The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
BRIAN SUCIU,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No: 5:26-cv-188-WWB-PRL
COMMISSIONER TAYLOR N.
HATCH, DR. LINDA ABELES, KIDS
CENTRAL, INC., BOARD
CHAIRMAN KEVIN MCDONALD,
CPS MANAGER ERICA MARCHAN,
CPS CASE WORKER TAMEKA
BOATWRIGHT, GUARDIAN AD
LITEM GAIL HAILE, and
SUPERVISOR JENNIFER HILL,
Defendants.
ORDER
Plaintiff Brian Suciu, proceeding pro se, initiated this action in federal court against
Kids Central, Inc. and several individuals in connection with a child custody matter. (Doc.
1). Plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2). For the reasons explained below,
Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis is taken under advisement, and in an
abundance of caution, Plaintiff will be permitted an opportunity to amend the complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 11, 2026, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a “Complaint for
Declaratory Relief, Damages, and Injunctive Relief” (“Complaint”) against Kids Central,
Inc., “a private contractor performing state child welfare services under [the] authority of [the
Florida Department of Children and Families]” (“DCF”); Kevin McDonald, the Board
Chairman of Kids Central, Inc.; Taylor Hatch, the Commissioner of the DCF; Dr. Linda
Abeles, “who conducted and submitted a psychological/medical evaluation used against
Plaintiff”; Erica Marchan, a Child Protective Services (“CPS”) manager “involved in the
investigation”; Tameka Boatwright, a CPS case worker “assigned to Plaintiff’s case”; Gail
Haile, a guardian ad litem “assigned to the matter”; and Jennifer Hill, a supervisor
“responsible for oversight of the CPS investigation” (collectively, the “Defendants”). (See
Doc. 1 at p. 2). Simultaneously with the filing of the Complaint, Plaintiff filed a Motion to
Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (Doc. 2).
As best can be discerned from the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff’s claims arise
out of his dissatisfaction with matters handled by Defendants in connection with a child
custody matter involving Plaintiff’s minor children. (See Doc. 1). Plaintiff avers that he is “the
parent of minor children subject to an investigation by the Florida Department of Children
and Families[,]” and “[d]uring the course of the investigation, Defendants created and relied
upon false medical and psychological evaluations authored by Defendant Dr. Linda
Abeles[,]” which “contained materially false statements and fabricated findings . . . [that]
were used as justification for state intervention and court proceedings.” (See id. at p. 3).
Plaintiff claims that “Defendants knew or should have known that the information contained
in the evaluation was false or misleading[,]” and “[d]espite this knowledge, Defendants relied
on the falsified information to continue CPS intervention.” (See id.). Plaintiff alleges that “[a]t
no time were [his] children in immediate danger” and that “[t]he investigation and actions
taken by Defendants were therefore unlawful and unconstitutional.” (See id.).
Plaintiff asserts the following claims for relief: (1) “Civil Rights Violations” under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I); (2) “Fraud on the Court” (Count II); (3) “Conspiracy to Violate Civil
Rights” (Count III); (4) “False Reporting and Fabrication of Evidence” (Count IV); and (5)
“Structural Conflict of Interest” (Count V). (See id. at pp. 4-5). Plaintiff requests injunctive
relief, asking the Court to “[d]eclare Defendants’ actions unconstitutional”; “[o]rder
correction of all false records”; and “[e]njoin Defendants from further unlawful interference.”
(See id. at p. 5). Plaintiff also seeks compensatory damages and punitive damages. (See id.).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
An individual may be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis if he declares in an
affidavit that he is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
However, before a plaintiff is permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is obligated
to review the complaint to determine whether it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See id. § 1915(e)(2). If the complaint is deficient, the Court is
required to dismiss the suit sua sponte. Id.
In evaluating a complaint under § 1915, courts must liberally construe pro se filings and
hold them to less stringent standards than papers drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). But courts cannot act as counsel for plaintiffs or rewrite pleadings. See
United States v. Cordero, 7 F.4th 1058, 1068 n.11 (11th Cir. 2021). Pro se litigants must still
comply with the procedural rules applicable to ordinary civil litigation. See McNeil v. United
States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
Nevertheless, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged
misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
While this pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it demands
more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” See id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” and must provide “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[.]” See Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Although a court must accept as true well-pleaded
allegations, it is not bound to accept a legal conclusion stated as a “factual allegation” in the
complaint. See id.; Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions
masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (citations omitted).
