Parke

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

LAURIE PARKE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:23-cv-2221-JSS-NWH

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

ORDER

Defendant, Delta Air Lines, Inc., moved to compel Plaintiff to provide

amended discovery responses, appear for a third deposition, and provide her cell

phone for forensic imaging. (Dkt. 199.) Plaintiff, Laurie Parke, opposed the motion.

(Dkt. 200.) The magistrate judge assigned to this case granted Defendant’s motion to

compel in part and denied it in part. (Dkt. 208.) Plaintiff objects to the order in part.

(See Dkt. 209.) Upon consideration, and for the reasons outlined below, the court

overrules Plaintiff’s objections to the magistrate judge’s order.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a flight attendant for over twenty-four

years, including during the COVID-19 pandemic. (See Dkt. 109 ¶¶ 8–21.) Pursuant

to federal regulations, Defendant adopted policies requiring its staff to wear masks and

to be vaccinated. (See id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff opposed the federal mandates and, by

extension, Defendant’s policies. (See id.) Indeed, Plaintiff “participated in a private

Telegram chat group composed exclusively of airline employees” dedicated to

discussing their “opposition to COVID-19 mask mandates.” (Id.)

During a layover in April 2022, “Plaintiff posted a photograph to the Telegram

group depicting a basket of candy and an informational flyer expressing opposition to

mask mandates.” (Id. ¶¶ 9–10.) Later that day, a customer service agent and an in-

flight supervisor, each working for Defendant, confronted Plaintiff on her flight. (Id.

¶ 13.) During the confrontation, they showed Plaintiff a screenshot of the photograph

she had posted to the Telegraph group chat and accused her of holding a sign opposing

mask mandates. (Id. ¶¶ 9–10, 13.) Further, in full view of passengers who had already

begun boarding, the customer service agent and the in-flight supervisor began

questioning Plaintiff about her failure to wear a mask. (Id. ¶ 14.) After some debate

about the continuing validity of the federal guidelines, Plaintiff agreed to wear a mask.

(Id. ¶¶ 14–15.) Yet this did not end the matter. When the flight reached its destination,

Plaintiff was confronted by two more in-flight supervisors. (Id. ¶ 17.) Again, Plaintiff

and Defendant’s staff debated the continuing validity of the federal guidelines and a

recent court ruling’s impact on Defendant’s internal policies. (Id.)

According to the complaint, Plaintiff then experienced “increased scrutiny and

[was] targeted for minor infractions.” (Id. ¶ 26.) Soon thereafter, she was suspended.

(Id. ¶ 18.) As a result, Plaintiff was “removed from subsequent flight rotations, placed

on inactive status, and deprived of her regular income.” (Id.) In response, “Plaintiff

submitted internal reports objecting to” her fellow employees’ purported surveillance

of the Telegram group and their attempts to confront Plaintiff about her refusal to obey

Defendant’s policy requiring her to wear a mask. (Id. ¶ 20.) According to Plaintiff,

Defendant refused to address her concerns or to explain why she had been suspended.

(Id. ¶¶ 18, 20.) Instead, Defendant fired Plaintiff for alleged “insubordination and

policy violations.” (Id. ¶ 21.) Considering the timeline of events, Plaintiff believes that

her suspension and termination emanated from her “objections to Defendant’s wage

deductions, disparate treatment of unvaccinated employees, and failure to

accommodate her medical condition.” (See id. ¶¶ 18, 23.)

After Plaintiff filed suit, Defendant requested that she produce, among other

things, all her correspondence relating to her employment, her “interaction[s] or work

with” her co-workers “during the course of [her] employment,” and “any facts or

allegations in this [l]awsuit.” (Dkt. 155-2 at 38.) Defendant then took Plaintiff’s

deposition. (See Dkt. 155-3.) During her first deposition, Plaintiff purportedly testified

that she “possessed several records responsive to Defendant’s discovery requests . . .,

which she had failed to provide or supplement.” (Dkt. 155 at 3.) According to

Defendant, Plaintiff “admitted that she failed to exhaustively search for several

additional categories of records,” and, when asked about other requests, “failed to

confirm that there were no responsive documents within her possession, custody, or

control.” (See id.) Accordingly, Defendant moved to compel Plaintiff to supplement

her discovery responses and to attend a second deposition. (See id. passim.) The

magistrate judge granted Defendant’s motion. (See Dkt. 179.)

