Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

:

Alan Williams, et al., :

: Case No. 2:25-cv-00070

Plaintiffs, :

v. : Judge Graham

:

Ohio Department of Mental : Magistrate Judge Jolson

Health and Addiction :

Services, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

OPINION & ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon the Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Doc. 14. For the reasons

that follow, the Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

The Plaintiffs in this matter are Pastor Alan Williams (“Williams”) and the

LLCs he operates as residential facilities to benefit the homeless community1

(“collectively, “Plaintiffs”). The Defendants in this matter are the Ohio Department

of Mental Health and Addiction Services (“ODMHAS”) and various employees of

ODMHAS (the “Employee Defendants”). Plaintiffs initiated this suit after ODMHAS

investigations and enforcement actions resulted in the loss of licenses to operate four

(4) residential facilities.

1 Namely, My Friends Place in Unity, LLC, My Brother’s Place II, LLC, and My Best Friends

Place, LLC.

Plaintiffs claim that their constitutional rights were violated by the various

ways in which the investigations were tainted. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the

investigations were animated by prejudice against Williams’ race and religion and

the results were based on five (5) illegal searches conducted from February 24, 2021,

and September 19, 2022. Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants planted,

destroyed, and concealed evidence “so as to convey the false impression that Mr.

Williams’ properties were unsafe and unfit for habitation.” Doc. 13, # 263.

An ODMHAS hearing was held on January 23, 2023, regarding whether to

revoke four (4) licenses to operate Plaintiffs’ facilities. Id. at 269. On May 30, 2023,

ODMHAS issued an adjudication order revoking all four (4) licenses. Id. Plaintiffs

appealed to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, raising much of the same

arguments concerning the propriety of the investigations as he does in the instant

case. Doc. 3-2, # 216. The Court of Common Pleas ultimately affirmed the ODMHAS

order of May 30, 2023. Doc. 13, # 269. Plaintiffs again appealed, this time to the Court

of Appeals of Ohio’s Tenth Appellate District, and they left with the same result when

the appellate court affirmed the decision below. Id.

Plaintiffs filed the instant suit on January 27, 2025. In their Second Amended

Complaint (“SAC”), Plaintiffs raise the following claims:

Count I: § 1983 Unlawful Religious Discrimination

Count II: § 1983 Equal Protection

Counts III-VII: § 1983 Illegal Search (based on alleged searches

conducted on February 24, 2021, June 9, 2021, December 28,

2021, February 4, 2022, and September 19, 2022, respectively).

Count VIII: § 1981 Equal Rights Under Law

Count IX: § 1983 Due Process claim based on the administrative

hearing procedures.

Count X: § 1983 Due Process claim based on Defendants’

execution of the license revocation order before Plaintiffs

exhausted their appeals.

Count XI: Slander (raised only against Defendants ODMHAS and

Tina Nutter)

Count XII: Alleging the ODMHAS regulatory scheme is

unconstitutional both facially and as applied to Plaintiffs.

Doc. 13.

Defendants filed the motion to dismiss currently before the Court, arguing for

dismissal based on jurisdictional grounds, pursuant to Fed. Civ. R. 12(b)(1), and

based on Plaintiffs’ purported failure to state a claim, pursuant to Fed. Civ. R.

12(b)(6). Doc. 14. In their responsive pleading, Plaintiffs conceded that Defendant

ODMHAS should be dismissed from the suit, thus leaving only the individual

Defendants. Doc. 15, # 329.

Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss brought under Fed. Civ. R. 12(b)(1) argues that the Court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the dispute. A motion to dismiss brought

under Fed. Civ. R. 12(b)(6) argues that the operative complaint fails to state a claim

for which relief can be granted. In either case, the court is “[r]equired to construe the

complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and to accept the factual

allegations as true.” Leisure v. FBI of Columbus, Ohio, 2 F. App'x 488, 489 (6th Cir.

2001). However, the court is not required to credit a claimant’s “summary allegations

or unwarranted legal conclusions.” Id. (citing Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d

737, 745 (6th Cir. 1999), abrogated by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506,

122 S. Ct. 992, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002)). Plaintiff bears the burden of an affirmative

showing of jurisdiction, without which dismissal is required. See Walls v. Waste Res.

Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 317 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance

Corp. of Indiana, 298 U.S. 178, 56 S. Ct. 780, 80 L. Ed. 1135 (1936)). “Although

typically courts are limited to the pleadings when faced with a motion under Rule

12(b)(6), a court may take judicial notice of other court proceedings without

converting the motion into one for summary judgment.” Buck v. Thomas M. Cooley L.