Subject-matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue in any case pending in the United States
District Court. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, which are “‘empowered to
hear only those cases within the judicial power of the United States as defined by Article III
of the Constitution,’ and which have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant
authorized by Congress.” See Univ. of So. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir.
1999) (quoting Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994)). “[A] court must
zealously [e]nsure that jurisdiction exists over a case, and should itself raise the question of
subject matter jurisdiction at any point in the litigation where a doubt about jurisdiction
arises.” Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001); see Fitzgerald v. Seaboard Sys.
R.R., 760 F.2d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1985) (“A federal court not only has the power but also
the obligation at any time to inquire into jurisdiction whenever the possibility that jurisdiction
does not exist arises.”). This inquiry should be done at the earliest stage in the proceedings
and sua sponte whenever subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking. See Univ. of So. Ala., 168
F.3d at 410; Fitzgerald, 760 F.2d at 1251. If a court “determines at any time that it lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Morrison
v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[O]nce a court determines that
there has been no [jurisdictional] grant that covers a particular case, the court's sole remaining
act is to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.”).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Shotgun Pleading
As a threshold matter, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to comply with the pleading
requirements set forth in Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8
requires that, among other things, the complaint set forth “a short and plain statement of the
claim” demonstrating an entitlement to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Each allegation in
the complaint must be “simple, concise, and direct.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Rule 10
requires that a party “state its claims . . . . in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as
practicable to a single set of circumstances” and that each claim be stated in separate counts
“[i]f doing so would promote clarity.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
In this instance, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that he is entitled to relief as required by Rule 8(a)(2), nor does it set forth
each allegation in separate, numbered paragraphs as required by Rule 10(b). See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2), 10(b). Although Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he is “still required to conform to
procedural rules, and the court is not required to rewrite a deficient pleading.” See Washington
v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 256 F. App’x 326, 327 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation
omitted).
Given that Plaintiff’s Complaint violates both Rules 8 and 10, it is an impermissible
shotgun pleading. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir.
2015) (defining a “shotgun pleading” as a pleading that “violate[s] either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule
10(b), or both”). The Eleventh Circuit has identified four basic categories of shotgun
pleadings: (1) a complaint “containing multiple counts where each count adopts the
allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before
and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint”; (2) a complaint “replete with
conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of
action”; (3) a complaint that fails to separate “each cause of action or claim for relief” into a
different count; and (4) a complaint that “assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants
without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or
which of the defendants the claim is brought against.” See id. at 1321-23. Each of these types
of pleadings fail “to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the
grounds upon which each claim rests.” See id. at 1323. The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly
condemned the use of shotgun pleadings. See Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th
Cir. 2021); Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Indeed,
shotgun pleadings “exact an intolerable toll on the trial court’s docket,” among other things.
See Cramer v. Florida, 117 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff’s Complaint falls under the second and fourth categories of shotgun
pleadings. First, Plaintiff’s Complaint contains conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not
obviously connected to a particular count. Plaintiff does not properly delineate the pertinent
facts that supposedly buttress each of the counts in the Complaint. See Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of
Trs. Of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that a hallmark of a
shotgun pleading is that “it is virtually impossible to know which allegations of facts are
intended to support which claim(s) for relief”). Second, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to connect
four of the five causes of action with any particular defendant. For example, in Counts I, II,
III, and V of the Complaint, Plaintiff improperly lumps all Defendants together and fails to
identify which defendant is responsible for which acts or omissions. As a result, Plaintiff’s
Complaint makes it virtually impossible for the Court to discern what claims Plaintiff asserts
against each defendant and what role, if any, each defendant played in the alleged violations.
See Veltmann v. Walpole Pharmacy, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1161, 1164 (M.D. Fla. 1996). Because
Plaintiff’s Complaint constitutes an impermissible shotgun pleading, it fails to give the
Defendants adequate notice of the claims asserted against them and the grounds upon which
each claim rests. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323.
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Next, and most importantly, it appears that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s claims. To the extent Plaintiff is asking the Court to intervene in any ongoing
state court proceedings, the Court would abstain from doing so under the Younger abstention
doctrine. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden
State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431-37 (1982) (explaining the application of the Younger
abstention doctrine in the civil context).1 “Younger and its progeny reflect the longstanding
national public policy, based on principles of comity and federalism, of allowing state courts
1 In general, “[t]he Supreme Court has recognized only three types of state proceedings where
abstention is warranted: (1) criminal prosecutions; (2) civil enforcement proceedings; and (3) civil
proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ . . . judicial
functions.” See Leonard v. Ala. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 61 F.4th 902, 907-08 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). All of Plaintiff’s claims appear to relate to civil state proceedings,
with at least one count directly referencing Defendants’ actions taken at the state level during court
proceedings. (See Doc. 1 at pp. 3-4).
to try cases—already pending in state court—free from federal court interference.” Butler v.
Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 245 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
Under the Younger abstention doctrine, “federal courts ordinarily must refrain from
deciding the merits of a case when (1) there is a pending state judicial proceeding; (2) the
proceeding implicates important state interests; and (3) the parties have an adequate
opportunity to raise any constitutional claims in the state proceeding.” See Newsome v. Broward
Cnty. Pub. Defenders, 304 F. App’x 814, 816 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citing Middlesex
Cnty. Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 432); Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 73 (2013)
(explaining that under the Younger abstention doctrine, federal courts will not interfere with
certain state civil proceedings, including “civil proceedings involving certain orders that are
uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions”) (citation
omitted).
Upon consideration of these factors, the Court finds that abstention is warranted to
the extent that any of the state court proceedings referenced in Plaintiff’s Complaint remain
active and pending. See, e.g., Narciso v. Walker, 811 F. App’x 600, 601-03 (11th Cir. 2020) (per
curiam) (citing Younger in affirming the dismissal of a plaintiff’s federal court challenge to a
child custody proceeding pending in state court); Thomas v. Disanto, 762 F. App’x 770, 773
n.4 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (agreeing with the district court’s alternative holding that
plaintiff’s federal lawsuit over a child custody matter was barred by Younger to the extent that
the proceedings were ongoing); Liedel v. Juv. Ct. of Madison Cnty., Ala., 891 F.2d 1542, 1546
(11th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that “under Younger [abstention,] . . . federal district courts may
not interfere with ongoing child custody proceedings”).
First, while it is not entirely clear whether the state court proceedings are final, it is
apparent that Plaintiff seeks federal court intervention in state court proceedings relating to a
child custody matter. Specifically, in the Complaint, Plaintiff asks the Court to “[d]eclare
Defendants’ actions unconstitutional,” “[o]rder correction of all false records” that “were
used as justification for state intervention and court proceedings[,]” and “[e]njoin Defendants
from further unlawful interference.” (See Doc. 1 at pp. 3, 5); see also Old Republic Union Ins. Co.
v. Tillis Trucking Co., 124 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining that Younger abstention
applies to injunctions and declaratory judgments that would effectively enjoin state court
proceedings). Second, it is well-settled that matters involving child custody implicate
important state interests. See 31 Foster Child. v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003);
Davis v. Self, 547 F. App’x 927, 930 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415,
435 (1979) (“Family relations are a traditional area of state concern.”). Finally, Plaintiff has
not shown that he is procedurally prevented from raising his constitutional claims in the state
court proceedings. See Daniels v. Geraldi, 578 F. App’x 811, 811 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam)
(stating that an “[a]dequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges exists so long as
state procedural law does not bar the party from raising the constitutional claim”) (citing Old
Republic Union Ins. Co., 124 F.3d at 1262); 31 Foster Child., 329 F.3d at 1279 (noting that a
plaintiff has “the burden of establishing that the state proceedings do not provide an adequate
remedy for their federal claims” and “[a] federal court ‘should assume that state procedures
will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary’”)
(citations omitted); see also Leonard, 61 F.4th at 909 (“To demonstrate that claims are
procedurally prevented in state tribunals, plaintiffs should provide evidence of state laws,
rules, or procedures that would allow a district court to evaluate whether the plaintiff’s federal
claims will effectively be shut out from the judicial system and cut off from effective review
in the courts.”).
Further, to the extent that the state court proceedings have concluded, this Court
would still not be an available avenue to seek review because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
precludes federal courts (other than the United States Supreme Court) from reviewing and
rejecting final state court judgments or orders. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (explaining the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Rooker v. Fid. Tr.
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). “It is
well-settled that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction to review, reverse, or invalidate a
final state court decision.” Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)
(citations omitted). This jurisdictional bar “extends not only to constitutional claims
presented or adjudicated by a state court, but also to claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’
with a state court judgment” such that the federal court litigant is seeking to “effectively
nullify” the state court judgment—directly or indirectly—or if it “succeeds only to the extent
that the state court wrongly decided the issues.” See Incorvaia v. Incorvaia, 154 F. App’x 127,
128 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (quoting Goodman ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327,
1332 (11th Cir. 2001)); Coreno v. One W. Bank FSB, 617 F. App’x 928, 930 (11th Cir. 2015)
(per curiam) (quoting Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009)); see also Castro
v. Lewis, 777 F. App’x 401, 406 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). Simply stated, “federal courts
are not a forum for appealing state court decisions.” See Staley v. Ledbetter, 837 F.2d 1016,
1018 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). Rooker-Feldman has been applied to, among other types of
cases, those concerning child custody matters. See Fox v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 828 F.
App’x 639, 640 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (collecting cases).
Plaintiff’s claims in this case appear to amount to an improper collateral attack on the
state court proceedings involving the custody of his children. Exercising jurisdiction over this
kind of collateral attack on the state court proceedings would require the Court to improperly
interfere with ongoing proceedings or final judgments or orders entered by the state courts,
which is exactly what the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is designed to protect against. See, e.g., Fox,
828 F. App’x at 641-42 (affirming dismissal of complaint brought by mother alleging
violations of her constitutional rights stemming from a termination of parental rights action
based upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman); Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th
1206, 1213 (11th Cir. 2021) (explaining that asking a federal court to “‘review and reject’ the
state court’s child custody judgment. . . . would be a violation of Rooker-Feldman”); Thomas,
762 F. App’x at 773 (affirming the district court’s finding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
was a jurisdictional bar to the review of a state court child custody matter to the extent the
proceeding had concluded); Goodman ex rel. Goodman, 259 F.3d at 1333 (describing a federal
action seeking “an injunction preventing enforcement of the state court judgment and
returning custody to the aggrieved parent” as an “easy case for application of the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine”).
Moreover, the proceedings involve issues of child custody, which fall under the
domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 308
(2006) (“[O]nly divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees remain outside federal
jurisdictional bounds.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Ankenbrandt v.
Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (“We conclude, therefore, that the domestic relations
exception, as articulated by this Court since [Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582 (1858)] divests the
federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.”). As such,
“federal courts generally dismiss cases involving divorce and alimony, child custody,
visitations rights, establishment of paternity, child support, and enforcement of separation or
divorce decrees still subject to state court modification.” See Ingram v. Hayes, 866 F.2d 368,
369 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff seeks federal
court intervention concerning child custody determinations related to his children, the
domestic relations exception precludes this Court from exercising jurisdiction over such
claims.
C. Amendment
In an abundance of caution, the Court will allow the Plaintiff an opportunity to file an
amended complaint to clarify the basis of his claims and the jurisdiction over them. Plaintiff
must provide the Court with sufficient information and in a coherent manner so that it can
perform the review required under § 1915. The amended complaint must clearly state the legal
theory or theories upon which Plaintiff seeks relief and explain with factual allegations how
each defendant is responsible. Additionally, the amended complaint must clearly state the
basis for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff should carefully
consider whether he can allege a claim in good faith because pursuing frivolous claims could
lead to the imposition of sanctions.
Plaintiff is cautioned that, despite proceeding pro se, he is required to comply with this
Court’s Local Rules, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Plaintiff may obtain a copy of the Local Rules from the Court’s website
(http://www.flmd.uscourts.gov) or by visiting the Office of the Clerk of Court. Additionally,
resources and information related to proceeding in court without a lawyer, including a
handbook entitled “Guide for Proceeding Without a Lawyer,” can be located on the Court’s
website (http://www.flmd.uscourts.gov/pro_se/default.htm). Plaintiff should also consult
the Middle District of Florida’s Civil Discovery Handbook for a general discussion of this
District’s discovery practices (http://www. □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is TAKEN
UNDER ADVISEMENT. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint on or before May 7,
2026. The amended complaint must comply with all pleading requirements contained in
Rules 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and those contained in the
Local Rules of the Middle District of Florida. Failure to comply with this Order may result
in a recommendation that this action be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
DONE and ORDERED in Ocala, Florida on April 9, 2026.
Shanes
PHILIP R. LAMMENS
United States Magistrate Judge
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties
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