CROCKER

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MONIQUE C.,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:25-cv-11858 (BRM)

v.

OPINION

FRANK BISIGNANO, COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE

Before this Court is Plaintiff Monique C.’s (“Plaintiff”) appeal of the final decision of the

Commissioner (“Commissioner”) of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her

application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (the

“Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (ECF No. 1.) This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). Having reviewed and considered the submissions filed in connection with the appeal and

having declined to hold oral argument in accordance with Local Civil Rule 78.1(b), for the reasons

set forth below and for good cause shown, Plaintiff’s appeal of the Commissioner’s final decision

is DENIED, and the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

This matter arises out of the Commissioner’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s application

for DIB, dated May 17, 2024. (See generally ECF No. 1–3.) On March 7, 2023, Plaintiff applied

for DIB alleging disability due to severe impairments beginning January 1, 2023, including but

not limited to “bilateral tarsal tunnel syndrome, bilateral plantar nerve lesions, left knee arthritis,

headaches, hypertension, morbid obesity, depression disorder, anxiety disorder, kidney disease,

status post-ovarian cystectomy, [and] low back pain.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 6; see also Transcript of

Proceedings1 (“Tr.”) (ECF No. 5) at 213–17.) Plaintiff also applied for Supplemental Security

Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 6; accord Tr.

at 218–24.) The Commissioner initially denied the application for both DIB and SSI on August

17, 2023 (ECF No. 1 ¶ 7; accord Tr. at 129–35), and again upon reconsideration on October 23,

2023 (ECF No. 1 ¶ 8; accord Tr. at 144–51).

Plaintiff, through counsel, then filed a written request for a hearing. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 8; accord

Tr. at 152–53.) Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Gina A. Pantuso (“ALJ Pantuso”) held a

hearing on April 11, 2024. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 9; accord Tr. at 70–90.) In a decision dated May 17,

2024, ALJ Pantuso found Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act as her

“allegations of chronic kidney disease and low back pain are not associated with any medically

determinable impairments,” she “has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work,”

and considering her “age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are

jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that [she] can perform.” (Tr. at 45–

65; accord ECF No. 1 ¶ 10.) The decision became final when the Appeals Council declined review

on April 18, 2025. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 11–12; accord Tr. at 7–13.)

On June 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed a civil action appeal of the final decision denying her

application for DIB with this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff does not

appeal the final decision denying her application for SSI pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). (See

id.) On September 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed her motion brief pursuant to Supplemental Rule 6 for

1 The administrative record is set forth in this transcript. (See generally ECF No. 5.)

Social Security Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (ECF Nos. 7, 8.) The Commissioner filed an

Opposition on November 19, 2025 (ECF No. 11), and Plaintiff filed a Reply on December 3, 2025

(ECF No. 12).

B. Factual Background

1. Plaintiff’s History

Plaintiff is forty-five years old. (Tr. at 55, 75.) She has a high school diploma and

previously worked as a self-employed hairdresser. (Tr. at 55, 75.) Plaintiff allegedly suffers from

the following impairments: morbid obesity, bilateral tarsal tunnel syndrome and plantar nerve

lesions, left knee arthritis, low back pain, headaches, hypertension, kidney disease, depression and

anxiety. (Tr. at 51.) Plaintiff is approximately 5’5” and her weight was within the range of 287 to

297 between January 20 and November 28, 2023.2 (Compare Tr. at 767, with Tr. at 808.) Her

treating physicians have routinely advised her to lose weight through diet and exercise (see, e.g.,

Tr. at 397, 457, 799), which would assist in treating her other impairments (see, e.g., Tr. at 624–

25 (advising her to lose weight to reduce headaches); Tr. at 652 (advising her to lose weight to

reduce stress on her left knee)). Plaintiff has not been provided with any treatment or prescribed

any medications for her morbid obesity. (See generally Tr.)

Plaintiff has a history of bilateral chronic pain and swelling in her feet. (Tr. at 51, 76–78,

96.) She previously underwent a right foot vein removal in 2015 and 2017. (Tr. at 780.) On January

3, 2022, Plaintiff followed up with Advanced Care Foot and Ankle regarding burning pain and

2 Plaintiff’s weight fluctuates widely between medical records. For example, the medical records

of Dr. Levine suggest her weight was within the range of 287 to 297 pounds between January 20

and November 28, 2023 (Tr. at 767, 808), whereas the records of Dr. Kapoor suggest her weight

was consistently 165.35 pounds between same (Tr. at 599, 623). The Court finds the measurements

of Dr. Levine to be consistent with the other measurements in the record. (See Tr. at 91, 257, 369,

462, 486, 534, 564, 703, 736, 820-21.)

numbness on the medial side of her left hindfoot, which had been diagnosed as bilateral tarsal

tunnel syndrome and plantar nerve lesions. (Tr. at 372; see also Tr. at 438 (claiming she was

diagnosed with tendon dysfunction).) Plaintiff rated the pain at 7/10 and claims the pain is

exacerbated by standing and walking, and relieved by sitting and resting. (Tr. at 372; accord Tr.

at 431–32.) The record notes Plaintiff has previously undergone injections, physical therapy, and

nerve destruction without relief. (Tr. at 372.) On April 25, 2022, Plaintiff reported similar pain and

numbness at the bottom of her heels, which first started approximately two weeks earlier (Tr. at

384); and on August 17, 2022, she reported similar pain and numbness on the medial side of her

right hindfoot, which first started approximately two months earlier (Tr. at 411). She rated her pain

at 7/10. (Tr. at 384.) Between September and December 2022, Plaintiff underwent additional

injections, physical therapy, and nerve destruction procedures. (Tr. at 397.) Plaintiff claims she

ultimately underwent six surgeries in her feet, including the installation of implants in both feet.

(Tr. at 438, 462, 463, 736–37; see also Tr. at 82–83 (stating two implants were installed in the

right foot and one in the left foot).) She testified she presently receives monthly injections in her

feet and utilizes “a brace on her right foot and ankle sleeves on both feet to assist with managing

the pain.” (Tr. at 83–84, 147, 438.)

On August 28, 2023, Plaintiff fell and injured her left knee, which has resulted in pain,

weakness, and loss of balance. (Tr. at 56, 110, 615, 649.) Plaintiff also alleges she suffers from

low back pain as a result of her fall. (Tr. at 51.) She subsequently underwent x-rays of the left knee

showing no fractures or dislocations but indicating “[s]ignificant medial joint space narrowing[,]

[g]lobal osteophytes[,] [and] [a]rthritis.” (Tr. at 651.) She underwent an MRI of the left knee

indicating “an extruded tear of the medial meniscus and full-thickness cartilage loss in the medial

aspect of her knee and tricompartmental arthritis.” (Tr. at 649.) She was ultimately diagnosed with

unilateral primary osteoarthritis associated with her morbid obesity. (Tr. at 649.) She initially rated

the pain in her left knee as 4/10, which subsequently worsened to 7/10. (Tr. at 649, 651.) On August

29, 2023, she received a cortisone injection in the left knee without improvement. (Tr. at 651, 661.)

