Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

SWIFT PAWS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:26-cv-259-JSS-LHP

DEFENDANTS IDENTIFIED IN

SCHEDULE A,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

ORDER

Plaintiff sues Defendants (identified in Schedule A attached to the complaint,

(Dkt. 1-2)) under the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–390, for the alleged infringement of

looping lure systems for use as lure-chasing pet toys patented under United States

Patent Numbers 10,609,904 and 12,156,508. (Dkt. 1.) At 6:15 P.M. E.D.T. on March

9, 2026, the court granted Plaintiff’s verified motion (Dkt. 9) and entered an ex parte

temporary restraining order (TRO), including an asset freeze, against Defendants.

(Dkt. 10.) On March 13, 2026, the court extended the period for the TRO to 6:15 P.M.

E.D.T. on April 6, 2026. (Dkt. 17.) Plaintiff has paid the $10,000 that the court

required as security for the TRO, (Dkt. 10 at 16; Dkt. 20), and now moves to convert

the TRO to a preliminary injunction against Defendant Zhende Tech (identified in at

least the first two entries of Schedule A, which are associated with the Amazon

platform, (Dkt. 1-2 at 1)), (Dkt. 23). Zhende Tech opposes the motion to convert.

(Dkt. 24.) On March 30, 2026, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion.

the TRO to a preliminary injunction against Zhende Tech.

BACKGROUND

In the complaint, Plaintiff asserts one count of infringement of its two utility

patents. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 45–53.) To remedy the alleged infringement, Plaintiff seeks

injunctive and monetary relief, including legal fees. (Id. at 16–17.)

Plaintiff, a corporation headquartered in Melbourne, Florida, develops and sells

pet products, including pet toys. (Dkt. 9 at 2.) As relevant here, Plaintiff developed

and sold the looping lure systems for use as lure-chasing pet toys with the claimed

elements of the asserted patents (the patented products). (Id. at 2–3.) Plaintiff owns

United States Patent Number 10,609,904 titled Lure Chasing System (the ‘904 patent).

(Id. at 3.) The ‘904 patent application was filed on December 14, 2014, and issued by

the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) on April 7, 2020. (Id.)

Plaintiff has attached the ‘904 patent as Exhibit 2 to the complaint. (Id.; see Dkt. 1-3.)

In addition, Plaintiff owns United States Patent Number 12,156,508 titled Pulley

System Allowing for Passage of Object Attached to Line (‘508 patent). (Dkt. 9 at 3.)

The ‘508 patent application was filed on April 11, 2022, and issued by the USPTO on

November 13, 2024. (Id.) Plaintiff has attached the ‘508 patent as Exhibit 3 to the

complaint. (Id.; see Dkt. 1-4.) Since at least 2016, Plaintiff has sold its products to the

public. (Dkt. 9 at 3.) Plaintiff sells its products—including the patented products—

through its website, its Amazon store, the Chewy retail site, and other online sites. (Id.

at 3–4.) Further, Plaintiff’s patented products have appeared multiple times on the

national television show Shark Tank. (Id. at 4.)

Plaintiff has recently learned that some ecommerce stores were promoting,

advertising, marketing, distributing, offering for sale, and selling products covered by

one or more claims of each of the asserted patents. (Id.) This ecommerce activity

occurred through stores operating under the seller aliases identified in Schedule A,

which is Exhibit 1 to the complaint. (Id.; see Dkt. 1-2.) Defendants are the stores listed

in Schedule A, including Zhende Tech. (See Dkts. 1, 1-2, 9.) According to Plaintiff,

Defendants conceal their identities using fictitious names and addresses to register and

operate their network of online storefronts. (Dkt. 9 at 4.) Plaintiff asserts upon

information and belief that Defendants reside or operate in foreign jurisdictions and

manufacture, distribute, import, offer for sale, or sell products, including infringing

products, from the same or similar sources in those foreign locations into the United

States, where the products are offered for sale under aliases through online

marketplaces. (Id.)

Plaintiff states that through online marketplaces, such as Amazon, eBay,

TikTok, and Temu, Defendants have infringed, and continue to infringe, on Plaintiff’s

asserted patents by manufacturing, distributing, importing, offering for sale, or selling

the looping lure systems for use as lure-chasing pet toys, which perform the same

function in the same way and achieve the same result as is claimed in the asserted

patents. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ infringing products are in direct

competition with the patented products sold by Plaintiff, without any license or

authorization from Plaintiff. (Id.) Schedule A identifies Defendants by providing their

sold-by names, seller business names, product Amazon Standard Identification

Numbers (ASINs), and product and seller storefront links, which consist of

Amazon.com web addresses or similar information. (Dkt. 1-2.)

A claims chart with descriptions and photographs, attached as Exhibit 4 to the

complaint, displays one of Zhende Tech’s allegedly infringing products for comparison

with Plaintiff’s patent claims. (Dkt. 1-5.) Review of the claims chart reveals that

Defendants’ allegedly infringing products likely infringe the asserted claims of the

asserted patents. (See id.) Plaintiff reports that Defendants’ infringing products are

made with inferior materials and are offered at reduced prices, thereby negatively

affecting Plaintiff’s revenue, goodwill, and market position. (Dkt. 9 at 12–14.)

Plaintiff further reports that Defendants often use tactics involving search engine

optimization and product promotion methods that directly divert consumers to

Defendants’ infringing products from Plaintiff’s patented products, which reduces

Plaintiff’s market share. (Id.)

At the evidentiary hearing, Plaintiff and Zhende Tech presented argument on

the motion, and Plaintiff introduced eleven exhibits into evidence and called one

witness. Zhende Tech did not introduce any exhibits or call any witnesses. The eleven

exhibits, which were admitted without objection, consisted of the ‘904 and ‘508 patents

(Exhibits 1 and 2), Schedule A (Exhibit 3), documents showing the assignment of the

patents to Plaintiff (Exhibits 4 and 5), the claims chart (Exhibit 6), screenshots related

to Defendants’ online marketplaces (Exhibits 7 and 8), reviews of allegedly infringing

products (Exhibit 9), video footage of Plaintiff on Shark Tank (Exhibit 11), and

screenshots of complaints from Plaintiff to online marketplaces about allegedly

infringing products (Exhibit 12). (Dkt. 27.) Plaintiff used a physical exemplar of an

allegedly infringing product from Zhende Tech (Exhibit 10) to argue patent

infringement but did not offer the exemplar into evidence. (See id.)

Meghan Wolfgram, Plaintiff’s founder and chief executive officer, testified on

its behalf. (See Dkt. 13.) She provided general information about Plaintiff, described

her role in developing Plaintiff’s products and securing the patents at issue, and

discussed the assignment of the patents to Plaintiff. She also stated that she bought

the exemplar from Zhende Tech through Amazon and that the claims chart shows

photographs of the exemplar. With reference to the exemplar, Ms. Wolfgram

explained how the features described in the patents function and how the claims chart

illustrates Zhende Tech’s infringement of the patents. As to sales, she testified that

Plaintiff sells products in various ways—online, at charity events and pet competitions,

and through twenty-five to thirty independent retailers—and that Plaintiff has sold

20,000 products since 2012. She further testified that Plaintiff granted a license to one

company to sell a product covered by the patents and that as the sales of allegedly

infringing products increased, the licensee’s sales decreased, indicating that

Defendants are diverting consumers from Plaintiff and the licensee. According to Ms.

Wolfgram, Plaintiff could not manufacture products at prices as low as those of the

allegedly infringing products without sacrificing quality. Relatedly, she shared

negative consumer reviews about the allegedly infringing products and explained that

the negative reviews have damaged Plaintiff’s reputation because Plaintiff’s name has

become synonymous with all products in its category of lure-chasing pet toys. In fact,

Ms. Wolfgram reported, a consumer called Plaintiff’s customer support number to

complain about an unsafe product because he believed that he had bought one of

Plaintiff’s products when actually, he had purchased a competitor’s product.

Before the hearing, Zhende Tech submitted a response focusing in large part on

the terms “drive window,” “arcuate surface,” and “opening height” in the ‘904 patent

and “object passthrough window” and “inwardly beveled pulley shield” in the ‘508

patent. (Dkt. 24 at 3–16.) Zhende Tech discussed the terms when arguing that the

exemplar does not demonstrate infringement of the patents and when challenging the

validity of the ‘904 patent based on the indefiniteness of some of its terms. (Id.) During

both direct and cross-examination, Ms. Wolfgram explained how the exemplar

includes the challenged terms. Following Ms. Wolfgram’s testimony, the parties

presented closing arguments. Plaintiff argued that Zhende Tech is attempting to

rewrite the text of the patent claims based on language in the patent specifications and

that claim construction is unnecessary because the terms in the patent claims,

including the challenged terms, can be given their ordinary meanings. Plaintiff further

maintained, with respect to irreparable injury, that the same photographs for allegedly

infringing products appear on the sites of various online marketplaces such that the

sales discussed during the hearing represent only a fraction of the sales diverted from

Plaintiff. Zhende Tech contended that claim construction is necessary and that as a

lay witness, Ms. Wolfgram cannot provide it. Zhende Tech conclusorily objected

under Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403, and 702 and Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 26 to Ms. Wolfgram’s lay testimony connecting claims terms to the

exemplar. Zhende Tech also asserted that the patents include indefinite terms and that

as to irreparable injury, Plaintiff has a monetary remedy for infringement whereas

Zhende Tech has no adequate remedy if the court issues a preliminary injunction and

thereafter Zhende Tech is found not to have infringed the patents.

APPLICABLE STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs TROs and preliminary injunctions.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. The key difference is that whereas TROs may issue without

notice to the adverse party, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1), “[t]he court may issue a

preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1).

“Every order granting an injunction and every [TRO] must . . . state the reasons why

it issued[,] . . . state its terms specifically[,] and . . . describe in reasonable detail—and

not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or

required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1). Rule 65 further states: “The court may issue a

preliminary injunction or [TRO] only if the movant gives security in an amount that

the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found

to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c); accord M.D.

Fla. R. 6.01(a)(4) (requiring a TRO motion to “include . . . a precise and verified

explanation of the amount and form of the required security”); M.D. Fla. R. 6.02(a)(1)

(requiring the same of a preliminary injunction motion).

“A TRO or preliminary injunction is appropriate where the movant” satisfies

four requirements: (1) “there is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits,” (2)

“the TRO or preliminary injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable injury,” (3) “the

threatened injury outweighs the harm that the TRO or preliminary injunction would

cause to the non-movant,” and (4) “the TRO or preliminary injunction would not be

averse to the public interest.” Parker v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 275 F.3d 1032,

1034 (11th Cir. 2001); accord M.D. Fla. R. 6.01(b), 6.02(a)(1). Preliminary injunctive

relief “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant

clearly establishes the burden of persuasion as to each of the four prerequisites.” Wall

v. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 543 F. Supp. 3d 1290, 1292 (M.D. Fla. 2021)

(alteration adopted and quotations omitted).

Relatedly, a “request for equitable relief invokes the district court’s inherent

equitable powers to order preliminary relief, including an asset freeze, in order to

assure the availability of permanent relief.” Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading,

Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 987 (11th Cir. 1995). An order freezing assets should provide a

procedure for the person whose assets are frozen to petition the court to modify the

asset freeze. See id. at 987–88 (affirming an asset freeze in a trademark infringement

case because the asset freeze “expressly allowed [the defendants] to petition the district

court to modify the freeze” (citing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Atlantex Assocs., 872 F.2d 966,

970–71 (11th Cir. 1989))).

ANALYSIS

The court discusses the four requirements for a preliminary injunction—

likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury, balance of harms, and public

interest—and then explains why continuing the asset freeze is warranted.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The Patent Act permits courts to “grant injunctions in accordance with the

principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such

terms as the court deems reasonable.” 35 U.S.C. § 283. “In seeking a preliminary

injunction pursuant to section 283, a patent holder must establish a likelihood of

success on the merits both with respect to validity of its patent and with respect to

infringement of its patent.” Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 (Fed.

