SCIABICA

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JENNA SCIABICA,

Plaintiff, .

Civil Action No. 25-17223 (MAS) (RLS)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MARLBORO TOWNSHIP PUBLIC

SCHOOLS, ef al.,

Defendants.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon four motions to dismiss Plaintiff Jenna Sciabica’s

(‘Plaintiff’) Complaint (ECF No. 1): (1) Defendant Marlboro Township’s (the “Township”)

Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 3); (2) Defendant Pasquale Menna’s (““Menna’’) Motion to Dismiss

(ECF No. 12); (3) Defendant Laurie Swanson’s (“Swanson”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16);

and (4) Defendants Marlboro Township Public Schools (““MTPS”), Michael Ballone (“Ballone”),

John Pacifico (“Pacifico”), Loreen Labuza (“Labuza”), Michael J. Gross, Esq. (“Gross”), Vincent

Caravello (“Caravello”), Christine Jelinsky (“Jelinsky”), and Michaela Weir’s (“Weir”) Motion to

Dismiss (ECF No. 29). Plaintiff opposed all four motions, (ECF Nos. 17, 19, 25, 35.) Defendants!

filed replies for three of the motions. (ECF Nos. 24, 32, 38.) The Court has carefully considered

the parties’ submissions and reaches its decision without oral argument under Local Civil Rule

78.1(b). For the reasons below, Defendants’ Motions are granted.

“Defendants” collectively refers to the Township, Menna, Swanson, MTPS, Ballone, Pacifico,

Labuza, Gross, Caravello, Jelinsky, and Weir.

I. BACKGROUND’

A. The Parties

Plaintiff, a New Jersey resident, was a special education teacher with MTPS for sixteen

years. (Compl. {ff 2, 9, ECF No. 1.) MTPS is “a public[-]school district organized under New

Jersey law, operating schools within [the] Township[.]” Ud. J 10.) The Township is “a municipal

corporation and a state-created governmental organization[.|” (Ud. 4] 18.) Other Defendants hold

various titles in connection with MTPS or the Township: (1) Ballone serves as the Superintendent

of MTPS (id. § 11); (2) Pacifico serves as Principal of Marlboro Memorial Middle School (id.

{ 12); (3) Labuza is Vice-Principal of MTPS (id. □ 13); (4) Gross is counsel for MTPS (id. § 14);

(5) Caravello is Business Administrator for MTPS (id. § 15); (6) Jelinsky is Assistant Business

Administrator for Marlboro Township Schools (id. § 16); (7) Weir is an employee of MTPS (id.

17); and (8) Menna is a municipal prosecutor for the Township (id. § 20).°

B. Plaintiff’s Career

Plaintiff, who served as a special education teacher in MTPS from 2008 until her “forced

resignation in 2024[,]” “was a tenured teacher with an unblemished record[.]” Ud. J§ 2, 9, 28.) She

was “instrumental in introducing the Wilson Reading System to [the] Township, a specialized

curriculum designed to help students with dyslexia and other reading difficulties.” Ud. § 29.)

Plaintiff was also the only teacher in MTPS with a “Level II Wilson certification.” (id. 4 30.)

Despite this, Plaintiff was forced to act “out of her highly specialized position [which] denied

* For the purpose of considering the instant motion, the Court accepts all factual allegations in the

Complaint as true. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008).

3 Other individuals are named as defendants in Plaintiff's Complaint, but the Court does not

address them or the facts related to their purported involvement beyond the extent needed to

contextualize the facts related to Defendants who filed the instant motions to dismiss. (See Compl.

21-27.)

struggling readers with language disabilities an educational resource that no other teacher[] in the

district w[as] qualified or licensed to provide.” Ud.) According to Plaintiff, “[t]he destruction of

[her] career” began on March 13, 2024, because of an “innocent interaction in a school

hallway ... involving a playful reference to a dance dress fitting that had occurred the previous

week in the presence of the student’s mother[.|” Ud. J 3.)