She received physical therapy for pain and weakness in both her left knee and lower back with

minimal improvement between December 4, 2023, and February 5, 2024. (Tr. at 749–65; see also

Tr. at 766–69.) Between January 30 and February 13, 2024, she received three Euflexxa intra-

articular viscosupplementation injections without improvement.3 (Tr. at 649, 663. But see Tr. at

659 (reporting minor improvement between second and third Euflexxa injection).) She was

scheduled for a second cortisone injection in March 2024 (Tr. at 663), but the records do not

indicate whether she ultimately received same (see generally Tr.). Plaintiff was advised an

arthroscopic surgery would provide no clinical utility and, if anything, may worsen her condition.

(Tr. at 649.) Although she will ultimately be required to undergo knee replacement surgery, her

treating physicians have not recommended it at this time based on her age. (See Tr. at 649.) The

record does not include any complaints, findings, or treatment relating to the alleged lower back

pain after December 4, 2023. (See generally Tr.)

Plaintiff claims she suffers diffuse, throbbing pressure headaches. (Tr. at 82.) She first

reported the headaches in or about August 2021, which she described as “starting behind both eyes

[and] radiating throughout the whole head.” (Tr. at 620.) At the time, papilledema was observed.

(Tr. at 620.) On November 13, 2021, Plaintiff underwent a transcranial doppler, which “showed

no evidence of an[] intracranial stenosis or cerebral vasospasm.” (Tr. at 620.) On September 8,

2022, she underwent an electroencephalogram, the results of which were normal. (Tr. at 620.) On

3 ALJ Pantuso mistakenly states Plaintiff received the Euflexxa intra-articular

viscosupplementation injections in February 2014. (Tr. at 56.)

December 7, 2022, she underwent an MRI of the brain, which showed a normal brain and intact

optic nerves. (Tr. at 620.) Plaintiff was ultimately diagnosed with “secondary pseudotumor cerebri

with underlying migraine component.” (Tr. at 625.) She was advised to lose weight and prescribed

medication for her headaches, which reduced but did not eliminate both the intensity and frequency

of same. (Tr. at 621, 624–25.)

Plaintiff also claims she suffers from hypertension, status post-ovarian cystectomy, and

kidney disease. (Tr. at 51.) First, the record establishes Plaintiff was in fact diagnosed with benign

hypertension.4 (See, e.g., Tr. at 766–69.) The record also shows she was prescribed Amlodipine

and Losartan in response to same prior to January 20, 2023. (See Tr. at 259, 356, 438, 501, 820.

But see Tr. at 51 (claiming Plaintiff was not prescribed any blood pressure medications).) On April

26, 2023, Howard S. Levine, DO, noted her blood pressure was “well managed.” (Tr. at 795.)

Next, Plaintiff underwent a laparoscopic ovarian cystectomy on June 13, 2023. (Tr. at 480–595.)

On June 30, 2023, Dr. Levine reported the laparoscopic ovarian cystectomy went well. (Tr. at 787–

90.) Finally, Dr. Levine diagnosed Plaintiff with a “little bit” of renal insufficiency based on a

blood urea nitrogen (“BUN”) test and glomerular filtration rate (“GFR”) test, which indicated a

creatine level of 1.10.13 over normal on November 28, 2023. (Tr. at 766.) The record does not

include any further complaints, findings, or treatment relating to hypertension, status post-ovarian

cystectomy, or kidney disease. (See generally Tr.)

4 Plaintiff’s blood pressure readings fluctuate widely between medical records. For example, the

medical records of Dr. Levine suggest her blood pressure was within the ranges of 98 to 130/66 to

84 between January 20 and November 28, 2023 (Tr. at 767, 771, 775, 781, 785, 788, 792, 796,

800, 804, 808), whereas the records of Dr. Kapoor suggest her blood pressured was within 122/70

to 72 between January 20 and December 8, 2023 (Tr. at 599, 605, 611, 617, 623).

Plaintiff has a history of anxiety and depression. (Tr. at 57, 78–80; see also Tr. at 151

(reporting anxiety, depression, suicidal intentions, and post-traumatic stress disorder).) Plaintiff

claims she was first diagnosed with anxiety and depression following the death of her son’s father

in 2007,5 which was worsened following the death of her youngest brother in 2021. (Tr. at 454–

55, 706.) She was previously admitted for suicidal intentions three times in a single year. (Tr. at

454.) Plaintiff received psychiatric care and was prescribed medication for her anxiety and

depression until her psychiatrist moved in 2021. (Tr. at 368.) Following same, she did not seek

additional psychiatric care as her primary care physician prescribed the necessary medications.

(Tr. at 259, 368; see also Tr. at 795 (“Plaintiff has a history of depression, but it is well

controlled.”).) However, Plaintiff claims her anxiety and depression worsened after retiring as a

hair stylist. (Tr. at 81–82, 449, 453–54, 819.) Plaintiff began to experience sleeplessness because

the “[b]ills [were] piling, and shut off notices [were] stressing [her] out,” which the medications

did not alleviate. (Tr. at 449, 453; see also 466, 703–04 (identifying the primary cause of her

anxiety and depression as her inability to sleep).) On September 13, 2023, Plaintiff sought

additional psychiatric care reporting “her anxiety and depression have become a bit hard to control

by herself.” (Tr. at 819–20.) At the time, she rated her depression as 8/10. (Tr. at 821. But see Tr.

at 820 (assessing “no signs of depression or elevation”).) On January 9, 2024, Plaintiff was

diagnosed with general anxiety and major depression, recurrent moderate. (Tr. at 704; see also Tr.

at 710 (describing the impairment as moderate due to depression and grief).)

The record establishes Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity since she

retired as a hair stylist on January 1, 2023. (Tr. at 51.)

5 The record is not clear whether the son’s father passed away in 2007 or 2017. (Compare Tr. at

454, with Tr. at 723.)

2. Administrative History

On July 5, 2023, Ashraf K. Faltas, M.D., conducted a consultative examination. (Tr. at

366–69.) At the time, Plaintiff reported a history of hypertension (2.5 years), bilateral chronic pain

and swelling in her feet (6 years), and anxiety and depression (9 years). (Tr. at 368.) Plaintiff

claimed she had undergone three surgeries relating to the constant pain in her feet and took

medication for her anxiety and depression, which was prescribed by her primary care physician.

(Tr. at 368.) “[S]he ha[d] not seen a psychiatrist in approximately [five] years.” (Tr. at 368.)

However, when asked to elaborate further, Plaintiff became “belligerent” and “extremely

aggressive.” (Tr. at 368.) Dr. Faltas conducted a physical examination and noted Plaintiff was

“[u]ncooperative with range of motion.” (Tr. at 369.) Dr. Faltas observed an “[a]brasion over [her]

right foot and ankle” but otherwise reported neither a sensory nor motor deficit, and normal deep

tendon reflexes, strength, and gait and gross manipulation. (See Tr. at 369.) Dr. Faltas noted

Plaintiff “was able to get on and off the examination table without any assistance and without the

use of any devices.” (Tr. at 369.)

On July 13, 2023, Ashley Appleton, Psy.D., completed a psychiatric examination. (Tr. at

438–42.) Plaintiff reported a history of anxiety and depression. (See Tr. at 439.) Specifically,

Plaintiff claimed she is usually “irritable” and experiences “excessive worry” due to “her financial

stability, her children’s well-being[,] and her overall health,” which has resulted in her loss of

interest in activities. (See Tr. at 439.) She also claimed she suffers from frequent tearfulness and

panic attacks “at least three times a day,” and has difficulty concentrating and sleeping more than

three hours at night. (See Tr. at 439.) Plaintiff denied suffering from “hallucinations, delusions,

paranois[,] or phobias.” (Tr. at 439.) Although she prefers assistance due to the risk of falling,

Plaintiff reported she was capable of “her own grooming, bathing[,] and dressing.” (Tr. at 441.)