Cir. 1988).

The Patent Act creates a presumption of validity for a patent. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a)

(“A patent shall be presumed valid. . . . The burden of establishing invalidity of a

patent . . . shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”). “In the context of a

preliminary injunction, while the burden of proving invalidity is with the party

attacking validity, the party seeking the injunction retains the burden of showing a

reasonable likelihood that the attack on its patent’s validity would fail.” Oakley, Inc. v.

Sunglass Hut Int’l, 316 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). Plaintiff

has satisfied that burden by showing that the patents underwent rigorous examination,

with the examiners considering numerous references. (See Dkts. 1-3, 1-4; Dkt. 23 at

6–7.) See Grinnell Corp. v. Am. Monorail Co., 285 F. Supp. 219, 225 (D.S.C. 1967) (“It

is abundantly evident from the file history of the . . . patent that the application was

subjected to rigorous examination. . . . Thus[,] the . . . application is entitled fully to

the presumption of validity accorded by the statute . . . .”).

Admittedly, “[w]hen the presumptions and burdens applicable at trial are taken

into account, the injunction should not issue if the party opposing the injunction raises

a substantial question concerning infringement or validity, meaning that it asserts a

defense that the party seeking the injunction cannot prove lacks substantial merit.”

Oakley, 316 F.3d at 1340 (alteration adopted and quotation omitted). As discussed at

the hearing, Zhende Tech focuses on terms in the asserted patent claims in an attempt

to “raise[] substantial questions of invalidity and non[-]infringement demonstrating

that Plaintiff cannot meet its [preliminary injunction] burden and [that] the TRO

should be dissolved.” (Dkt. 24 at 5–6.) With regard to invalidity, Zhende Tech

maintains that terms such as “drive window” and “arcuate” in the ‘904 patent render

that patent invalid as indefinite. (See id. at 4, 8 (citing Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz,

Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“A patent is indefinite if its claims, read in

light of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to

inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the

invention.” (quotation omitted))).) It would appear that Zhende Tech does not attack

the validity of the ‘508 patent but instead argues only the non-infringement of that

patent. (See id. passim.) To the extent that Zhende Tech argues the ‘508 patent’s

invalidity, for example, based on the purported indefiniteness of claim terms, the court

concludes that the legal presumption of validity remains intact as to that patent.

For a patent “to be indefinite, reasonable efforts at claim construction must

result in a definition that does not provide sufficient particularity or clarity to inform

a skilled artisan of the bounds of the claim.” 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp.,

725 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The patents at issue are sufficiently definite

when the court considers the legal framework for claim construction. See id. at 1321

(“To the extent possible, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning,

as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time

of the invention. Idiosyncratic language, highly technical terms, or terms coined by

the inventor are best understood by reference to the specification. While [courts]

construe the claims in light of the specification, limitations discussed in the

specification may not be read into the claims. Courts may rely on dictionary

definitions when construing claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition does not

contradict any definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent

documents.” (citations omitted)); see also Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d

1576, 1582–83 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“It is well-settled that, in interpreting an asserted

claim, the court should look first to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent

itself, including the claims, the specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution

history. Such intrinsic evidence is the most significant source of the legally operative

meaning of disputed claim language. . . . In most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic

evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim term. In such

circumstances, it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence.” (citation omitted)). The

court notes that “claims themselves [may] provide substantial guidance as to the

meaning of particular claim terms.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed.

Cir. 2005).

The challenged terms in the ‘904 patent, specifically “drive window” and

“arcuate,” do not suffer from indefiniteness. As to the term “drive window,” the

specification for the ‘904 patent consistently uses “drive” in relation to a motorized

pulley unit, contrasted with a transfer pulley unit, (see Dkt. 27-1 at 2, 9–11), and

consistently uses “window” to describe a feature, numbered forty-eight in the

specification’s figures, that permits a lure to enter and exit a unit, (see id. at 10–11).