Sch., 597 F.3d 812, 816 (6th Cir. 2010).

DISCUSSION

Under Rule 12(b)(1), Defendants argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

strips this Court of jurisdiction to review a final state court judgment.2 Under Rule

12(b)(6), Defendants argue that certain claims are barred by res judicata, and that

Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The Court

discusses these arguments in turn.

I. Plaintiffs’ Claims Largely Evade the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ illegal search and seizure claims (Counts III-

VII) cannot be adjudicated by this Court pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as Defendants describe it, “is based on the negative

2 Defendants originally raised three (3) arguments under 12(b)(1), but two (2) of them applied

solely to Defendant ODMHAS, and thus they moot in light of Plaintiffs’ concession that the

Department should not be a part of this case.

inference that, if appellate court review of [final judgments from the highest court of

a state] is vested in the U.S. Supreme Court,” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), then

“federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review such matters.” Doc. 14, # 299.

In determining whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies, the Court must

look to “the source of the injury” alleged in the complaint. McCormick v. Braverman,

451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006). The inquiry is whether the source of the injury is

the state court decision, in which case the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would prevent

the district court from asserting jurisdiction, or if “there is some other source of

injury, such as a third party’s actions.” Id.

In the instant case, Defendants contend that the argument under Counts III-

VII of the SAC “is the exact same argument that [Plaintiffs] made” in the state court

proceedings, and which the state tribunals found unpersuasive. Doc. 14, # 300.

Therefore, Defendants argue, this Court is without jurisdiction over such claims

“because they seek appellate review of state court judgments.” Id.

Plaintiffs argue that they are merely presenting an “independent claim, albeit

one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which

he was a party,” thereby negating the application of Rooker-Feldman. Doc. 15, # 330

(quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293, 125

(2005)). In such circumstances—when a plaintiff “attempts to litigate in federal court

a matter previously litigated in state court”—the federal district court “may be bound

to recognize the claim- and issue-preclusive effects of a state-court judgment, but

federal jurisdiction over an action does not terminate automatically on the entry of

judgment in the state court.” Id.

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not

apply here. Plaintiffs are not alleging an injury with its source in a state court

judgment; rather, much like the claimants in Hohenberg v. Shelby County, Tennessee,

Plaintiffs here challenge “the allegedly wrongful actions and omissions that led to

their judgments, not the judgments themselves.” 68 F.4th 336, 340 (6th Cir. 2023).

Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief seeks “actual economic and compensatory

damages,” “punitive damages,” “treble damages,” “statutory damages and fines,” and

attorney fees and costs (doc. 13, # 277), none of which “would amount to ‘review and

rejection’ of any of the judgments binding the claimants.” Hohenberg, 68 F.4th at 341.

This is true regardless of whether Plaintiffs raised the same arguments in state court

and lost. Because such injuries alleged and the relief sought are not traceable to a

state court judgment, Plaintiffs’ re-run of arguments raised unsuccessfully in state

court may be barred by principles of res judicata, but not the jurisdictional bar of the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

However, Plaintiffs also seek “injunctive relief to prevent further violations

and restore Plaintiffs’ licenses.” Doc. 13, # 277. Though not made explicit by the text

of SAC, such relief appears to be based on Count XII, which alleges that the

“regulatory scheme for revoking the license of Health care facilities is

unconstitutional both facially and as applied to Pastor Williams.” Id. at # 276. While

the Court finds that it has jurisdiction over the claim itself (see Hohenberg, 68 F.4th

at 341 (holding Rooker-Feldman does not bar declaratory relief that plaintiffs’ rights

were violated)), the Court further finds that the requested injunction and license-

restoration tilt into Rooker-Feldman territory, where the Court cannot grant such

relief without effectively sitting in review of a state court judgment. See Lawrence v.

Welch, 531 F.3d 364, 371 (6th Cir. 2008) (“claims seeking injunctive relief are barred

by Rooker–Feldman if they necessarily require the federal court to determine that a

state court judgment was erroneously entered.”). Thus, the Court concludes that

Defendants’ Rooker-Feldman argument is well-taken to the narrow extent that it bars

the Court from issuing one form of relief sought by Plaintiffs.

