Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MALAIKA WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION

v. NO. 26-1367

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,

Defendant.

Pappert, J. May 26, 2026

MEMORANDUM

Pro se plaintiff Malaika Williams sued JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. for reducing

the credit limit on her account. She amended once as a matter of course and, after

Chase moved to dismiss all claims, filed a second amended complaint. The Court

struck that filing for not complying with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), and

Williams moved for leave to file a proposed second amended complaint. In that

pleading, she alleges numerous violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Count

I), the Credit CARD Act and the Truth in Lending Act (Count II), the Fair Credit

Reporting Act (Count III), the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer

Protection Law (Count IV), the Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act (Count V),

fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation (Count VI), unjust enrichment (Count VII),

and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count VIII). Chase opposed the motion,

arguing amendment would be futile because Williams fails to state claims upon which

relief could be granted.

The Court grants Williams’s motion, denies the motion to dismiss as moot, and

construes Chase’s response in opposition as a renewed motion to dismiss, which is

granted. Count I is dismissed without prejudice as to the claims under 15 U.S.C.

§ 1691(a) but with prejudice as to the claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(1) and

Regulation B. Counts II, IV, V, VI and VII are dismissed without prejudice, and Counts

III and VIII are dismissed with prejudice.

I

In November of 2023, Malaika Williams, a black woman, opened a Chase

Freedom Unlimited credit card account. (SAC ¶ 8, Dkt. No. 19-1.) Chase issued her an

initial credit limit of $4,800, which increased to $7,800 in mid-2024. (Id. ¶ 13.)

Williams contends she used her account responsibly and made all required payments

on time. (Id. ¶ 12.) She purportedly relied on her credit limit in structuring her

monthly expenses, earning cash back rewards, maintaining her “credit utilization ratio

at levels consistent with a strong credit profile,” and forgoing applications for competing

credit products. (Id. ¶ 14.)

On September 24, 2025, Chase sent Williams a letter through an online banking

portal, stating it had “reduced the credit line on [her] account to $4,600.” (SAC ¶ 18);

(Sep. 24, 2025 Letter from Chase to Williams at 2, Mot. Ex. A, Dkt. No. 19-2.) Chase

explained the balances she owed on revolving accounts were “too high,” and the

balances on her accounts were “too high compared to credit limits.” (Sep. 24, 2025

Letter from Chase to Williams at 2.) The letter included details about the credit bureau

and credit score used to make the decision, (id.), as well as an “EQUAL CREDIT

OPPORTUNITY ACT NOTICE”:

The federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act prohibits creditors from

discriminating against credit applicants on the basis of race, color, religion,

national origin, sex, marital status, age (provided the applicant has the

capacity to enter into a binding contract); because all or part of the

applicant’s income derives from any public assistance program; or because

the applicant has in good faith exercised any right under the Consumer

Credit Protection Act. The federal agency that administers compliance

with this law concerning this creditor is the Consumer Financial Protection

Bureau, 1700 G Street NW, Washington, DC 20552.

(Id. at 4.) Chase also instructed Williams to provide any new information to help

reevaluate the decision, (id. at 2), which she never did.

By decreasing her credit limit, Chase purportedly increased her credit utilization

ratio, caused other issuers to reduce her credit limits, limited her ability to earn

unlimited cash back rewards and other benefits, and inflicted “physical and emotional

harm,” such as depression, anxiety, insomnia, headaches, nausea, and loss of

concentration. (SAC ¶ 25.) She accuses Chase of violating various federal and state

laws and tries to support her claims with “CFPB official research” regarding credit line

decreases for consumers of color, similar cases against Chase, and legal scholarship on

discrimination in banking. See generally (Evid. of Pattern of Discrimination, Mot. Ex.

B, Dkt. No. 19-2).

II

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that “the court should freely give

leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). District courts

generally do so where the plaintiff can cure the defects in the pleadings and state a

valid legal claim. 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15[3] (2026). Refusing leave to amend

is inappropriate “unless it is beyond a doubt that there are no facts to support relief.”

Id. That standard “is especially true for pro se plaintiffs, for whom the court should

grant leave at least once if there is any indication of a valid claim.” Id.

Williams is a pro se plaintiff, and it’s not clear, beyond a doubt, that no facts

could support relief, see infra Parts IV–X. The purpose of pleading “is to facilitate a

proper decision on the merits,” see Kiser v. Gen. Elec. Corp., 831 F.2d 423, 427 (3d Cir.

