Harris

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

BYRON HARRIS,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 1:26-cv-433

Judge Matthew W. McFarland

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF

REHABILITATION, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Byron Harris, sues the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, the

Warren Correctional Facility, and several prison employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

deprivation of his ViaPath tablet. (Compl., ECF No. 1-2.) This matter is before the Court for the

initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to identify

cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it,

which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),

1915A(b)(1)–(2); see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997). Having

performed the initial screen, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS

Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

This matter is also before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2), which is GRANTED. (ECF

No. 1.) Plaintiff must pay the full amount of the Court’s $350 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

Plaintiff’s certified trust fund statement reveals that he has $0.00 in his prison account, which is

insufficient to pay the filing fee.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust accounts

(Inmate ID Number A690477) at the Warren Correctional Institution is DIRECTED to submit

to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio as an initial

partial payment, 20% of the greater of either the average monthly deposits to the inmate trust

account or the average monthly balance in the inmate trust account, for the six months

immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint.

After full payment of the initial, partial filing fee, the custodian shall submit 20% of the

inmate’s preceding monthly income credited to the account, but only when the amount in the

account exceeds $10.00, until the full fee of $350.00 has been paid to the Clerk of this Court. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

Checks should be made payable to: Clerk, United States District Court. The checks

should be sent to:

Prisoner Accounts Receivable

260 U.S. Courthouse

85 Marconi Boulevard

Columbus, Ohio 43215

The prisoner’s name and this case number must be included on each check.

It is ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute this action without prepayment of

fees or costs and that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs

had been prepaid. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and

the prison cashier’s office.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on April 19, 2026, he made a complaint that prison staff had lost or

misplaced Plaintiff’s ViaPath Tablet. Plaintiff was provided with a replacement tablet, but the

replacement was also discovered to be missing from its charging port on the morning of April

20, 2026. Plaintiff reported the second missing tablet but staff were unable to find it. After three

business days passed, Plaintiff sent a kite to the institutional inspector and public records officer

requesting a “theft lost report filing of complaint” and advising of Plaintiff’s intention to file a

complaint based on their alleged violation of Ohio’s public records statute, Ohio Rev. Code

§ 149.43.(B)(1). The public records officer informed Plaintiff that the Ohio Department of

Rehabilitation and Correction has nothing to do with ViaPath as it is a separate company.

Plaintiff alleges that, to date, he still has not received a response to his public records request or a

new ViaPath tablet. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1.)

Although Plaintiff styles his filing as a “Petition for Writ of Mandamus,” the undersigned

construes Plaintiff’s allegations as a Complaint advancing claims (1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

deprivation of property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and

(2) under Ohio Rev. Code § 149.43 for failure to comply with Ohio’s public records statute. As

relief, Plaintiff seeks an order compelling prison staff to provide him with a new ViaPath tablet,

charger, and headphones and an order compelling Defendants to comply with Ohio Rev. Code

¶ 149.43(B)(1).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In

doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e):

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See

also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring a court to conduct a screening of “a complaint in a civil action

in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity . . . [to] identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion

of the complaint [that is] frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted”).

Further, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See Hill v.

Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading

that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”

is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not

“suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).

Instead, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial

plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The

plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the

strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504

(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,

614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient

treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim

asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

III. ANALYSIS

All of Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed. First, to the extent that Plaintiff contends that

he was deprived of property without due process of law, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged the

inadequacy of the remedies available under Ohio law. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527

(1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) and Hudson v. Palmer,

468 U.S. 517 (1984). In Parratt, the United States Supreme Court held that the existence of

adequate post-deprivation state remedies eliminates any due process claim arising from the

negligent deprivation of a prisoner’s property. 451 U.S. at 539–44. The Hudson Court extended

Parratt’s application to all § 1983 due process claims involving deprivation of property,

regardless of whether the deprivation is negligent or intentional. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533–36. Cf.

Jefferson v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Sch. Sys., 360 F.3d 583, 587–88 (6th Cir. 2004) (“If satisfactory

state procedures are provided in a procedural due process case, then no constitutional deprivation

has occurred despite the injury.”). Following Parratt and Hudson, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that in a § 1983 case “claiming the deprivation of a property

interest without procedural due process of law, the plaintiff must plead and prove that state

remedies for redressing the wrong are inadequate.” Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1065–66

(6th Cir. 1983). When a plaintiff fails to do so, dismissal for failure to state a claim is

appropriate. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Hopkins, 10 F.3d 373, 377-78 (6th Cir. 1993) (dismissal of

procedural due process claim upheld when the plaintiff had “not pled or shown that [the state]

judicial remedies are inadequate . . . .”); Ruiz v. Fisher, No. 96-4212, 1998 WL 661139, at *5

(6th Cir. Sept. 2, 1998) (concluding that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim of either

intentional or negligent deprivation of property where he had not pled “that state remedies for

redressing the wrong [were] inadequate”).

Plaintiff’s Complaint provides insufficient factual content or context from which the

Court could reasonably infer that Ohio’s post-deprivation tort remedies are inadequate under

Parratt and Vicory to redress his alleged property loss. See Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342,

349 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Hudson, 468 U.S. at 534–36) (“State tort remedies generally satisfy

the postdeprivation process requirement of the Due Process Clauses.”). Accordingly, he has

failed to state a property-deprivation due process claim.

Finally, the undersigned recommends that the Court decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court

may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when the Court “has dismissed all claims over

which it has original jurisdiction.” The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has

held that “[i]f the federal claims are dismissed before trial, the state claims generally should be

dismissed as well.” Brooks v. Rothe, 577 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Here,

Plaintiff’s allegations relating to Ohio’s public records statute fail to provide a basis for a claim

over which this Court has original jurisdiction. “The basic statutory grants of federal court

subject-matter jurisdiction are contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for federal-

question jurisdiction, and § 1332, which provides for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.”

Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501 (2006) (cleaned up). Federal-question jurisdiction is

implicated when a plaintiff pleads a claim “arising under” the federal laws or the United States

Constitution. Id. (citation omitted). For a federal court to have diversity jurisdiction under

§ 1332(a), there must be complete diversity, meaning that each plaintiff must be a citizen of a

different state than each defendant, and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000.

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996).

Plaintiff’s remaining claims under the Ohio Revised Code pertain squarely to state law

and do not arise under federal laws or the United States Constitution. Nor has Plaintiff alleged

that he and Defendants are citizens of different states, or that the amount in controversy exceeds

$75,000. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege facts on which the Court could rely to

conclude that this Court has original subject-matter jurisdiction over his state-law claims.

Because the undersigned is recommending dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s federal claims, it is

further recommended that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any

remaining state-law claims and that it dismiss any such claims without prejudice to filing in state

court.

IV. DISPOSITION

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED.

In addition, for the reasons above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s

federal claims for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and that Plaintiff’s

remaining state-law claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to re-filing in state

court.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with

supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive

further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura

CHELSEY M. VASCURA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE