RISIS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DANIEL M. RISIS,

Plaintiff,

No. 25cv16644 (EP) (JBC)

v.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

LIVINGSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Defendant.

PADIN, District Judge.

In this civil rights action, pro se Plaintiff Daniel M. Risis alleges that the Livingston Police

Department’s (“LPD”) “policies, customs, and coordinated actions chilled Plaintiff’s protected

speech, selectively enforced laws on the basis of gender, and denied hearings, fair process, and

access to courts, causing irreparable and compensable harm.” D.E. 1 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”)

¶ 35.

The Complaint alleges seven counts against the LPD.1 Id. ¶¶ 35–41. Count I alleges that

the LPD engaged in policies and customs that eroded Plaintiff’s protected speech, discriminated

against Plaintiff based on gender, and denied Plaintiff a fair hearing. Id. ¶ 35. Count II alleges

§ 1983 violations based on “[w]arrantless intrusions, fabricated complaints, seizure/non-return of

1 On February 17, 2026, this Court noted Plaintiff’s failure to serve and directed him to serve seven

defendants (the “Unserved Defendants”): Robert Menendez, Mikie Sherrill, the Essex County

Prosecutor’s Office, the New Jersey Department of Children and Families, the Family Court of

Essex County, Mallary Blask Risis, and Matthew Smuro. The Court provided Plaintiff 30 days

to show cause in writing why this case should not be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) as to

those unserved defendants. The Court then sua sponte provided a 30-day extension to serve the

Unserved Defendants. D.E. 30. Despite the extension, Plaintiff failed to serve the Unserved

Defendants, and this Court dismissed the action without prejudice as to the Unserved Defendants.

D.E. 32.

property, and denial of process” by the LPD. Id. ¶ 36. Count III alleges that Defendants conspired

to deprive him of equal protection and equal privileges in violation of § 1985(3). Id. ¶ 37. Count

IV alleges that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1986 by having “knowledge and ability to prevent

ongoing deprivations” and “fail[ing] to act.”2 Id. ¶ 38. Count V alleges that Defendants violated

the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“Civil RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1964.

Id. ¶ 39. Count VI asserts state-law claims for interference with custody, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, defamation, and civil conspiracy. Id. ¶ 40. Finally, Count VII alleges § 1983

violations based on a failure to train LPD officers not to engage in “[c]onstitutional deprivations.”

Id. ¶ 41.

The Township of Livingston (the “Township”)—which the Complaint names only as the

LPD, and which represents that it was improperly pleaded as such—appeared as the real party in

interest and moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).3

D.Es. 9 (“Motion” or “Mot.”) & D.E. 9-1. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. D.E. 16 (“Opposition”

or “Opp’n”). The Township replies. D.E. 15 (“Reply”). The Court decides the Motion without

oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L. Civ. R. 78.1(b).

2 Because Plaintiff brings this claim against “supervisory/official Defendants who had power to

prevent and failed to do so,” the Court assumes this count includes the LPD.

3 The Court notes that this action was brought against the LPD—not the Township. But “[u]nder

New Jersey law, naming [the LPD] as a defendant is legally equivalent to naming the [Township]”

so “the Court will construe Plaintiff’s § 1983” claims against the Township. El v. Atl. City

Freeholders Bd. of Commissioners, No. 22-6281, 2023 WL 8271768, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2023).

I. BACKGROUND4

Plaintiff is a New Jersey resident and father of two minor sons. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 18; D.E. 1-

4 (the “Attachments”) at 6.5 From around 2019 through 2025, Mallary Blask Risis, Plaintiff’s

wife, who Plaintiff alleges he is separated from, reportedly took their sons across county and state

lines at least twenty-four times without consent or prior court authorization. Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff

reported these removals and submitted domestic violence claims against Ms. Risis to the LPD, the

Essex County Prosecutor’s Office, and the New Jersey Department of Children and Families.

Id. ¶ 21. According to Plaintiff, the officers and agencies of these departments did not enforce

New Jersey’s custodial-interference statutes. Id. ¶ 22.

Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Risis’s private counsel, Matthew Smuro, acted jointly with State

officials to shield her from liability. Attachments at 1. Plaintiff claims that Smuro and State

officials (1) advanced falsehoods about Plaintiff and suppressed discovery, and (2) municipal

actors entered his home on fabricated complaints. Id. ¶ 25. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that he

faced fabricated charges and unlawful detainment under the pretext of violations of unspecified

temporary restraining orders. Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff also alleges that since 2023, Defendants then-

Senator Robert Menendez and then-Representative Mikie Sherrill (together, the “Public

Officials”) willfully ignored Plaintiff’s complaints of alleged constitutional violations. Id. ¶ 27;

Attachments at 3–4.

4 The facts in this section are taken from the factual allegations in the Complaint, which the Court

presumes to be true for purposes of resolving the Motion to Dismiss. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

5 Plaintiff includes three attachments: Attachment A details the list of defendants and the basis for

their inclusion in this action. Attachment B is a letter from the Plaintiff to the Court requesting an

independent review of officials that permitted his alleged harassment. Attachment C lists the

criminal and civil statutes Mallary Blask Risis has purportedly violated. Because the Attachments

are consolidated in one docket entry, the Court refers to page numbers in the entry, D.E. 1-4.

After airing the Public Officials’ decision to ignore Plaintiff’s complaints, Plaintiff

allegedly began experiencing what he believed was retaliation for pursuing his grievances.

Compl. ¶ 28. For instance, Plaintiff asserts that three unidentified men were permitted to sit in on

a private family court proceeding, breaching confidentiality and judicial ethics. Id. Plaintiff

asserts that when attempting to identify these individuals, “production was delayed or refused,

impeding his access to evidence and relief.” Id. ¶ 29. Plaintiff argues that these retaliatory actions

amount to “a pattern of racketeering activity” under Civil RICO. Id. ¶¶ 30, 39.

As a result of the alleged pattern of retaliation, Plaintiff has sustained psychological,

financial, and reputational harm, including “complex PTSD symptoms and economic devastation.”

Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff also contends that substantial financial assets, such as multiple properties, were

disrupted during litigation. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiff, however, does not detail which PTSD-related

symptoms he suffers from or how litigation has affected him financially. See id.

The Complaint seeks compensatory, treble, and punitive damages; attorney fees;

declaratory relief; and an injunction prohibiting retaliation, harassment, and defamation arising

from the facts alleged. Id. at 12–14.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court accepts all well-pled factual

allegations as true, construes the complaint in the plaintiff’s favor, and determines “whether, under

any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. Cnty.

of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d

361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the

complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly

authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v.

Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). Courts may not consider “[f]actual claims and

assertions raised by a defendant.” Doe v. Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 345 (3d Cir. 2022).

Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court construes his Complaint liberally and holds it

to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 94 (2007). But liberal construction does not relax the obligation to plead facts: a pro se plaintiff

must still allege enough to state a plausible claim. Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,

245 (3d Cir. 2013).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible,

meaning “the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). Although there is no “‘probability

requirement,’” plaintiff’s claims must do more than present “a sheer possibility that a defendant

has acted unlawfully.” Id. The allegations must include “more than labels and conclusions.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Thus, “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings

that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 679. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must

be supported by factual allegations.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678.

III. DISCUSSION

At threshold, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff can hold the LPD liable for a

§ 1983 violation under the Monell doctrine. Under that doctrine, a municipality answers under

§ 1983 not for its employees’ acts on a theory of respondeat superior, but only for its own policy

or custom that is the moving force behind a constitutional violation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

436 U.S. 658, 690–94 (1978). Because the LPD is not an independent legal entity but is instead

an administrative arm of the Township, it is not amenable to suit. The proper defendant is the

Township of Livingston, which—improperly pleaded as the LPD—is the real party in interest and

has appeared to defend. See D.E. 9-1. And even if the Township were substituted as defendant,

the Complaint would fail under Monell because Plaintiff pleads no municipal policy or custom.

The Complaint faces a recurring obstacle. Plaintiff names eight defendants—the LPD

among them—along with fifty fictitious John Does, but pleads against them collectively. See

Compl. Plaintiff does little to distinguish which defendant did what. Id. Each of the seven counts

re-alleges all thirty-four preceding factual paragraphs and then asserts its claim against

undifferentiated groups: “all Defendants,” “state/municipal Defendants,” or “supervisory/official

Defendants.” Id. ¶¶ 35–41. That is a shotgun pleading, and it leaves the Court unable to discern

which factual allegations are directed at the LPD or the Township as opposed to the seven other

named defendants. See Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 93 (3d Cir. 2019) (requiring that

a complaint “identif[y] discrete defendants and the actions taken by these defendants”). The Court

construes the pro se Complaint liberally and does not rest dismissal on this defect alone, but

Plaintiff’s failure to tie specific allegations to specific defendants compounds the pleading

deficiencies addressed below—most directly, the absence of any allegation connecting a policy or

custom to the Township.

