Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

MARGARET MARCELUS BENS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:25-cv-00602-JES-DNF

BRYTEN REAL ESTATE PARTNERS,

LLC, and COLLIER COUNTY

HOUSING AUTHORITY,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on review of Defendants’

(Second) Joint Motion for Judicial Notice of State Court Order and

to Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant (Doc. #116) filed on

February 11, 2026. Plaintiff filed an Objection (Doc. #119) and

Response in Opposition (Doc. #120) on February 13, 2026. For the

reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and

denied in part.

A. The Court Takes Judicial Notice of the Orders

Defendant seeks to have the Court take judicial notice of the

Order of Civil Contempt filed in Collier County Circuit Court Case

Number 2025-CC-001388. (Doc. #116, p. 6.) Plaintiff does not

dispute the factual findings or legal characterizations of the

document, however, argues that the Court may only “take judicial

notice of the existence of state court proceedings[.]” (Doc. #120,

p. 1.) Further, Plaintiff argues that the state court findings

relate to “post-judgment enforcement matters” and do not relate to

“Plaintiff’s federal credit-reporting claims.” (Id.)

A court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to

reasonable dispute because it: “(1) is generally known within the

trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately

and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned.” See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). “In order

for a fact to be judicially noticed under Rule 201(b),

indisputability is a prerequisite.” See United States v. Jones,

29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994). “A court may take judicial

notice of a document filed in another court ‘not for the truth of

the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to

establish the fact of such litigation and related filings.’” Id.

(quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc., 969

F.2d 1384, 1388 (2d Cir. 1992)).

The Court will take judicial notice of the existence of the

Order of Civil Contempt (Doc. #116-1) since the filing is

verifiable through court dockets and record. However, the Court

declines to take judicial notice of its contents as established

fact — i.e., Plaintiff is a vexatious litigant.

B. Plaintiff Is Not A Vexatious Litigant

Defendants also seek to declare Plaintiff as a vexatious

litigant and impose restrictions on her litigation activities —

specifically through 28 U.S.C. § 1927, the Court’s inherent

authority, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. (Doc. #116,

pp. 6-7.) Plaintiff asserts that her actions in this case reflect

“active litigation, not abuse” as she has “amended her complaint

within the scheduling order, filed discovery motions permitted by

the Federal Rules, and responded to Court directives.” (Doc. #120,

pp. 1-2.)

In support of the motion, Defendants highlight Plaintiff’s

actions both in state and federal court. Defendants allege that

Plaintiff filed two lawsuits in state court regarding the same

subject matter and has been deemed a vexatious litigant under

Florida Statutes Section 68.093. (Doc. #116, p. 3.) In the order

declaring Plaintiff a vexatious litigant Judge Brown noted

Plaintiff had sent hundreds of emails to the state court and

judicial assistant, sent hundred of emails to defense counsel and

their staff, filed repetitive and unmeritorious pleadings,

willfully failed to comply with state court orders, etc. (Id. at

pp. 3-4.) Further, Plaintiff has sent hundreds of “bad-faith

emails” to the Defendants and filed “voluminous . . . unmeritorious

pleadings.” (Id. at p. 4.)

Defendants first seek sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The

statute provides “[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to

conduct cases in any court of the United States . . . who so

multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and

vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the

excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred

because of such conduct.” The plain language of the statute refers

strictly to any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases,

not pro se litigants. See Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1106

(11th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Bridge v. Poenix

Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008). As such, the Court declines

to impose sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

Defendants next seek sanctions under the inherent powers of

the Court. Federal courts have both the inherent and the

constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from

conduct that impairs its ability to carry out its functions. See

Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1073 (11th Cir. 1986)(per

curiam)(citing In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1261-62 (2d

Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986)). However, a court

may not completely foreclose the litigant from any access to the

court. Id. Prior to imposing a sanction under a courts inherent

power, the court must find bad faith. See In re Walker, 532 F.3d

1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008).

In this case, the only action by Plaintiff that may warrant

sanctions has previously been addressed by the Court. (See Doc.

#112.) The Court noted that any further misrepresentations to the

Court would likely warrant sanctions, however, Defendants have

made no showing. Although Defendants argue Plaintiff’s

unmeritorious filings justify sanctions, the Court has not noted

that any filings were frivolous, but rather denied them on the

merits, for failure to follow the Local Rules, or as premature.

(See Docs. ## 35, 41, 62, 106, 114.) Further, while Defendants

characterize Plaintiff’s communication as being made in bad-faith,

the emails in connection with this case are not so egregious as to

warrant sanctions. Some emails relate to the state proceeding and

others relate to discussing potential filings — as required by the

Local Rules. (Doc. #116-3, pp. 2, 4, 18, 20.) The actions may be

irksome but are not currently vexatious.

Finally, the Court will not impose sanctions pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11 because it would be

procedurally improper. First, Rule 11 requires that a motions for

sanctions be filed “separately from any other motion.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 11(c)(2). Second, “the motion must be served under Rule

5, but it must not be filed or be presented to the court” if the

issue “is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days after

service. . ..” Id. Here, the motion was made alongside a motion

for judicial notice and Defendants made no showing that the safe

harbor provision was followed. Accordingly, the Court cannot issue

sanctions pursuant to Rule ll. Id.

For the reasons set forth in this order, the motion will be

granted in part and denied in part.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED :

(1) Defendants’ (Second) Joint Motion for Judicial Notice of

State Court Order and to Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious

Litigant (Doc. #116) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in

part as follows:

a. The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of

the Order of Civil Contempt;

b. The Court will not declare Plaintiff a vexatious

litigant nor will the Court impose sanctions at

this time.

DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this Ist day of

April 2026.

□□□ E. STEELE

SHYIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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