Lagos
State,” which he says constitutes primary evidence that S-J-H was deserted
under USCIS’s own policies. Compl. ¶¶ 114–19. By failing to do so, Helmuth
says USCIS did not consider whether S-J-H was deserted. See Helmuth Resp.
at 3–4. Second, Helmuth asserts that USCIS’s decision impermissibly
“collaterally attacked the [Nigerian] Magistrate Court’s adoption order which
found S-H- a ward of the state sub silentio.” Compl. ¶ 125. In moving for
summary judgment, USCIS counters that the agency “properly considered all
evidence” and “did not discard inconvenient facts or collaterally attack the
validity of the Nigerian adoption decree.” U.S. MSJ at 1. I address each claim
in turn.
A. USCIS did not fail to consider evidence of a Nigerian court
order deeming S-J-H a ward of the state
At the core, Helmuth’s first challenge concerns a purported Nigerian
Magistrate Court order finding that S-J-H was a “ward of the state,” and
USCIS’s alleged failure to consider or defer to that finding. According to
Helmuth, “S-J-H was ‘declared a ward of the State by a Court order issued by
the Magistrate Court, Ebute Metta, Lagos on 9th October, 2019, since his birth
family could not be identified.’ ” Helmuth MSJ at 12 (quoting CAR at 96)
(citation modified). Helmuth argues that per USCIS’s own policy manual, the
court order constitutes “[p]rimary evidence of . . . desertion” that USCIS
arbitrarily failed to consider. Id. at 13 (quoting USCIS Policy Manual Vol. 5,
Part C, Chapter 7(B)(4)). In response, USCIS identifies two flaws in Helmuth’s
position, one factual and one legal.
i. USCIS permissibly discredited evidence related to the
Nigerian Magistrate Court’s care order
As a factual matter, “USCIS does not dispute that Plaintiff legally
adopted S-J-H- in accordance with Nigerian law,” U.S. MSJ at 11, but instead
asserts that “there is no court order making S-J-H- a ward of the state,” U.S.
Resp. at 3, see also id. at 5 & n.1. For that reason, USCIS argues that it fairly
“considered an abundance of evidence,” including the court and other
government records, and reasonably discredited certain evidence. U.S. MSJ at
19. I agree.
USCIS first explains that most of Helmuth’s record citations refer to
external, third-party statements concerning the court order, not the order
itself. Start with Helmuth’s principal citation to the CAR at pages 92–97, 224,
and 304. See Helmuth MSJ at 12, 16. As USCIS correctly details, these
citations refer to the “unsworn statement given by Lady Beth Obieri,” the
founder of Living Fountain Orphanage, in September 2022. U.S. Resp. at 5 n.1.
In its original NOID, USCIS explained that it discredited Obieri’s statement
because it was “dated after the issuance of the NOID,” and thus did not provide
contemporaneous evidence. See CAR at 42; see also CAR at 3 (listing Obieri’s
statement as evidence considered in issuing final decision). Thus, even absent
explicit discussion, the record reflects that USCIS considered this evidence.
Next, Helmuth also relies on a March 2023 affidavit from Adetutu Ipaye,
an employee in the Ministry of Youth and Social Development, which states
“[t]hat the child has become a ward of the State as provided for under relevant
laws concerning children in Lagos State,” CAR at 203. USCIS suggests that
Ipaye’s statement is not equivalent to a court order, nor should it be credited
because it contains factual inaccuracies regarding S-J-H’s “health status.” See
U.S. Reply at 5–7 (Doc. 28) (explaining that, despite Ipaye’s statement, the
record “lacks an order from the Magistrate Court declaring that S-J-H- is a
ward of the state.”). And although USCIS’s denial order did not mention
Ipaye’s affidavit regarding whether S-J-H was a ward of the state, USCIS
ultimately found the affidavit not credible to establish S-J-H’s whereabouts
between the dates of September 3 and September 10, 2019. See CAR at 7 (“Ms.
Ipaye does not work for the police” and “[t]here is no direct evidence from the
police that the child was in their custody for a week or that they are even
equipped to house and care for a newborn infant.”). As with Obieri’s statement,
I cannot reweigh the evidence to undermine USCIS’s credibility determination
about Ipaye’s affidavit, which does not “constitute a foreign court proceeding,
decree, order, finding, or judgment that would be entitled to any deference
under USCIS’ Policy Manual or international law.” Muozoba v. Jaddou, No.
1:23-CV-1112 (GTS/MJK), 2024 WL 3968900, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2024).
So far as I can tell, the only documents that match Helmuth’s description
of this specific Magistrate Court order are an unsigned family court “Care
Order” between the “[Ministry of Youth and Social Development]” and the
child, and a handwritten note signed by “C.M Admin” extending the care order
multiple times. See CAR at 243–44. The orders do not explicitly state that S-J-
H is a ward of any competent authority, nor does Helmuth explain how these
two documents establish S-J-H’s abandonment or desertion by his birth
parents.2 See id. at 243. And despite Helmuth’s contention that USCIS “never
offered a reasoned explanation for why this important aspect of the case was
not investigated,” Helmuth Reply at 4 (Doc. 29), USCIS’s decision explicitly
references the care order, noting that it was “unsigned, with an attached
2 Similarly, the August 2021 Nigerian Magistrate Court order declaring the
Helmuths “the Legal Parents of [S-J-H]” did not explicitly make a finding that S-J-H
had been designated as a ward of the state, and that order does not mention his birth
parents at all. See CAR at 246–249; see also U.S. MSJ at 15.
handwritten document with additional dates written for the Care Order and
signed by C.M. Admin,” CAR at 1. Likewise, USCIS’s earlier denial explained
that the care order’s “lack of signatures, lack of court letterhead, confused
pronoun reference all point to the lack of credibility of the documents and the
purported evidence included within them.” CAR at 41–42. USCIS permissibly
evaluated this evidence. See Anameze v. Jaddou, No. 1:24-CV-192 (MAD/PJE),
2025 WL 447742, at *15 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2025) (explaining that USCIS
reasonably considered deficiencies in a similar Nigerian magistrate court
order). Arbitrary and capricious review does not permit me to reweigh these
determinations, which appear to align with USCIS’s policy statements.3 See
USCIS Policy Manual Vol. 5, Part C, Ch. 8(C)(2) (permitting an official’s
consideration of “credible and probative evidence to question the reliability of
the [court] documentation”). In sum, USCIS’s decision reflects that the agency
considered court documents purporting to show S-J-H’s designation as a ward
of the state and permissibly found the documents not to be credible.
3 Of course, “agency interpretations contained in policy statements, manuals, and
enforcement guidelines are not entitled to the force of law.” United States v. R&F
Props. of Lake County, Inc., 433 F.3d 1349, 1357 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Christensen
v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)). But an agency’s operation in accordance
with its own policies is relevant to whether it acted arbitrarily and capriciously. See
Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 971 F.3d 1258, 1268 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (“If an agency
announces and follows—by rule or by settled course of adjudication—a general policy
by which its exercise of discretion will be governed,” an irrational departure from that
policy “could constitute action that must be overturned” (citation modified)).
ii. USCIS did not fail to consider relevant evidence of
whether S-J-H was an orphan by desertion
As for the legal relevance of the Nigerian court orders, USCIS contends
that even if a competent authority found that S-J-H was “a ward of the state,”
that alone would be insufficient to conclude that S-J-H’s parents deserted him
because the INA’s definition also requires the parents’ refusal to carry out their
rights and obligations. See U.S. MSJ at 9–11, 14; U.S. Resp. at 5–6. So, USCIS
says it did not need to address the orders in detail. Helmuth pivots in response,
claiming that USCIS failed to adequately address desertion because “a local
authority – and not a foreign court – can declare a child to be a ward of the
state.” Helmuth Resp. at 8. Even so, the record reflects that USCIS considered
this issue and the evidence to the extent it was relevant.
Although the INA does not specifically define either “abandonment” or
“desertion,” USCIS’s regulations purport to do so.4 On the latter term,
4 Neither party discusses whether Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S.
369 (2024), impacts how I should assess the regulations’ definition of terms left
undefined in the INA, namely “abandonment” and “desertion.” Absent any argument
by Helmuth either that the INA is ambiguous or that USCIS’s definitions do not
accord with its text, I proceed on the view that Section 204.3(b)’s sub-definitions are
consistent with the meaning of “orphan” in the INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(F)(i).
And I observe that the regulatory definitions broadly track the terms’ ordinary
meanings. See Abandon, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/6133739204 (“To give up (a thing or person) to the
control or discretion of another; to surrender or relinquish completely to another
person or agent.”); Desert, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/1049493802 (“To forsake (a person, institution, cause,
etc., having moral or legal claims upon one)”).
“[d]esertion by both parents means that the parents have willfully forsaken
their child and have refused to carry out their parental rights and obligations
and that, as a result, the child has become a ward of a competent authority in
accordance with the laws of the foreign-sending country.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(b)
(emphasis added); see CAR at 11 (using this same definition). A “[c]ompetent
authority means a court or governmental agency of a foreign-sending country
having jurisdiction and authority to make decisions in matters of child welfare,
including adoption.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(b). USCIS’s policy manual repeats the
above formulation but adds that “[d]esertion differs from abandonment in that
the parents have not taken steps to divest themselves of parental duties, but
the parents’ inaction has caused a local authority to step in to assume custody
of the child.” USCIS Policy Manual Vol. 5, Part C, Chapter 4(B)(2).
While I agree with Helmuth that a court order need not explicitly
designate S-J-H a ward of a competent authority to suggest that “a local
authority . . . stepp[ed] in to assume custody of the child,” the critical factor is
why the authority intervened in the first place. At bottom, then, Helmuth is
incorrect that, “[u]nlike abandonment, desertion does not require proof that
the parents have willfully forsaken their rights to the child.” Helmuth MSJ at
5; see CAR at 7 (“An element of abandonment, disappearance, and desertion
requires that the birth parent has ‘willfully’ forsaken parental rights.”). These
two orphan sub-definitions hinge on the child’s parents’ conduct and require
that the parents willfully gave up their parental rights either by action or
inaction. In either case, that a competent authority assumed control of the
child can rarely be dispositive of the statutory inquiry absent evidence of the
parents’ “willful” decision. For this reason, Helmuth’s argument that USCIS
did not consider “desertion,” or that it only attempts to do so post-hoc, is
misguided.
To be sure, USCIS’s denial decision focuses on why the evidence was
insufficient to establish “that the child meets the abandonment definition of an
orphan.” CAR at 5. That makes sense, given that Helmuth’s primary argument
in support of the I-600 petition was that “[t]his child was abandoned.” Id. at
24; see generally id. at 17–25 (declining to discuss desertion in response to the
NOID). But USCIS also concluded that the evidence did not show that S-J-H
was “an orphan by any of the other sub definitions of orphan,” including by
desertion. As USCIS argues, its decision “explained that the evidence
submitted painted an unclear picture as to the child’s true identity and the
circumstances surrounding his birth.” U.S. MSJ at 20. Those circumstances
are equally relevant to desertion.
For example, no evidence confirmed S-J-H’s whereabouts for the seven-
day period between the September 3, 2019 police report and S-J-H’s arrival at
his first orphanage. See CAR at 7. And USCIS explained that S-J-H’s birth
certificate, which was issued by the Nigerian government in 2021, listed a
birthdate seven days after the date when police were first contacted concerning
his alleged abandonment. See id. at 5–6, 185, 205. The Nigerian Population
Commission was unable to amend the birth certificate after the fact because
“no qualified informants or credible persons who could narrate the true facts
of his birth have been presented . . . .” Id. at 6, 181. And questions remained
regarding S-J-H’s birth mother and the maternity clinic that was shut down in
2019 due to allegations of child trafficking. Id. at 7; see id. at 8 (“[T]he State
Health Agency has no record of any Floridec maternity clinic, and the actual
Flofidel maternity clinic was closed due to allegations of child trafficking.”).
Notably, “[t]here is no name for the birth mother or the child listed in the police
incident report form, dated September 3, 2019,” and “[n]o records were
provided from the maternity clinic or anyone who worked there who would
have had firsthand knowledge of the alleged abandonment.” Id. at 6; see id. at
70–72, 205. The September 3, 2019 police report “records a statement by the
husband of the purported owner of the maternity home that his wife was
accused of stealing the baby by some unknown people,” but no details were
provided regarding any follow-up investigation. See id. at 6, 205.
Further, an October 5, 2021 report from the Helmuths’ adoption service
provider, Morgan Hill Children Foundation, suggests that, per a Nigerian
State CID report, “the woman carrying the baby on August 26[, 2019] . . . was
taking the baby to another hospital and that she was arrested along with the
owner of the Floridec maternity home.” Id. at 6. But USCIS received no
“contemporaneous evidence of the arrest or interrogation of” either woman, nor
did the later police report mention the arrests. Ultimately, USCIS concluded
that “[t]here is a question as to whether the child was kidnapped or abducted,”
an issue that “directly contradicts a presumption that the birth parent willfully
has forsaken parental obligations and rights,” as necessary for Helmuth to
establish that S-J-H was either abandoned or deserted. See id. at 7.
So far as Helmuth addresses the record on this point, he contests its
relevance because “[t]he definition of an orphan does not require proof of the
[child’s] ‘origin story.’ ” Helmuth Resp. at 12. In other words, in “speculating”
about the facts of S-J-H’s purported abandonment, Helmuth falls back into his
core argument that “USCIS entirely failed to appreciate that the Nigerian
government had made the child a ward of the state, which rendered [his]
parents’ identity and actions . . . no longer required to prove he was an
orphan.” Id.; see Helmuth Reply at 4 (arguing that the Helmuths “did present
evidence that a local authority had stepped in to assume custody of S-J-H and
declare him a ward of the state”). Helmuth relies on Blanford v. USCIS for the
proposition that “[n]othing in either the United States Code or the Code of
Federal Regulations requires USCIS to verify, or Plaintiff to prove, the
children’s age or place of birth.” 741 F. Supp. 3d at 789. That is true but
incomplete. As Blanford “concede[d],” the “age and place of birth could be
relevant in determining the identity [of a child],” particularly when kidnapping
or trafficking concerns exists. Id. But unlike Blanford, where evidence of the
mother’s identity was “so overwhelming,” id., the circumstances of S-J-H’s
“origin story” here directly relate to whether his birth mother (or father, for
that matter) had “willfully forsaken [her] child and [had] refused to carry out
their parental rights and obligations.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(b).
Absent the threshold finding, whether a Nigerian court had “reasonable
grounds to believe S-J-H- was in need of care, protection, or control,” see
Helmuth Resp. at 13, is not enough to render him an orphan under the INA.
See Nwankwere v. Jaddou, No. 1:22-CV-01212-SKO, 2023 WL 5835785, at *11
(E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2023) (finding that “USCIS repeatedly highlighted the
inconsistencies in the evidence as to the child’s identity and its concerns
regarding the legitimacy of the child’s claims origins,” notwithstanding a
Nigerian government ministry’s determination “that the child was considered
abandoned, orphaned, and qualified to be adopted”). To the extent that USCIS
declined to engage with the care or adoption orders, USCIS’s decision was not
arbitrary and capricious in the light of countervailing evidence that S-J-H’s
birth parents did not willfully forsake him.
B. USCIS’s decision is not an impermissible collateral attack
on the judgment of a Nigerian court
In a similar line of attack to the first, Helmuth asserts that USCIS’s
“failure to consider and examine the significance that S-J-H- was declared a
ward of the state constitutes an impermissible attack on a foreign judgment.”
Helmuth MSJ at 14; see Compl. ¶¶ 120–28. According to Helmuth, under
international law, “a final judgment of a court of a foreign state . . . confirming
the status of a person . . . is entitled to recognition in courts of the United
States.” Helmuth MSJ at 14 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law, § 481 (1987)). USCIS counters that “the validity of the Nigerian court
judgment is not at issue here,” only whether Helmuth provided sufficient
evidence to satisfy that S-J-H was an orphan under the INA. U.S. MSJ at 24–
25. Because neither foreign court order resolves the definitional question, I
agree.
The principal dispute here regards the preclusive effect of multiple
Nigerian court orders, beginning with the October 9, 2019 care order.
Repeatedly, Helmuth posits that “competent authorities had pursued a care
order for S-J-H- and a foreign court declared the child a ward of the state.”
Helmuth MSJ at 15; Helmuth Reply at 4 (“[A] local authority had stepped in
to assume custody of S-J-H- and make him a ward of the state.”). But as USCIS
notes, this initial, unsigned care order, did not expressly make such a finding.
See U.S. MSJ at 15–16; U.S. Reply at 5. Apparently conceding as much,
Helmuth responds that because “the Court issued an order placing the child
under the supervision of an appropriate authority . . . by operation of
[Nigerian] law S-J-H- became a ward of the state.”5 Helmuth Resp. at 13.
As an initial matter, Helmuth’s position is doubtful because Nigerian law
distinguishes between care orders and wardship orders. As relevant here,
Nigeria’s Child’s Rights Laws outline several scenarios that authorize a police
officer to “bring a child before the Court,” including if the child “is an orphan
or is deserted by relatives.” See Child’s Rights Laws, § 44(1)(a) (Doc. 25-1). In
certain circumstances, a Nigerian court may issue a care or supervision order
placing the child “in the care of a designated authorised person” or “under the
supervision of a designated appropriate authority or supervision officer” if “the
care given to the child . . . is not what a parent would reasonably be expected
to give to the child,” or “the child is beyond parental control.” Id. § 47(1)(a)–(b),
(2)(a)–(b). “Where a care order is granted with respect to a child, it will be the
duty of the State Government and the appropriate authority designated by the
order to receive the child into its care while the order remains in force.” Id.
5 To the extent that Helmuth asks this Court to consider foreign law, he has given
sufficient notice as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1. “In determining
foreign law, the court may consider any relevant material or source, including
testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules
of Evidence.” FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1. I thus consider the Nigerian statutes attached to
Helmuth’s motion for summary judgment. See (Doc. 25-1).