Plaintiff claimed she is unable to perform household chores but is capable of managing her own

money and traveling independently. (Tr. at 441; see also Tr. at 438 (stating Plaintiff arrived at the

psychiatric examination on her own).) Dr. Appleton described Plaintiff as cooperative, oriented,

and focused. (See Tr. at 440.) Furthermore, Dr. Appleton noted Plaintiff had normal short- and

long-term memory and was capable of engaging in organized thought process, simple calculations,

and recall activities. (See Tr. at 440–41.) Dr. Appleton diagnosed Plaintiff with a generalized

anxiety disorder and a major depressive disorder. (Tr. at 441.) Dr. Appleton opined Plaintiff “is

able to follow and understand simple directions and instructions” and “to perform simple tasks.”

(Tr. at 441.) However, due to her difficulty concentrating and frequent panic attacks, Plaintiff “may

have difficulty learning new tasks and performing complex tasks.” (Tr. at 441.) Dr. Appleton

concluded Plaintiff’s anxiety and depression “may significantly interfere with [Plaintiff]’s ability

to function on a daily basis.” (Tr. at 441.)

On April 11, 2024, ALJ Pantuso conducted a hearing, which was attended by vocational

expert Michael Smith. (Tr. at 70–90.) Smith provided classifications for Plaintiff’s past work as a

hair stylist, which he classified as light. (Tr. at 85–86.) When asked by ALJ Pantuso what, if any,

work a hypothetical individual could perform who is “limited to sedentary work; . . . occasionally

balancing, stooping, crouching, crawling, and kneeling; able to perform simple work in a low stress

work environment defined as no contact with the general public, little decision making, and few

changes in the work setting,” Smith opined such an individual could not work as a hair stylist but

could work as a “ticket counter,” a “polisher [of] eye glass frames,” or a “table worker.” (Tr. at

85.) However, Smith claimed such an individual could not maintain employment in any of these

positions if he or she was regularly off task more “than 10% of the overall workday” or regularly

absent “more than once a month.” (Tr. at 87–88.)

In a written decision, dated May 17, 2024, ALJ Pantuso found Plaintiff was not disabled

under the meaning of the Act beginning January 1, 2023. (Tr. at 45–65.) Consistent with the five-

step sequential evaluation process for DIB benefits, see infra Section III, ALJ Pantuso determined

Plaintiff has not been engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2023, and has the

following severe impairments: “bilateral tarsal tunnel syndrome; bilateral plantar nerve lesions;

left knee arthritis; headaches; hypertension; morbid obesity; depression disorder; and anxiety

disorder.” (Tr. at 51.) ALJ Pantuso also determined Plaintiff’s “allegations of chronic kidney

disease and low back pain are not associated with any medically determinable impairments.” (Tr.

at 51.) ALJ Pantuso found Plaintiff’s severe impairments, both individual or in combination, did

not meet or equal the severity of one of the list impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,

Appendix 1 (“Listing”). (See Tr. at 52–54.) Specifically, ALJ Pantuso determined the impairments

most closely equated to Listing 1.18 (Abnormality of a Major Joint), 11.14 (Peripheral

Neuropathies), 4.00 (Cardiovascular System), 12.04 (Depressive, Bipolar and Related Disorders),

and 12.06 (Anxiety and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorders). (See Tr. at 52–53.) However, the

impairments do not meet any of these listings as the evidence does not demonstrate: “chronic joint

pain”; “stiffness with abnormal motion, instability, or immobility of the affected joint(s)”; or

“impairment-related physical limitation of musculoskeletal functioning” (Listing 1.18);

“disorganization of motor function in two extremities, resulting in an extreme limitation in the

ability to stand up from a seated position, balance while standing or walking, or use the upper

extremities” (Listing 11.14); “chronic heart failure, ischemic heart disease, recurrent arrhythmias,

symptomatic congenital heart disease, heart transplant, aneurysm of the aorta or major branches,

chronic venous insufficiency, or peripheral artery disease” (Listing 4.0); or “the inability to

function independently, appropriately, or effectively, and on a sustained basis (Listings 12.04 &

12.06). (Tr. at 52–53.) ALJ Pantuso determined Plaintiff had a residual functional capacity

(“RFC”) capable of sedentary and simple work in a low-stress environment, “involving no contact

with the general public, little decision-making, and few changes in the work setting.” (Tr. at 54.)

In support of same, ALJ Pantuso assigned no specific evidentiary weight to any prior medical

findings or opinions. (Tr. at 57.) Based on her age, education, prior work experience, and RFC,

ALJ Pantuso determined Plaintiff was incapable of performing her past work but was capable of

performing other unskilled sedentary work relying upon Smith’s testimony. (Tr. at 59–60.)

Following the written decision, Plaintiff filed an appeal with the Appeals Council, which

included additional medical records not presented to ALJ Pantuso. (See Tr. at 8.) Some of these

records were dated prior to the issuance of the written decision on May 17, 2024 (the “Unpresented

Prior Records”), and some were dated post same (the “Post Records”). (See Tr. at 8.) In response,

the Appeals Council reviewed the additional prior medical records finding the records “would

[not] change the outcome of the decision.” (Tr. at 8.) However, the Appeals Council did not review

the additional Post Records as these records “do[] not relate to the period at issue.” (Tr. at 8.) The

Appeals Council advised Plaintiff the additional Post Records would be considered in a subsequent

application for DIB “beginning on or before May 17, 2024.” (Tr. at 8.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a district court “shall have power

to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or

reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the

cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir.

2001). The Commissioner’s decisions regarding questions of fact are deemed conclusive by a

reviewing court if supported by “substantial evidence” in the record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Knepp

v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000). A district court must affirm an ALJ’s decision if it is

supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Substantial evidence is

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation omitted); Newhouse v. Heckler, 753

F.2d 283, 285 (3d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence “is more than a mere scintilla

of evidence but may be less than a preponderance.” Newell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541,

545 (3d Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court reaffirmed this understanding of the substantial evidence

standard in Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102–03 (2019). To determine whether an ALJ’s

decision is supported by substantial evidence, a court must review the evidence in its totality.

Daring v. Heckler, 727 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir. 1984). “Courts are not permitted to re-weigh the

evidence or impose their own factual determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d

356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011). Accordingly, a court may not set an ALJ’s “decision aside if it is supported

by substantial evidence, even if [it] would have decided the factual inquiry differently.” Hartranft

v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).

III. THE FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS

Under the Act, the SSA is authorized to pay SSI and DIB to “disabled” persons. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1382(a). A person is “disabled” if “he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less

than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). A person is unable to engage in substantial

gainful activity only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that

he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work

experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national

economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or

whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

Regulations promulgated under the Act establish a five-step process for determining

whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of SSI and DIB. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. First, the ALJ

determines whether the claimant has shown he or she is not currently engaged in “substantial

gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140

(1987). If a claimant is presently engaged in any form of substantial gainful activity, he or she is

automatically denied disability benefits. Id. Second, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has

demonstrated a “severe impairment” or “combination of impairments” that significantly limits his

or her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c);

see Bowen, 482 U.S. at 140–41. Basic work activities are defined as “the abilities and aptitudes

necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(b). These activities include:

(1) Physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting,

pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling;

(2) Capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking;

(3) Understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple

instructions;

(4) Use of judgment;

(5) Responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual

work situations; and

(6) Dealing with changes in a routine work setting.