The Court addresses Plaintiff’s federal claims in turn: the § 1983 claims governed by

Monell (Counts I, II, and VII), the § 1985(3) conspiracy claim (Count III), the derivative § 1986

claim (Count IV), and the civil RICO claim (Count V). Because no federal claim survives, the

Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims in Count VI.

A. Liability Under the Monell Doctrine

1. Plaintiff’s Monell claim against the LPD

Plaintiff improperly tries to extend § 1983 liability to the LPD through the Monell doctrine.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law,

deprives another of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because

the LPD operates as an arm of local government, Plaintiff’s effort to hold it liable implicates

Monell, which governs when—and against whom—a constitutional violation by a municipal entity

gives rise to § 1983 liability. Municipalities are “persons” under § 1983, but only when a

municipal policy or custom causes the violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91. Police departments

like the LPD are not municipalities—they are administrative sub-units with no independent legal

existence, and therefore not suable persons under § 1983. Padilla v. Twp. of Cherry Hill, 110 F.

App’x 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2004).

To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that a person acting under color

of state law deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law. West v. Atkins, 487

U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The LPD is not a “person” that may be found liable under § 1983 under Monell

because it is not an independent legal entity. See Carter v. Matos, No. 09-5503, 2010 WL

3169284, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2010) (dismissing a § 1983 claim against a police department);

Johnson v. Provenzano, No. 12-1253, 2014 WL 7011545, at *9 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 2014) (same).

And where, as here, the defendant is a municipality like the Township, a plaintiff must also

satisfy Monell’s demand of a policy or custom that is the “moving force” behind the violation.

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). In other words, “liability cannot be predicated

solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Kornegey v. City of Philadelphia, 299 F. Supp.

3d 675, 680 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)

(noting that a defendant must be personally involved in the alleged wrongful conduct to be held

liable for civil rights violations)). Accordingly, Counts I and II are DISMISSED with prejudice6

as to the LPD and are DISMISSED without prejudice as to the Township.

2. Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Monell

Read against the Township—the proper municipal defendant, which has appeared—

Plaintiff’s Monell claim fails. The Complaint points to no facts suggesting that a Township policy

or custom authorized the harassment Plaintiff alleges.7 To make a Monell claim, plaintiffs must

show: (1) the existence of a policy or custom, (2) that policymakers acted with deliberate

indifference to the known consequences of that policy or custom, and (3) that the policy or custom

was the “moving force” behind the constitutional violation. Toka v. Burlington Cnty., No. 23-

1971, 2026 WL 1506314, at *7 (D.N.J. May 29, 2026) (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan

Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404–06 (1997)). For example, Monell itself involved a class

of female employees of the Department of Social Services and of the Board of Education of the

City of New York who were compelled to take unpaid leaves from their jobs due to their

pregnancies. 436 U.S. at 660–61. The Supreme Court held that since the case “unquestionably”

6 Because § 1983 claims cannot be brought against the LPD, amendment would be futile. Fallon

v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr. of Se. Pa., 877 F.3d 487, 494 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that dismissal with

prejudice is warranted when “[a]mendment would be futile if the complaint . . . would nonetheless

be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim”).

7 The Court addresses Plaintiff’s pleading failures with respect to the Township, as it is the proper

Defendant and the real party in interest here. The Court’s reasoning and decision would be the

same as to the LPD, assuming it could be sued under Monell.

involved a policy that forced the plaintiffs to take unpaid leave, the municipality of New York City

could be held liable under § 1983. Id. at 694–95.

Plaintiff does not meet his burden under the Monell doctrine. Unlike Monell, where the

plaintiffs identified an official policy causing the harm, Plaintiff here merely alludes to vague

references of “deliberate evidence suppression” and discriminatory policies and customs.

Compl. ¶¶ 23–26. And Plaintiff does even less to allege that a policymaker, policy, or custom

authorized the discrimination outlined in the Complaint. See generally Compl.