Although the term “drive window” does not appear in the specification, only in the

claims, (see id. passim), a skilled artisan would know the bounds of the asserted claims

in light of the ordinary meaning of “drive window” as a combination of “drive” and

“window” and the definitions of those constituent terms derived from their uses in the

specification. See Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed.

Cir. 2004) (“It is true that the entire term . . . is not defined in the patent . . . .

Nonetheless, the components of the term . . . allow the reader to infer the meaning of

the entire phrase with reasonable confidence.”). As to the term “arcuate,” which is

similarly confined to the claims, (see Dkt. 27-1), the parties seemingly agree that the

dictionary definition of the term, i.e., “curved like a bow,” applies. Although Zhende

Tech challenges the definiteness of the term, it also provides this definition in its

response, (Dkt. 24 at 8), and when on the witness stand, Ms. Wolfgram was amendable

to using the definition. In addition, she pointed out the relationship between “arcuate”

and the more familiar term “arc.” The Oxford English Dictionary defines “arcuate”

as “[c]urved like a bow, arc-shaped, arched” and confirms an etymological kinship

between the word and “arc.” See Arc, Oxford English Dictionary (online ed. 2026);

Arcuate, Oxford English Dictionary (online ed. 2026). The court cannot conclude that

any of the terms in the patents are indefinite such that the patents are invalid, and

overall, Zhende Tech fails to “raise[] a substantial question concerning . . . validity”

with respect to either patent. See Oakley, 316 F.3d at 1340.

Regarding infringement, a defendant infringes a utility patent when “during the

term” of the patent, “without authority,” the defendant “makes, uses, offers to sell, or

sells any patented invention[] within the United States or imports into the United

States any patented invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 271. Plaintiff’s claims chart, (see Dkts. 1-

5, 27-6), in and of itself, suffices to demonstrate Zhende Tech’s infringement of

Plaintiff’s patents, as the chart illustrates where in Zhende Tech’s product each

element of the asserted claims of the asserted patents is found. See Quickie Mfg. Corp.

v. Libman Co., 180 F. Supp. 2d 636, 642 (D.N.J. 2002) (“[T]he relevant comparison in

an infringement determination is . . . of the accused device with the claims of the

patent at issue.”); cf. KI Ventures, LLC v. Fry’s Elecs., Inc., 579 F. App’x 985, 991 (Fed.

Cir. 2014) (supporting that “pictures with arrows that clearly point to the accused parts

for every claim limitation,” like the photographs in the claims chart attached to

Plaintiff’s complaint, can “clarify . . . infringement contentions”). That said, Ms.

Wolfgram’s testimony also showed how the exemplar product includes each claim

element. Insofar as Zhende Tech disputes her expertise, “expert evidence is not always

necessary to resolve questions of patent infringement.” Kyocera Wireless Co. v. President

Elecs., Ltd., 179 F. App’x 53, 54 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Union Carbide Corp. v. Am. Can

Co., 724 F.2d 1567, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). In any event, her years of experience

developing Plaintiff’s products make Ms. Wolfgram a knowledgeable lay witness, if

not an expert witness. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 (providing that an expert may be

“qualified . . . by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education”).

Zhende Tech argues that its products do not infringe Plaintiff’s patents because

the “drive window,” “arcuate surface,” and “opening height” elements of the ‘904

patent and the “object passthrough window” and “inwardly beveled pulley shield”

elements of the ‘508 patent are absent from Zhende Tech’s products. (See Dkt. 24 at

3–16.) Having considered Zhende Tech’s arguments about non-infringement,

including those advanced during the evidentiary hearing, the court does not find the

arguments persuasive. Overall, Zhende Tech does not “raise[] a substantial question

concerning infringement.” See Oakley, 316 F.3d at 1340. The court concludes that in

light of their features, Zhende Tech’s products likely infringe the elements of the

asserted claims.

Plaintiff can likely establish the validity of the asserted patents as well as

Defendants’ infringement thereof. Accordingly, Plaintiff has demonstrated a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits to obtain a preliminary injunction.

B. Irreparable Injury

For the irreparable injury requirement, the party seeking the preliminary

injunction must establish that “the injury is immediate and is not compensable by

monetary damages. Even when considered under traditional equitable rules, however,

the existence of a likely infringer in the market may” satisfy this requirement “because

of the difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies.” Tiber

Labs., LLC v. Hawthorn Pharms., Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1381 (N.D. Ga. 2007)

(quotation omitted). Plaintiff has identified Defendants as multiple likely infringers

sharing an online market with Plaintiff and has submitted evidence that Defendants

are causing Plaintiff harm by using inferior materials—to the detriment of Plaintiff’s

goodwill—to sell products at reduced prices, thereby diverting consumers from

Plaintiff. (Dkt. 23 at 7–8.) Ms. Wolfgram testified, for example, that Plaintiff could

not manufacture products for prices as low as those charged by the alleged infringers

unless Plaintiff sacrificed the quality of its products. Consequently, Plaintiff has shown

that a preliminary injunction is required to prevent irreparable injury.

Zhende Tech contends: “Plaintiff’s asserted harm is, at most, competitive

marketplace harm that can be addressed through damages if infringement were

ultimately proven.” (Dkt. 24 at 17.) The court disagrees. Evidence supports that

Defendants’ infringement of the patents has caused Plaintiff to lose customers and has

damaged its goodwill. The reviews in Exhibit 9 demonstrate that consumers have

experienced several problems with allegedly infringing products: one reviewer

commented that he was “[v]ery disappointed” that a product “completely stopped

working no matter how long [he] charge[d] it,” a second reviewer described a product’s

quality as “truly . . . ‘bottom of the barrel’ bad” and “[a]bsolutely awful,” a third

reviewer indicated that a product “started to smell like it was burning” on just the

second day of owning it, and a fourth reviewer stated: “I have four cats walking around

crying for this broken toy. [I will] never buy another.” (Dkt. 27-9 at 1–2.) Ms.

Wolfgram testified that such negative reviews have damaged Plaintiff’s reputation

because consumers equate all lure-chasing pet toys with Plaintiff. She further testified

to actual consumer confusion—insofar as a consumer called Plaintiff to complain

about a product that he mistakenly believed he had bought from Plaintiff—and to the

diversion of customers from Plaintiff and its sole licensee. “[T]he loss of customers

and goodwill is an irreparable injury.” Ferrero v. Associated Materials, Inc., 923 F.2d

1441, 1449 (11th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted).

C. Balance of Harms

As Plaintiff observes, (see Dkt. 23 at 8), requiring a patent holder “to compete

against its own patented” product such that irreparable injury occurs “places a

substantial hardship” on the patent holder. Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659

F.3d 1142, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In contrast, “an infringer of [intellectual property]

cannot complain about the loss of ability to offer its infringing product.” WPIX, Inc.

v. ivi, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 594, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (collecting cases); accord i4i L.P.

v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The district court’s analysis [of

the balance of harms] properly ignored the expenses [the defendant] incurred in

creating the infringing products. Similarly irrelevant are the consequences to [the

defendant] of its infringement, such as the cost of redesigning the infringing

products. . . . [N]either commercial success, nor sunk development costs, shield an

infringer from injunctive relief. [The defendant] is not entitled to continue infringing

simply because it successfully exploited its infringement.” (citations omitted)).

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has shown a substantial likelihood that it is competing

in its online marketplace against products—sold by Defendants—that infringe its

patents, Plaintiff has established that its threatened injuries outweigh the harms that a

preliminary injunction would cause Defendants. See XYZ, 668 F. Supp. 3d at 1276

(“[The p]laintiff faces hardship from loss of sales and his inability to control his

reputation in the marketplace. By contrast, [the d]efendants face no hardship if they

are prohibited from the infringement of [the p]laintiff’s copyrights and patents which

[consists of] illegal acts.”). Although Zhende Tech complains that it “should not be

restrained from selling a non-infringing product,” (Dkt. 24 at 17), Plaintiff has shown

that Defendants, including Zhende Tech, are likely selling infringing products.

D. Public Interest

Given “the importance of the patent system in encouraging innovation,” Sanofi-

Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006), the public has a

“general interest in upholding patent rights,” i4i L.P., 598 F.3d at 863. Further, as

Plaintiff explains, absent a preliminary injunction, consumers “will continue to be

confused and misled by the infringing acts of Defendants[,] and the market will be

flooded with inferior [i]nfringing [p]roducts in contravention of Plaintiff’s [patent]

rights.” (Dkt. 23 at 9.) Because “the public interest is served by preventing consumer

confusion in the marketplace,” Davidoff & Cie, S.A. v. PLD Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297,

1304 (11th Cir. 2001), Plaintiff has demonstrated that a preliminary injunction

preventing Defendants from infringing Plaintiff’s utility patents would serve the public

interest. Cf. Alston v. www.calculator.com, 476 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1323 (S.D. Fla. 2020)

(“[W]hen a trademark is shown to have been infringed, the public’s right to be free of

confusion . . . is infringed[,] too[.]” (citation omitted)). Zhende Tech’s argument to

the contrary depends on the premise that Zhende Tech has not infringed on Plaintiff’s

patents, (see Dkt. 24 at 18), but the court has explained above that Plaintiff is likely to

succeed on the merits of its infringement claims with respect to Defendants, including

Zhende Tech.

E. Asset Freeze

By satisfying the requirements for likelihood of success, irreparable injury,

balance of harms, and public interest, Plaintiff has established the need for a

preliminary injunction. See Wellons, 754 F.3d at 1263; Wall, 543 F. Supp. 3d at 1292.

To maintain the status quo, Plaintiff seeks to continue the freeze on Defendants’ assets

related to the allegedly infringing products that Defendants sell through Amazon.com

and other online marketplaces as indicated by Schedule A. (Dkt. 23 at 10; see Dkt. 1-

2.)

When a plaintiff seeks equitable relief, a court can order an asset freeze “to

assure the availability of permanent relief,” Levi Strauss, 51 F.3d at 987, and “the

district courts’ equitable powers [to freeze assets] apply even more broadly when the

public interest is involved,” AT&T Broadband v. Tech Commc’ns, Inc., 381 F.3d 1309,

1317 (11th Cir. 2004). Here, the remedies sought in the complaint include equitable

relief: namely, injunctive relief to restrain Defendants from infringing, and assisting

others in infringing, Plaintiff’s utility patents and to prevent non-party financial service

providers, ecommerce platforms, web hosts, search engines, and the like from

facilitating Defendants’ infringement. (Dkt. 1 at 16–17.) Moreover, Plaintiff

represents that “[a]s a result of Defendants’ infringement, Plaintiff intends to seek the

equitable relief of an accounting of Defendants’ profits under 35 U.S.C. § 289,” and

Plaintiff maintains: “Plaintiff has a good-faith belief that . . . Defendants will . . . hide

their ill-gotten assets beyond the jurisdiction of this [c]ourt, unless those assets

continue to be restrained.” (Dkt. 23 at 10.) The court agrees that an asset freeze is

warranted. See Purple Innovation, LLC v. Individuals, No. 24-24008-CIV-MARTINEZ,

2024 WL 5399073, at *3, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 239537, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 25,

2024) (granting an asset freeze and reasoning: “In light of the inherently deceptive

nature of the counterfeiting business, and the likelihood that [the d]efendants have

violated federal trademark and patent laws, [the p]laintiff has good reason to believe

[the d]efendants will hide or transfer their ill-gotten assets beyond the jurisdiction of

this [c]ourt unless those assets are restrained.”). The public’s interests in enforcing

patent rights and counteracting consumer confusion, discussed above, lend additional

support to this asset-freeze determination. See AT&T, 381 F.3d at 1317.

Any person whose assets are frozen pursuant to this order may petition the court

to modify the asset freeze by filing a motion in this case in compliance with the Local

Rules. See Levi Strauss, 51 F.3d at 987–88; Purple Innovation, 2024 WL 5399073, at *5,

2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 239537, at *14 (“Any [d]efendant or financial institution

account holder subject to this [o]rder may petition the [c]ourt to modify the asset

restraint set out in this [o]rder[.]”).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to convert (Dkt. 23) is GRANTED as set forth in this order.

2. This preliminary injunction is ENTERED against Defendant Zhende Tech:

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

1. Defendant, its officers, directors, employees, agents, subsidiaries, and

distributors, and all other persons in active concert or participation with

Defendant are preliminarily restrained from

a. manufacturing, importing, advertising, promoting, offering to sell,

selling, distributing, or transferring any products infringing Plaintiff’s

asserted patents (Patent Numbers 10,609,904 and 12,156,508), including

any reproduction, copy, or colorable imitation thereof;

b. communicating, directly or indirectly, with any person or persons

i. from whom Defendant purchased or obtained products infringing

the asserted patents,

ii. to whom Defendant sold or offered to sell these products, or

iii. whom Defendant knows or reasonably believes to possess,

control, or have access to any of these products;

c. otherwise communicating, directly or indirectly, about this action with

any person, except for Defendant’s legal representation;

d. secreting, concealing, destroying, selling off, transferring, or otherwise

disposing of

i. any products not manufactured or distributed by Plaintiff that bear

the asserted patents or

ii. any evidence relating to the manufacture, importation, sale, offer

for sale, distribution, or transfer of any products that infringe the

asserted patents; and

e. knowingly instructing, aiding, or abetting any other person in engaging

in any of the activities referred to in a. through d. above.

2. During the pendency of this action or until further order of the court, Defendant

shall not transfer any ownership interest of a business if that business has in any

way used online marketplaces with respect to products that infringe the asserted

patents, including any reproduction, copy, or colorable imitation thereof.

3. Upon receiving notice of this order, Defendant and any third-party financial

institutions, payment processors, banks, escrow services, money transmitters,

or marketplace platforms who are providing services for Defendant including

but not limited to online marketplaces (collectively, the third-party providers)

shall, within five business days after receipt of notice of this order,

a. restrain the transfer of all funds, including funds relating to ongoing

account activity, held or received for Defendant’s benefit or to be

transferred into Defendant’s financial accounts, restrain any other

financial accounts tied thereto, and immediately divert those restrained

funds to a holding account for the trust of the court. Such restraining of

the funds and the disclosure of the related financial institution account

information (as provided below) shall be made without notice to the

account owners or the financial institutions until after those accounts are

restrained. No funds restrained by this order shall be transferred or

surrendered by any third-party provider for any purpose (other than

pursuant to a chargeback made pursuant to their security interest in the

funds) without the express authorization of this court.

b. provide Plaintiff expedited discovery of

i. the identity of all financial accounts and subaccounts associated

with the stores operating under the identifying information seen in

Schedule A, as well as any other accounts of the same customers,

ii. all known contact information for Defendant, including its

identities, locations, aliases, and email addresses, and

iii. an accounting of the total funds restrained and identities of the

financial accounts and subaccounts for which the restrained funds

are related.

4. Any person subject to this order may petition the court to modify the asset freeze

set forth in this order by filing in this case a motion that fully complies with the

Middle District of Florida Local Rules, available at the court’s

https://www.flmd.uscourts.gov/sites/flmd/files/flmd-amended-local-rules-

effective-november-01-2025.pdf webpage.

5. This order shall apply to all seller accounts, seller identification names,

ecommerce stores, domain names, websites, and financial accounts which

Defendant is allegedly using to infringe Plaintiff’s patents.

6. This order shall remain in effect until the court orders otherwise.

7. The $10,000 security that Plaintiff furnished to the court in connection with the

TRO, (see Dkt. 20; Dkt. 23 at 10), meets Rule 65(c)’s security requirement such

that Plaintiff need not provide additional security for the preliminary injunction.

ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on April 3, 2026.

i —_

JUKIE S. SNEED

NITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Parties

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