The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
THE MEDICAL PROTECTIVE :
COMPANY, :
: Case No. 3:24-cv-292
Plaintiff, :
: Judge Thomas M. Rose
v. :
: Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry
DONALD ALEXANDER :
GRONBECK, et al., :
:
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
ENTRY AND ORDER GRANTING, IN PART, AND DENYING, IN PART,
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS TO DONALD
ALEXANDER GRONBECK (DOC. NO. 79); DENYING MOTION FOR
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS TO ALL DEFAULTING DEFENDANTS (DOC. NO.
75); AND, ISSUING DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________________________
This matter comes before the Court on two purportedly dispositive motions filed by
Plaintiff The Medical Protective Company (“MedPro”). MedPro has brought an Amended
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (“Amended Complaint”) (Doc. No. 57) against Defendants
Donald Alexander Gronbeck (“Gronbeck”), Yellow Springs Primary Care, Inc. (“Yellow
Springs”), and a host of individuals who claim to be victims of sexual assault by Gronbeck, to wit:
Elizabeth Brewington, Maria Bright, Matthew Byington, Christy Combs, Dakota Joy, Denise Law,
Lisa Marietta, Corey Messer, Nickie Nickels, Lydia Pritchard, Mileah Roper, Jacqueline Louise
Hobbs, Danyelle Everage, Michelle Fout, Erin Murphy, and Jessica Robbins (collectively, the
“Victim Defendants”). Broadly speaking, MedPro, as the insurer to Gronbeck and Yellow
Springs, seeks the Court’s declaration that MedPro has no duty to defend or indemnify either
Gronbeck or Yellow Springs in state court civil proceedings initiated against the two by the Victim
Defendants. (See Doc. No. 5.) Now, MedPro has filed its Motion for Default Judgment as to all
Defaulting Defendants (“Default Motion”) (Doc. No. 75) and its Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings as to Donald Alexander Gronbeck (“JOP Motion”) (Doc. No. 79) (together, the
“Motions”).
For the reasons explained in greater detail below, the Court GRANTS, IN PART, and
DENIES, IN PART, MedPro’s JOP Motion and DENIES MedPro’s Default Motion.
I. BACKGROUND1
This case concerns professional services insurance policies issued by MedPro to
Gronbeck—formerly Dr. Gronbeck—and Yellow Springs. After receiving his application for
coverage, MedPro issued Gronbeck a professional services policy on April 7, 2014, which was
renewed annually until April 7, 2022 (the “Gronbeck Policy”). (Doc. No. 57 at PageID 1717-18.)
In March of 2019, Gronbeck acquired another professional services policy from MedPro on behalf
of Yellow Springs, a primary care provider, in his capacity as sole shareholder thereof (the “Yellow
Springs Policy”). (Id. at PageID 1720-21.) Once approved in 2019, the Yellow Springs Policy
was renewed each year until coverage ended on April 7, 2022, much like the Gronbeck Policy.
(Id.)
Both the Gronbeck Policy and the Yellow Springs Policy (collectively, the “Policies”) offer
1 At the outset, the Court hereby takes judicial notice of both the state court criminal proceedings and civil pleadings
against Gronbeck and Yellow Springs—which may be located at GREENE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS,
COURTVIEW, https://courts.greenecountyohio.gov/eservices/search.page.7?x=*xhM3ZGOnG4EzNuSfVvC4Q (last
visited June 2, 2026). The Court finds such information to be integral to MedPro’s Amended Complaint, if not
attached thereto, and necessary to the disposition of MedPro’s claims.
Rather than repeat the same lengthy citation for each reference to the state court records, the Court instead utilizes a
shorthand. In the context of Gronbeck’s criminal proceedings, the Court will refer to documents in the following
manner: (Case No. 2025 CR 72, Crim. Judgment Entry at Page 1). In referring to pending civil actions against
Gronbeck and Yellow Springs, the Court will refer to the pleadings by stating the name of the lead plaintiff, followed
by the title of the referenced document and the page number of that document, which, by way of example, will read
as follows: (Everage Complaint at Page 1).
insurance for claims based on professional services rendered, or professional services which
should have been rendered, and define professional services as:
(a) the rendering of medical, surgical, dental, or nursing services to a patient
and the provision of medical examinations, opinions, or consultations
regarding a person’s medical condition within the Insured’s practice as a
licensed health care provider. This shall include first aid rendered at the
scene of an accident without expectations of monetary compensation.
(b) the credentialing of a health care provider, including the review of the provider’s
fitness and qualification to provide health care services by a professional review
board or committee through formally adopted, written procedures.
(See id. at PageID 1719-22.) Coverage notwithstanding though, the Policies do explicitly state
that MedPro will not cover the “payment of damages (BUT WILL DEFEND) in any claim for
damages if said damages are in consequence of the performance of a criminal act or willful tort or
sexual act.” (See Doc. No. 57-6 at PageID 1851; see also Doc. No. 57-14 at PageID 2186.)
In 2022, Gronbeck began facing accusations of sexual assault for acts allegedly done unto
his patients during medical examinations from 2013 through 2021. (See Case No. 2022 CR 464,
Crim. Indictment.) For clarity, although MedPro alleges that certain Victim Defendants reported
Gronbeck to the local authorities as early as 2021 (see Doc. No. 57 at PageID 1710), no formal
action was taken against Gronbeck until 2022. On October 20, 2022, Gronbeck was charged in
the Greene County Court of Common Pleas with 50 criminal counts, alleging rape, sexual battery,
gross sexual imposition, and/or sexual imposition. (Case No. 2022 CR 464, Crim. Indictment.)
On February 13, 2025, Gronbeck pled no contest to thirteen counts of gross patient neglect and
one count of attempted patient abuse. (Case No. 2025 CR 72, Plea Agreement; see also Case No.
2025 CR 73, Plea Agreement.) The same day, the state court sentenced Gronbeck for his crimes
and entered judgment reflecting as much. (Case No. 2025 CR 72, Crim. Judgment Entry
(Community Control) at Page 1.)
Additionally, as pertinent to MedPro’s Amended Complaint, Gronbeck and Yellow
Springs are now the defendants in three civil actions brought in the Greene County Court of
Common Pleas by the Victim Defendants. (Doc. No. 57 at PageID 1709-17.) In each such case,
the Victim Defendants are pursuing relief for various sexual assaults that Gronbeck perpetrated
upon them while they treated at Yellow Springs as patients. (Id.) To-date, MedPro is representing
Gronbeck and Yellow Springs in these underlying actions pursuant to the Policies and subject to a
complete reservation of rights. (Id. at PageID 1722.)
On January 9, 2023, Jacqueline Louise Hobbs filed a complaint against Gronbeck and
Yellow Springs, stating claims2 for assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
negligent hiring, negligent credentialing, complicity to commit assault, and complicity to commit
battery (the “Hobbs Complaint” or, in context, the “Hobbs Action”). (Hobbs Complaint at Page
1-10.) The Hobbs Complaint specifically avers that “Gronbeck encouraged Hobbs to follow up
with him at [Yellow Springs],” and, once she did, she alleges that “Gronbeck, over the course of
his treatment of Hobbs, prescribed opiates, oxycodone, envivance, and [a]dderall to her, often in
amounts exceeding safe levels.” (Id. at Page 3.) Ms. Hobbs claims that she treated with Gronbeck
as an outpatient for a number of years and, “[b]efore, during, and after examinations, Gronbeck
violated [her] sexually.” (Id. at Page 4.) For example, Ms. Hobbs alleges that “when Hobbs’
lymph nodes in her neck were inflamed, Gronbeck required [her] to take off her pants so he could
feel near her vagina, allegedly checking other lymph nodes.” (Id.) These acts, Ms. Hobbs submits,
constitute assault by Gronbeck and negligence by Yellow Springs. (Id. at Page 5-6, 7-9.)