G Plaintiff’s Relationship with L.T. and Wendi Turturici

L.T. was a student assigned to Plaintiffs special education class due to L.T.’s “reading and

short-term memory challenges that necessitated additional academic support.” Ud. {§ 33, 53.) L.T.

attended Plaintiff's class two or three days per week for specialized instruction. (ld 4 33.) While

working with L.T., Plaintiff “observed symptoms that concerned her and contacted [L.T.’s

mother,] Wendi Turturici [¢Turturici’)] to share her observations.” Ud. § 34.) This “led to the

identification of L.T.’s previously undiagnosed seizure disorder, prompting immediate medical

intervention... .” (/d.) Turturici was “grateful” for Plaintiff's intervention, and Plaintiff claims

that her “intervention cemented a relationship built on trust, gratitude, and mutual respect between

[Plaintiff] and L.T.’s family, leading to an extended friendship that would last for three years prior

to the incident at issue.” Ud. 7¥ 35, 36.)

Plaintiff developed a close friendship with Turturici, which was “characterized by frequent

communication, shared humor, and mutual support during challenging times” and included

regularly sharing text messages, memes, TikTok videos, and personal information. (/d. J 37, 38.)

Some of the communications included their “irreverent, sometimes crude sense of humor that

included discussions of topics that might seem inappropriate to outsiders but were perfectly normal

within the context of their friendship.” (/d. {[ 38.) In fact, according to Plaintiff, “Turturici

frequently used inappropriate language in her home and around her children, creating an

environment where casual, sometimes crude humor was the norm.” (/d. § 39.) Moreover, Turturici

also supported Plaintiff when Plaintiffs life partner was diagnosed with cancer and after her

partner passed away. (/d. {ff 41-45.) According to Plaintiff, Turturici offered comfort, support, and

practical assistance whenever she needed during this time. (/d.)

Due to the relationship Plaintiff established with L.T. and Turturici, Plaintiff “developed a

mentoring relationship with L.T.” and “viewed L.T. as if she were [Plaintiff’s] own daughter or

niece[.]” Ud. §] 53, 54.) This resulted in Plaintiff occasionally texting L.T., and sending

approximately fifty text messages to L.T. over the course of three years, all of which were “with

the knowledge and explicit approval of... Turturici.” Ud. 49 56, 57.)

D. The March 13, 2024, Incident

On March 5, 2024, “Turturici repeatedly requested that [Plaintiff] help L.T. try on her

dance dress to ensure proper fit for an upcoming performance.” Ud. $60.) At “Turturici’s

insistence, [Plaintiff] assisted L.T. with the dress fitting in the family’s home, with... Turturici

present and actively participating in the process.” (/d. § 61.) “When it became apparent that the

chest area of the dress was too large for L.T., [Plaintiff] helped position L.T.’s breasts appropriately

over the built-in padding to achieve the proper fit —all under the direct supervision and with the

explicit approval of . . . Turturici.” (7d. § 62.) L.T. expressed “minor embarrassment” about the

fitting process, but Turturici bluntly dismissed those concerns. Ud. § 63.)

On March 13, 2024, Plaintiff encountered L.T. in the hallway at Marlboro Memorial

Middle School “in full view of other teachers and students,” including Weir, another teacher. (/d.

{7 65, 66.) Plaintiff asked L.T. briefly about her health, as she had been ill the prior week, and

“gently felt L.T.’s forehead to check for fever[.]” Ud. Ff 67, 68.) Then, Plaintiff “made a playful

reference to the dress fitting that had occurred the previous week, asking ‘What did mom decide.

How are we getting those boobalas in the dress?’ while lightly tapping L.T.’s upper chest area

twice with her fingertips.” (Ud. J 69.) “The entire physical contact lasted no more than a second or

two” and L.T.’s reaction to the interaction was “entirely positive[,|” as “she giggled, stomped her

feet playfully, and continued down the hallway with a smile on her face[.]” Ud. {§ 70, 71.)

E. Aftermath of the Incident

Weir, who was “positioned approximately two or three feet away from the interaction[]

with L.T.’s back to her,” reported to the police that Plaintiff had “‘groped’ L.T.’s breasts ‘using

two hands[.]’” Ud. 73, 75.) L.T., however, attended regular classes and activities after the

incident and never reported “feeling uncomfortable or violated by the interaction, nor did she seek

support from school counselors or other staff members.” (/d. $§| 78-80.)

Despite L.T.’s response to the incidents, “Defendants immediately presumed [Plaintiff's]

guilt and took drastic disciplinary action[.]” Ud. 4 82.) Ballone “perpetuated .. . Weir’s false

accusations and used these lies as the basis to force Plaintiff to resign from her position as a special

education teacher.” (/d. § 83.) Despite there being video footage of the incident between Plaintiff

and L.T., Ballone withheld the video footage from Plaintiff. (7d. {§ 75, 84.) Plaintiff was suspended

with pay pending investigation, but Plaintiff claims that “Defendants [neither] informed [her] of

any investigation launched against her” nor provided her “with requisite notice of the specific

charges against her, the evidence supporting those charges, or her right to representation during

the investigation process.” (Ud. {9 85-87.) Moreover, “Defendants refused to show Plaintiff the

video of the incident. . . until August 31, 2024,” despite the fact that both Plaintiff and her attorney

made timely demands.* (/d. 88.)

* Plaintiff also claims that her attorney was not permitted to review the video until May 9, 2024.

(Compl. { 88.)

On May 13, 2024, Defendants “leveled tenure charges against Plaintiff... which was no

more than a wholesale adaptation of the allegations contained” in a civil complaint filed by

Turturici and her family. Ud. 89.) As a result, Plaintiff claims that “Defendants pressured [her]

to resign under circumstances that were coercive and fundamentally unfair, threatening even more

severe consequences if she refused to comply.” Ud. 991.) Following Plaintiff's resignation,

Defendants transmitted “false and stigmatizing information about her to the New Jersey State

Board of Examiners and other state authorities” that resulted in administrative proceedings that

jeopardized Plaintiff's teaching certification and pension benefits. J§ 93, 95.) Additionally,

Swanson and other named defendants posted “false and defamatory content about [Plaintiff] on

Facebook, Instagram, and other social media platforms.” (/d. |] 102.)

Plaintiff claims that, “as a direct result of the torrent of Defendants’ abuse,” she was

admitted to a psychiatric ward of a hospital and was released after a judicial hearing. Ud. § 108.)

On a separate occasion, Plaintiff was treated and released from the psychiatric emergency room

and has “been obligated [to receive] mental health services including but not limited to intensive

therapies and medications[.|” (/d.) Plaintiff's mental health treatment is still ongoing, and she

alleges that she has suffered and continues to suffer “devastating economic losses” such as loss of

salary, benefits, and pension contributions. Ud. § 108-10.) Moreover, Gross, Jelinsky, and

Caravello have “made false representations to unemployment authorities on at least three

occasions that resulted in the denial of [Plaintiff's] unemployment benefits, further exacerbating

her financial distress.” Ud. ¥ 111.) The destruction of Plaintiff's reputation has, according to her,

“made it impossible for her to secure alternative employment as a teacher, effectively ending a

career that spanned more than a decade and a half” and has subjected her to “credible threats to

her physical safety requiring police intervention[.]” Ud. 112, 113-15.)

F. Procedural Background

On November 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed her Complaint alleging twelve causes of action:

(1) Monell liability resulting from a violation of Plaintiff's procedural and substantive due process

rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserted against MTPS, Ballone, Pacifico, Labuza, Gross,

Caravello, and Jelinsky, in their official capacities (collectively, “School District Defendants”)

(“Count One”); (2) “stigma-plus” liability resulting from a violation of due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against School District Defendants (“Count

Two”); (3) Monell liability resulting from a violation of Plaintiffs procedural and substantive due

process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserted against Menna in his official capacity and the

Township (collectively, “Police Defendants”) (“Count Three”); (4) violation of due process under

the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Menna in his individual capacity

(“Count Four”); (5) violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (the “NJCRA”), N.J. Stat. Ann.

§ 10:6-2, asserted against School District Defendants and Police Defendants (“Count Five”);

(6) defamation asserted against Swanson and other defendants (“Count Six’); (7) intentional

infliction of emotional distress asserted against Swanson and other defendants (“Count Seven”);

(8) breach of contract against School District Defendants (“Count Eight”); (9) violation of New

Jersey Wage Payment Law against School District Defendants (“Count Nine’); (10) constructive

termination against School District Defendants (“Count Ten”); (11) “bad faith denial of insurance

coverage” against two insurance company defendants (“Count Eleven”); and (12) breach of

insurance contract against two insurance company defendants (“Count Twelve”). Ud. 119-64.)

School District Defendants, Police Defendants, Weir, and Swanson subsequently filed

motions to dismiss. (See generally Township’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 3; Menna’s Mot. to

Dismiss, ECF No. 12; Swanson’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 16; Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s Mot.

to Dismiss, ECF No. 29.) Plaintiff opposed all four motions. (P1.’s Opp’n Br. to Township’s Mot.,

ECF No. 17; Pl.’s Opp’n Br. to Menna’s Mot., ECF No. 25; Pl.’s Opp’n Br. to Swanson’s Mot.,

ECF No. 19; Pl.’s Opp’n Br. to Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s Mot., ECF No. 35.) School District

Defendants, Police Defendants, and Weir replied. (Township’s Reply, ECF No. 24; Menna’s

Reply, ECF No. 32; Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s Reply, ECF No. 38.)

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure® 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of

what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

A district court conducts a three-part analysis when considering a motion to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6). See Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (Gd Cir. 2011). First, the court must

identify “the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Ashcroft v, Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675

(2009). Second, the court must identify all of the plaintiffs well-pleaded factual allegations, accept

them as true, and “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Fowler v.

UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 Gd Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The court can discard bare

legal conclusions or factually unsupported accusations that merely state the defendant unlawfully

harmed the plaintiff. See Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Third, the court

must determine whether “the [well-pleaded] facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show

that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 679), A facially plausible claim “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

> All references to “Rule” or “Rules” hereafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” /d. at 210 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). On a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the “defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been

presented.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc.

v. Fidelcor, Inc. , 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that the claims asserted against them should be dismissed because

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (See generally Township’s

Moving Br., ECF No. 3-3; Menna’s Moving Br., ECF No. 12-6; Swanson’s Mot. to Dismiss; Sch.

Dist. Defs. & Weir’s Moving Br., ECF No. 29-2.) The Court first turns to the Complaint as asserted

against Weir.

A. Complaint Against Weir

Weir argues that the Complaint in its entirety should be dismissed as to Weir because

“[w]hile Plaintiff names [Weir] as a defendant in the caption of the Complaint, and details actions

she allegedly took in this case, none of the Counts in the Complaint assert that any cause of action

is asserted against her.” (Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s Moving Br. 10.) Plaintiff “does not oppose

dismissal without prejudice” as to Weir. (P1.’s Opp’n Br. to Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s Mot. 5.)

The Court, accordingly, dismisses the Complaint as to Weir. See, e.g., Royal v. Rutherford

Police Dep’t, No. 11-4862, 2020 WL 3496950, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. June 29, 2020) (“Defendant

Feliciano is only referred to once in the [operative] [c]omplaint and is not named in any causes of

action. ... As there are no claims stated against .. . Feliciano in the [operative] [c]omplaint, he

will be dismissed from this matter.’”’).

B. Counts One Through Four Asserted Against School District Defendants, Police

Defendants, and Menna in his Individual Capacity

Plaintiff asserts four counts pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) Count One against School

District Defendants under a theory of Monell liability (Compl. 119-28); (2) Count Two against

School District Defendants under a theory of “stigma-plus” liability (id. J§ 129-32); (3) Count

Three against Police Defendants under a theory of Monell liability (id. § 133-39); and (4) Count

Four against Menna in his individual capacity (id. {J 140-47).

Section 1983 operates as the procedural vehicle by which a plaintiff may bring a claim for

violation of constitutional rights in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the

United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under

color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

L. Count One

“A public entity ... may be held liable for the violation of a constitutional right under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 only when the alleged unconstitutional action executes or implements policy or a

decision officially adopted or promulgated by those whose acts may fairly be said to represent

official policy.” Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Monell v. Dep’t

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)). Moreover, “[a] school district may incur Monell

liability under [§] 1983 for a violation of an individual’s constitutional rights when it implements

an official policy or custom that results in a constitutional deprivation.” G.S. vy. Penn-Trafford Sch.

Dist., No. 20-3281, 2023 WL 4486667, at *3 (3d Cir. July 12, 2023) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at

694).

“To plead a municipal liability claim [pursuant to Monell], a plaintiff must allege that ‘a

[local] government’s policy or custom. . . inflict[ed] the injury’ in question.” Est. of Roman vy. City

10

of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (second, third, and fourth alterations in original)

(citation omitted). “To satisfy the pleading standard, [the plaintiff] must [not only] identify a

custom or policy, [but also] specify what exactly that custom or policy was.” McTernan v. City of

York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). Furthermore, “[a]lthough a policy or custom is necessary

to plead a municipal claim, it is not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. A plaintiff must also

allege that a policy or custom was the ‘proximate cause’ of h[er] injuries.” Est. of Roman, 914 F.3d

at 798 (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 Gd Cir. 1996)). To meet this burden, a plaintiff

may allege facts of an “‘affirmative link’ between the policy or custom and the particular

constitutional violation [s]he alleges.” /d. (citing Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir.

1990)). Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized that “municipal liability may be imposed

for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances.” Pembaur v.

City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986)).

As an initial matter, Plaintiff concedes that Count One must be dismissed as to School

District Defendant individuals who are not final policymakers. (See Pl.’s Opp’n Br. to Sch. Dist.

Defs. & Weir’s Mot. 5.) The Complaint does not allege facts as to the final decision-making

authority for Labuza, Gross, Caravello, and Jelinsky (see generally Compl.), and Plaintiff argues

in opposition that the theory she advances relates to Ballone, Pacifico, and MTPS (see PI.’s Opp’n

Br. to Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s Mot. 5). Count One is, therefore, dismissed as to Labuza, Gross,

Caravello, and Jelinsky.

With respect to Ballone, Pacifico, and MTPS, School District Defendants argue that

Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Plaintiff only alleges

“conclusory statements” regarding the relevant “policies, customs, and practices|.]” (Sch. Dist.

Defs. & Weir’s Mot. to Dismiss 14-15.) The Court agrees.

11

Plaintiff's Complaint vaguely alleges that she suffered constitutional violations as a result

of MTPS’s: (1) “custom of disciplining employees without due process or meaningful

investigation”; (2) “policy of transmitting stigmatizing accusations to licensing authorities without

substantiation”; (3) “failure to train and supervise administrators regarding the Constitutional

rights of employees”; and (4) “deliberate indifference to the reputational and property interests of

employees when responding to complaints.” (Compl. § 126.) Third Circuit precedent, however,

explicitly requires a plaintiff to “specify what exactly that custom or policy was.” McTernan, 564

F.3d at 658. Without more, Plaintiff's claim must fail against Ballone, Pacifico, and MTPS.

Count One is, accordingly, dismissed as to all School District Defendants.

2. Count Two

“Civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on reputational harms are known as

‘stigma-plus’ claims.” D&D Assocs., Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 552 F. App’x 110, 113 (3d Cir. 2014)

(citing Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 2006)). To state such a claim, a

plaintiff “must show a stigma to h[er] reputation plus deprivation of some additional right or

interest.” Dondero v. Lower Milford Township, 5 F Ath 355, 360 (3d Cir. 2021) (emphasis in

original) (quoting Hill, 455 F.3d at 236). Under the “stigma” prong, the plaintiff must allege that

the stigmatizing statements were both “public” and “false.” /d For the “plus” prong, the plaintiff

must “allege an alteration or extinguishment of an interest protected by the Constitution or state

law.” Cooley vy. Barber, No. 07-3327, 2007 WL 2900550, at *1 Gd Cir. Oct. 4, 2007) (citations

omitted).

Here, Plaintiff vaguely alleges that: (1) “Ballone ... perpetuated . . . Weir’s false

accusations” (Compl. 83); (2) “Defendants transmitted false and stigmatizing information about

her to the New Jersey State Board of Examiners and other state authorities” which contained

12

“materially false statements about the nature of the allegations against [Plaintiff]” (id. {J 93, 94);

(3) Gross, Jelinsky, and Caravello “made false representations to unemployment authorities on at

least three occasions” (id. § 111); and (4) “Defendants publicly and falsely accused Plaintiff of

professional misconduct and moral unfitness in connection with her employment, disseminating

those stigmatizing charges to third parties, including within the school community, law

enforcement, and to state licensing authorities” (id. J 130). Plaintiff does not, however, allege what

the actual statements are that caused such harm to her reputation or who made which statement.

(See generally Compl.) Without more, Plaintiff's stigma-plus claim asserted against School

District Defendants must fail. See, e.g., Berkery v. Wissahickon Sch. Bd., 99 F. Supp. 3d 563, 572

(E.D. Pa. 2015) (finding plaintiff's stigma-plus claim failed because “nowhere does [p]laintiff

identify the alleged stigmatizing statement(s) which she baldly alleges are false” and “[w]ithout

the statements, no assessment can be made as to whether, even construed in [p]laintiff’s favor,

such statements could have a stigmatizing effect on [p]laintiffs reputation”); Zucal v. County of

Lehigh, 660 F. Supp. 3d 334, 350 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (finding plaintiffs failed to plead a stigma-plus

claim where “[pflaintiffs have failed to identify the substance of the purported stigmatizing

statements”).

Count Two is, accordingly, dismissed.

3. Counts Three and Four

Plaintiff alleges a Monell liability claim against Police Defendants and a procedural due

process violation claim against Menna in his individual capacity based on allegations that Menna

instructed employees to “disseminate a CD copy of surveillance video that had been confidentially

viewed in camera in the criminal trial against Plaintiff.” (Compl. ¥§ 136, 141.) Plaintiff, however,

fails to allege that the video was actually disseminated or who it was disseminated to. (See

13

generally id.) Moreover, Plaintiff fails to provide case law to support any argument that she has a

property interest in, or a privacy right to, the video. (See generally P1.’s Opp’n Br. to Township’s

Mot.; PI.’s Opp’n Br. to Menna’s Mot.); see also Hill, 455 F.3d at 234-35 (noting that to state a

claim for “deprivation of procedural due process rights, a plaintiff must allege that[:] (1) [s]he was

deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s

protection of ‘life, liberty, or property[;]’ and (2) the procedures available to [her] did not provide

‘due process of law’” (quoting Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000))).

Without more, Plaintiff's claims relating to instructions about disseminating a video must

fail. Counts Three and Four’ are, accordingly, dismissed.

C. Count Five Asserted Against School District Defendants and Police Defendants

Plaintiff asserts Count Five against School District Defendants and Police Defendants for

a violation of the NICRA. (Compl. {§ 145-47.) Plaintiff alleges that her “deprivations [asserted

under Count Five] mirror and supplement the violations of the United States Constitution alleged

in Counts One through Four... .” Ud. 147.)

For the same reasons Plaintiff's § 1983 claims fail, however, so too does her NJCRA claim.

See, e.g., Wronko v. Howell Township, No. 17-1956, 2018 WL 516055, at *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 23, 2018)

(“For the reasons set forth in connection with the § 1983 analysis .. . , [p]laintiff[] cannot state a

claim under the NJCRA[.]”); Fearron v. Restuccia, No. 20-14819, 2023 WL 2367679, at *11

(D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2023) (dismissing NJCRA claims for “same reasons as the § 1983 claim”); K./. v.

Greater Egg Harbor Reg'l High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 431 F. Supp. 3d 488, 504 n.8 (D.N.J.

° The Court further notes that Menna, as a prosecutor, is protected by prosecutorial immunity for

claims asserted against him that relate to the acts he performed in accordance with his prosecutorial

role. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (“[A]cts undertaken by a prosecutor

in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of

his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity.”).

14

2019) (Courts in this Circuit have consistently interpreted the NJCRA and Section 1983

analogously [.]” (citing Szemple v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 493 F. App’x 238, 241 (3d Cir. 2012))).

Count Five is, accordingly, dismissed.