Id. A claimant who does not have a severe impairment is not considered disabled. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(c); see Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 1999).

Third, if a claimant’s impairment(s) is found to be severe, the ALJ then determines whether

the impairment(s) meets or equals one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,

Appendix 1 (the “Impairment List”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant demonstrates

his or her impairment(s) is equal in severity to, or meets, one of the impairments on the Impairment

List, the claimant has satisfied his or her burden of proof and is automatically entitled to benefits.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); see also Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141. If the specific impairment is not

listed, the ALJ will consider in his or her decision the impairment that most closely satisfies those

listed for purposes of deciding whether the impairment is medically equivalent. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1526. If there is more than one impairment, then the ALJ must consider whether the

combination of impairments equals any listed impairment. Id. An impairment or combination of

impairments is basically equivalent to a listed impairment if there are medical findings equal in

severity to all the criteria for the one most similar. Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1186 (3d

Cir. 1992).

If the claimant is not conclusively disabled under the criteria set forth in the Impairment

List, step three is not satisfied, and the claimant must prove at step four whether he or she retains

the RFC to perform his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), (f); Bowen, 482 U.S.

at 141. Step four involves three sub-steps:

(1) the ALJ must make specific findings of fact as to the claimant’s

[RFC]; (2) the ALJ must make findings of the physical and mental

demands of the claimant’s past relevant work; and (3) the ALJ must

compare the [RFC] to the past relevant work to determine whether

claimant has the level of capability needed to perform the past

relevant work.

Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 120 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). When

determining RFC, an ALJ’s consideration of medical opinion evidence is subject to the framework

articulated in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (for claims filed before March 27, 2017) or 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520c (for claims filed after March 27, 2017).

Claimants are not disabled if their RFC allows them to perform their past relevant work.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f). However, if the claimant’s RFC prevents him or her from

doing so, or if the claimant has no past relevant work, an ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step

of the process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(g). The final step requires the ALJ to “show there are

other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant can perform,

consistent with [his or] her medical impairments, age, education, past work experience, and

[RFC].” Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). In doing so, “[t]he ALJ must

analyze the cumulative effect of all the claimant’s impairments in determining whether she is

capable of performing work and is not disabled.” Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523.

An ALJ typically seeks the assistance of a vocational expert at this final step. Plummer, 186 F.3d

at 428.

The claimant bears the burden of proof for steps one, two, and four. Sykes v. Apfel, 228

F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2000). Neither side bears the burden of proof for step three “[b]ecause step

three involves a conclusive presumption based on the listings.” Id. at 263 n.2; see Bowen, 482 U.S.

at 146 n.5. An ALJ bears the burden of proof for step five. Sykes, 228 F.3d at 263.

On appeal, the harmless error doctrine requires a plaintiff to show, as to the first four steps:

(1) an error occurred; and (2) but for that error, they might have proven their disability. Holloman

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 639 F. App’x 810, 814 (3d Cir. 2016). In other words, when reviewing an

appeal based on the first four steps, a court considers whether the plaintiff articulated a basis for a

decision in their favor, based on the existing record. If the plaintiff cannot, it is unlikely they will

meet their burden of showing an error was harmful. See, e.g., Lippincott v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

982 F. Supp. 2d 358, 380–81 (D.N.J. 2013) (finding ALJ’s error was harmless); Powers v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., Civ. A. No. 19–21970, 2021 WL 1207793, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2021) (finding the

plaintiff had not demonstrated she was prejudiced by the ALJ’s decision and had not shown an

error occurred amounting to harm).

The court’s review of legal issues within this appeal is plenary. See Schaudeck v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999). Factual findings are reviewed “only to determine

whether the administrative record contains substantial evidence supporting the findings.” Sykes,

228 F.3d at 262. Substantial evidence is “less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than

a mere scintilla.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

Substantial evidence also “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). When

substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner’s factual findings, this Court must abide

by those determinations. See id. (citing Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 431); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

IV. DECISION

Plaintiff appeals the Commissioner’s decision and requests the Court to reverse the

decision pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and find Plaintiff is entitled to a period

of disability beginning on January 1, 2023. (ECF No. 1; accord ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff challenges

the Appeals Council decision not to review the additional Post Records as these records do not

relate to the relevant time period. (ECF No. 8 at 24–26.) Plaintiff also challenges the following

determinations: (a) the determination her chronic kidney disease is not associated with a medically

determinable impairment at step two (id. at 26–28); (b) the determination her severe impairments,

both individually or in combination, did not meet or equal the severity of one of the Listed

impairments at step three (id. at 38–41); (c) the determination Plaintiff has the RFC necessary to

perform sedentary work at step four (id. at 28–37, 41–44); and (d) the determination there are jobs

in significant numbers she can perform in the economy at step five (id. at 37–38). The Court

reviews each argument in turn.

A. Plaintiff’s Challenge to the Appeals Council’s Determination

Pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court has the authority to remand a

matter for further proceedings based on additional evidence not considered by the ALJ if the

evidence is new, material, and there exists “good cause why it was not previously presented to the

ALJ.” Levyash v. Colvin, Civ. A. No. 16-2189, 2018 WL 1559769, at *13 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2018)

(quoting Matthews, 239 F.3d at 592); see also Haney v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ. A. No. 13-3033,

2014 WL 2916454, at *15 (D.N.J. June 26, 2014) (“[C]ourts have recognized that Congress

intended this aspect of § 405(g) to be sparingly applied.”). Evidence is new if it was not available

at the time of the proceeding and is material if it is relevant, probative, and reasonably possible to

have altered the outcome of the determination. Bettuccio v. Colvin, Civ. A. No. 12-1512, 2013 WL

3188165, at *17 (W.D. Pa. June 21, 2013). Evidence is not material, however, “if it [only] relate[s]

to the time period for which benefits were denied and does not concern the subsequent

deterioration of the previously non-disabling condition.” Levyash, 2018 WL 1559769, at *13

(second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lisnichy v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 599 F. App’x 427, 429 (3d Cir. 2015)); see also Hanson v. Astrue, Civ. A. No. 12–084,

2013 WL 1631389, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2013) (declining to remand case for new evidence as

“[w]hile all of the records submitted to the Appeals Council are ‘new’ in the sense that they post-

date the ALJ’s decision, these records are immaterial since they do not relate to the time period for

which benefits were denied”).

