The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
JERRY EDWARDS,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:25-cv-02399-AAS
PARALLEL PRODUCTS
OF FLORIDA, LLC,
Defendants.
_____________________________________/
ORDER
Defendant Parallel Products of Florida, LLC (Parallel) moves to dismiss
Plaintiff Jerry Edwards’s Amended Complaint. (Doc. 31). Mr. Edwards
responded in opposition to Parallel’s motion. (Doc. 36).
I. BACKGROUND
According to the amended complaint, Mr. Edwards began his
employment with Parallel in June 2024. (Doc. 25, p. 2). Mr. Edwards alleges
that during his employment, a manager, Hiram Rodriguez, referred to him and
other employees as “DAN’s.” (Id., p. 3). Mr. Edwards alleges that Mr. Rodriguez
explained the term “DAN” to mean “dumb ass nigger.” (Id.).
Mr. Edwards also alleges that Mr. Rodriguez engaged in sexually explicit
conduct and comments towards Mr. Edwards. Specifically, Mr. Edwards claims
1
that Mr. Rodriguez slapped his genitals and stated, “you better want my nuts
in your mouth if you want to keep your job,” and “how do my nuts taste?” (Id.).
Mr. Edwards alleges that on September 13, 2024, after Mr. Rodriguez
again referred to employees as “DAN’s,” Mr. Edwards contacted “Angelo” at
Vertex Global Solutions (Vertex) to lodge a formal complaint.1 (Id., p. 4). Two
days later, on September 15, 2024, Mr. Edwards alleges that he reported his
concerns to Kerrie O’Rourke in Human Resources (HR). (Id). Mr. Edwards
further claims that a co-worker, Donovan Busch, told him to “get on board”
with Mr. Rodriguez or he would be fired. (Id). Mr. Edwards claims that another
employee, “Ivan,” encouraged others to say Mr. Edwards was lying about Mr.
Rodriguez’s comments. (Id.).
On September 23, 2024, Mr. Edwards was terminated. (Id., pp. 4–5). He
filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC Charge) and the Florida Commission on Human
Relations, and 180 days have passed since he filed the EEOC Charge. (Id., pp.
2, 37-1, 37-2). A right-to-sue letter was issued on June 13, 2025. (Doc. 37-2).
Mr. Edwards’s amended complaint asserts ten counts against Parallel,
alleging hostile work environment, racial discrimination, sexual harassment,
1 Mr. Edwards was a temporary worker at Parallel, employed through a nonparty
staffing agency, Vertex. (Doc. 31, n. 1).
2
and retaliation for opposing the alleged racial discrimination and sexual
harassment. (Doc. 25). These claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Florida Civil Rights Act, Chapter
760, Florida Statutes (FCRA). (Doc. 25). Parallel moves to dismiss Mr.
Edwards’s amended complaint as legally deficient and fatally flawed. (Doc. 31).
Mr. Edwards responded in opposition. (Doc. 36).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” A complaint may be attacked—and dismissed—for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In reviewing
a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court applies the plausibility standard set
forth in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the [c]ourt to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, review is generally limited to the four corners of the complaint. When
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reviewing a complaint for facial sufficiency, the court “must accept [a]
[p]laintiff’s well pleaded facts as true and construe the [c]omplaint in the light
most favorable to the [p]laintiff.” Rickman v. Precisionaire, Inc., 902 F. Supp.
232, 233 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Counts I–III
Mr. Edwards brings claims for race-based hostile work environment
under § 1981, Title VII, and the FCRA (Counts I–III). Courts analyze hostile
work environment claims under § 1981, Title VII, and the FCRA using the
same framework. Potwin v. Dynasty Bldg. Sols., LLC, No. 8:24-CV-174-KKM-
CPT, 2024 WL 4881385, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2024); Bell v. Liberty Nat’l
Life Ins. Co., No. 22-11015, 2023 WL 5624535, at *3 (11th Cir. Aug. 31, 2023);
Smelter v. S. Home Care Servs., Inc., 904 F.3d 1276, 1283 & n.3 (11th Cir.
2018); see Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1245 n.6 (11th
Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“[T]he same analytical framework and proof
requirements that apply to employment discrimination claims under Title VII
also apply to discrimination claims under Section 1981 and the FCRA.”).
To withstand a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff asserting race discrimination
under § 1981, Title VII, or the FCRA must plead sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to plausibly suggest intentional race discrimination. Potwin,
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2024 WL 4881385, at *2 (citing Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1246). A hostile work
environment exists when “the workplace is permeated with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). To state a
claim for a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must allege:
(1) that he belongs to a protected group; (2) that he has been
subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment
must have been based on a protected characteristic of the
employee . . .; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and
create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5)
that the employer is responsible for such environment under
either a theory of vicarious or of direct liability.
Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002);
Satchel v. Sch. Bd. of Hills. Cnty., 251 F. App’x 626, 630 (11th Cir. 2007).
The court focuses on the third element—whether the alleged harassment
occurred because of Mr. Edwards’s race. Mr. Edwards does not identify his own
race in the amended complaint, but implies he is white by referencing statutory
protections afforded to Caucasian individuals. (Doc. 25, p. 7). Mr. Edwards
later confirms he is white in his response to Parallel’s motion (Doc. 36, p. 5).
Mr. Edwards alleges that Mr. Rodriguez referred to employees, including
himself, as “DAN’s.” (Doc. 25, p. 3). Although the alleged language constitutes
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a racial slur, the slur is not directed toward Mr. Edwards based on his race.
It is a fundamental principle that not all offensive conduct or language
rises to the level of actionable discrimination under Title VII. Reeves v. C.H.
Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 809 (11th Cir. 2010). Rather, a
plaintiff must “establish that they were subject to at least some harassment
based on their own race,” not just exposed to offensive language concerning
others. Melton v. I-10 Truck Ctr. Inc., 166 F.4th 905, 919 (11th Cir. 2026). Thus,
derogatory remarks concerning other racial groups—even if offensive—do not
necessarily establish a racially hostile work environment for a plaintiff who
does not belong to that group. Belser v. City of Decatur, No. 1:06-CV_1454-
TCB/AJB, 2007 WL 9701528 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 12, 2007), report and
recommendation adopted sub nom. Belser v. City of Decatur Police Dep’t, No.
1:06-CV_1454-TCB, 2008 WL 11406005 (N.D. Ga. Jan 7, 2008) (concluding
that the proper inquiry focuses on whether the alleged comments targeted the
plaintiff’s race rather than the race of others, where an African American
plaintiff claimed harassment after being called “white trash” and “spic”).
Conduct or language that is “based on” one’s race is considered in a
hostile work environment claim. See Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d
571, 584 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington N. &
Santa Fe. Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006).
6
“Innocuous statements or conduct, or boorish ones that do not relate to the
[race] of the . . . offended party (the plaintiff), are not counted.” Id. at 583; see
also Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d 1287, 1301–02 (11th
Cir. 2007) (“Title VII does not prohibit profanity alone, however profane. It
does not prohibit harassment alone, however severe and pervasive. Instead,
Title VII prohibits discrimination, including harassment that discriminates
based on a protected category . . .”).
Here, Mr. Edwards does not allege that Mr. Rodriguez’s comments were
directed at him because he is white, nor does he allege that he belongs to the
racial group referenced by the slur. Instead, the amended complaint suggests
that the term was used broadly toward multiple employees, without regard to
their individual races. (Doc. 25). Such allegations undermine any inference
that the conduct was motivated by racial animus toward Mr. Edwards himself
based on his race.
Accordingly, Mr. Edwards fails to plausibly allege a race-based hostile
work environment claim under § 1981, Title VII, and the FCRA. Accordingly,
Parallel’s motion to dismiss Counts I-III is GRANTED.
B. Counts IV–VI
Mr. Edwards brings a claim for retaliation under § 1981, Title VII, and
the FCRA for opposing racial discrimination (Counts IV–VI). Courts analyze
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retaliation claims under § 1981, Title VII, and the FCRA using the same
framework. Burstein v. Emtel, Inc., 137 F. App’x 205, 208 n. 7 (11th Cir. 2005)
(“Florida courts apply federal case law interpreting Title VII to FCRA claims.”);
Smith v. Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 604CV1811ORL28DAB, 2006 WL
8439525, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2006) (“A § 1981 claim and a Title VII claim
are analyzed under the same framework.”).
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show that
he “(1) engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) that [he] suffered a
materially adverse employment action; and (3) that there was a causal link
between the two.” Lee v. HQM of Fort Myers, LLC, No. 2:11-CV-714-FTM-99,
2012 WL 3545700, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 26, 2012), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 2:11-CV-00714-UA-DNF, 2012 WL 3548062 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 16,
2012).
1. Statutorily Protected Activity
Complaining of racial discrimination is considered a statutorily
protected activity. See Munnings v. Fedex Ground Package Sys., Inc., No.
6:07CV282-ORL-19KRS, 2008 WL 1849003, at *24 n. 17 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 22,
2008). Additionally, “filing a complaint is statutorily protected activity.” Miller
v. Roche Sur. & Cas. Co., 502 F. App’x 891, 893 (11th Cir. 2012). Filing a
complaint requires “some degree of formality . . . in order that the employer
8
has fair notice that an employee is lodging a grievance.” Id. This requirement
is to ensure that “an employer who does not (or should not) know an employee
has made a complaint could [not] discriminate because of that complaint.”
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1 (2011).
Mr. Edwards plausibly alleges that he engaged in a statutorily protected
activity in opposing what he perceived to be racially discriminatory conduct in
the workplace. Specifically, Mr. Edwards alleges that he complained about Mr.
Rodriguez’s repeated use of racially offensive language, including reporting the
behavior to both the staffing agency’s HR department and Parallel’s HR
department. (Doc. 25, p. 4). Mr. Edwards further claims that Parallel’s HR
representative, Ms. O’Rourke, took notes during their conversation. (Id.).
These allegations demonstrate sufficient formality to place the employer on
notice of Mr. Edwards’s complaints. See generally Komer v. Corizon Health,
Inc., No. 8:18-CV-2148-T-30AEP, 2018 WL 4503023, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 20,
2018) (finding that the plaintiff’s complaints to the employer’s HR department
on numerous occasions were a protected activity). Parallel also does not
meaningfully dispute that Mr. Edwards engaged in protected activity. Thus,
the court finds such complaints constitute protected activity under § 1981, Title
VII, and the FCRA.
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2. Materially Adverse Employment Action
Parallel does not dispute that Mr. Edwards suffered adverse
employment action. “Undoubtedly, termination is an adverse employment
action.” Rohrer v. AFC Cable Sys. Inc., No. 8:06-CV-1503-T-27TBM, 2008 WL
11385397, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 2, 2008). Mr. Edwards was terminated on
September 23, 2024. (Doc. 25 pp. 4–5). Thus, he suffered a materially adverse
employment action under § 1981, Title VII, and the FCRA.
3. Causal Link Between the Protected Activity and
Adverse Employment Action
To establish causation, the plaintiff must show that the employer was
aware that the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct. Uche v. St. Lukes-St.
Vincents Healthcare, Inc., No. 3:12-CV- 865-J-32-JBT, 2015 WL 476178, at *7
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 2015); Brungart v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 231
F.3d 791, 799 (11th Cir. 2000). Once awareness is established, “mere proximity
in time may be sufficient to establish relatedness where the temporal
relationship is very close.” Uche, 2015 WL 476178, at *7; Brown v. Alabama
Dep’t of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1182 (11th Cir. 2010); Freeman v. Fed. Exp.
Corp., No. 804CV2481TBM, 2006 WL 563123, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 8, 2006)
(quoting Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004). Compare
Donnellon v. Fruehauf Corp., 794 F.2d 598, 601 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding that
temporal relationship of up to a month sufficient to prove relatedness), with
10
Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007)
(determining that a three-to-four-month disparity was insufficient to establish
relatedness).
Parallel was aware that Mr. Edwards engaged in protected conduct by
filing an HR complaint. See Essick v. Fid. Nat’l Info. Servs., Inc., No. 3:14-CV-
949-J-34-JRK, 2016 WL 3615677, at *8 (M.D. Fla. July 6, 2016) (finding that
the employer was “plainly aware” of the protected conduct when the employee
filed an HR complaint). Mr. Edwards was terminated eight days after he
reported his concerns to HR. (Doc. 25, pp. 4–5). This temporal proximity is
enough to establish relatedness for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss.
Thus, the court finds that Mr. Edwards sufficiently alleged a causal connection
between his protected activity and termination.
Accordingly, having plausibly alleged all three elements, Mr. Edwards’s
amended complaint states a claim for retaliation under § 1981, Title VII, and
the FCRA. Parallel’s motion to dismiss Counts IV–VI is DENIED.
C. Counts VII and VIII
Mr. Edwards brings a claim for sexual harassment under Title VII and
the FCRA (Counts VII and VIII). The Court analyzes Title VII and FRCA
claims under the same framework. Gamboa v. Am. Airlines, 170 F App’x 610,
611 (11th Cir. 2006).
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1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The parties dispute whether Mr. Edwards’s sexual harassment
allegations—particularly those involving multiple supervisors or co-workers,
rather than one individual—fall within the scope of the EEOC Charge. (Doc.
37-1). Parallel argues these are new and were “not set forth in” the EEOC
Charge. (Doc. 31, pp. 13–14). Mr. Edwards responds that the allegations are
reasonably related to and would naturally grow out of the EEOC Charge’s
factual allegations of sexual harassment. (Id., pp. 15–16). Mr. Edwards states
that his “Amended Complaint virtually mirrors” the EEOC Charge. (Doc. 36 p.
15).
A “plaintiff’s judicial complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC
investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of [a] charge of
discrimination.” Alexander v. Fulton County, Ga., 207 F.3d 1303, 1332 (11th
Cir. 2000). At the same time, judicial complaints “may encompass any kind of
discrimination like or related to the allegations contain[ed in] the charge.”
Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004)
(referring to Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir.
1970)). Consistent with this principle, “[c]ourts are . . . ‘extremely reluctant to
allow procedural technicalities to bar claims brought under (Title VII).’”
Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1280 (quoting Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 460–61). Accordingly,
12
the proper inquiry here is whether Mr. Edwards’s amended complaint was like
or related to, or grew out of, the allegations contained in the EEOC charge. See
Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1280. Judicial claims that “amplify, clarify, or more
clearly focus” the EEOC allegations are permissible, whereas “‘allegations of
new acts of discrimination are inappropriate.’” Brooks v. CSX Transp., Inc., No.
3:09-CV-379-J-32HTS, 2009 WL 3208708, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2009).
Mr. Edwards’s amended complaint alleges the same type of
discrimination and series of events described in the EEOC Charge. In the
EEOC Charge, Mr. Edwards checked boxes for sex discrimination and
retaliation and explicitly wrote in “sexual harassment.” (Doc. 37-1). Mr.
Edwards stated that “[Mr.] Rodriguez would walk by me and slap my front
private parts with his hands. He would also make comments to me such as ‘you
better want my nuts in your mouth if you want to keep your job’ or ‘how do my
nuts taste?’” Id. The amended complaint mirrors these allegations, asserting
that Mr. Rodriguez “routinely walked by [Mr. Edwards] and slapped [Mr.
Edwards’s] genitals with his hands. Mr. Rodriguez would also make comments
to [Mr. Edwards] such as ‘you better want my nuts in your mouth if you want
to keep your job’ or ‘how do my nuts taste?’” (Doc. 25, p. 33). Although the
amended complaint also alleges that “[Mr. Edwards] was subjected to
unwelcome conduct based on sex by his male supervisors,” this elaboration
13
does not render the claim unexhausted. (Id., p. 34).
Rather, it constitutes an amplification of the same core allegations of
sexual harassment and is “like or related to the allegations containing the
charge.” Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1280; see Gross-Jones v. Mercy Medical, 874 F.
Supp. 2d 1319, 1330 (focusing on the nature of the discriminatory acts rather
than the precision of identifying specific claims or perpetrators and allowing a
“sexual harassment claim to proceed even though the employee failed to check
the ‘sex’ box on her EEOC charging form”).
Thus, the court finds that Mr. Edwards has exhausted his
administrative remedies.
2. Sexual Harassment Claim
Parallel asserts, in a wholly conclusory manner and without citation to
authority or substantive analysis, that Mr. Edwards fails to state a sexual
harassment claim, arguing only that his allegations merely recite the elements
without sufficient factual support. (Doc. 31, p. 14). To plead a sexual
harassment claim, a plaintiff must show:
(1) [he] belongs to a protected group; (2) [he] has been subject to
unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based on
[his] membership in a protected group; (4) the harassment was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of
[his] employment and create an abusive working environment; and
(5) a basis for holding the employer liable exists.
14
Reeves, 594 F.3d at 809.
a. Protected Group
Mr. Edwards is a member of a protected class. See Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982) (indicating that in sex
discrimination cases, a plaintiff must simply assert being a man or a woman);
Brill v. Lante Corp., 119 F.3d 1266, 1270 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that all men
and women are members of a protected class in sex discrimination cases);
Longariello v. Sch. Bd. of Monroe County, Fla., 987 F. Supp. 1448–49 (S.D. Fla.
1997) (“As a male, (plaintiff) clearly is a member of a protected class.”).
b. Unwelcome Sexual Harassment
The EEOC defines conduct that may constitute sexual harassment as:
“sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of sexual nature . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a). The employee must not
solicit or incite the conduct and must regard the conduct as “undesirable or
offensive.” Henson, 682 F.2d at 903. Mr. Edwards alleges that Mr. Rodriguez
repeatedly engaged in uninvited physical contact with his genitals and made
explicit sexual remarks. (Doc. 25, p. 33). Nothing in the amended complaint
suggests that Mr. Edwards solicited or incited this behavior. Thus, Mr.
Edwards plausibly alleged that the sexual conduct was unwelcome, satisfying
this element.
15
c. Membership in a Protected Group.
“The act of sexual harassment itself creates an inference that the
harasser harbors a sexually discriminatory animus towards the plaintiff.
When a person ‘sexually harasses’ another, i.e., makes comments or advances
of an erotic or sexual nature, we infer that ‘the harasser [is making] advances
towards the victim because the victim is a member of the gender the harasser
prefers.” Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1246 (11th Cir.
1998) (quoting Fredette v. BVP Mgmt. Associates, 112 F.3d 1503, 1505 (11th
Cir. 1997).
Mr. Edwards asserts that Mr. Rodriguez subjected him to repeated
sexual touching and explicit sexual comments directed at him. (Doc. 25, p. 33).
Such conduct gives rise to an inference of discriminatory animus based on sex,
as sexual harassment itself supports the conclusion that the conduct occurred
because of the plaintiff’s membership in a protected group. See Llampallas,
163 F.3d at 1246.
d. Sufficiently Severe or Pervasive
Establishing this severity and pervasiveness requirement “includes a
subjective and objective component.” McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1378
(11th Cir. 2008). The plaintiff must “subjectively perceive” the harassment to
be severe and pervasive enough to alter the terms or conditions of his
16
employment, and the plaintiff’s “subjective perception must be objectively
reasonable.” Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999).
The court presumes, based on his allegations, that Edwards subjectively found
his working environment to be abusive. See Freese v. Wuesthoff Health Sys.,
Inc., No. 6:06CV175-ORL-31JGG, 2006 WL 1382111, at *5 (M.D. Fla May 19,
2006).
The court turns to the objective component of the analysis. The court
considers the following four factors in the objective analysis: “(1) frequency of
alleged conduct, (2) severity of the conduct, (3) ‘whether the conduct is
physically threatening or humiliating or a mere offensive utterance[,]’ and (4)
whether the conduct ‘unreasonably interferes’ with the plaintiff’s performance
at work.” MacMartin v. Marine Mgmt. Services, Inc., No. 3:22-CV-610-BJD-
LLL, 2023 WL 9469635, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2023), report and
recommendation adopted as modified, No. 3:22-CV-610-BJD-LLL, 2023 WL
9469397 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2023) (citing Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1246. “[C]ourts
should examine the conduct in context, not as isolated acts. And determine
under the totality of the circumstances whether the harassing conduct is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of the plaintiff’s
employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment.” Mendoza,
195 F.3d at 1246.
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i. Frequency
The Eleventh Circuit has found one incident per week to be sufficiently
frequent, whereas an incident every two months to be insufficiently frequent.
Compare Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broadcasting Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d
501, 509 (11th Cir. 2000) (fifteen instances in four months “was not
infrequent”) with Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1249 (five inappropriate instances in
eleven months were “far too infrequent” to support a sexual harassment claim).
Sexual comments and only three incidents of physical contact are frequent
enough to establish a sexual harassment claim. See Olson v. Lowe’s Home
Centers Inc., 130 F. App’x 380, 388 (11th Cir. 2005).
Mr. Edwards alleges he was “routinely” slapped on the genitals and told
crude remarks through the course of his employment, which was around three
months. (Doc. 25, p. 33). Although Mr. Edwards does not provide an exact
number of incidents, the term “routinely” implies recurring, not isolated
behavior, and therefore, Mr. Edwards has plausibly alleged conduct that is
sufficiently frequent to support a hostile work environment claim. See Wiant
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 938 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1243 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (“At
the motion to dismiss stage, the complaint is construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.”).
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ii. Severity
As the court has held, allegations of repeated unwanted touching in
private areas is sufficiently severe and pervasive.
, No. 804CV1055T24TBM, 2005 WL 8160201, at *6 (M.D.
Fla. July 25, 2005) (“[G]iven . . . the fact that it was unwanted conduct,
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff was subjected
to a sexually hostile work environment due to people touching her butt.”);
, 234 F.3d at 509 (finding that unwanted massages and standing
so close to the plaintiff so that the defendant’s body parts touched her from
behind was severe). Whereas “simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated
incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes
in the terms and conditions of employment.” ,
524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).
Mr. Edwards alleges that he was routinely subjected to unwanted
physical contact and crude sexual remarks throughout his employment. (Doc.
25, p. 33). This conduct goes well beyond the type of “simple teasing” or isolated
comments that the court has found insufficiently severe or pervasive. Given
the repeated contact with an intimate body area, coupled with the ongoing
sexual remarks, the court finds that the alleged conduct is sufficiently severe
and pervasive.
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iii. Physically Threatening or Humiliating
“Grabbing the crotch area of either sex certainly conveys a message that
extends beyond workplace crudity,” which is physically threatening and
humiliating. Cobb v. Sunshine Rest. Merger Sub, LLC, No. 8:09-CV-2639-T-
26MAP, 2011 WL 87310, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2011) (comparing to cases
that involve only brushing or touching). Further, harassment that occurs “in
the presence of coworkers” is especially humiliating. Fernandez v. Trees, Inc.,
961 F.3d 1148, 1155 (11th Cir. 2020). The Eleventh Circuit has acknowledged
that “most people have a special sense of privacy in their genitals.” Adams v.
Sch. Bd. of St. John’s Cnty., 57 F.4th 791, 805 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc).
Mr. Edwards alleges that he was routinely slapped on the genitals in the
workplace, conduct that he alleges is both physically invasive and inherently
humiliating. (Doc. 25, p. 33). To the extent this conduct occurred in the
presence of coworkers, it would further exacerbate the humiliation, as
harassment carried out publicly is especially degrading. See Fernandez, 961
F.3d at 1155. The court finds that Mr. Edwards has alleged conduct that is
physically threatening and humiliating.
iv. Interference
When determining whether the alleged conduct unreasonably interfered
with an individual’s performance at work, the Supreme Court has noted that
20
an “abusive work environment can ‘detract from an employee’s job
performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them
from advancing their careers.’” Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. An employee’s mental
well-being is relevant and “may be taken into account . . .” Id. at 23. “[T]he
conduct in question need not have tangibly affected the plaintiff’s job
performance in order to be actionable.” Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide,
Inc., 525 F.3d 1139, 1147 (11th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc granted, opinion
vacated, 569 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2009), on reh’g en banc, 594 F.3d 798 (11th
Cir. 2010) (finding that conduct making it difficult for the plaintiff to
concentrate was sufficient interference with job performance).
In his amended complaint, Mr. Edwards alleges that “[t]he sexually
harassing conduct was severe and/or pervasive and altered the terms and
conditions of [his] employment, creating an intimidating, hostile, and abusive
work environment.” (Doc. 25, p. 34). Mr. Edwards also stated that “a
reasonable person in [his] position would find the work environment hostile or
abusive. (Id.). Mr. Edwards alleges repeated, unwanted physical contact
involving his genitals, coupled with ongoing crude sexual remarks—conduct
that is inherently distracting, degrading, and likely to impair an employee’s
ability to focus and perform job duties. (Id.). Accordingly, Mr. Edwards has
plausibly alleged that the harassment unreasonably interfered with his job
21
performance.
Lastly, the court considers the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether the harassment Mr. Edwards faced was objectively severe or
pervasive enough to alter the terms or conditions of his employment. See
Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1246. For purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss, the
court is satisfied that it could. Thus, Mr. Edwards has plausibly alleged the
fourth element to plead a sexual harassment claim.
e. Basis for Accountability
As to this factor, if the sexual harassment is committed by a co-worker,
“there is a basis for holding the employer liable ‘if it knew or should have
known of the harassing conduct but failed to take prompt remedial action.’”
, No. 2:09-CV-220-FTM-36DNF, 2011 WL 13175531,
at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2011) (quoting , 277 F.3d at
1278). An employer is liable for sexual harassment if they “knew or should
have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.”
, 76 F.3d 1155, 1167 (11th Cir.),
, 83 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 1996),
111 F.3d 1530 (11th Cir. 1997), rev’d, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 141 L. Ed.
2d 662 (1998). “A plaintiff can prove an employer’s knowledge of harassment
by showing that [he] complained to higher management.”
22
Mr. Edwards alleges that he opposed Mr. Rodriguez’s conduct. (Doc. 25,
p. 39).2 Such allegations are sufficient to plausibly establish that Parallel had
actual knowledge of the harassment. Despite this notice, Mr. Edwards alleges
that the harassment continued, supporting an inference that Parallel failed to
take prompt remedial action. ( , p. 37).
Accordingly, Mr. Edwards plausibly alleges a sexual harassment claim
under Title VII and the FCRA. Parallel’s motion to dismiss Counts VII and
VIII is DENIED.
C. Counts IX and X
Mr. Edwards asserts a claim for retaliation under Title VII and the
FCRA, alleging that he suffered adverse action after opposing sexual
harassment (Counts IX and X). The Court analyzes Title VII and FRCA claims
under the same framework. Gamboa, 170 F App’x at 611.
1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The parties dispute whether Mr. Edwards exhausted his administrative
remedies. Parallel contends that Mr. Edwards failed to do so because his
amended complaint introduces allegations of adverse employment actions that
2 Mr. Edwards describes, under a different count, that he opposed Mr. Rodriguez’s
actions by complaining to management and HR about the sexual harassment. Factual
allegations of one count can inform the meaning of factual allegations of another
count. See States v. Schmitz, 634 F.3d 1247, 1263 n. 10 (11th Cir. 2011).
23
were not included in his EEOC Charge. (Doc. 31, p. 12). Mr. Edwards responds
that he provided sufficient factual detail in his EEOC Charge that a reasonable
EEOC investigation would have uncovered the later-alleged adverse
employment actions, thereby satisfying the administrative prerequisites to
suit. (Doc. 36, pp. 15–16).
As stated above, “plaintiff’s judicial complaint is limited by the scope of
the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the
charge of discrimination.” Alexander, 207 F.3d at 1332. At the same time,
judicial complaints “may encompass any kind of discrimination like or related
to the allegations containing the charge.” Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1280 (referring
to Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 466. Consistent with this principle, “[c]ourts are . . .
‘extremely reluctant to allow procedural technicalities to bar claims brought
under (Title VII).’” Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1280 (quoting Sanchez, 431 F.2d at
460–61). “A plaintiff is not required to identify every possible incident of
retaliation in the administrative charge to raise a retaliation claim.” Mcgriff v.
Vystar Credit Union, No. 3:25-CV-70-TJC-LLL, 2026 WL 598623, at *1 (M.D.
Fla. Mar. 4, 2026).
Accordingly, Mr. Edwards did not need to list every possible adverse
employment action. See Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th
Cir. 2018) (The standard is whether the claim is “like or related to, or grew out
24
of, the allegations contained in [the] EEOC charge.”).
2. Retaliation
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show that
he “(1) engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) that [he] suffered a
materially adverse employment action; and (3) that there was a causal link
between the two.” Lee v. HQM of Fort Myers, LLC, No. 2:11-CV-714-FTM-99,
2012 WL 3545700, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 26, 2012), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 2:11-CV-00714-UA-DNF, 2012 WL 3548062 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 16,
2012).
a. Statutorily Protected Activity
“Indeed, protected activity includes voicing a complaint to superiors
about alleged discrimination.” Garcia v. Operating, No. 8:24-CV-02981-WFJ-
TGW, 2025 WL 1394242, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 14, 2025) (finding that the
plaintiff engaged in a protected activity by reporting an instance of
discrimination to his direct supervisors); Bolton v. Baldwin Cnty. Pub. Sch.,
627 F. App’x 800, 803 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Protected activities include…the
voicing informally of a complaint to superiors, or the use of an employer’s
internal grievance procedure to report alleged discrimination.”). Additionally,
complaining to HR is a protected activity. See Cid v. City of Miramar, Fla., 810
F. App’x 816, 821 (11th Cir. 2020).
25
Mr. Edwards alleges he opposed Mr. Rodriguez’s conduct by reporting
the alleged harassment to both management and HR. (Doc. 25, p. 39). These
allegations plausibly establish that Mr. Edwards engaged in statutorily
protected activity. His complaints to management and HR fall squarely within
the types of conduct recognized as protected under Eleventh Circuit precedent.
Accordingly, Mr. Edwards has sufficiently alleged the first element of a
retaliation claim.
b. Materially Adverse Employment Action
“An adverse employment action is a ‘serious and material change in
terms, conditions or privileges of employment.’” McCone v. Pitney Bowes, Inc.,
582 F. App’x 798, 800 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047,
1056 (11th Cir. 2012). Typically, they involve “a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant
change in benefits.” Id. However, reprimands, negative evaluations, threats of
job loss and suspensions without pay, exclusions from meetings, and removal
of job duties—even in the aggregate—are not. See Akins v. Fulton Cnty., 420
F.3d 1293, 1300–02 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361
F.3d 610 (11th Cir. 2004). “Undoubtedly, termination is an adverse
employment action.” Rohrer, 2008 WL 11385397, at *9.
26
Mr. Edwards alleges that he was subject to many adverse employment
actions, including “increased scrutiny, discipline, negative performance
evaluations, denial of opportunities, reduction in hours or responsibilities,
suspension, and/or termination.” (Doc. 25, pp. 39–40). Parallel argues these
allegations are “merely a boilerplate list of examples of adverse employment
actions,” and thus, Mr. Edwards’s claim should be dismissed for failing to plead
factual support. (Doc. 31 p. 13).
The Supreme Court has made it clear that to survive a motion to dismiss,
a plaintiff is not required to allege facts specific to the prima facie case. See
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002) (explaining that the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis for establishing a prima facie
case “is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement”); see also
Henderson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 436 F. App’x 935, 937 (11th Cir.
2011) (“A complaint in an employment discrimination case need not contain
specific facts establishing a prima facie case under the evidentiary framework
for such cases to survive a motion to dismiss.”). The complaint must contain
“only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955 at 1974. Therefore, accepting Mr.
Edwards’s allegations as true, he has plausibly alleged that he suffered an
adverse employment action.
27
c. Causal Link
In demonstrating causation, a plaintiff must show “her protected activity
was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” Univ. of Tx.
Sw. Med. Ctr. V. Nassaar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013). “[A] plaintiff must prove
that had she not [engaged in the protected conduct], she would not have been
fired.” Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 924 (11th Cir. 2018). To
establish a causal connection, a plaintiff must give evidence that: “(1) the
decision-makers responsible for the adverse actions were aware of the
protected activity; and (2) the adverse acts were at least somewhat related and
in close temporal proximity to the protected activity.” Smith v. Quintiles
Transnat’l Corp., 509 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1203 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
Mr. Edwards alleges “[t]here is a causal connection between [his]
protected activity and the adverse employment actions, as shown by temporal
proximity, retaliatory animus, shifting or pretextual explanations, disparate
treatment, and/or pattern of antagonism following Plaintiff’s complaints.”
(Doc. 25, p. 40). Although Mr. Edwards does not provide additional context or
circumstantial evidence beyond this allegation, the factual allegations of one
count can inform the meaning of factual allegations of another count. See
Schmitz, 634 F.3d at 1263 n. 10. Drawing on the factual allegations set forth
in Counts IV–VI, Mr. Edwards has plausibly alleged that Parallel was aware
28
of his protected conduct by virtue of his HR complaint. Mr. Edwards alleged
that his termination occurred eight days after he reported concerns to HR.
(Doc. 25, pp. 4-5). As already established in the analysis of Counts IV—VI, this
temporal proximity is sufficient to satisfy the relatedness requirement at the
pleading stage.
Thus, having plausibly alleged all three elements, Mr. Edwards’s
amended complaint states a claim for retaliation under Title VII and the
FCRA. Parallel’s motion to dismiss Counts IX and X is DENIED.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Parallel’s Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:
1. The Court DISMISSES Counts I, IJ, and III with prejudice.
2. The Court DENIES Parallel’s Motion to Dismiss as to Counts IV,
V, VI, VII, VIII, TX, and X.
3. Consistent with Rule 12(a)(4)(A), Parallel must file its answer to
Counts IV through X no later than April 30, 2026.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on April 16, 2026.
AMANDA ARNOLD SANSONE □
United States Magistrate Judge
29