D. Counts Six and Seven Asserted Against Swanson

Plaintiff asserts Counts Six and Seven against Swanson for defamation and intentional

infliction of emotional distress. (Compl. □□ 148-54.) Swanson argues that, among other things, the

claims against Swanson should be dismissed because Plaintiff “fails to identify any conduct

undertaken by . . . Swanson individually.” (Swanson’s Mot. to Dismiss *27.) The Court agrees.

Here, the only facts alleged in the Complaint as to Swanson are that Swanson, among other

defendants, “participated in the mobbing by posting false and defamatory content about [Plaintiff]

on Facebook, Instagram, and other social media platforms” and these statements “falsely branded

[Plaintiff] as a ‘predator,’ ‘groomer,’ ‘pedophile,’ and other deeply offensive terms[.]” (Compl.

47 102-03.) Plaintiff, however, has not alleged any details about the purported defamatory

statements Swanson individually made. See, e.g., Trainor v. McGibney, No. 24-8873, 2025 WL

1207595, at *3-4 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2025) (dismissing defamation claim and intentional infliction

of emotional distress claim premised on defamatory statements where “[p]laintiffs have not

indicated what the specific language at issue is and when the alleged posts were published [and a]s

such, [p]laintiffs’ allegations are not enough to provide notice as to which statements are at issue”).

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff attempts to group plead the claims arising in tort, Plaintiff has

failed to allege a cause of action against Swanson. See Testa v. Hoban, No. 17-1618, 2018 WL

623691, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2018) (finding that plaintiff “failed to plead ‘a short and plain

’ Page numbers preceded by an asterisk refer to the page numbers noted in the ECF header.

15

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ against [certain djefendants”

where plaintiff failed to plead any allegations as to those defendants (citations omitted)); McLeod

v. Fifth Jud. Dist. of Pa, No. 20-1362, 2022 WL 13986832, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2022)

(“Pleadings that fail to identify each defendant’s role for the alleged wrong are insufficient.” (citing

Pushkin v. Nussbaum, No. 12-324, 2017 WL 1591863, at *7 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2017)).

Counts Six and Seven asserted against Swanson are, accordingly, dismissed.

E. Count Eight Asserted Against School District Defendants

Plaintiff asserts Count Eight for a breach of contract claim against School District

Defendants. (Compl. { 155-56.) School District Defendants argue that Count Eight should be

dismissed as Plaintiff “failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate a viable breach of contract

claim[,]” including because: (1) “there [are] no facts alleged, nor could be alleged that [Plaintiff]

was employed by any of the six individuals [Plaintiff] named[;]” and (2) Plaintiff fails to allege

“that [her] employment was based on a contract, and if it was, what the terms of that contract

[were], what terms [MTPS] allegedly breached, and whether that alleged breach led to a legally

cognizable loss.” (Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s Moving Br. 20.) Plaintiff recognizes in opposition

that “[bJecause Plaintiffs employment relationship existed with the School District as the

employing entity, contractual liability runs against that entity rather than individual employees”

and, as a result, Plaintiff “does not oppose dismissal of the breach of contract claim against the

individual defendants to the extent they were not parties to the employment contract.” (P1.’s Opp’n

Br. to Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s Mot. 25-26.)

Under New Jersey law, a breach of contract claim requires four elements: (1) “the parties

entered into a contract containing certain terms;” (2) the plaintiff performed her contractual

obligations; (3) the defendant breached the contract; and (4) the plaintiff suffered damages because

16

of the defendant’s breach. Goldfarb v. Solimine, 245 A.3d 570, 577 (N.J. 2021) (quoting Globe

Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 139 A.3d 57, 64 (N.J. 2016)). Here, Plaintiff fails to allege a breach of

contract claim, including because Plaintiff's Complaint does not allege: (1) a contract containing

certain terms; (2) the fact that her employment with MTPS was governed by a contract containing

certain terms; or (3) a breach of those certain terms. (See generally Compl.); Goldfarb, 245 A.3d

at 577. Without more, Plaintiff's breach of contract claim asserted against all of School District

Defendants must fail.

Count Eight is, accordingly, dismissed.

F. Count Nine Asserted Against School District Defendants

Plaintiff's Count Nine asserts a cause of action under the New Jersey Wage Payment Law

(the “WPL”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-4.1, ef seg. (Compl. {4 157-58.) School District Defendants

argue that this claim should be dismissed because “Plaintiff has not alleged any facts

demonstrating that her salary was withheld.” (Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s Moving Br. 21.) In

opposition, Plaintiff argues that she adequately alleges a claim under the WPL because she “was

an employee of the Marlboro School District who performed services as a tenured educator” and

alleges that “Defendants failed to pay compensation owed to her in connection with her

employment and separation from service, including earned salary and related employment

payments.” (Pl.’s Opp’n Br. to Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s Mot. 26.)

The WPL “sets forth requirements as to an employer’s timing and mode of payments to

[its] employee[s]” and “confers a private cause of action on employees for an employer’s failure

to pay wages according to its requirements.” Mahanor v. Berkley Life Scis., No. 31-18981, 2022

WL 2541773, at *16 (July 7, 2022) (citations omitted). The WPL defines “wages” as “the direct

monetary compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, where the amount is

17

determined on a time, task, piece, or commission basis excluding any form of supplementary

incentives and bonuses which are calculated independently of regular wages and paid in addition

thereto.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-4.1.

Here, Plaintiff's conclusory allegations state that “Defendants violated New Jersey wage

payment laws by withholding [Plaintiff's] earned salary without legal justification[.]” (Compl.

110.) Plaintiff does not identify which Defendants® purportedly withheld her salary and further

asserts that she was actually “suspended with pay” (id. J 85) and that she subsequently resigned

Ud. 91, 92). Without more, Plaintiff has not adequately alleged facts that one or more of School

District Defendants withheld her wages in accordance with certain requirements in violation of the

The Court, accordingly, dismisses Count Nine.

G. Count Ten Asserted Against School District Defendants

Plaintiff's Count Ten asserts a “constructive termination” claim against School District

Defendants based on the alleged fact that “Defendants created intolerable working conditions

through false accusations and public defamation, forcing [Plaintiffs] constructive termination.”

(Compl. {| 159-60.) School District Defendants argue that Count Ten should be dismissed because

““constructive termination’ is not a stand-alone cause of action.” (Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s

Moving Br. 24.) The Court agrees. See 4 McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 12:317 (3d ed.) (“Constructive

termination is not a stand-alone case of action; the constructive discharge doctrine simply extends

® The Court notes, however, that a claim pursuant to the WPL is only available as against one’s

employer. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-4.2 (“[E]very employer shall pay the full amount of wages

due to [its] employees... (emphasis added)); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-4.10 (“Any employer who

knowingly fails to pay the full amount of wages to an employee . . .” (emphasis added)), Plaintiff

recognizes this in her opposition, noting that “[t]o the extent liability lies with the employer

responsible for paying wages, Plaintiff does not oppose limiting the claim [to the relevant

Defendant] accordingly.” (Pl.’s Opp’n Br. to Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s 27.)

18

liability to employers who indirectly effect a discharge that would have been forbidden by statute

if done directly.”); Knox v. Union Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. 13-5875, 2015 WL 769930, at *8 (D.N.J.

Feb, 23, 2015) (dismissing “constructive discharge claim” because it is not an independent cause

of action); Matos v. PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., No. 03-5320, 2005 WL 2656675, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 17,

2005) (“[C]onstructive discharge is merely a form of adverse employment action, and is not an

independent claim.” (citations omitted)).

The Court, accordingly, dismisses Count Ten.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are granted. The Court

will issue an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

“

MICHAEL A. Sut

23 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: , 2026

To the extent Plaintiff attempts to plead a claim for an adverse employment action such as

wrongful discharge, she fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as she fails to

adequately plead the other elements of the claim. See, e.g., DeFalco v. Rutgers Univ. Police Dept,

No. 15-6607, 2017 WL 6667517, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2017) (noting that to adequately plead a

cause of action for wrongful discharge resulting from a “constructive discharge, [p]laintiff must

assert both discrimination and a discharge, i.e. a cessation of employment’).

19