Instead, Plaintiff relies solely on “labels and conclusions” that do not survive a Rule

12(b)(6) challenge. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Such conclusory statements, either alone or in

conjunction, are insufficient to present a factual basis to establish liability under Counts I and II of

the Complaint under Monell. See Costino v. Anderson, No. 14-6940, 2017 WL 4404392, at *6

(D.N.J. Oct. 4, 2017) (explaining that “conclusory allegations are . . . insufficient to state a

plausible Monell claim to survive a motion to dismiss.”). Plaintiff also argues that the LPD acted

within its scope of employment, Compl. ¶ 13, improperly invoking the standard reserved for a

respondeat superior theory of liability, which, under Monell, cannot be the sole reason for § 1983

liability, Kornegey, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 680.

Alternatively, Plaintiff could demonstrate that a municipality’s failure to train officers

amounts to a Monell violation when “(1) municipal policymakers know that employees will

confront a particular situation; (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees

mishandling; and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause deprivation of

constitutional rights.” Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).

In Carter, the plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim against unknown policymakers within the

Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office for inadequately training their police officers. 181 F.3d at

342–43. The Third Circuit held that the plaintiff had adequately pleaded all three elements,

focusing on element two, which it found satisfied due to Philadelphia’s 39th Police District’s

history of corruption, which amounted to a “history of employee[] mishandling.” See id. at 357.

Here, Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts for Count VII to support all three Carter

elements. Plaintiff identifies no Township policymaker, no prior incident, and no specific gap in

training. See Compl. Fatally, Plaintiff includes nothing to establish either that Township or LPD

officials knew their officers would face the kind of situation Plaintiff describes or that such

encounters have a history of mishandling under element two. Id. And finally, Plaintiff fails to

allege a single fact tying the alleged training deficiency to a pattern of constitutional harm where

the wrong choice by an officer would frequently cause deprivation. Id. Thus, Count VII is

DISMISSED with prejudice as to the LPD and is DISMISSED without prejudice as to the

Township.8

B. Plaintiff’s Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights Claim Fails

Here, too, Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

conspired to deprive him of equal protection and equal privileges. Compl. ¶ 37. The Township

responds that the Complaint identifies no agreement among any defendants and no racial or class-

based discriminatory animus—both of which a claim under § 1985(3) requires. Mot. at 5–6.

Section 1985(3) does not reach every agreement to do another wrong; it supplies a remedy only

8 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s opposition leans heavily on body-worn-camera footage, which he

claims the Township has withheld. D.Es. 16-1 & 16-2 (“Plaintiff’s Certifications”). But the

allegations in Plaintiff’s Certifications do not appear in the Complaint, and on a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion the Court looks to the pleadings, not to new facts a party supplies in its brief. Pennsylvania

ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a complaint

may not be amended by briefs to a motion to dismiss). Plaintiff may not amend his Complaint

through his Opposition. And even credited, Plaintiff’s Certifications describe missing footage—

not any municipal policy or custom. They therefore do not save the Monell claims.

for conspiracies to deprive a person of equal protection of the laws that are motivated by some

racial or otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403

U.S. 88, 102 (1971) (holding that § 1985(3) requires “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-

based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action”). To state a claim for

conspiracy under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege four elements:

(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any

person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and

immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4)

whereby a person is injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or

privilege of a citizen of the United States.

Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters

& Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828–29 (1983)).

To allege a conspiracy under the first element, a plaintiff must plead plausible factual

allegations to support the reasonable inference that two or more persons formed an actual

agreement to deprive the plaintiff of their civil rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); see Watson v. Sec’y,

Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 436 F. App’x 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2011). Further, a plaintiff must set forth

allegations that address the (1) period of the conspiracy, (2) object of the conspiracy, and (3)

actions of the alleged conspirators taken to achieve the conspiracy. Kelly v. Pier, No. 16-3417,

2017 WL 3397030, at *10 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2017) (quoting Ivan v. Cnty. of Middlesex, 595 F. Supp.

2d 425, 484 (D.N.J. 2009)); see also Schlichten v. Cnty. of Northampton, 279 F. App’x 176, 179

(3d Cir. 2008) (requiring a conspiracy to be pleaded with specificity).

Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim fails at the first element. Although Plaintiff claims that

defendants conspired to deprive him of equal protection and equal privileges, and he alludes to

collaboration between private counsel and public officials, Plaintiff presents no facts that support

the inference that the LPD reached an agreement, either among themselves or with other

defendants, to deprive him of his civil rights. See Compl. Indeed, Plaintiff does not distinguish

among defendants in alleging the conspiracy—the same shotgun defect noted above. See Foulke

v. Twp. of Cherry Hill, No. 23-2543, 2024 WL 3568841, at *1 (D.N.J. July 29, 2024) (dismissing

a § 1983 complaint due to shotgun pleading).