§ 49(1). During that time, however, the “State Government or an appropriate
authority” must “allow the child reasonable contact with . . . the parents of the
child,” id. § 50(1)(a), suggesting that the child’s parents need not have deserted
or abandoned him as understood within the meaning of the INA.
Additionally, the wardship proceedings Helmuth references appear to be
separate proceedings altogether, with mutually exclusive orders. See Helmuth
MSJ at 14–16. A different Child’s Rights Laws provision states that “[w]here
an application is made for an order in respect of a child, the child becomes a
ward of court on the making of the order.” Child’s Rights Laws, § 86(2). In turn,
“[w]here it appears to the Court that there are exceptional circumstances
making it impracticable for a ward of court to be . . . under the care of either of
the ward’s parents . . . the Court may . . . make an order committing the care
of the ward to an appropriate authority.” Id. § 88(1). But even once a wardship
is ordered by the court, “[t]he drafting of a care order with respect to a child
who is . . . a ward of court, brings that wardship to an end.” Id. § 49(10)(b).
Helmuth does not reconcile these differences, nor does he point to other record
evidence of wardship proceedings related to S-J-H. See U.S. Resp. at 5 n.1
(explaining that “there was no application made for wardship proceedings”).
Ultimately, and as discussed above, S-J-H’s wardship alone remains
insufficient to satisfy all parts of the “abandonment” or “desertion” definitions.
Similar limitations apply to the Nigerian Family Court’s adoption order.
See CAR at 246–249. Again, USCIS does not contest the order’s validity,
conceding that the U.S. Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) “makes clear that
adoption in a foreign country is governed by the standards and criteria that
country establishes,” which the federal government must then “generally
accept.” U.S. MSJ at 10 (citing 9 FAM § 502.3-1(G)(a), (e)). None of USCIS’s
findings were “contrary to the Nigerian decree” that recognized the Helmuths
as S-J-H’s adoptive parents under Nigerian law. See U.S. MSJ at 25; CAR at
246–49. That September 8, 2021 order—printed on the Magistrate Court’s
letterhead and signed by the Family Court Chairman and Assessor—declares
the Helmuths as S-J-H’s legal parents, gives them consent “to take [S-J-H] out
of the Court’s jurisdiction and out of the Country Nigeria,” and attaches certain
monitoring conditions to the adoption. See CAR at 246–49. Insofar as the
adoption order recognizes S-J-H’s “status” as the Helmuths’ adoptive child
under Nigerian law, USCIS’s decision does not disturb that recognition.
Instead, USCIS merely determined that, notwithstanding his
classification under Nigerian law, S-J-H did not meet the INA’s “orphan”
definition based on the evidence submitted. Helmuth does not persuade that
the Nigerian court’s “status” determination overlaps with the federal statutory
definition of “orphan” such that accepting it would compel USCIS to decide in
his favor. In fact, USCIS’s regulations contemplate different types of evidence
for each finding. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(d)(1)(iii) (“Evidence that the child
is an orphan”), with id. § 204.3(d)(1)(iv) (“Evidence of adoption abroad or that
the prospective adoptive parents have . . . custody of the orphan for emigration
and adoption in accordance with the laws of the foreign-sending country.”).
Here, “[t]he fact that the Magistrate’s Court may have considered evidence . . .
that purports to attest to the identity and orphanhood of the child[] before
issuing [the] decree[] does not mean that the Magistrate’s Court rendered
findings on those issues, and [Helmuth] has presented no allegation, evidence,
or legal authority to suggest that the Magistrate’s Court was required to make
such findings to effectuate a valid adoption pursuant to Nigerian law.”
Muozoba, 2024 WL 3968900, at *6. USCIS’s decision did not impermissibly
collaterally attack the Nigerian court’s adoption decree.
* * *
Like other courts that have addressed similar challenges, I recognize
“that adopting a child is one of the most selfless acts a person can undertake”
and am mindful of “the weight of this case and the impact this decision may
have on [Helmuth], his wife, and [S-J-H].” Anameze, 2025 WL 447742, at *16.
But I have no lawful authority to deviate from the heavily circumscribed limits
of judicial review in this case. Because USCIS’s decision denying Helmuth’s
petition was not arbitrary or capricious, I cannot set it aside.
IV. CONCLUSION
The following is therefore ORDERED:
1. Defendant United States Citizenship and Immigration Services’
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 23) is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff Justin Helmuth’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
25) is DENIED.
3. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment against Plaintiff and for
Defendant, and to CLOSE this case.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on April 21, 2026.
pall
United States District Judge
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