II. Plaintiffs’ Claims in Counts I-X are Barred by Res Judicata.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by res judicata based on

the preceding litigation in Ohio courts. Federal courts “look to the state’s law to assess

the preclusive effect it would attach to [the] judgment.” Ohio ex rel. Boggs v. City of

Cleveland, 655 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). The Sixth Circuit has

articulated the four (4) elements of claim preclusion in Ohio as follows:

(1) [A] prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of

competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the

same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second

action raising claims that were or could have been litigated

in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the

transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of

the previous action.

Hapgood v. City of Warren, 127 F.3d 490, 493 (6th Cir. 1997). Defendants contend

that, over the course of Plaintiffs’ administrative appeal in the Franklin County

Court of Common Pleas and their subsequent appeal to the Tenth District Court of

Appeals, all four (4) elements have been met. As to Counts I-X, the Court agrees.

a. The First, Second, and Fourth Elements are Satisfied as to Counts I-X

of the Second Amended Complaint.

Indisputably, there is a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of

competent jurisdiction, satisfying the first element. See My Friend's Place in Unity v.

Dep't of Mental Health & Addiction Servs., 2024-Ohio-3257, appeal not

allowed, 2024-Ohio-5340, 175 Ohio St. 3d 1532, 245 N.E.3d 791. And there is no

dispute that this (“second”) action arises from the same transaction or occurrence,

satisfying the fourth element.

The second element requires the Court to consider whether this action involves

“the same parties[] or their privies” as the state court proceedings. Hapgood, 127 F.3d

at 493. Ohio courts “have applied a broad definition to determine whether the

relationship between the parties is close enough to invoke the doctrine,” holding that

“‘a mutuality of interest, including an identity of desired result,’ may create privity.”

Kirkhart v. Keiper, 2004-Ohio-1496, ¶ 8, 101 Ohio St. 3d 377, 379, 805 N.E.2d 1089,

1092 (quoting Brown v. Dayton, 2000-Ohio-148, 89 Ohio St. 3d 245, 248, 730 N.E.2d

958, 962).

In the state court action, the appellants were My Friend’s Place in Unity, My

Brother’s Place, My Brother’s Other Place, and My Best Friend’s Place (collectively,

the “Facilities”). In the instant case, the Plaintiffs are the same, with the addition of

Williams, the owner and operator of the Facilities. On the other side of the v., only

ODMHAS was named as a party during the state court proceedings, while the instant

action includes seven (7) employees of the Department as well, named in their official

capacities. Doc. 13. Williams and the Facilities plainly have mutuality of interest, as

do ODMHAS and its employees in their official capacities. See Heike v. Cent.

Michigan Univ. Bd. of Trs., 573 F. App'x 476, 481-82 (6th Cir. 2014) (official capacity

employees are in privity with their governmental entity employer) (citing cases).

Therefore, the Court finds that the parties of the instant action are identical to, or in

privity with, the parties of the state court proceedings, thus satisfying the second

element.

b. The Third Element is Satisfied as to Counts I-X of the Second Amended

Complaint.

The third element asks whether the instant claims “were or could have been

litigated in the first action.” Hapgood, 127 F.3d at 493. The Sixth Circuit has

recognized that this element “concerns only the legal possibility of bringing the

disputed claims in the previous action.” U.S. ex rel. Sheldon v. Kettering Health

Network, 816 F.3d 399, 416 (6th Cir. 2016). Under this standard, res judicata has

been applied when the rules of civil procedure for the prior forum would allow the

precluded claims, regardless of whether they were actually raised. See Doe ex rel. Doe

v. Jackson Loc. Schs. Sch. Dist., 422 F. App'x 497, 501 (6th Cir. 2011). On the other

hand, res judicata is not applicable to a claim which was not ripe when the previous

action was commenced. See Ohio ex rel. Boggs v. City of Cleveland, 655 F.3d 516, 522

(6th Cir. 2011).

In the instant case, the bulk3 of Plaintiffs’ claims were or could have been

raised in the state court proceedings. Plaintiffs do not dispute that at least some of

the claims and issues before the court were previously raised in state court, but they

offer no colorable argument for why res judicata would not bar this Court’s

consideration of those matters. For example, while both the trial and appellate courts

conducted thorough analyses of the warrantless search and seizure claims, Plaintiffs

curiously claim that “none of their opinions cited the governing law or analyzed the

claims using the well-known standard for determining if administrative searches

have exceeded their scope.” Doc. 15, # 333. In fact, both opinions cite controlling

precedent from the Supreme Court of Ohio in addition to the relevant statutes. See

My Friend's Place in Unity, 2024-Ohio-3257 at ¶¶ 20-21 (citing authorities to

conclude that “holders of licenses for residential facilities consent to inspections by

[ODMHAS] when they apply for and maintain licenses to operate these facilities.”).

Whether these authorities provide the “well-known standard” to which Plaintiffs

refer is unclear, as Plaintiffs have not provided any authority for nor articulation of

such a standard.

Furthermore, the allegations in the SAC make it clear that the previously

unasserted claims could have been raised by Plaintiffs as they pursued their appeal

in the Ohio courts. See doc. 13. Plaintiffs largely concede that the Ohio Court of

Common Pleas has jurisdiction to review the claims they raise for the first time in

the instant case. Doc. 15, # 332. See State ex rel. Schwarzmer v. Mazzone, 2025-Ohio-

3 The exceptions are Counts XI (slander) and XII (facial and as applied constitutional

challenge), which are discussed below.

1246, 178 Ohio St. 3d 455, 459, (“The common pleas court is a court of general subject-

matter jurisdiction with power over ‘all matters at law and in equity that are not

denied to it.’”) (quoting Saxton v. Seiberling, 48 Ohio St. 554, 29 N.E. 179 (1891)).

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue that certain claims were not ripe at the time of the

administrative appeal, and that, regardless, they were “not required to bring the

claims at that time,” pursuant to Harrison v. Montgomery Cnty., Ohio, No. 20-4051,

2021 WL 1881382 (6th Cir. May 11, 2021). Doc. 15, # 332. Plaintiffs are incorrect in

both respects.

Start with the ripeness question. Plaintiffs argue that the “due process claims”

could not have been raised previously because they “involve [their] treatment in the

administrative hearing and on appeal,” and therefore “did not accrue until the state

court proceedings in which Plaintiffs’ rights were being violated were complete.” Doc.

15, # 333. But the due process claims raised in the SAC do not allege rights violations

in the state court proceedings. Of Counts I-X, the only claim that accrued after the

end of the administrative proceedings is Count X (due process),4 concerning the

allegation that Defendants wrongfully informed Plaintiffs’ residents of the license

revocation while Plaintiffs’ appeal was pending. Doc. 13, # 276-77. Plaintiffs cite no

authority supporting a due process right to a stay of execution of an administrative

order during pendency of an appeal. Even assuming such a right exists, Plaintiffs

could have exercised that right by seeking to suspend the administrative order in the

Court of Common Pleas during the appeal, as provided by the Ohio Revised Code. See

4 The other due process claim, Count IX, concerns the fairness of the revocation hearing, an

issue which was litigated in the state court proceedings.

Ohio Rev. Code § 119.12.5 Defendants note that Plaintiffs raised these “exact same

facts” in a motion for contempt in the Court of Common Pleas, which denied the

motion. Doc. 16, # 355 (citing My Friend’s Place in Unity et al. v. Ohio Dept. of Mental

Health & Addiction Servs., Franklin County Court of Common Pleas docket Case No.

23-cv-004267); see also Buck, 597 F.3d at 816 (“Although typically courts are limited

to the pleadings when faced with a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may take

judicial notice of other court proceedings without converting the motion into one for

summary judgment.”). Alternatively, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ theory of Count X

depends on a finding that the license revocation was itself wrongfully obtained, it

must fail, because res judicata precludes this Court from adjudicating that previously

litigated issue. See doc. 3-2, # 236 (Court of Common Pleas decision finding the license

revocation order was “supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and

is in accordance with law.”).

Plaintiffs’ reliance on Harrison v. Montgomery County for the proposition that

they did not need to raise all their claims in state court is misplaced. In Harrison, the

Sixth Circuit held, “if a plaintiff chooses to pursue an administrative appeal, claim

preclusion may bar a later attempt to seek the same relief.” 997 F.3d at 651. The

claimant in Harrison “did not pursue an administrative appeal,” which, the panel

explicitly acknowledged, “sets her case apart.” Id. Even though the Plaintiffs here

have indeed pursued an administrative appeal, and are now seeking the same relief,

5 Paragraph (E) states, “The filing of a notice of appeal shall not automatically operate as a

suspension of the order of an agency. If it appears to the court that an unusual hardship to

the appellant will result from the execution of the agency’s order pending determination of

the appeal, the court may grant a suspension and fix its terms.”

they simply emphasize the Sixth Circuit’s “may” as if it were an escape hatch from

long-standing principles of res judicata. Doc. 15, # 333. The Court is not persuaded.

As a further distinction, much of the Sixth Circuit’s discussion in Harrison concerns

why the claims at issue could not be raised during the time of the administrative

appeal (for complicated and idiosyncratic reasons not present here).

The unique facts of Harrison do not alter the general rule that res judicata will

preclude a claim that could have been raised in a prior proceeding. Carroll v. City of

Cleveland, 522 F. App'x 299, 305 (6th Cir. 2013) (applying res judicata where

claimants “could have asserted each of the claims they raise here” in prior

administrative appeal). Therefore, because Counts I-X of the SAC were or could have

been raised in state court, those claims are now precluded by res judicata.

III. Counts XI and XII Fail to State Claims for Which Relief Can be

Granted.

Two claims escape the application of res judicata but nevertheless warrant

dismissal. In Count XI, Plaintiffs raise a common law slander claim solely against

Defendant Nutter, alleging that she “contacted other agencies and individuals and

intentionally made statements that she knew to be false in an ultimately successful

effort to drive Pastor Williams completely out of business.” Doc. 13, # 276. The SAC

is vague as to when any such statements occurred, alleging that Nutter made such

statements “throughout the time she oversaw the review of Plaintiffs’ licenses,” (id.)

and “during and after these events.” Id. at # 270. Without more, the Court cannot

determine when this claim accrued and thus cannot say that it could have been raised

previously. But the same vagaries that save the slander claim from the res judicata

bar also doom the claim as inadequately pleaded. At no point do Plaintiffs identify

the content of the allegedly slanderous statements. See Mitchell v. Fujitec Am., Inc.,

518 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1092 (S.D. Ohio 2021) (to state a claim for slander or libel,

plaintiff must plead sufficient facts as to the content of the alleged statements).

Rather, Plaintiffs’ allegations are entirely conclusory, which warrants dismissal

under Fed. Civ. R. 12(b)(6).

In Count XII, Plaintiffs allege that ODMHAS’ “Regulatory scheme for revoking

the license of Health care facilities is unconstitutional both facially and as applied to

Pastor Williams.” Id. at # 276. Though Plaintiffs raised a facial and as-applied

constitutional challenge in state court, the claim currently before the Court is based

on Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024), which had not been decided

before Plaintiffs appealed the administrative order. Therefore, Count XII could not

have been raised in the state court proceedings. Regardless, this claim is without

merit.

In Jarkesy, the Supreme Court recognized a Seventh Amendment right to a

jury trial for claims that are “legal in nature,” even when arising from agency

enforcement of “novel statutory regimes.” 603 U.S. at 126, 139. At issue in Jarkesy

was whether the respondents were entitled to a jury trial based on the Securities and

Exchange Commission’s enforcement action seeking civil penalties for alleged

securities fraud. Id. at 115. The Supreme Court answered affirmatively: “The SEC’s

antifraud provisions replicate common law fraud, and it is well established that

common law claims must be heard by a jury.” Id. at 120. Furthermore, because the

punitive nature of the civil monetary penalties sought were “legal in nature,” they

implicated the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial as “a type of remedy at

common law that could only be enforced in courts of law.” Id. at 122-23 (quoting Tull

v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987)).

Plaintiffs do not demonstrate how this reasoning applies to the facts of this

case. Rather, Plaintiffs simply argue that “prior to [Jarkesy], administrative regimes

like those in Ohio were understood to be perfectly legal,” but that now it is possible

“to raise a claim that the system is unconstitutional for numerous reasons.” Doc. 15,

# 333-34. Elsewhere in their briefing, in response to Defendants’ argument that

Count XII is inadequately pleaded for failing to identify which statute or regulation

is allegedly unconstitutional, Plaintiffs contend that they “are alleging the entire

structure is now illegal under [Jarkesy].” Id. at # 339. For support, Plaintiffs allude

to Jarkesy’s “extensive attack” on “numerous aspects of administrative courts,

questioning their legitimacy more broadly.” Id.

The Court does not read Jarkesy to be the blank check Plaintiffs claim it to be.

Regardless, the Court agrees with Defendants that they “should not be expected to

guess which particular provision is the basis for the claim.” Doc. 14, # 318. Plaintiffs’

purported attack on “the entire structure” (doc. 15, # 339) simply does not “state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007).

Therefore, dismissal is warranted for Counts XI and XII, and the Court need

not address the remaining arguments in Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Counts I-X, which

were or could have been litigated in the prior proceeding in state court, are precluded

on the basis of res judicata. Counts XI and XII fail to state a plausible claim to relief.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (doc. 13) is DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ James L. Graham

JAMES L. GRAHAM

United States District Judge

DATE: June 5, 2026