Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

JOSE L. CONSUEGRA RICARDO,

Petitioner,

v. Case No.: 2:26-cv-00848-SPC-NPM

TODD BLANCHE,

Respondent,

/

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are petitioner Jose L. Consuegra Ricardo’s Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) and the government’s response (Doc. 7). For

the below reasons, the Court grants the petition.

Consuegra Ricardo is a native of Cuba who was paroled into the United

States on September 1, 2012. He was issued a notice to appear on May 27,

2018, and an immigration judge ordered him removed on July 2, 2018. On

September 27, 2018, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) released

Consuegra Ricardo under an order of supervision. On November 27, 2025, local

law enforcement arrested Consuegra Ricardo for driving with a suspended

license and turned him over to ICE. He is currently detained at Alligator

Alcatraz. On February 13, 2026, ICE took a group of noncitizens, including

Consuegra Ricardo, to the Mexican border and instructed them to disembark

and cross into Mexico. Consuegra Ricards remained seated, and ICE returned

him to Alligator Alcatraz.

“Once a noncitizen’s order of removal becomes administratively final, the

Government ‘shall’ remove the person within 90 days.” Singh v. U.S. Attorney

Gen., 945 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)).

The government must detain the noncitizen during the 90-day removal period,

which begins when the removal order becomes administratively final. Id.

Detention may continue after the removal period, but not indefinitely.

In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held, “if removal is not

reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention

unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.” 533 U.S. 678, 700-01

(2001). If removal is not practically attainable, detention no longer serves its

statutory purpose of “assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.”

Id. at 699. The Court found it unlikely Congress “believed that all reasonably

foreseeably removals could be accomplished in [90 days].” Id at 701. So, “for

the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts,” it established a

“presumptively reasonable period of detention” of six months—the 90-day

removal period plus an additional 90 days. Id. Courts use a burden-shifting

framework to judge the constitutionality of additional post-removal detention:

After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe

that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence

sufficient to rebut the showing.

Id.

The government argues Consuegra Ricardo’s petition is premature

because his current detention has not exceeded 180 days. They assume the

six-month presumptively reasonable period of detention resets each time a

noncitizen is detained. That assumption is inconsistent with Zadvydas. It

would effectively allow DHS to detain noncitizens indefinitely and avoid

judicial scrutiny by releasing and re-detaining them every 180 days. As the

Eleventh Circuit recognized, “[t]he Supreme Court’s stated rationale for

establishing a presumptively reasonable ‘6-month period’ for detention

pending removal supports our conclusion that this period commences at the

beginning of the removal period.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052

n.3 (11th Cir. 2002).

Because the six-month period for presumptively reasonable detention

has expired, Zadvydas’s burden-shifting framework applies. Consuegra

Ricardo has carried his initial burden by showing a good reason to believe there

is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.

ICE was unable to remove him to Cuba in 2018, and there is no indication Ciba

is likely to accept him now.

The burden thus shifts to the government. ICE points to its February

13, 2026 attempt to send Consuegra Ricardo to Mexico. But the evidence before

the Court suggests that was an informal effort to compel voluntary departure,

not an above-board removal attempt that complied with statutory and

constitutional requirements. See Andriasian v. Immigr. and Naturalization

Servs., 180 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Failing to notify individuals who

are subject to deportation that they have the right to apply for asylum in the

United States and for withholding of deportation to the country to which they

will be deported violates both INS regulations and the constitutional right to

due process.”); see also D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, --- F. Supp.

3d ---, 2026 WL 521557 (D. Mass. Feb. 25, 2026) (setting aside DHS’s current

third-country removal policy because it violates noncitizens’ right to seek fear-

based relief under the Convention Against Torture). ICE makes no attempt to

show it can lawfully remove Consuegra Ricardo in the reasonably foreseeable

future.

The Court finds no significant likelihood Consuegra Ricardo will be

removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. He is entitled to release from

detention under Zadvydas. If removal becomes likely in the reasonably

foreseeable future, ICE can detain Consuegra Ricardo to “assur[e] [his]

presence at the moment of removal.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 680.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

Jose L. Consuegra Ricardo Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is

GRANTED.

1. The respondent shall release Consuegra Ricardo within 24 hours of

this Order and provide him telephone access so he can arrange his

transportation from the facility.

2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions and

deadlines, enter judgment, and close this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on April 16, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTMP-1

Copies: All Parties of Record