Establishing “good cause” requires a claimant to demonstrate “some justification for the

failure to acquire and present such evidence to the [ALJ].” Donna F. v. O’Malley, Civ. A. No. 22-

2503, 2024 WL 3755891, at *18 (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 2024) (quoting Szubak v. Sec’y of Health &

Hum. Servs., 745 F.2d 831, 833 (3d Cir. 1984)). The Third Circuit has recognized a claimant

“should generally be afforded only one fair opportunity to demonstrate eligibility for benefits

under any one set of circumstances.” Szubak, 745 F.2d at 834; accord E.E.O.C. v. Westinghouse

Elec. Corp., 925 F.2d 619, 631 (3d Cir. 1991); Lourenco v. Kijakazi, Civ. A. No. 21-6732, 2022

WL 1683840, at *9 (D.N.J. May 26, 2022). Therefore, to demonstrate “good cause” exists, a

claimant is required to “provide a logical reason [as to] why the proffered additional evidence was

not, or could not have been, presented to the [ALJ] for inclusion in the record during the

administrative proceedings.” Haney, 2014 WL 2916454, at *15 (internal quotation marks omitted);

see also Szukak, 745 F.2d at 834 (“A claimant might be tempted to withhold medical reports, or

refrain from introducing all relevant evidence, with the idea of obtaining another bite of the apple

if the [ALJ] decides that the claimant is not disabled.”). Courts “have routinely rejected a change

in attorney representation between the hearing and the appeal, without more, as providing good

cause to supplement under § 405(g).” Haney, 2014 WL 2916454, at *15; see also Jaclyn N. v.

Bisignano, Civ. A. No. 23-22456, 2025 WL 3101691, at *14 (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 2025) (“[N]either

current counsel’s implicit differing legal strategy nor former counsel’s suggested negligence

establishes the necessary good cause.”); Lyons v. Berryhill, Civ. A. No. 18-1106, 2019 WL

4094701, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2019) (holding it was the plaintiff’s obligation “to present her

best case to the ALJ, not to wait to see whether she liked his decision to decide whether to submit

rebuttal evidence. Such ‘sand-bagging’ does not constitute good cause.”).

Here, Plaintiff challenges the Appeals Council decision to reject the Unpresented Prior

Records as the records do “not show a reasonable probability that [they] would change the

outcome” and the Post Records as the records do “not relate to the period at issue.” (ECF No. 8 at

24–26 (quoting Tr. at 8).) The Commissioner argues the Appeals Council was not required to

remand the determination for additional administrative proceedings as Plaintiff failed to

demonstrate the Post Records are new and material, and there exists good cause for having failed

to present same during the prior administrative proceeding under sentence six of 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). In response, Plaintiff claims the Post Records are new “as it was not in the record before,”

and material as “it reasonably relates to the relevant time period,” and that good cause exists as

she “was represented by a non-attorney representative prior to the hearing and after the hearing

she retained [an] [a]ttorney.” (ECF No. 12 at 5–8.)

The Appeals Council did not err in rejecting the Unpresented Prior Records, as the records

are not “new,” i.e., not available at the time of the proceeding. See Bettuccio, 2013 WL 3188165,

at *17. Nor did the Appeals Council err in rejecting the Post Records. Regardless of whether the

Post Records are “new” or “material,” Plaintiff has not demonstrated “good cause” exists for

failing to present these records to the ALJ. Haney, 2014 WL 2916454, at *15. Plaintiff’s sole

argument in support of her claim “good cause” exists is that her representation has changed from

a non-attorney representative to an attorney representative. (See ECF No. 12 at 6–7.) However, the

courts have routinely held that such a change in representation is sufficient to demonstrate good

cause for remand. See Haney, 2014 WL 2916454, at *15; see also Donna F., 2024 WL 3755891,

at *19 (holding the failure of a non-represented plaintiff to present records to the ALJ did not

constitute good cause); Simonson v. Berryhill, Civ. A. No. 16-631, 2017 WL 5632691, at *3 (M.D.

Pa. Nov. 22, 2017) (holding “change in representation from a non-attorney representative at the

administrative stage to an attorney representative before the [D]istrict [C]ourt . . . . did not

constitute good cause”).

The record establishes Plaintiff had non-attorney representation prior to the administrative

hearing and was represented by counsel at the hearing, Rafi Issagholian, Esq. (See Tr. at 70, 137–

143.) ALJ Pantuso questioned Issagholian if he had an opportunity to review the record, and

Issagholian confirmed he had, stating the record is closed. (See Tr. at 74–75.) Based on this,

Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a sufficient justification for failing to hold the record open so as to

acquire and present the Post Records to the ALJ. See Donna F., 2024 WL 3755891, at *19; see

also Matos v. Kijakazi, Civ. A. No. 21-2024, 2022 WL 1134995, at *8 (D.N.J. Apr. 18, 2022)

(“Ultimately, Plaintiff’s good cause argument appears to boil down to either that current counsel

disagrees with prior counsel’s legal strategy to not obtain Dr. Paris’s report, or that prior counsel

was somehow negligent. Neither reason is adequate justification for submitting new evidence, and,

in turn, is not good cause.”).

Accordingly, the Court finds the Appeals Council’s decision to reject the Unpresented Prior

Records and post-records was not an error as Plaintiff cannot establish the records are “new,”

“material,” and “good cause” exists as to why the additional records were not presented to ALJ

Pantuso.

B. Plaintiff’s Challenge to ALJ Pantuso’s Step Two Determination

During step two, the ALJ considers whether a claimant has demonstrated a “severe

medically determinable physical or mental impairment” that significantly limits his or her physical

or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c); see Bowen, 482

U.S. at 140–41. The step two determination “is a de minimis screening device to dispose of

groundless claims,” Newell, 347 F.3d at 546, which requires the ALJ to consider each and every

impairment the claimant or the record has identified, both individually and in combination. See

Vanessa T-H. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ. A. No. 23-2293, 2024 WL 1635685, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr.

16, 2024) (citing Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005)); see also 20 C.F.R. §

404.1512(a)(1) (“[The SSA] will consider only impairment(s) [the claimant] say[s] [she] ha[s] or

about which [it] receive[s] evidence.”). If the claimant demonstrates “something beyond a slight

abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities which would have no more than a minimal

effect on an individual’s ability to work,” Corradina S. v. Bisignano, Civ. A. No. 23-3121, 2025

WL 1902590, at *7 (D.N.J. July 10, 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McCrea v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 370 F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2004)), then the evaluation proceeds to the next

step, Gbur v. Kijakazi, Civ. A. No. 21-863, 2023 WL 8456134, at *5–6 n.1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2023)

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii)–(iii)). Therefore, as step two exists to screen groundless

claims with no severe complaints, courts have consistently held if the ALJ finds the claimant has

demonstrated at least one severe impairment and continues the evaluation onto the next step, the

failure to identify another condition as severe is typically a harmless error. See Friday v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., Civ. A. No. 20-4504, 2021 WL 3879081, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2021); Crawford v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ. A. No. 13-5500, 2015 WL 1003864, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2015).

However, an ALJ need not consider medical impairments which are not “medically

determinable.” See Willistine S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ. A. No. 20-5501, 2021 WL 4452491,

at *6 n.14 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2021) (“[A]n ALJ does not have to consider an alleged impairment if

he does not find such an impairment is medically determinable.” (quoting Diciano v.

Commissioner of Social Security, Civ. A. No. 18-17383, 2019 WL 6696523, at *4 (D.N.J. 2019)).

A medically determinable impairment is an impairment that can be demonstrated by objective

medical evidence gathered through “acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.”

Nicholas M. v. O’Malley, Civ. A. No. 23-22121, 2024 WL 4319579, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2024)

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3)); “[A]n ALJ will not use a claimant’s statement of symptoms, a

diagnosis, or a medical opinion to establish the existence of an impairment.” Corradina S., 2025

WL 1902590, at *7 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521, 416.921).

Here, Plaintiff challenges ALJ Pantuso’s step two determination that her chronic kidney

disease is a non-severe impairment not associated with a medically determinable impairment.6

(ECF No. 8 at 26–28.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues the record contains more than the required de

minimis level of evidence necessary to establish the impairment under step two. (Id. at 27.) In

response, the Commissioner concedes the record establishes Plaintiff has “a bit [of] renal

insufficiency,” but argues the record fails to demonstrate the impairment “significantly limited her

ability to basic work activities.” (ECF No. 11 at 9 (alteration in original) (quoting Tr. at 766).)

Alternatively, the Commissioner claims even if the record demonstrates the chronic kidney disease

was a severe impairment, the error was harmless. (See id.)

ALJ Pantuso did not err in determining that the alleged impairment of chronic kidney

disease is not medically determinable. As noted by ALJ Pantuso, “the record does not include a

related diagnosis from an acceptable medical source for [chronic kidney disease].” (Tr. at 51; see

also Tr. at 505 (indicating no medical condition relating to her kidneys as of June 13, 2023).) On

November 28, 2023, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Levine that “her cardiologist told her that she had

kidney failure and needed dialysis.” (Tr. at 766.) The record does not identify the alleged

cardiologist who advised Plaintiff she had kidney failure and required dialysis. (See generally Tr.)

Regardless, the record clearly reflects Dr. Levine reviewed her labs, which indicated a normal

blood urea nitrogen (“BUN”) level, a normal glomerular filtration rate (“GFR”), and a creatine of

only 1.10.13 over normal, and advised Plaintiff due to her pain management medications and

eating habits her “kidney functions [with] a little bit renal insufficiency.” (Tr. at 766.) The record

6 Plaintiff does not dispute ALJ Pantuso’s step two determination that her alleged status post-

laparoscopic ovarian cystectomy and lower back pain were non-severe impairments not associated

with a medically determinable impairment. (Compare Tr. at 51, with generally ECF No. 8.)

does not suggest Dr. Levine, or any other physician, diagnosed Plaintiff with chronic kidney

disease. (See generally Tr.)

Accordingly, the Court finds ALJ Pantuso’s determination that Plaintiff’s chronic kidney

disease was not a medically determinable impairment is supported by substantial evidence in the

record and, as such, remand for further administrative proceedings at step two is not warranted.

C. Plaintiff’s Challenge to ALJ Pantuso’s Step Three Determination

During step three, the ALJ compares the medical evidence of a claimant’s impairments

with the Impairments List in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, which are presumed

severe enough to preclude any gainful work. See Holley v. Colvin, 975 F. Supp. 2d 467, 476 (D.N.J.

2013), aff’d, 590 F. App’x 167 (3d Cir. 2014). The entries in the Impairments List are descriptions

of various physical and mental illnesses and abnormalities, categorized by the body system they

affect. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 529–30 (1990). All impairments are defined “in terms of

several specific medical signs, symptoms, or laboratory test results.” Id. at 530. “If a claimant’s

impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, he will be found disabled. . . . If the

claimant does not suffer from a listed impairment or its equivalent, the analysis proceeds to step

four.” Holley, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 476. To be found disabled, however, the claimant “must present

medical findings equal in severity to all the criteria for the one most similar listed impairment.”

Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 531.

“For a claimant to show that his [or her] impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of

the specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter

how severely, does not qualify.” Id.; see SSR 83–19, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Rulings 90

(Jan. 1983) (“An impairment ‘meets’ a listed condition . . . only when it manifests the specific

findings described in the set of medical criteria for that listed impairment.”); 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.926(a) (1989) (noting claimant’s impairment is “equivalent” to listed impairment if the

medical findings are “at least equal in severity and duration to the criteria of any listed

impairment”). “A claimant cannot qualify for benefits under the ‘equivalence’ step by showing

that the overall functional impact of his [or her] unlisted impairment or combination of

impairments is as severe as that of a listed impairment.” Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 531–32.

To conclude an applicant is not disabled under the step three analysis, the ALJ must “set

forth the reasons for his [or her] decision.” Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119 (remanding where ALJ made

only conclusory statements without mentioning any specific listed impairments or explaining

reasoning). Conclusory statements have been found to be “beyond meaningful judicial review.”

Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704–05 (3d Cir. 1981). As the Third Circuit has explained, the ALJ

is not required to “use particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his [or

her] analysis . . . . [but must] ensure that there is sufficient development of the record and

explanation of findings to permit meaningful review.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505. The ALJ satisfies

this standard by “clearly evaluating the available medical evidence in the record and then setting

forth that evaluation in an opinion, even where the ALJ did not identify or analyze the most

relevant Listing.” Scatorchia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 137 F. App’x 468, 470–71 (3d Cir. 2005).

Although an ALJ’s decision on step three need not address every minor piece of medical

evidence in the record, the decision must meaningfully consider the elements of the listings and

whether the weight of medical evidence presented shows a plaintiff meets these elements.

Ramazan K. v. Dudek, Civ. A. No. 24–6138, 2025 WL 1720409, at *11 (D.N.J. June 20, 2025).

Conclusory statements that an impairment does not meet a certain listing are insufficient. Compare

Parrotta v. Kijakazi, Civ. A. No. 21–13602, 2022 WL 2289554, at *9–11 (D.N.J. June 24, 2022),

and Rivera v. Saul, Civ. A. No. 20–5308, 2021 WL 5122075, at *9–10 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2021)

(affirming ALJ step three determination evaluating specific symptoms included in listings and

considering medical evidence to determine whether symptoms were met), with Dance v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., Civ. A. No. 20–3141, 2021 WL 3144696, at *4–5 (D.N.J. July 26, 2021) (reversing

ALJ step three determination that failed to specifically match proffered medical evidence to

elements of relevant listing).

Plaintiff challenges ALJ Pantuso’s step three determination that her severe impairments,

both individual or in combination, did not meet or equal the severity of Listing 1.18 (Abnormality

of a Major Joint), 12.04 (Depressive, Bipolar and Related Disorders), and 12.06 (Anxiety and

Obsessive-Compulsive Disorders).7 (ECF No. 8 at 38–41.) The Court addresses each in turn.

1. Listing 1.18

Plaintiff argues ALJ Pantuso failed to sufficiently evaluate the record under Listing 1.18.

(Id. at 39.) Listing 1.18 requires a claimant to demonstrate an “abnormality of a major joint(s) in

any extremity” by documented: (a) “chronic joint pain or stiffness”; (b) “abnormal motion,

instability, or immobility of the affected joint(s)”; (c) “anatomical abnormality of the affected

joint(s)”; and (d) “impairment-related physical limitation of musculoskeletal functioning that has

lasted, or is expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1 § 1.18. Listing 1.18 also requires medication documentation indicating:

7 Plaintiff does not challenge ALJ Pantuso’s step three determination her severe impairments did

not meet or equal the severity of Listing 11.14 (Peripheral Neuropathies) and 4.00 (Cardiovascular

System). (See Tr. at 52-53.)

(1) A documented medical need for a walker, bilateral canes, or

bilateral crutches or a wheeled and seated mobility device involving

the use of both hands; (2) An inability to use one upper extremity to

independently initiate, sustain, and complete work- related activities

involving fine and gross movements, and a documented medical

need for a one- handed, hand-held assistive device that requires the

use of the other upper extremity or a wheeled and seated mobility

device involving the use of one hand; or (3) An inability to use both

upper extremities to the extent that neither can be used to

independently initiate, sustain, and complete work-related activities

involving fine and gross movements.

Id. Based on the administrative record, ALJ Pantuso concluded Listing 1.18 is not met because the

record does not demonstrate any of the required criteria. (See Tr. at 52.) ALJ Pantuso does not

make specific findings pertaining to the criteria under step three. (See Tr. at 52–54.) However, she

later reviewed and evaluated Plaintiff’s complaints and supportive medical records under step four

(see Tr. at 52–59), during which, ALJ Pantuso noted the record does not include a documented

medical need for a walker or cane as required to meet Listing 1.18 (see Tr. at 55). Because Plaintiff

has not alleged an inability to use an upper extremity, ALJ Pantuso did not make any findings

relating to same. (See generally Tr. at 52–59.) “Reading the decision as a whole, [the Court] find[s]

that the record and explanation of findings is developed enough to permit meaningful review . . .

.” Cosme v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 845 F. App’x 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Jones, 364 F.3d at

505). Furthermore, regardless of whether the decision shows a meaningful consideration of the

criteria of Listing 1.18, Plaintiff has failed to present a medical record presented to ALJ Pantuso

showing a documented medical need for a walker or cane.8 (See generally ECF No. 8 at 39);

Rebecca L. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 617 F. Supp. 3d 256, 270 (D.N.J. 2022) (holding “[the] plaintiff

8 In support of her argument ALJ Pantuso failed to sufficiently evaluate the record under Listing

1.18, Plaintiff cites to a prescription signed by Dr. Levine for a “shower bar” and “walker” dated

August 25, 2023. (See ECF No. 8 at 39 (citing Tr. at 69).) The Court notes, however, the

prescription was one of the Unpresented Prior Records. (See Tr. at 8.)

bears the burden to prove that an error by the ALJ was harmful” (citing Holloman, 639 F. App’x

at 814)).

Accordingly, the Court finds ALJ Pantuso’s determination that Plaintiff has not met Listing

1.18 is supported by substantial evidence in the record and, as such, remand for further

administrative proceedings at step three is not warranted.

2. Listing 12.04 and 12.06

Plaintiff argues ALJ Pantuso failed to appreciate the record evidencing the level of

assistance she requires to care for and manage herself due to her irritability and inability to focus

under Listings 12.04 and 12.06. (ECF No. 8 at 39–41.) Relevant to this appeal, Listings 12.04 and

12.06 require, in part, a claimant to demonstrate a marked limitation of two, or an extreme

limitation of one, of the following areas of mental functioning: (1) understanding, remembering,

or application of information; (2) interacting with others; (3) concentration, persistence, or

maintaining pace; or (4) adapting or managing oneself.9 See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1,

§ 12.00(E). These areas “are evaluated in conjunction with a five-point scale (consisting of none,

mild, moderate, marked, and extreme limitation).” Morris v. Saul, Civ. A. No. 19-1588, 2021 WL

3889555, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2021) (citing id. at § 12.00(A) & (F)). A claimant has a marked

limitation if the claimant’s ability to function “in this area independently, appropriately,

effectively, and on a sustained basis is seriously limited,” id. at § 12.00(F)(2)(d), and a claimant

9 Alternatively, a claimant may demonstrate his or her mental disorder is “serous and persistent,”

i.e., the claimant demonstrates over two years of medical documentation evidencing a history of a

mental disorder and evidence of both: (1) ongoing medical treatment—”[m]edical treatment,

mental health therapy, psychosocial support(s), or a highly structured setting(s),” which

“diminishes the symptoms and signs of [the] mental disorder”; and (2) marginal adjustment—

”[the] minimal capacity to adapt to changes in [an] environment or to demands that are not already

of [the claimant’s] daily life.” Id. at § 12.00(G)(2)(b), (c). Plaintiff does not argue the record

demonstrates over two years of medical documentation evidence a history of a mental disorder

under Listings 12.04 or 12.06. (See generally ECF No. 8.)

has an extreme limitation if he or she is “not able to function in this area independently,

appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis,” id. at § 12.00(F)(2)(e). Based on the

administrative record, ALJ Pantuso determined Plaintiff had a mild limitation under the third area

(concentration, persistence, and maintaining pace) and moderate limitations under the first

(understanding, remember, application of information), second (interacting with others), and

fourth (adapting or managing oneself) areas. (See Tr. at 52–54.)

Plaintiff challenges ALJ Pantuso’s evaluation of her limitations within the five-point scale.

(See ECF No. 8 at 39–41.) Plaintiff does not argue the evaluation is not based on sufficient medical

records in the administrative record under Listing 12.04 or 12.06, but rather claims ALJ Pantuso

did not adequately consider Plaintiff’s “anger,” “irritability,” “inappropriate interactions,” “panic

attacks,” and required “level of assistance.” (See id. at 39–41.) However, “this argument is

essentially a request by Plaintiff for the Court to re-weigh the evidence in [her] favor, something

the Court may not do.” J.M. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ. A. No. 24-8438, 2025 WL 3312259, at

*7 (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 2025); see also Chandler, 667 F.3d at 359 (“[C]ourts are not permitted to re-

weigh the evidence or impose their own factual determinations.”).

Accordingly, the Court finds ALJ Pantuso’s determination that Plaintiff has not met Listing

12.04 or 12.06 is supported by substantial evidence in the record and, as such, remand for further

administrative proceedings at step three is not warranted.

D. Plaintiff’s Challenge to ALJ Pantuso’s Step Four Determination

At step four in the disability determination process, an ALJ must assess the claimant’s RFC

and compare it to her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), (f); Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141.

The claimant bears the burden of proof on step four, see Sykes, 228 F.3d at 263, including to

present the facts necessary for the ALJ to assess the claimant’s RFC, see Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146

n.5. On appeal, a claimant must show: (1) an error occurred; and (2) but for that error, she might

have proven her disability. See Holloman, 639 F. App’x at 814. If a claimant believes an error was

made, he “must clearly identify the error and explain how the error actually ‘affect[ed] [his or her]

“substantial rights.”‘“ Id. at 814 n.3 (first alternation in original) (quoting Shinseki, 556 U.S. at

407).

In determining a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ is required to consider all relevant medical

evidence from acceptable sources and “may not make speculative inferences from medical

reports.” Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429. “Although the ALJ may weigh the credibility of the evidence,”

Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121, “the ALJ may not reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason,”

Yensick v. Barnhart, 245 F. App’x 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see

also Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429 (“[A]n ALJ is not free to employ [his or] her own expertise against

that of a physician who presents competent medical evidence.”). Rather, the ALJ “must give some

indication of the evidence which he rejects and his [or her] reason(s) for discounting such

evidence,” Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121, pursuant to the framework articulated in 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520c. In evaluating the credibility of a medical opinion, the most important factors are its

supportability and consistency with evidence from other sources. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. Other

relevant factors include, but are not limited to, whether the medical source received education or

training in a relevant area of specialty, personally examined the claimant, or is familiar with the

disability program’s policies and requirements. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(3)(v), (4), (5).

In conducting an analysis of a claimant’s obesity, an ALJ is not required to “use particular

language or adhere to a particular format.” Shaver v. Bisignano, Civ. A. No. 25-077, 2026 WL

594357, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2026) (quoting Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504

(3d Cir. 2009)). Rather, so long as the ALJ meaningfully considered “the effect of a claimant’s

obesity, individually and in combination with her impairments, on her workplace function at step

three and at every subsequent step,” remand is not required. Id. (quoting Diaz, 577 F.3d at 504);

see also Woodson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 661 F. App’x 762, 765 (3d Cir. 2016); Cooper v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 563 F. App’x 904, 911 (3d Cir. 2014).

Here, Plaintiff challenges ALJ Pantuso’s step four determination that she has an RFC to

perform sedentary work. (ECF No. 8 at 28–37, 41–44.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues ALJ Pantuso:

failed to rely on any expert in determining her RFC (id. at 36–37); failed to adequately afford

controlling weight to the opinions of her treating physicians (id. at 28–32); and failed to consider

or analyze her subjective complaints (id. at 41–43). Plaintiff also argues ALJ Pantuso failed to

consider her morbid obesity in support of her step four determination. (id. at 32–33.) In response,

the Commissioner argues ALJ Pantuso: was permitted to determine the RFC absent the support of

an expert (ECF No. 11 at 17–18); afforded controlling weight to the opinion of Dr. Levine in

support of the RFC (id. at 13–16); appropriately considered her morbid obesity (ECF No. 8 at 18–

19); and appropriately considered her subjective complaints (ECF No. 11 at 19).

ALJ Pantuso determined Plaintiff had an RFC to perform “sedentary work” except that

Plaintiff can “occasionally balance, stoop, crouch, crawl, and kneel.” (Tr. at 54.) Therefore, ALJ

Pantuso found Plaintiff “is limited to simple work in a low-stress environment, defined as

involving no contact with the general public, little decision-making, and few changes in the work

setting.” (Id.) In support, ALJ Pantuso considered, in part, Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the

records of her treating physicians, and the opinions of Dr. Appleton, Dr. Faltas, and Dr. Levine.

(See Tr. at 54–59.) Notably, ALJ Pantuso found Dr. Appleton’s opinion Plaintiff “had no limitation

with simple tasks but had difficulty maintaining attention and concentration and may have

difficulty learning new tasks and performing complex tasks” to be “persuasive.” (Tr. at 58.) In

contrast, ALJ Pantuso found Dr. Faltas’s opinion that Plaintiff has “retained [the] physical capacity

for tasks such as activities of daily living despite her severe cardiovascular, foot/ankle, obesity,

and neurological impairments” to only be “partially persuasive[] as they are less restrictive than

indicated by the evidence as it relates to [her] capacity for exertional activity.” (Id.) Similarly, ALJ

Pantuso found Dr. Levine’s opinion that Plaintiff “had moderate limitation with activities of daily

living, social functioning, concentration, persistence, and pace” to only be “partially persuasive[]

as it is internally inconsistent.” (See Tr. at 58 (comparing the opinion to the medical record as a

whole and Plaintiff’s testimony).) Therefore, the record establishes ALJ Pantuso’s RFC

determination considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, relied on the opinions of Dr. Appleton,

Dr. Faltas, and Dr. Levine in support of the RFC determination, and afforded controlling weight

to each opinion.

The record also establishes ALJ Pantuso sufficiently considered Plaintiff’s morbid obesity

in support of her RFC determination. ALJ Pantuso determined Plaintiff’s morbid obesity to be a

severe impairment at step two. (Tr. at 51.) Pursuant to SSR 19-2p, ALJ Pantuso then considered

the impact the impairment has on her other impairments in determining whether the impairments

equaled a listing under step three. (Tr. at 52.) In determining Plaintiff’s RFC, ALJ Pantuso

recounted the medical records documenting her morbid obesity during the relevant period, noting

her BMI increased from 31.8 to 45.6 between January 2023 and February 2024. (Tr. at 56–57.)

Therefore, the record establishes ALJ Pantuso considered Plaintiff’s morbid obesity at each

relevant step, including but not limited to in support of her RFC determination. See Shaver, 2026

WL 594357, at *9.

Accordingly, the Court finds ALJ Pantuso’s determination that Plaintiff has an RFC to

perform sedentary work is supported by substantial evidence in the record and, as such, remand

for further administrative proceedings at step four is not warranted.

E. Plaintiff’s Challenge to ALJ Pantuso’s Step Five Determination

During step five, an ALJ must “assess whether [the] claimant can return to past work or

adjust to other work.” Ubaldini v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., No. 22-2686, 2023 WL 7001840, at *4 (3d

Cir. Oct. 24, 2023). To assess same, the ALJ often relies “on the testimony of vocational experts

and specialists.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607,

612 (3d Cir. 2014)). Such testimony typically “centers upon, one or more hypothetical questions

posed by the ALJ to the vocational expert.” Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 614 (quoting Podedworny v.

Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984)). Notably, the ALJ is not required to convey to the

vocational expert each and every individual alleged impairment but rather is merely required to

“accurately” convey the credibly established limitations as determined under step four. See Smith

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 634 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554).

“An ALJ’s mere inclusion of certain alleged limitations among the hypothetical questions does not

reflect the ALJ’s acceptance that a claimant suffers from such limitations.” Ubaldini, 2023 WL

7001840, at *4. An objection to the adequacy of the ALJ’s hypothetical questions “often boil[s]

down to [an] attack[] on the RFC assessment itself.” Cox v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., Civ. A.

No. 24-140, 2025 WL 2556573, at *5 (W.D. Pa. July 12, 2025) (quoting Rutherford, 399 F.3d at

554 n.8).

Here, Plaintiff challenges ALJ Pantuso’s step five determination that there exist jobs in

significant numbers, which she can perform. (ECF No. 8 at 37–38.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues

ALJ Pantuso failed to consider whether there exists any jobs that would accommodate her walker,

her repeated absences due to medical appointments, and her repeated time off task. (Id. at 37–38.)

In response, the Commissioner claims ALJ Pantuso was not required to consider whether there

exists any such jobs as the alleged requirements of absences and time off task were merely

hypothetical and not supported by the record. (ECF No. 11 at 20–21.)

Plaintiff does not challenge the accuracy of the ALJ’s hypothetical questions but rather

attempts to challenge the RFC determination under step five. (See ECF No. 8 at 37–38 (arguing

ALJ Pantuso did not consider Plaintiff’s use of a cane or walker, time off-task, or absenteeism);

but see Tr. at 61 (noting vocational expert testimony regarding assistive devices, time off-task,

absenteeism, and unscheduled breaks); Tr. at 87–89 (including the following additional conditions:

use of a cane or walker, off-task tolerance, and unexcused absence tolerance); see also ECF No. 8

at 38 (arguing ALJ Pantuso did not consider the effects of Plaintiff’s medications); but see

generally Tr. at 53–60 (reviewing subjective complaints and medications effects under third and

fourth steps).) Such a challenge, however, is inappropriate at this stage. See Cox, 2025 WL

2556573, at *5. Because the determination that Plaintiff has an RFC to perform sedentary work is

supported by substantial evidence in the record, see supra Section IV.D, ALJ Pantuso was not

required to include the additional proposed limitations of repeated absences or time off task.

Accordingly, the Court finds ALJ Pantuso’s determination that jobs exist in significant

numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform is supported by substantial evidence

in the record and, as such, remand for further administrative proceedings at step five is not

warranted.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the decision and remand the

matter pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is DENIED; and the Commissioner’s

decision is AFFIRMED. An appropriate order follows.

Date: June 23, 2026 /s/ Brian R. Martinotti

HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE