Hunter

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

ACCEL SCHOOLS SR LLC,

Plaintiff, Case No. 3:25-cv-303

vs.

TRAVONNA HUNTER, District Judge Michael J. Newman

Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry

Defendant.

______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER: (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (Doc. No. 13); (2) AWARDING PLAINTIFF DEFAULT

JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT IN THE AMOUNT OF $81,137.35; (3)

AWARDING POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF THIS ORDER AT

THE APPLICABLE FEDERAL STATUTORY RATE DISCUSSED IN THIS OPINION;

AND (4) TERMINATING THIS CASE ON THE DOCKET

______________________________________________________________________________

This civil case was filed on September 15, 2025. Plaintiff is a business that provides

staffing management to charter schools, such as the Springfield Sports Academy (“SSA”) in

Springfield, Ohio. Doc. No. 1 at PageID 2. Defendant was the principal of SSA from June 2023

through June 2025. Id. The parties executed an agreement pertaining to Defendant’s employment

on April 28, 2024, which included a twelve-month restriction on Defendant soliciting employees

or students from SSA, as well as a restriction on working for any school within ten miles of the

location at which she worked. Id. at PageID 2-3. Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant for

breach of contract, tortious interference and breach of fiduciary duty, alleging that she launched a

competing school within the ten-mile radius of SSA and solicited eleven students and two

employees to join her school from SSA. Id. at PageID 3-4. Plaintiff also claims Defendant

improperly used a credit card in Plaintiff’s name for personal expenses, amounting to conversion.

Id. at PageID 4-8.

The docket reflects that pro se Defendant Travonna Hunter was served on September 23,

2025, establishing an answer date of October 14, 2025.1 Doc. No. 5. Because Defendant did not

answer upon that date, Plaintiff filed an application to the Clerk for an entry of default against

Defendant on October 23, 2025 (Doc. No. 9), and the Clerk of Court put on an entry of default on

October 28, 2025 (Doc. No. 10). Then, on December 19, 2025, Defendant filed a pro se letter in

response to Plaintiff. Doc. No. 12. Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment on December 22,

2025. Doc. No. 13. Thereafter, the Court, in an Order issued on January 15, 2026, liberally

construed Defendant’s letter in her favor and advised her she could file a motion to set aside the

Clerk’s entry of default—and gave Defendant a deadline of February 6, 2026 in which to do so.

Doc. No. 14. Defendant has not filed such a motion, and the time for doing so has now passed.

I.

“When a party fails to defend an action as required, the court may enter a default

judgment.” Woods v. Najar, No. 18-1328, 2018 WL 9651541, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 17, 2018); see

H .F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1970)

(“Default judgment must normally be viewed as available only when the adversary process has

been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party”); see also Parallax Advanced Rsch.

Corp. v. SPG Inst., Inc., No. 3:21-cv-133, 2021 WL 3634739, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 17, 2021)

(“[C]ourts are … more likely to grant a default judgment in cases where a defendant has been

entirely unresponsive”). Further, “a district court may sua sponte enter default judgment” against

a defendant when that defendant failed to comply with court orders. Turner v. Whitehorn, No. 98-

6635, 1999 WL 1336074, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 21, 1999); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f)(1)(C) (The Court

may sua sponte “issue any just orders…, if a party or its attorney . . . fails to obey a scheduling or

1 As with all pro se litigants, Defendant’s documents and allegations are liberally construed in her

favor. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).

other pretrial order”). “The decision to enter a default judgment lies in the district court’s sound

discretion.” New York Life Ins. Co. v. Baker, No. 2:20-CV-2577, 2021 WL 640412, at *2 (S.D.

Ohio Jan. 4, 2021) (citation omitted).

Defendant failed to comply with the Court’s January 15th Order. In that Order, the Court

set a briefing schedule, giving Defendant an opportunity to file a motion to set aside the Clerk’s

entry of default. Doc. No. 14 at PageID 167. The Court also made it clear to Defendant that not

responding could result in a default judgment against her. Doc. No. 14 at PageID 168. Having

filed no such motion, her failure to comply with the Court’s Order prevents the lawsuit from

moving toward resolution on the merits. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962);

see also Carpenter v. City of Flint, 723 F.3d 700, 704 (6th Cir. 2013); Turner, 1999 WL 1336074,

at *2; Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991) (affirming case dismissal where pro se

plaintiff failed to comply with “readily comprehended court deadlines of which he was well-

aware”); Steck Mfg. Co. v. Hildebrand, No. C-3-98196, 1999 WL 34843602, at *1 (S.D. Ohio

Sept. 30, 1999) (“Therefore, default judgment is warranted, as this is an instance in which ‘the

diligent party must be protected lest he be faced with interminable delay and continued uncertainty

as to his rights’” (citing H .F. Livermore Corp., 432 F.2d at 691)). In light of this, and having

reviewed the record in its entirety, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for a default

judgment. Doc. No. 13.

II.

“[W]hile liability may be shown by well-pleaded allegations, the district court must

conduct an inquiry in order to ascertain the amount of damages with reasonable certainty.” DT

Fashion LLC v. Cline, No. 2:16-cv-1117, 2018 WL 542268, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 24, 2018)

(quoting United States v. Parker-Billingsley, No. 3:14-cv-307, 2015 WL 4539843, at *1 (S.D.

Ohio Feb. 10, 2015)). A court may determine damages without holding an evidentiary hearing if

the damages are “capable of ascertainment from definite figures contained in the documentary

evidence or in detailed affidavits.” Parker-Billingsley, 2015 WL 4539843, at *1.

Review of Plaintiff’s complaint and additional briefing reveals the following.

To support its damages award request, Plaintiff submitted two sworn affidavits: (1) from

its Executive Vice President and Superintendent, Dr. Chad Carr, stating that Defendant owes

$49,710.65, including $1,721.09 for unauthorized credit card changes; $10,000 to recruit and fill

two former-employee positions as a result of Defendant’s solicitations; and $37,989.56 in lost

profits; and (2) from Plaintiff’s trial counsel, Shannon K. Patton, testifying that Defendant owes

$30,926.70 for attorneys’ fees in this matter. Doc. No. 13-1 at PageID 148-51; Doc. No. 13-2 at

PageID 152-53. Plaintiff also submitted a profile reflecting the rates for similarly experienced

attorneys in Ohio as of 2024 according to the Ohio Bar Association. Doc. No. 13-2 at PageID

154-66. These damages total $80,637.35. Plaintiff also requests $1,721.09 in punitive damages

as to the unauthorized credit card charges, which is the same amount as Defendant charged to the

card, bringing the total requested damages to $82,358.44. Doc. No. 13 at PageID 141.

By way of these affidavits, the attached exhibit, and the unambiguous language of the

contracts, Plaintiff has sufficiently proven its requested damages in the amount of $80,637.35

“with reasonable certainty.” DT Fashion LLC, 2018 WL 542268, at *2. Further, the Court finds

a punitive damages award, as to the unauthorized credit card charges, is sufficiently proven. See

Digital & Analog Design Corp. v. N. Supply Co., 44 Ohio St. 3d 36, 43–44 (1989) (explaining

punitive damages, including that malice is required to seek punitive damages; malice may be

inferred by showing a conscious disregard for the rights of others which has a great probability of

causing substantial harm). Defendant used Plaintiff’s credit card multiple times for purchases such

as alcohol and clothing, consciously disregarding Plaintiff’s rights through her pattern of conduct

and resulting in substantial harm to Plaintiff due to the amounts charged. See Doc. No. 13-1 at

PageID 149. The Court infers malice based on these circumstances. See Digital & Analog Design

Corp., 44 Ohio St. 3d at 43. Additionally, there is sufficient evidence that Defendant planned her

actions in advance; that it was probable the actions would do harm to Plaintiff; that Plaintiff’s

rights were obvious to Defendant; that Defendant disregarded Plaintiff’s rights; and that there was

a conversion of property. See id. at 44; Doc. No. 13-1 at PageID 149-50. Given the unauthorized

credit card bill totals $1,721.09, the Court finds a punitive damages award of $500.00 is more

reasonable and appropriate than the $1,721.09 requested here. See, e.g., State Farm Mut.

Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (discussing how few instances of

punitive damages awards exceeding a single-digit ratio of punitive to compensatory damages will

satisfy due process); see also, Isenberg v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 661 F.Supp.2d 627, 631 (N.D.

Tex. 2009) (in which a Northern District of Texas court found that unauthorized credit card

conduct constituted “fraudulent and malicious conduct” and awarded $116,990.91 in punitive

damages on actual damages of $409,468.19 (approximately a 0.29:1.00 ratio)). In granting a

punitive damages award of $500.00, the punitive damages to actual damages ratio is also

approximately 0.29:1.00, which the Court finds appropriate in light of the fraudulent, unauthorized

credit card charges here. See Isenberg, 661 F.Supp.2d at 631.

III.

Plaintiff also requests Defendant be enjoined from unlawfully soliciting its employees and

students. Doc. No. 13 at PageID 143. “A plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must

demonstrate that it has suffered irreparable injury, there is no adequate remedy at law, ‘that,

considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is

warranted,’ and that it is in the public’s interest to issue the injunction.” Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469

F.3d 534, 550 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391

(2006)).

Plaintiff does not demonstrate that there is no adequate remedy at law for possible future

instances of Defendant soliciting Plaintiff’s employees and students. If Defendant solicits further

employees and students in violation of the parties’ contract, Plaintiff can seek judicial intervention

as in this case. As such, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for an injunction against Defendant.

IV.

Plaintiff additionally requests an award of post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1961. Doc. No. 13 at PageID 147. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), post-judgment interest is required

“to be paid on money awarded by district courts in civil actions.” CAPSA Sols., LLC v. Concord

Healthcare Grp., LLC, No. 2:18-cv-594, 2019 WL 4894038, at *3-4 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 4,

2019) (citations omitted). “The district court has no discretion to deny post-judgment interest, as

it is mandatory.” Id. (citing Caffey v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 302 F.3d 576, 586 (6th Cir. 2002)).

“Such interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the

weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors

of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding the date of the judgment.” 28

U.S.C. § 1961(a).

The Sixth Circuit has interpreted “judgment” to mean “any judgment that is not entirely

set aside.” Skalka v. Fernald Env’t Restoration Mgmt. Corp., 178 F.3d 414, 429 (6th Cir. 1999).

The general rule for determining which “judgment” starts the accrual of post-judgment interest is

that “post[-]judgment interest should begin to run once damages have been ‘ascertained’ in [a]

meaningful way.” Caffey, 302 F.3d at 588 (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno,

494 U.S. 827, 835-36 (1990)).

Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to post-judgment interest at the applicable statutory rate

(3.80%) from the date of this Order until the entire judgment is satisfied. See Powell v. Divine

Status, LLC, No. 2:23-CV-501, 2025 WL 415495, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 7, 2025) (finding that

post-judgment interest began to accrue from the date the court awarded damages and not the

default judgment date).

V.

Plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment is therefore GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART. The Court AWARDS Plaintiff a final judgment against Defendant in the

amount of $81,137.35. The Court also AWARDS post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1961. Further, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for a permanent injunction. Finally, the

Court TERMINATES this case on the docket.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

June 9, 2026 s/Michael J. Newman

Hon. Michael J. Newman

United States District Judge