On January 18, 2024, Elizabeth Brewington, Maria Bright, Matthew Byington, Christy
2 The Court uses the phrase, “stating claims,” in a colloquial sense. The Court takes no position whatsoever on whether
any of the Victim Defendants have stated meritorious claims capable of withstanding a dispositive motion, as such a
determination is squarely within the purview of the Greene County Court of Common Pleas.
Combs, Dakota Joy, Denise Law, Lisa Marietta, Corey Messer, Nickie Nickels, Lydia Pritchard,
and Mileah Roper brought suit against Gronbeck and Yellow Springs, alleging negligence,
negligent hiring and supervision, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress (the “Brewington Complaint” or, in context, the “Brewington Action”). (Brewington
Complaint at Page 1-32.) Likewise, on January 18, 2024, Danyelle Everage, Michelle Fout, Erin
Murphy, and Jessica Robbins filed a complaint against Gronbeck and Yellow Springs, claiming
negligence, negligent hiring and supervision, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress (the “Everage Complaint” or, in context, the “Everage Action”). (Everage
Complaint at Page 1-20.) The Brewington Complaint and the Everage Complaint allege that
Gronbeck assaulted the Victim Defendants “during medical examinations at [Yellow Springs].”
(Brewington Complaint at Page 7; Everage Complaint at Page 5.) Similarly, both the Brewington
Complaint and the Everage Complaint claim that Gronbeck and Yellow Springs negligently failed
“to establish policies and procedures that were adequate to protect the health, safety, and welfare
of … patients,” such as providing for the supervision of Gronbeck when conducting medical
examinations. (Brewington Complaint at Page 27-28; Everage Complaint at Page 13.) As a result,
the plaintiffs in both actions (Victim Defendants here) were sexually assaulted. (Brewington
Complaint at Page 29; Everage Complaint at Page 14.)
After nearly two years representing Gronbeck and Yellow Springs in state court, MedPro
instituted the current action on November 2, 2024. (Doc. No. 1.) Following a bit of motion
practice, MedPro subsequently filed its Amended Complaint on November 13, 2025. (Doc. No.
57.) Therein, MedPro alleges that it has no duty to defend or indemnify either Gronbeck or Yellow
Springs in the underlying state court cases pursuant to the Policies, despite having defended both
up to this point in time. (Id. at PageID 1723-34.) Gronbeck and Defendant Jacqueline Louis
Hobbs then submitted their answers to the Amended Complaint November 26, 2025, and February
23, 2026, respectively. (Doc. Nos. 61 & 71.) On the other hand, neither Yellow Springs nor the
remaining Victim Defendants have timely responded to MedPro’s Amended Complaint.3
In that vein, MedPro obtained a Clerk’s Entry of Default (Doc. Nos. 69 & 70) and
proceeded to file the instant Default Motion as to Yellow Springs and the defaulting Victim
Defendants on March 17, 2026. (Doc. No. 75.) Gronbeck responded on March 27, 2026 (Doc.
No. 76), and all of the Victim Defendants, save for Ms. Hobbs, responded to the Default Motion
on March 31, 2026 (Doc. No. 78). MedPro filed its final reply in support of its Default Motion on
April 14, 2026 (Doc. No. 82). MedPro’s Default Motion is ripe for review and decision at this
time.
Meanwhile, MedPro submitted its JOP Motion as to Gronbeck on April 2, 2026. (Doc.
No. 79.) With the exception of Yellow Springs, all Defendants, be they in default or not, timely
responded to the JOP Motion (Doc. Nos. 83, 84, 85), and MedPro filed its final reply in support of
said Motion on May 7, 2026 (Doc. No. 87). Thus, MedPro’s JOP Motion is now likewise ripe for
review and decision.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c)
Motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 12(c) are reviewed under
the same standard as motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim per Rule 12(b)(6). See Warrior
Sports, Inc. v. Nat’l. Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 623 F.3d 281, 284 (6th Cir. 2010). When
considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, “[a]ll well-pleaded material allegations of the
pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the
3 The remaining Victim Defendants filed an answer out of time and the Court has since set aside the Clerk’s Entry of
Default (Doc. No. 70) against them. (See Doc. No. 89.)
moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hindel v. Husted,
875 F.3d 344, 346 (6th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the court “need
not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.” JPMorgan Case Bank,
N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 2007).
“To survive a Rule 12(c) motion, a complaint must contain direct or inferential allegations
respecting all the material elements under some viable legal theory.” Hindel, 875 F.3d at 346-47
(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). “[T]he plaintiff must provide the grounds for its entitlement to relief, and that ‘requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’”
Albrecht v. Treon, 617 F.3d 890, 893 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)) (internal citation omitted). “A plaintiff falls short if [the plaintiff] pleads facts
‘merely consistent with a defendant’s liability’ or if the alleged facts do not ‘permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79); see
also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (a complaint will not withstand a motion to dismiss if it offers only
“naked assertion[s]” without “further factual enhancement”).
In reviewing motions for judgment on the pleadings, courts primarily consider the
pleadings, which consist of the complaint, the answer, and any written instruments attached as
exhibits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a) (defining “pleadings” to include both the
complaint and the answer); Fed. R. Civ P. 10(c) (stating that “[a] copy of a written instrument that
is an exhibit to a pleading is part of the pleading for all purposes”). Though the allegations
contained in the complaint are the primary focus, courts may also account for “matters of public
record, orders, [and] items appearing in the record of the case.” Barany-Snyder v. Weiner, 539
F.3d 327, 332 (6th Cir. 2008). Additionally, courts may consider exhibits attached to a motion for
judgment on the pleadings “so long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the
claims contained therein.” Brent v. Wayne Cty. Dept. of Human Servs., 901 F.3d 656, 695 (6th
Cir. 2018).
When deciding on a matter of law, “[a] federal court sitting in diversity must apply the
substantive law . . . of the state in which it sits.” Phelps v. McClellan, 30 F.3d 658, 661 (6th Cir.
1994) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stenor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, (1941)); Clutter v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 646 F.2d 1151, 1153 (6th Cir. 1981). To the extent that the state’s highest
court has not addressed the issue presented, the federal court must anticipate how the state’s highest
court would rule. Imperial Hotels Corp. v. Dore, 257 F.3d 615, 620 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Bailey
Farms, Inc. v. NOR-AM Chem. Co., 27 F.3d 188, 191 (6th Cir. 1994)). “If the highest court has
not spoken, the federal court must ascertain from all available data what the state law is and apply
it.” Clutter, 646 F.2d at 1153.
2. Default Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides for default judgments. To obtain a default
judgment against a party pursuant to Rule 55, there first must be an entry of default regarding that
party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), (b); Shepard Claims Serv., Inc. v. William Darrah & Assocs., 796
F.2d 190, 193 (6th Cir. 1986) (“[E]ntry of default is … the first procedural step on the road to
obtaining a default judgment”). Next, the party seeking the default judgment must apply for one,
either to the clerk (if the claim is for a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by
computation) or to the court (in all other cases). Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b).
To enter a default judgment against a party, a court must have both subject matter
jurisdiction over the action and personal jurisdiction over that party. Answers in Genesis of Ky.,
Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int’l, Ltd., 556 F.3d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[F]ederal courts have a
duty to consider their subject matter jurisdiction in regard to every case”); Citizens Bank v. Parnes,
376 F. App’x 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a threshold issue
that must be present to support any subsequent order of the district court, including entry of the
default judgment”); Kuhlman v. McDonnell, No. 1:20-cv-510, 2022 WL 407240, at *2 (S.D. Ohio
Feb. 10, 2022). Additionally, the Court must be satisfied that the facts in the complaint state a
claim for relief against that party. Harrison v. Bailey, No. 95-6263, 107 F.3d 870 (Table), 1997
WL 49955, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 6, 1997) (“Default judgments would not have been proper due to
the failure to state a claim against these defendants”); Anderson v. Johnson, No. 98-1931, 194 F.3d
1311 (Table), 1999 WL 1023753, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 4, 1999) (“Even if a default has been entered
against a party, it remains for the court to consider whether the unchallenged facts constitute a
legitimate cause of action, since a party in default does not admit mere conclusions of law”);
Parallax Advanced Research Corp. v. SPG Institute, Inc., No. 3:21-cv-133, 2021 WL 3634739, at
*2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 17, 2021) (“[A] default judgment fails as a matter of law if the plaintiff’s
complaint does not assert a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted”). Once a default has
been entered, the factual allegations in the complaint—other than those relating to the amount of
damages—are accepted as true. Parallax Advanced Research Corp., 2021 WL 3634739, at *2
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6); Stooksbury v. Ross, 528 F. App’x 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2013)).
Under Rule 55(b)(2), the Court may enter default judgment without a hearing, but it also
may conduct a hearing or make a referral when “it needs to: (A) conduct an accounting; (B)
determine the amount of damages; (C) establish the truth of any allegations by evidence; or (D)
investigate any other matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Finally, the Sixth Circuit has explained
that, “[w]hen considering whether to enter a default judgment, a court should take into account: 1)
possible prejudice to the plaintiff; 2) the merits of the claims; 3) the sufficiency of the complaint;
4) the amount of money at stake; 5) possible disputed material facts; 6) whether the default was
due to excusable neglect; and 7) the preference for decisions on the merits.” Russell v. City of
Farmington Hills, 34 F. App’x 196, 198 (6th Cir. 2002).
III. ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter to these analyses, the Court must ensure that it has both personal
jurisdiction over the named Defendants and subject matter jurisdiction over the entire case.
Regarding the former, the court is satisfied that it possesses personal jurisdiction over the named
Defendants. Each of the named Defendants is a resident of the State of Ohio. “It is axiomatic that
Ohio courts can exercise jurisdiction over a person who is a resident of Ohio.” Prouse, Dash &
Crouch, L.L.P. v. DiMarco, 876 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (Ohio 2007). As such, the Defendants are
subject to the Court’s general jurisdiction.
The Court likewise finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the present action under
the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq., but the Court’s decision to exercise that
jurisdiction here requires some explanation. Generally, “[i]n a case of actual controversy within
its jurisdiction … any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration ….” 28
U.S.C. § 2201(a). The use of the word, “may,” in the Declaratory Judgment Act imbues courts
with “a power permissive,” and “the granting of a declaratory judgment rests in the sound
discretion of the court.” Grand Trunk W. R. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 746 F.2d 323, 325 (6th Cir.
1984) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Still, “‘[i]n this circuit, a district court’s discretion is not unfettered ….’” W. Bend Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Nat. Remedies Massage, LLC, No. 2:22-cv-3578, 2023 WL 5748789, at *4 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 6, 2023) (quoting U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Albex Aluminum, Inc., 161 F. App’x. 562, 563 (6th
Cir. 2006)). The Sixth Circuit has instructed courts confronted with whether to exercise
jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act to consider five factors:
(1) whether the judgment would settle the controversy;
(2) whether the declaratory judgment action would serve a useful purpose
in clarifying the legal relations at issue;
(3) whether the declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose of
‘procedural fencing’ or ‘to provide an arena for a race for res judicata;
(4) whether the use of a declaratory action would increase the friction
between our federal and state courts and improperly encroach on state
jurisdiction; and
(5) whether there is an alternative remedy that is better or more effective.
Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. J & L Lumber Co., Inc., 373 F.3d 807, 813 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Roumph, 211 F.3d 964, 968 (6th Cir. 2000)).
To the extent that these factors are applicable to MedPro’s plea for declaratory relief, the
Court finds that said factors weigh in favor of exercising jurisdiction. First, a declaratory judgment
in this case will settle the controversy, as a declaratory judgment can define MedPro’s duties, or
lack thereof, to defend or indemnify Gronbeck and Yellow Springs in state court. Second, a
declaratory judgment will clarify the legal relations at issue. In particular, MedPro will know its
duties, Gronbeck and Yellow Springs will know whether they can continue to expect MedPro to
provide for their defense, and the Victim Defendants will gain a clearer picture of the parties who
are adverse to them in the court of common pleas. Third, there is no evidence of procedural fencing
here and the Court will not presume there is. Fourth, a declaratory judgment is unlikely to cause
friction between the federal and state courts. As discussed in greater detail below, MedPro’s duties
to Gronbeck and Yellow Springs can be ascertained from the Policies and the face of the pleadings
in both this case and the underlying state court cases brought by the Victim Defendants. It is
unnecessary to wade into the merits of the Victim Defendants’ allegations. And, fifth, while it is
possible that MedPro could seek the same relief in state court, there is nothing about MedPro’s
claims which inherently makes them best suited for a state forum. Rather, the conclusions reached
with this Order rely upon established Ohio law that this Court is more than capable of applying.
Therefore, the Court finds that it may appropriately exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to the
Declaratory Judgment Act in this matter and elects to do so.
Jurisdiction being established, MedPro’s Motions boil down to an argument that it has
neither a duty to defend nor indemnify either Gronbeck or Yellow Springs for the Victim
Defendants’ claims relating to Gronbeck’s sexual misdeeds. The Court considers the nature of
MedPro’s duties under the Policies, accordingly.
1. Duty to Defend
The Court first turns its attention to MedPro’s duty to defend in the underlying state court
actions at issue. On this front, MedPro argues that the sexual acts committed by Gronbeck do not
qualify as “professional services” under the Policies. (Doc. No. 75-2 at PageID 2483-87; Doc. No.
79-2 at PageID 2547-54, 2559-60.) To make this argument, MedPro largely relies on authority
from other jurisdictions to define the term, “professional services.” (See Doc. No. 75-2 at PageID
2483-84; see also Doc. No. 79-2 at PageID 2548-49.) Nevertheless, when MedPro appropriately
looks to Ohio law for support, particularly with respect to Gronbeck, MedPro contends that
coverage is out of step with Ohio public policy, as the State of Ohio does not endorse insurance
coverage for the performance of intentional torts like sexual assault. (Doc. No. 79-2 at PageID
2559-60.) Because Gronbeck and Yellow Springs are being sued by the Victim Defendants for
Gronbeck’s intentional torts, MedPro says that the Policies create no duty to defend either party.
(See id.)
At first blush, an insurer’s duty to defend an insured requires some consideration of the
insurance policy at issue. See NCMIC Ins. Co. v. Smith, 389 F. Supp. 3d 535, 540-41 (S.D. Ohio
2019). “The Supreme Court of Ohio has held ‘that an insurance policy is a contract, and that the
relationship between the insurer and the insured is purely contractual in nature.’” NCMIC Ins.
Co., 389 F. Supp. 3d at 540 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marsh, 472 N.E.2d 1061, 1062
(Ohio 1984)). Insurance agreements are to be construed “in conformity with the intention of the
parties as gathered from the ordinary and commonly understood meaning of the language
employed.” King v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 519 N.E.2d 1380, 1383 (Ohio 1988) (citing Dealers
Dairy Prods. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 164 N.E.2d 745, 747 (Ohio 1960)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “[W]here provisions of a contract of insurance are reasonably susceptible to more than
one interpretation, they will be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the
insured.” King, 519 N.E.2d at 1383 (citing Faruque v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 508 N.E.2d
949, 949-50 (Ohio 1987); Thompson v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 513 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ohio
1987) (collecting cases)).
In conjunction with policy language, courts are to discern whether a particular duty to
defend exists by observing “the scope of the allegations in the complaint against the insured.”
Cincinnati Ins. Co v. Anders, 789 N.E.2d 1094, 1097 (Ohio 2003) (citing generally Motorists Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Trainor, 294 N.E.2d 874 (Ohio 1973)). “‘The duty attaches whenever the complaint
states a covered claim, or potentially or arguably does so.’” NCMIC Ins. Co., 389 F. Supp. 3d at
540 (quoting M/G Transport Servs., Inc. v. Water Quality Ins. Syndicate, 234 F.3d 874, 977 (6th
Cir. 2000)) (emphasis in original) (cleaned up). “[O]nce a court determines the insurer must
defend one claim within a complaint, ‘it must defend the entire lawsuit, even though other claims
may not come within the coverage of the policy.’” NCMIC Ins. Co., 389 F. Supp. 3d at 540
(quoting Holloway Sportswear, Inc. v. Transportation Ins. Co., 177 F. Supp. 2d 764, 769 (S.D.
Ohio 2001)). Conversely, “[a]n insurer need not defend any action or any claims within the
complaint when all the claims are clearly and indisputably outside the contracted policy coverage.”
Davis & Meyer Law, Ltd. v. ProNational Ins. Co., 2007-Ohio-3552, at ¶ 28 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007)
(citing Cardiothoracic & Vascular Surgical Specialists, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 2006-Ohio-
6947, at ¶ 21 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006)).
A. Gronbeck – Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
In applying the above-stated principles, the Court finds that MedPro has a duty to defend
Gronbeck in the Victim Defendants’ underlying state court actions. To aid in the explanation of
this decision, the Court contrasts the instant case with that of Dibeneditto v. Medical Protective
Co., 3 F. App’x. 483 (6th Cir. 2001). There, the Sixth Circuit, applying analogous Kentucky law,
found that MedPro did not have a duty to defend Dibeneditto against claims of sexual impropriety
made by the plaintiff’s former employees, under a professional services insurance policy that was
largely, if not completely, identical to the Policies at bar. Id. The Sixth Circuit held that, even
though Dibeneditto’s policy contained the same provision stating that MedPro would defend but
would not pay damages for claims arising from sexual torts, the sexual harassment at issue simply
“did not relate to the rendering of professional services …,” because the former employees’ claims
were “based solely on acts relating to their employment.” Id. at 487.
Here though, looking to the Victim Defendants’ complaints, the Victim Defendants do not
claim that Gronbeck assaulted them apropos of nothing, but within the context of medical
examinations and often in the course of regular treatment. In this way, the Victim Defendants are
arguably complaining that instead of receiving professional services which should have been
rendered, they suffered sexual assaults.
To be sure, finding otherwise would effectively nullify the “BUT WILL DEFEND”
language contained in the Gronbeck Policy. While the exclusion housing that language may not
confer any rights upon Gronbeck unto itself, it certainly implies that one has been established
elsewhere in the Gronbeck Policy for allegations of sexual assault. Construing the Gronbeck
Policy in Gronbeck’s favor, the Court is compelled to lean into the implication. In total, it would
seem that MedPro sold monster insurance when it issued the Gronbeck Policy. The company
cannot now be incredulous at what has scurried out from under the bed. MedPro agreed to defend
Gronbeck if he faced a sexual assault claim that arguably fell within the Gronbeck Policy’s
coverage and the Victim Defendants have made such claims.
Thus, MedPro must defend Gronbeck in state court against the Victim Defendants.
B. Yellow Springs – Motion for Default Judgment
Despite Yellow Springs’ default, the Court is likewise unconvinced that MedPro is entitled
to a declaration regarding its duty to defend Yellow Springs on the merits. Where a tortfeasor’s
employer, like Yellow Springs to Gronbeck here, was negligent with respect to the subordinate’s
torts, “permitting coverage … does not subsidize the episodes of … abuse of which its victims
complain, at the ultimate expense of other insureds ….” Doe v. Shaffer, 738 N.E.2d 1243, 1248
(Ohio 2000) (quoting Gearing, 665 N.E.2d at 1119) (internal quotation marks omitted) (cleaned
up).
As stated above, the Yellow Springs Policy provides Yellow Springs coverage for claims
arising from professional medical services which should have been rendered. To this end, the
Victim Defendants’ underlying complaints all allege that Gronbeck assaulted them when they went
to Yellow Springs for medical care. Moreover, the Victim Defendants claim that Yellow Springs
was negligent in providing for Gronbeck’s supervision; a negligence which proximately caused
their injuries at Gronbeck’s hand. To the extent the Victim Defendants take issue with Yellow
Springs then, they are complaining of not only the sexual assaults they suffered, but of the medical
services they did not receive, and which should have been rendered, as covered under the Yellow
Springs Policy. Therefore, MedPro has a duty to defend Yellow Springs in the Victim Defendants’
state court actions.
2. Duty to Indemnify
The Court next considers MedPro’s duty to indemnify Gronbeck and Yellow Springs.
“The duty to indemnify is triggered by the insured’s actual legal liability.” Twin Maples Veterinary
Hosp. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 824 N.E.2d 1027, 1030 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Further, as relevant to the present case, the Ohio Supreme Court “has
long recognized that Ohio public policy generally prohibits obtaining insurance to cover damages
caused by intentional torts.” Gearing v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 665 N.E.2d 1115, 1118 (Ohio 1996)
(collecting cases).
For Gronbeck, this means that he cannot be entitled to indemnification if he is ultimately
found liable for perpetrating intentional torts like sexual assault on the Victim Defendants. Yet,
the Court recalls that the Victim Defendants have raised substantive claims of negligence against
Gronbeck. Whether those theories succeed is a matter for the state court and any amount of
damages attributable to those theories is a matter for a properly empaneled jury in the Greene
County Court of Common Pleas. Ultimately, this Court only finds that MedPro must indemnify
Gronbeck only to the extent he is found liable for unintentional torts.
MedPro must also indemnify Yellow Springs, but the Court’s determination to that end is
less conditional. The Victim Defendants allege in their underlying complaints that the injuries
caused by Yellow Springs are the product of negligence rather than Gronbeck’s intentional acts
and, if Yellow Springs is found liable under such theories in state court, it will be for that
negligence.
To state otherwise would be to impute Gronbeck’s intent onto Yellow Springs. Construing
the Policies in favor of Yellow Springs, the Court does not think the Yellow Springs Policy can be
interpreted to shift intent between parties in this way. Doing so would obviate the need for separate
insurance agreements altogether. Gronbeck and Yellow Springs could just be listed on the same
policy. Precluding coverage for Yellow Springs in this case would also not further any policy
goals, but “would risk preventing the victim[s] from obtaining a fair and adequate recovery, in
contravention of the purpose of modern tort law.” Doe, 738 N.E.2d at 1248 (citation omitted).
Hence, MedPro must indemnify Yellow Springs in the Victim Defendants’ underlying state court
actions, specifically for Victim Defendants’ theories of negligence, should those theories prove
successful.
IV. CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court hereby GRANTS, IN PART, and DENIES,
IN PART, MedPro’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Donald Alexander Gronbeck
(Doc. No. 79), and DENIES MedPro’s Motion for Default Judgment as to all Defaulting
Defendants (Doc. No. 75). The Court, therefore, DECLARES the following:
1. MedPro must defend Gronbeck in the Victim Defendants’ state court actions—to
wit the: Hobbs Action, the Brewington Action, and the Everage Action;
2. MedPro must indemnify Gronbeck in the Victim Defendants’ state court actions—
to wit the: Hobbs Action, the Brewington Action, and the Everage Action—but
only insofar as Gronbeck is found liable for unintentional torts, if at all. Otherwise,
MedPro has no duty to indemnify Gronbeck for his alleged intentional torts;
3. MedPro must defend Yellow Springs in the Victim Defendants’ underlying state
court actions—to wit the: Hobbs Action, the Brewington Action, and the Everage
Action;
4. MedPro must indemnify Yellow Springs in the Victim Defendants’ underlying state
court actions—to wit the: Hobbs Action, the Brewington Action, and the Everage
Action; and,
5. The Clerk is DIRECTED to ENTER ITS JUDGMENT to reflect the findings
herein. However, this Order is NOT DISPOSITIVE of the entire case, as MedPro
has alleged six additional causes of action which were not addressed by the Motions
and not decided above.
DONE and ORDERED in Dayton, Ohio, this Monday, June 22, 2026.
s/Thomas M. Rose
________________________________
THOMAS M. ROSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE