Opinion

Opinion

Court
District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
Apr 21, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.3%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

LAZARO LUIS MARTINEZ

RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner,

v. Case No.: 2:26-cv-01032-SPC-NPM

WARDEN, FLORIDA SOFT SIDE

SOUTH DETENTION CENTER et

al.,

Respondents,

/

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are petitioner Lazaro Luis Martinez Rodriguez’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) and the government’s response

(Doc. 5). For the below reasons, the Court grants the petition.

Martinez Rodriguez is a native of Cuba who applied for admission into

the United States on April 17, 2015. He was deemed inadmissible but paroled

into the country under the Cuban Adjustment Act. Martinez Rodriguez later

applied for adjustment of status, but his application was denied. On May 1,

2018, he was arrested for domestic battery. An immigration judge ordered him

removed on May 15, 2018. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)

detained Martinez Rodriguez until August 3, 2018, when he was released on

an order of supervision.

In December 2025, local law enforcement arrested Martinez Rodriguez

for driving on a suspended license and handed him over to ICE. In February

2026, ICE took Martinez Rodriguez to the Mexican border but did not remove

him. The only explanation why is a vague claim that Martinez Rodriguez did

not comply with removal. In any case, ICE returned him to Alligator Alcatraz,

where he remains detained.

“Once a noncitizen’s order of removal becomes administratively final, the

Government ‘shall’ remove the person within 90 days.” Singh v. U.S. Attorney

Gen., 945 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)).

The government must detain the noncitizen during the 90-day removal period,

which begins when the removal order becomes administratively final. Id.

Detention may continue after the removal period, but not indefinitely.

In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held, “if removal is not

reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention

unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.” 533 U.S. 678, 700-01

(2001). If removal is not practically attainable, detention no longer serves its

statutory purpose of “assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.”

Id. at 699. The Court found it unlikely Congress “believed that all reasonably

foreseeably removals could be accomplished in [90 days].” Id at 701. So, “for

the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts,” it established a

“presumptively reasonable period of detention” of six months—the 90-day

removal period plus an additional 90 days. Id. Courts use a burden-shifting

framework to judge the constitutionality of additional post-removal detention:

After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe

that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence

sufficient to rebut the showing.

Id.

The government argues Martinez Rodriguez’s petition is premature

because his current detention has not exceeded 180 days. They assume the

six-month presumptively reasonable period of detention resets each time a

noncitizen is detained. That assumption is inconsistent with Zadvydas. It

would effectively allow DHS to detain noncitizens indefinitely and avoid

judicial scrutiny by releasing and re-detaining them every 180 days. As the

Eleventh Circuit recognized, “[t]he Supreme Court’s stated rationale for

establishing a presumptively reasonable ‘6-month period’ for detention

pending removal supports our conclusion that this period commences at the

beginning of the removal period.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052

n.3 (11th Cir. 2002).

Because the six-month period for presumptively reasonable detention

has expired, Zadvydas’s burden-shifting framework applies. Martinez

Rodriguez has carried his initial burden by showing a good reason to believe

there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future. ICE was unable to remove him to Cuba in 2018, and the government

has made no meaningful progress towards removal since then.

The burden thus shifts to the government. ICE points to its February

2026 attempt to send Martinez Rodriguez to Mexico. But the evidence before

the Court suggests that was an informal effort to compel voluntary departure,

not an above-board removal attempt that complied with statutory and

constitutional requirements. See Andriasian v. Immigr. and Naturalization

Servs., 180 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Failing to notify individuals who

are subject to deportation that they have the right to apply for asylum in the

United States and for withholding of deportation to the country to which they

will be deported violates both INS regulations and the constitutional right to

due process.”); see also D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, --- F. Supp.

3d ---, 2026 WL 521557 (D. Mass. Feb. 25, 2026) (setting aside DHS’s current

third-country removal policy because it violates noncitizens’ right to seek fear-

based relief under the Convention Against Torture). ICE makes no attempt to

show it can lawfully remove Martinez Rodriguez in the reasonably foreseeable

future.

The Court finds no significant likelihood Martinez Rodriguez will be

removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. He is entitled to release from

detention under Zadvydas. If removal becomes likely in the reasonably

foreseeable future, ICE can detain Martinez Rodriguez to “assur[e] [his]

presence at the moment of removal.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 680.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

Lazaro Luis Martinez Rodriguez Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(Doc. 1) is GRANTED.

1. The respondent shall release Martinez Rodriguez within 24 hours of

this Order and provide him telephone access so he can arrange his

transportation from the facility.

2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions and

deadlines, enter judgment, and close this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on April 21, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTMP-1

Copies: All Parties of Record

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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