1987) (citation omitted), and the Court has yet to address the merits of her claims. The

proper vehicle for assessing Chase’s arguments about futility is a motion to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6), not a motion for leave to amend under Rule 15(a). See City of

Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Altisource Asset Mgmt. Corp, 908 F.3d 872, 879 (3d Cir. 2018).

Otherwise, the First Amended Complaint—which Williams no longer stands by—would

be the operative pleading, and the Court would have to revisit claims she now seeks to

amend.

III

To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must “state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A

claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads facts from which the Court can infer

“that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although this “plausibility standard

is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’” it demands “more than a sheer possibility

that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Assessing plausibility under Twombly and Iqbal is a three-step process. See

Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016). Step one is to “take

note of the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Id. (alterations omitted)

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). Next, the Court should identify allegations that,

“because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of

truth.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Finally, for all “well-pleaded factual

allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they

plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). If the well-pleaded facts do not nudge the “claims across the

line from conceivable to plausible,” the Court must dismiss the complaint.1 Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570.

IV

Williams first alleges Chase violated the ECOA by: (1) discriminating against

her because of her race, (2) retaliating against her for exercising her consumer credit

rights and (3) providing a deficient adverse action notice. (SAC ¶¶ 30–32.)

A

The ECOA makes it unlawful for creditors to “discriminate against any

applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction . . . on the basis of race,

color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age.” 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1). To

state an ECOA claim, a plaintiff must allege she: (1) was a member of a protected class,

(2) applied for credit from the defendant, (3) was qualified for the credit and (4) was

denied credit despite her qualifications. Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d

261, 268 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

Williams fails to allege facts which could satisfy (2), (3) or (4). First, she never

requested a credit limit increase. Chase “unilaterally increased” her credit limit from

1 Chase argues its motion to dismiss should be granted as uncontested because Williams did

not respond or file a notice of intent to amend the First Amended Complaint within fourteen days.

See (Def.’s Resp. in Opp’n at 10–11 (citing Loc. R. Civ. P. 7.1(c)), Dkt. No. 20). Chase is correct that

Williams filed her motion after the fourteen-day limit had expired but, considering her pro se status,

the Court will not deny her motion as untimely or grant Chase’s motion as uncontested.

$4,800 to $7,800, which it then “unilaterally reduced” to $4,600. (SAC ¶¶ 13, 15);

Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937, 941 (8th Cir. 2014) (“The plain

language of the ECOA unmistakably provides that a person is an applicant only if she

requests credit.”). Second, she conclusorily alleges she had “an unblemished payment

history” and met “every objective marker of creditworthiness.” (Id. ¶¶ 20, 30); Harp v.

Bank of Am., No. 24-CV-6721, 2025 WL 1047713, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2025) (rejecting

an ECOA claim where the plaintiff alleged his creditworthiness “in conclusory terms”).

Third, she claims, without any factual support, that Chase’s stated reasons were

“pretextual,” similarly situated nonminority cardholders did not receive the same

treatment as she did, and Chase engaged in a pattern of discriminatory credit limit

reductions. (SAC ¶¶ 21, 30); Shahin v. PNC Bank, 625 F. App’x 68, 70–71 (3d Cir.

2015) (per curiam) (rejecting an ECOA claim where the plaintiff did not provide

nonconclusory allegations sufficient to establish discrimination). She also describes

other cases where Chase purportedly discriminated against customers of color and legal

scholarship on its credit limit practices. See generally (Evid. of Pattern of

Discrimination). None of that “evidence” suggests Chase discriminated against her.

B

Nor does Williams state a claim under § 1691(a)(3). To do so, she must show:

“(1) [she] exercised in good faith (2) a right under the Consumer Credit Protection Act,

and (3) as a result, the creditor discriminated against [her] with respect to the credit

transaction.”2 Harp, 2025 WL 1047713, at *3 (alteration in original) (quoting Bowen v.

First Fam. Fin. Servs., Inc., 233 F.3d 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 2000)).

2 Some district courts analyze § 1691(a)(3) claims using the same test as for § 1691(a)(1). See,

e.g., Louis-Jean v. Westlake Fin. Servs., No. 22-cv-5702, 2024 WL 3904575, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 22,

Williams does none of that. She never demonstrates how she acted in good faith

beyond conclusory assertions of her creditworthiness. See (SAC ¶¶ 20, 30). She claims

the cardholder agreement gave her “[t]he right to carry a revolving balance and make

minimum payments,” (id. ¶ 31), but the ECOA creates “no right to a consumer credit

transaction,” Louis-Jean, 2024 WL 3904575, at *3. And nowhere does she identify a

credit transaction that caused Chase to retaliate against her. Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs.,

Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 406 (6th Cir. 1998) (“In determining the existence of discrimination,

courts should look at the creditor’s motives or conduct in individual transactions . . . .”

(citation modified)).

C

Williams also insists, incorrectly, that Chase provided her with a deficient

adverse notice. The ECOA requires a creditor to notify an applicant of its action on an

application “[w]ithin thirty days . . . after receipt of a completed application for credit.”

15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(1). If a creditor takes an adverse action against an applicant, which

includes the “denial or revocation of credit, a change in the terms of an existing credit

arrangement, or a refusal to grant credit in substantially the amount or on

substantially the terms requested,” the ECOA and its implementing regulation, known

as Regulation B, “require the creditor to send a written notice to the applicant.”

Dieffenbach v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 514 F. App’x 125, 128 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting 15

U.S.C. § 1691(d)(6) and 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(1)(iii)).

2024); Pettineo v. GE Money Bank, No. 10-2569, 2011 WL 1163308, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2011).

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has only addressed the elements of a § 1691(a)(1) claim, see

Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 2004), and § 1691(a)(3)—not (a)(1)—mentions an

applicant’s good faith in exercising protected rights. Either way, Williams’s conclusory assertions of

discrimination and retaliation don’t state ECOA claims.

Regulation B states a written notice must contain: “(1) a statement of the action

taken, (2) the name and address of the creditor, (3) a statement of the

antidiscrimination provision codified in § 701(a) of the ECOA, (4) the name and address

of the federal agency that administers compliance concerning the creditor and (5) a

statement of specific reasons for the action taken.” Id. (citation modified) (citing 12

C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(2)). The statement of reasons “must be specific and indicate the

principal reason(s) for the adverse action.” Id. (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(b)(2)).

The September 24, 2025 letter from Chase to Willaims met each of these

requirements. The notice was in writing,3 stated Chase’s decision to decrease

Williams’s credit limits, provided the name and address of the creditor, set forth the

antidiscrimination provision of the ECOA, informed Williams of the name and address

of the federal agency that administers compliance concerning Chase, and contained

specific reasons for its decision. (Sep. 24, 2025 Letter from Chase to Williams at 2, 4);

Dieffenbach, 514 F. App’x at 128 (finding a written notice with the same information

satisfied the ECOA and Regulation B).

V

Williams next accuses Chase of violating the Credit CARD Act by not providing

her forty-five-day advance notice4 and the Truth in Lending Act by not making certain

disclosures when she opened her account. (SAC ¶¶ 35–37.)

3 Williams believes Chase should have sent her the notice by mail, see (SAC ¶ 18), but the

ECOA and its implementing regulations don’t require that method of service. To the contrary, Chase

provided her the notice, in writing, through her online banking portal. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 18.)

4 Williams also alleges the statute required Chase to include a statement informing her of the

right to reject the credit reduction. (SAC ¶ 36 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1637(i)(5)(A)).) The Credit CARD

Act has no such requirement, nor does § 1637(i)(5) exist.

A

The Credit CARD Act requires creditors to provide cardholders with written

notice forty-five days in advance of “any significant change” to the terms of their credit

account. 15 U.S.C. § 1637(i)(2). The Act’s implementing regulation, known as

Regulation Z, defines a “significant change in account terms” as “a change to a term

required to be disclosed under 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(b)(1) and (b)(2), an increase in the

required minimum periodic payment, a change to a term required to be disclosed under

§ 226.6(b)(4), or the acquisition of a security interest.” Dieffenbach, 514 F. App’x at 129

(citation modified) (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(c)(2)(ii)).

Williams believes a 41 percent reduction in available credit “unquestionably

constitutes a ‘significant change’ in account terms,” (SAC ¶ 35), but she never points to

any particular provision of the Credit CARD Act or Regulation Z indicating as much,

Dieffenbach, 514 F. App’x at 129 (rejecting a claim under the Credit CARD Act where a

plaintiff did not cite a provision in support). Nor are any of the examples in the statute

or regulation similar to what she alleges.5 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(c)(2)(ii).

B

The purpose of TILA is “to assure meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that

the consumer will be able to compare . . . the various credit terms available to [her] and

avoid the uninformed use of credit and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and

5 The closest example in Regulation Z states:

For open-end plans that are not subject to the requirements of § 226.5b, if a creditor

decreases the credit limit on an account, advance notice of the decrease must be

provided before an over-the-limit fee or a penalty rate can be imposed solely as a result

of the consumer exceeding the newly decreased credit limit. Notice shall be provided

in writing or orally at least 45 days prior to imposing the over-the-limit fee or penalty

rate and shall state that the credit limit on the account has been or will be decreased.

12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c)(1)(vi). But Williams never contends Chase imposed an over-the-limit fee or a

penalty rate on her account.

unfair credit billing and credit card practices.” 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (citation modified).

Before opening an account under an open-end consumer credit plan, the creditor shall

disclose to the person to whom credit is to be extended:

(1) The conditions under which a finance charge may be imposed;

(2) The method of determining the balance upon which a finance charge

will be imposed;

(3) The method of determining the amount of the finance charge;

(4) Where one or more periodic rates may be used to compute the finance

charge, each such rate, the range of balances to which it is

applicable, and the corresponding nominal annual percentage rate;

(5) Identification of other charges which may be imposed as part of the

plan, and their method of computation, in accordance with

regulations of the Bureau;

(6) In cases where the credit is or will be secured, a statement that a

security interest has been or will be taken;

(7) A statement, in a form prescribed by regulations of the Bureau of the

protection provided by §§ 1666 and 1666i of this title to an obligor

and the creditor’s responsibilities under §§ 1666a and 1666i of this

title; and

(8) Specific information regarding accounts where any extension of

credit is secured by the consumer’s principal dwelling.

See 15 U.S.C. § 1637(a).

None of those provisions apply to Williams’s claims. She alleges Chase didn’t

“clearly and conspicuously” disclose the circumstances under which Chase could reduce

her credit limit, (SAC ¶ 37), and nothing in TILA requires such a disclosure, see 15

U.S.C. § 1637(a).

VI

Williams additionally brings an FCRA claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a), (SAC

¶ 42), but that provision “is not enforceable by private citizens,” Traore v. Equifax Info.

Servs. LLC, No. 25-2822, 2025 WL 1933712, at *2 n.4 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 2025) (citing 15

U.S.C. § 1681m(h)); Perry v. First Nat’l Bank, 459 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The

unambiguous language of § 1681m(h)(8) demonstrates that Congress intended to

preempt private causes of action to enforce § 1681m.”); Doe v. Charter Comm’ns, LLC,

131 F.4th 323, 330 (5th Cir. 2025) (same); Wood v. Third Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,

No. 23-3042, 2023 WL 8174269, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2023) (same); N’jai v. U.S. Dep’t

of Educ., No. 22-5243, 2023 WL 3848363, at*1 (D.C. Cir. June 2, 2023) (same).

VII

William tries, unsuccessfully, to state claims under §§ 201–2(4)(v) and (vii) of the

UTPCPL and under the FCEUA.

A

The UTPCPL prohibits any person from engaging in “[u]nfair methods of

competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices,” 73 Pa. Stat. & Cons. Stat. Ann.

§ 201–3, and provides a nonexhaustive list of such acts, id. § 201–2(4). Section 201–

2(4)(v) forbids “[r]epresenting that goods or services have sponsorship, approval,

characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits or quantities that they do not have.” Id.

§ 201–2(4)(v). To state a claim, Williams must show: (1) a defendant made a false

representation, (2) the representation “actually deceives or has a tendency to deceive”

(3) the representation is “likely to make a difference in the purchase decision,” (4) she

justifiably relied on the defendant’s act or practice, and (5) she suffered an

ascertainable loss as a result. See Seldon v. Home Loan Servs., Inc., 647 F. Supp. 2d

451, 466 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (quoting Fay v. Erie Ins. Grp., 723 A.2d 712, 714 (Pa. Super.

Ct. 1999)) (listing first three elements); Baker v. Fam. Credit Counseling Corp., 440 F.

Supp. 2d 392, 412 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (citation omitted) (listing last two elements).

Williams does not satisfy these elements for four reasons. First, she alleges

Chase advertised and marketed the Chase Freedom Unlimited card as “revolving

credit” that provided “dependable access” for eligible card holders in good standing;

represented that she would earn unlimited cash back on purchases; and increased her

credit limit because of her creditworthiness. (SAC ¶ 47.) None of those representations

were false. Chase continues to provide her with credit and cash back on purchases. See

(Id. ¶ 15). It made no false representation by increasing her credit limit in mid-2024,

and her complaints about Chase withholding information about its right to decrease her

credit limit are conclusory. Moreover, “vague promises of cost savings and competitive

rates” don’t suffice under the UTPCPL. Landau v. Viridian Energy PA LLC, 223 F.

Supp. 3d 401, 416 (E.D. Pa. 2016).

Second, she never suggests how the purported misrepresentations actually

deceived or tended to do so.

Third, she does not allege how the representation would make a difference in a

purchasing decision.

Fourth, she does not plead an ascertainable loss. This element requires her “to

point to money or property that [s]he would have had but for the defendant’s fraudulent

actions,” and such damages “cannot be speculative.” McPartland v. Chase Manhattan

Bank USA, N.A., No. 22-CV-284, 2022 WL 1810979, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 2, 2022)

(citations omitted). Williams claims a laundry list of “ascertainable losses,” including

lost credit, reduced cash back rewards, reductions by other issuers, and fees, interest or

costs incurred. (SAC ¶ 49). Most of these allegations are only based on credit Williams

could have used had Chase not reduced her credit limit, which is too speculative to

constitute an ascertainable loss. See McPartland, 2022 WL 1810979, at *3 (rejecting a

diminished credit score as an ascertainable loss). And she specifies no fees, interest or

costs she incurred as a result of Chase’s actions.

B

Section 201–2(4)(vii) proscribes “[r]epresenting that goods or services are of a

particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if

they are of another.” 73 Pa. Stat. Cons. & Ann. § 201–2(4)(vii). Williams supports this

claim with the same allegations as her claim under § 201–2(4)(v), (SAC ¶ 47), which, for

the reasons already stated, is insufficient.

C

Williams also tries to state a claim under the FCEUA, (SAC ¶¶ 51–56), but she

can’t do so because she failed to state claims for relief under the UTPCPL, see Kaymark

v. Bank of Am., N.A., 783 F.3d 168, 182 (3d Cir. 2015).

VIII

A

To state a fraudulent misrepresentation claim, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a

misrepresentation, (2) fraudulent utterance thereof, (3) an intention by the maker that

the recipient will thereby be induced to act, (4) justifiable reliance by the recipient upon

the misrepresentation and (5) damage to the recipient as the proximate result.”

Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 310 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Martin v.

Lancaster Battery Co., 606 A.2d 444, 448 (Pa. 1992)). Pleadings alleging fraud must

“state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake,” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 9(b), meaning a plaintiff must plead “either the date, place or time of the fraud or

through alternative means give precision and some measure of substantiation to its

allegations of fraud,” Bennett v. Itochu Int’l, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 2d 469, 479–80 (E.D. Pa.

2010) (citing Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 2004)).

Williams points to similar statements as for her UTPCPL claim, none of which

were misrepresentations. See (SAC ¶ 59); supra Section VI.A. She conclusorily alleges

Chase “knew or was recklessly indifferent to the falsity of these representations,” (SAC

¶ 60), and provides no date, place or time of the “fraud” or substantiation of her

allegations. Nothing suggests Chase harbored any intent to induce her to act, and her

assertions of justifiable reliance are conclusory. See Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC,

885 F.3d 760, 778–79 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[I]t is not enough simply to assert that a

statement was fraudulent and that reliance upon it induced some action . . . .” (quoting

Blumenstock v. Gibson, 811 A.2d 1029, 1038 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002))).

B

Nor does Williams state a claim for negligent misrepresentation. To do so, she

must show: “(1) a misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) made under circumstances in

which the misrepresenter ought to have known of its falsity; (3) with an intent to

induce another to act on it; and (4) which results in injury to a party acting in

justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation.” Bortz v. Noon, 729 A.2d 555, 561 (Pa.

1999) (citation omitted).

Again, Williams doesn’t cite a misrepresentation Chase made. See supra Section

VI.A. She alleges this claim “in the alternative, if Chase did not have actual knowledge

of the falsity of its representations.” (SAC ¶ 62.) She alleges no facts that Chase knew

it made a misrepresentation or made a representation it should have known or didn’t

know was true or false. Nothing in the Second Amended Complaint indicates Chase

intended to induce others to act based on its purported misrepresentations, and

Williams never mentions—let alone plausibly alleges—justifiable reliance.

IX

Williams also asserts an unjust enrichment claim, see (SAC ¶¶ 65–66), but the

Court “may not make a finding of unjust enrichment . . . where a written or express

contract between parties exists,” Mitchell v. Moore, 729 A.2d 1200, 1203 (Pa. Super. Ct.

1999); Wilson v. Parker, 227 A.3d 343, 353 (Pa. 2020) (“[T]he doctrine of unjust

enrichment is inapplicable when the relationship between parties is founded upon a

written agreement or express contract.”); Hein v. Feldmeier, No. 25-cv-1140, 2026 WL

886371, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2026) (citation omitted). (“It is well-established in

Pennsylvania that, where an express contract exists which governs the rights and

liabilities of the parties, a claim for unjust enrichment is precluded.” (citation omitted)).

As Williams knows, the cardholder agreement governs her relationship with Chase.

See (Sep. 24, 2025 Letter from Chase to Williams at 2, 4); (SAC ¶¶ 9–10, 69).

She tries to salvage her claim under a “tort-companion theory” “to her fraud and

UTPCPL tort claims.” (SAC ¶¶ 64–65). She relies on the same improper conduct as the

underlying tort claims, (id.), which don’t succeed for the reasons already stated, see

supra Parts VII–VIII; Whitaker v. Herr Foods, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 3d 476, 493 (E.D. Pa.

2016) (“Where the unjust enrichment claim rests on the same improper conduct as the

underlying tort claim, the unjust enrichment claim will rise or fall with the underlying

claim.”).

X

Finally, Williams fails to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional

distress. NIED arises in only “four factual scenarios: (1) the defendant had a

contractual or fiduciary duty toward the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was subjected to a

physical impact, (3) the plaintiff was in a zone of danger and reasonably feared

impending physical injury, or (4) the plaintiff observed a tortious injury to a close

relative.” Weiley v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 51 A.3d 202, 217 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012)

(citation omitted).

Williams bases her claim entirely on her contractual relationship with Chase.

(SAC ¶ 69.) NIED claims based on contract apply to “preexisting relationships

involving duties that obviously and objectively hold the potential of deep emotional

harm in the event of breach.” Toney v. Chester Cnty. Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 95 (Pa. 2011).

This includes relationships involving “the very sensitive and emotionally charged field

of obstetrics,” see id., an EMS technician and a patient, see Mulawka v. Pennsylvania,

11-CV-1651, 2012 WL 6864596, at *13 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 2012), R. & R. adopted, 2013

WL 171911 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2013), or an adoption agency and adoptee parents, see

Madison v. Bethanna, Inc., No. 12-CV-1330, 2012 WL 1867459, at *12 (E.D. Pa. May

23, 2012). Beyond those scenarios, Pennsylvania courts “have refused to extend NIED

liability any further.” Hershman v. Muhlenberg Coll., 17 F. Supp. 3d 454, 460 (E.D. Pa.

2014). None of those circumstances are similar to the creditor-debtor relationship

between Williams and Chase. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 13-cv-

5058, 2014 WL 272082, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2014) (refusing to apply NIED to a

creditor-debtor relationship); Grimaldi v. Bank of Am., No. 12-CV-2345, 2013 WL

1050549, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2013) (same for a lender-borrower relationship).

XI

Courts should freely give leave to amend a complaint “when justice so requires.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). This rule expresses “a preference for liberally granting leave to

amend” unless “amendment would cause undue delay or prejudice, or that amendment

would be futile.” Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 291 (3d Cir. 2000). For the reasons

explained, Williams cannot allege any facts to state claims under 15 U.S.C.

§ 1691(d)(1), the FCRA, or NIED and thus amendment would be futile. That is not the

case, however, for her claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) in Count I or Counts II, IV, V,

VI and VII, so she may amend those claims consistent with this Memorandum and to

the extent she can allege facts sufficient to state plausible claims for relief.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gerald J. Pappert

Gerald J. Pappert, J.