Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

ALBERTO GARCIA CEBALLOS,

Petitioner,

v. Case No.: 2:26-cv-00939-SPC-NPM

WARDEN, FLORIDA SOFT SIDE

SOUTH DETENTION CENTER et

al.,

Respondent,

/

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are petitioner Alberto Garcia Ceballos’s Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) and the government’s response (Doc. 4). For

the below reasons, the Court grants the petition.

Garcia Ceballos is a native of Cuba who entered the United States

without inspection on August 26, 2014. Immigration officials apprehended

him, issued a notice to appear, and released him on his own recognizance. On

April 14, 2016, an immigration judge ordered Garcia Ceballos removed to

Cuba. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) released him on an

order of supervision on July 15, 2016. In 2021, Garcia Ceballos was convicted

of helping others unlawfully enter the U.S. He served his sentence, then

resumed reporting to ICE as required by the order of supervision.

On October 30, 2025, ICE arrested Garcia Ceballos at his home, revoked

his order of supervision, and detained him. ICE conducted an informal

interview on December 13, 2025, and Garcia Ceballos asked to be deported to

Cuba because he has family there. On January 25, 2026, ICE transferred

Garcia Ceballos to the EL Paso Camp East Montana, where ICE stages

“compliant CVNH removals.” (Doc. 5-1 at 3). Garcia Ceballos was scheduled

for such a removal on February 16, 2026, but he refused to depart the pod. ICE

returned Garcia Ceballos to Alligator Alcatraz, where he remains detained.

“Once a noncitizen’s order of removal becomes administratively final, the

Government ‘shall’ remove the person within 90 days.” Singh v. U.S. Attorney

Gen., 945 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)).

The government must detain the noncitizen during the 90-day removal period,

which begins when the removal order becomes administratively final. Id.

Detention may continue after the removal period, but not indefinitely.

In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held, “if removal is not

reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention

unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.” 533 U.S. 678, 700-01

(2001). If removal is not practically attainable, detention no longer serves its

statutory purpose of “assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.”

Id. at 699. The Court found it unlikely Congress “believed that all reasonably

foreseeably removals could be accomplished in [90 days].” Id at 701. So, “for

the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts,” it established a

“presumptively reasonable period of detention” of six months—the 90-day

removal period plus an additional 90 days. Id. Courts use a burden-shifting

framework to judge the constitutionality of additional post-removal detention:

After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe

that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence

sufficient to rebut the showing.

Id.

The government argues Garcia Ceballos’s petition is premature because

his current detention has not exceeded 180 days. They assume the six-month

presumptively reasonable period of detention resets each time a noncitizen is

detained. That assumption is inconsistent with Zadvydas. It would effectively

allow DHS to detain noncitizens indefinitely and avoid judicial scrutiny by

releasing and re-detaining them every 180 days. As the Eleventh Circuit

recognized, “[t]he Supreme Court’s stated rationale for establishing a

presumptively reasonable ‘6-month period’ for detention pending removal

supports our conclusion that this period commences at the beginning of the

removal period.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 n.3 (11th Cir.

2002).

Because the six-month period for presumptively reasonable detention

has expired, Zadvydas’s burden-shifting framework applies. Garcia Ceballos

has carried his initial burden by showing a good reason to believe there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. ICE was

unable to remove him to Cuba in 2016, and ICE has provided no indication

they can remove him to Cuba in the reasonably foreseeable future, despite his

stated willingness to repatriate.

The burden thus shifts to the government. ICE points to its February

16, 2026 attempt to send Garcia Ceballos to Mexico. But the evidence before

the Court suggests that was an informal effort to compel voluntary departure,

not an above-board removal attempt that complied with statutory and

constitutional requirements. See Andriasian v. Immigr. and Naturalization

Servs., 180 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Failing to notify individuals who

are subject to deportation that they have the right to apply for asylum in the

United States and for withholding of deportation to the country to which they

will be deported violates both INS regulations and the constitutional right to

due process.”); see also D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, --- F. Supp.

3d ---, 2026 WL 521557 (D. Mass. Feb. 25, 2026) (setting aside DHS’s current

third-country removal policy because it violates noncitizens’ right to seek fear-

based relief under the Convention Against Torture). ICE makes no attempt to

show it can lawfully remove Garcia Ceballos in the reasonably foreseeable

future.

The Court finds no significant likelihood Garcia Ceballos will be removed

in the reasonably foreseeable future. He is entitled to release from detention

under Zadvydas. If removal becomes likely in the reasonably foreseeable

future, ICE can detain Garcia Ceballos to “assur[e] [his] presence at the

moment of removal.” Zaduydas, 533 U.S. at 680.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

Alberto Garcia Ceballos Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is

GRANTED.

1. The respondent shall release Garcia Ceballos within 24 hours of this

Order and provide him telephone access so he can arrange his

transportation from the facility.

2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions and

deadlines, enter judgment, and close this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on April 17, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTMP-1

Copies: All Parties of Record