The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
LAZARO LUIS MARTINEZ
RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner,
v. Case No.: 2:26-cv-01032-SPC-NPM
WARDEN, FLORIDA SOFT SIDE
SOUTH DETENTION CENTER et
al.,
Respondents,
/
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are petitioner Lazaro Luis Martinez Rodriguez’s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) and the government’s response
(Doc. 5). For the below reasons, the Court grants the petition.
Martinez Rodriguez is a native of Cuba who applied for admission into
the United States on April 17, 2015. He was deemed inadmissible but paroled
into the country under the Cuban Adjustment Act. Martinez Rodriguez later
applied for adjustment of status, but his application was denied. On May 1,
2018, he was arrested for domestic battery. An immigration judge ordered him
removed on May 15, 2018. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
detained Martinez Rodriguez until August 3, 2018, when he was released on
an order of supervision.
In December 2025, local law enforcement arrested Martinez Rodriguez
for driving on a suspended license and handed him over to ICE. In February
2026, ICE took Martinez Rodriguez to the Mexican border but did not remove
him. The only explanation why is a vague claim that Martinez Rodriguez did
not comply with removal. In any case, ICE returned him to Alligator Alcatraz,
where he remains detained.
“Once a noncitizen’s order of removal becomes administratively final, the
Government ‘shall’ remove the person within 90 days.” Singh v. U.S. Attorney
Gen., 945 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)).
The government must detain the noncitizen during the 90-day removal period,
which begins when the removal order becomes administratively final. Id.
Detention may continue after the removal period, but not indefinitely.
In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held, “if removal is not
reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention
unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.” 533 U.S. 678, 700-01
(2001). If removal is not practically attainable, detention no longer serves its
statutory purpose of “assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.”
Id. at 699. The Court found it unlikely Congress “believed that all reasonably
foreseeably removals could be accomplished in [90 days].” Id at 701. So, “for
the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts,” it established a
“presumptively reasonable period of detention” of six months—the 90-day
removal period plus an additional 90 days. Id. Courts use a burden-shifting
framework to judge the constitutionality of additional post-removal detention:
After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe
that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence
sufficient to rebut the showing.
Id.
The government argues Martinez Rodriguez’s petition is premature
because his current detention has not exceeded 180 days. They assume the
six-month presumptively reasonable period of detention resets each time a
noncitizen is detained. That assumption is inconsistent with Zadvydas. It
would effectively allow DHS to detain noncitizens indefinitely and avoid
judicial scrutiny by releasing and re-detaining them every 180 days. As the
Eleventh Circuit recognized, “[t]he Supreme Court’s stated rationale for
establishing a presumptively reasonable ‘6-month period’ for detention
pending removal supports our conclusion that this period commences at the
beginning of the removal period.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052
n.3 (11th Cir. 2002).
Because the six-month period for presumptively reasonable detention
has expired, Zadvydas’s burden-shifting framework applies. Martinez
Rodriguez has carried his initial burden by showing a good reason to believe
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future. ICE was unable to remove him to Cuba in 2018, and the government
has made no meaningful progress towards removal since then.
The burden thus shifts to the government. ICE points to its February
2026 attempt to send Martinez Rodriguez to Mexico. But the evidence before
the Court suggests that was an informal effort to compel voluntary departure,
not an above-board removal attempt that complied with statutory and
constitutional requirements. See Andriasian v. Immigr. and Naturalization
Servs., 180 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Failing to notify individuals who
are subject to deportation that they have the right to apply for asylum in the
United States and for withholding of deportation to the country to which they
will be deported violates both INS regulations and the constitutional right to
due process.”); see also D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, --- F. Supp.
3d ---, 2026 WL 521557 (D. Mass. Feb. 25, 2026) (setting aside DHS’s current
third-country removal policy because it violates noncitizens’ right to seek fear-
based relief under the Convention Against Torture). ICE makes no attempt to
show it can lawfully remove Martinez Rodriguez in the reasonably foreseeable
future.
The Court finds no significant likelihood Martinez Rodriguez will be
removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. He is entitled to release from
detention under Zadvydas. If removal becomes likely in the reasonably
foreseeable future, ICE can detain Martinez Rodriguez to “assur[e] [his]
presence at the moment of removal.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 680.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
Lazaro Luis Martinez Rodriguez Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
(Doc. 1) is GRANTED.
1. The respondent shall release Martinez Rodriguez within 24 hours of
this Order and provide him telephone access so he can arrange his
transportation from the facility.
2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions and
deadlines, enter judgment, and close this case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on April 21, 2026.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SA: FTMP-1
Copies: All Parties of Record