Such vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient to support a conspiracy claim. See

Grant v. Slattery, No. 22-941, 2022 WL 4550632, at *7 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2022) (holding that

plaintiff failed to describe any concerted action between school board members necessary to plead

conspiracy); Kelly, 2017 WL 3397030, at *11 (holding that numerous general and conclusory

allegations that municipal defendants “conspired between and amongst themselves” do not fulfill

the plausibility requirement). Put simply, Plaintiff fails to “allege that [LPD or any defendant]

communicated with one another or came to an agreement to conspire against him.” Muhammad

v. Cappellini, 477 F. App’x 935, 938 (3d Cir. 2012) (affirming the dismissal for failure to plead a

conspiracy).

And even if Plaintiff had pleaded adequate factual allegations to establish a conspiracy, to

satisfy the second element, Plaintiff has pleaded no facts related to discriminatory animus or

invidious discrimination. Kidwai v. Hudson Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., No. 23-23206, 2026 WL

881599, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2026) (dismissing § 1985(3) claim for failing to plead racial or

class-based discriminatory animus). Because Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to satisfy

the elements of his conspiracy claim under § 1985, Count III is DISMISSED without prejudice

as to both the Township and the LPD.

C. Plaintiff’s Section 1986 Claim Fails

Count IV rises and falls with Count III. Section 1986 creates liability for those who know

that a § 1985 conspiracy is afoot, have the power to stop it, and fail to do so. Rogin v. Bensalem

Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 696 (3d Cir. 1980). The claim is entirely derivative. D’Aurizio v. Palisades

Park, 963 F. Supp. 378, 386 (D.N.J. 1997) (“[A]ll claims under section 1986 are derivative in

nature, requiring a valid underlying section 1985(3) claim.”) (citation omitted). As the Third

Circuit has put it, “transgressions of § 1986 by definition depend on a preexisting violation of §

1985.” Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1295 (3d Cir. 1994). Because Plaintiff has not stated a

claim under § 1985(3), his § 1986 claim necessarily fails with it. Count IV is DISMISSED

without prejudice as to both the Township and the LPD.

D. Plaintiff’s Civil RICO Claim Fails

Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to state a Civil RICO claim. Section 1962(c) of the

RICO statute provides that:

It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise

engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to

conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s

affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.

18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Section 1964(c) creates a civil cause of action for any person injured “in his

business or property” by a defendant’s RICO violation. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). To state a civil

RICO claim under § 1962(c), a plaintiff must allege four elements:

(1) the existence of an enterprise . . . affecting interstate commerce; (2) that the

defendant was employed by or associated with the enterprise; (3) that the defendant

participated, directly or indirectly, in the conduct or the affairs of the enterprise;

and (4) that the defendant participated through a pattern of racketeering activity that

. . . include[d] . . . at least two racketeering acts.

Munsif v. Cassel, 331 F. App’x 954, 958 (3d Cir. 2009).

Plaintiff has failed, among other things, to plead sufficient facts to establish a pattern of

racketeering. A pattern of racketeering requires the commission of at least two predicate acts of

racketeering within a ten-year period that are related and that amount to, or threaten the likelihood

of, continued criminal activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5); see, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492

U.S. 229, 240 (1989) (holding that plaintiffs successfully pleaded a pattern of racketeering activity

by alleging that defendants gave several bribes which were related by a common purpose). The

RICO statute lists obstruction offenses and certain types of fraud as predicate acts. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 1961(1).

Plaintiff alleges that a pattern of racketeering activity was created by the LPD through

“obstruction, fraud, and related predicate acts.” Compl. at 11. Although the Complaint does not

identify the obstruction statute upon which he bases his claims, he apparently9 seeks to proceed

under 18 U.S.C. § 1503. Under § 1503, anyone who “corruptly or by threats of force, or by any

threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence,

obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice” may be held criminally liable. 18 U.S.C.

§ 1503.

Plaintiff bases his obstruction claim upon allegations that the LPD “executed unlawful

entries” and deliberately suppressed evidence—but he does not provide specific details.

Attachment A at 2. Plaintiff does not plead facts or provide examples of the alleged corruption,

any threat of force, or any threatening communication on the part of the LPD. Plaintiff again

simply provides conclusory allegations, which cannot form the basis for an adequately pleaded

claim. See Winters v. Jones, No. 16-9020, 2018 WL 326518, at *10 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2018) (holding

claims that defendants obstructed justice by using corrupt plaintiffs to file lawsuits are insufficient

to plead a plausible obstruction of justice claim as a RICO predicate act); Matta v. Kaur, No. 24-

9 Plaintiff’s Complaint does not cite an obstruction statute by number. Section 1961(1) lists several

obstruction-related RICO predicates under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1510, 1512, and 1513. Plaintiff

does not point to any of the listed predicates but instead alleges generalized “deliberate evidence

suppression” and that “production was delayed or refused, impeding his access to evidence and

relief.” Compl. ¶ 29; Attachments at 2. That broad formulation tracks § 1503’s catch-all language

reaching anyone who “obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to . . . obstruct, or impede the due

administration of justice,” 18 U.S.C. § 1503, more closely than any of the other listed obstruction

predicates. The Court therefore construes Plaintiff’s obstruction theory as arising, if at all, under

§ 1503.

5743, 2025 WL 2987103, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2025) (noting that the Third Circuit has never

recognized obstruction of justice as a viable RICO predicate except in cases involving witness

intimidation). Thus, Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded obstruction as a predicate act.

The RICO statute lists mail fraud and wire fraud as predicate acts; general fraud is not

listed. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Plaintiff does not allege either mail or wire fraud. See Compl.

Nor does he present any facts to establish mail or wire fraud. Id. Plaintiff’s claims that fraud

establishes a pattern of racketeering also fail. See Briksza v. Moloney, No. 08-1785, 2009 WL

1767594, at *8 (D.N.J. June 19, 2009) (holding that plaintiff’s blanket allegations that defendants

engaged in fraud were insufficient predicate acts under RICO); Zellner v. Monroe Cnty. Mun.

Waste Mgmt. Auth., No. 07-1976, 2008 WL 2962595, at *9 (M.D. Pa. July 28, 2008) (holding that

general allegations of fraud will be dismissed as potential predicate acts because general fraud is

not listed in the RICO statute).

Further, Plaintiff here must plead the circumstances of the alleged underlying RICO fraud

predicate with particularity. Morales v. Superior Living Prod., 398 F. App’x 812, 814 (3d Cir.

2010) (requiring specificity for fraud-based RICO claim); Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). This requirement

can be met by pleading the date, place or time, or by injecting precision and some measure of

substantiation into the allegations. Morales, 398 F. App’x at 814.

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege specific instances of fraud at any point in the Complaint.

Plaintiff relies exclusively on vague and conclusory statements such as “[e]ach retaliatory action

fits a pattern . . . meeting the RICO threshold of concerted enterprise conduct through repeated

predicate acts of obstruction, fraud, and deprivation of rights.” See id. at 8. But “Plaintiff[] may

not rest upon vague or conclusory allegations of fraud.” Weiss v. First Unum Life Ins., No. 02-

4249, 2003 WL 25713970, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 2003) (citation omitted) (holding that plaintiff’s

allegations of fraud failed because plaintiff did not specify which specific fraudulent acts the

particular defendants were alleged to have engaged in). Because Plaintiff has failed to plead

sufficient facts to support his RICO claim under § 1962(c), Count V is DISMISSED without

prejudice as to both the Township and the LPD.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above,

IT IS, on this 23rd day of June, 2026,

ORDERED that Livingston Township’s Motion to Dismiss, D.E. 9, is GRANTED and it

is further

ORDERED that Counts I, I, and VII against the Livingston Police Department are

DISMISSED with prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that Counts I, II, and VII against the Livingston Township are DISMISSED

without prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that Counts III, IV, V, and VI'° are DISMISSED without prejudice as to both

the Livingston Police Department and the Livingston Township; and it is finally

ORDERED that Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within 45 days of this Order. □□

Fuky Tod

“Evelyn Padin, U.S.D.J.

‘0 Because the Court dismisses all of Plaintiff’s federal claims, it declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the state-law claims in Count VI. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine

Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“If the federal claims are dismissed before trial . . .

the state claims should be dismissed as well.”).

While the Court provides Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint, see Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236,

the Court cautions Plaintiff that “cany amendment must have a good faith basis on which [p]laintiff

can proceed,” Uygur v. Gensler, No. 24-975, 2024 WL 3497888, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 2024).

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