During Plaintiff’s second deposition, Defendant asked Plaintiff to describe her

efforts to comply with the court’s order directing her to supplement her discovery

responses. (See Dkt. 199-1 at 9–10, 14–23, 27, 34, 36–38, 40–45, 48–50.) Plaintiff

maintained that she had fully responded to Defendant’s discovery requests, while also

stating that she would not provide communications with friends and family

concerning her employment or this lawsuit. (See id. at 9–10, 14–16, 18–22, 25–27, 31,

34–35, 38, 40–43, 49–50, 52, 55, 62, 65, 86.) When she was pressed about this answer,

Plaintiff explained:

My personal friends and relatives that I communicate [with]

in any regard are private and personal to me, and they are

not subject to any discovery for you. That I’ve spoken to anyone

in my family or any of my friends about anything is my own

personal and private conversations, and I do not have to

divulge those. . . It’s my right to privacy. It’s my friends and

my family, and I do not have to discuss it. It’s privileged

between me and them.

(Id. at 16 (emphasis added).) Plaintiff further testified that she would not search her

messages for responsive communications:

Q. Did you search for information relevant or responsive to

[Defendant] and your claims in this case in your text

messages?

A. They’re private conversations, so no, I did not search them

because they’re my private conversations.

Q. What did you do to search your emails in response --

Strike that. How did you search your emails, if at all?

A. I don’t have emails pertaining to any Telegram or private

chats. And any emails between my brother and anyone else that

I’m friends with are private, so I don’t need to search them because

I'm not going to provide those. They’re my private

conversations. And when I was pro se, they were still

private. And I’m not on any kind of order where I’m not

allowed to talk about my situation with anybody. It’s my

personal thing, and they’re my family members and my

friends, and I’m allowed to talk about it with anybody that

I choose to. And they’re private conversations, private

emails.

(Id. at 17 (emphasis added).) Plaintiff also acknowledged that at least some of the

communications that she is withholding are responsive to Defendant’s requests. (Id.

at 10, 36–37 (“Everything else is private and personal items that you want. . . . When I

was pro se, I had friends and family helping me . . . and I do not have to provide any

of those personal, private information, emails, texts, anything to you.” (emphasis

added)).

After several hours of questioning, Plaintiff unilaterally terminated her second

deposition. (See id. at 86–87.) Accordingly, Defendant moved to compel Plaintiff to

“complete a reasonably diligent search of all records in her possession, custody, and

control, [to] amend her discovery responses accordingly, and [to] appear for a [third]

deposition to address [her] amended responses.” (Dkt. 199 at 2–3.) “[T]o enable an

objective and fair examination” of Plaintiff, Defendant also moved to compel Plaintiff

to submit her cell phone for forensic imaging. (Id. at 1, 3; see also Dkt. 199-5.)

At the hearing on Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff told the court that she searched

her cell phone, emails, and Telegram messages, “and produced everything that was

required to be produced.” (Dkt. 210 at 36.) To show that she made a good-faith effort

to comply with her discovery obligations, Plaintiff offered a declaration, which stated

that she “conducted a diligent, good-faith search for documents responsive to

Defendant’s discovery requests,” after which she produced “all responsive, non-

privileged documents” that were in her possession, custody, or control. (See Dkt. 200-

1; see also Dkt. 162-1.) Yet Plaintiff qualified this statement, both in her declaration

and at the hearing, stating that she produced all the responsive information that she

had, “except for private family, financial, [and] health information.” (Dkt. 210 at 37

(emphasis added); see Dkt. 200-1 ¶ 4; see also Dkt. 162-1 ¶ 3 (“I have not produced

purely personal communications with friends or family . . . that do not concern my

employment with or claims against [Defendant].”).)

According to Plaintiff, she alone decided what was, and was not, responsive to

Defendant’s requests. (See Dkt. 210 at 36–37 (acknowledging that Plaintiff made her

own decisions about what documents and communications were responsive).) While

Plaintiff’s declaration does not articulate how she decided what to produce and what

to withhold, (see Dkts. 200-1; 162-1), she testified that her decision making was largely

guided by what she considered to be private, (see Dkt. 199-1 at 9–10, 14–16, 18–22,

25–27, 31, 34–35, 38, 40–43, 49–50, 52, 55, 62, 65, 86). Complicating matters,

however, Plaintiff has not produced a privilege log or certified that, despite her

objections, she has produced all responsive documents, regardless of any applicable

privileges. (Dkt. 210 at 44.)

Given Plaintiff’s testimony that she would not search, let alone provide,

communications concerning her employment and this lawsuit, (see Dkt. 199-1 at 9–10,

14–16, 18–21, 27, 34, 38, 40–42, 49–50, 86), and her conflicting representations at the

hearing, (see Dkt. 210 at 44), the magistrate judge granted Defendant’s motion to

compel, (see Dkt. 208). Plaintiff objects to the portion of the magistrate judge’s order

“authorizing forensic imaging of [her] personal cell[ ]phone.” (See Dkt. 209.)

APPLICABLE STANDARDS

“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure strongly favor full discovery whenever

possible.” Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985).

Accordingly, “a civil litigant is generally entitled to ‘any information sought if it

appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Akridge

v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 1 F.4th 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter

that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the

case . . . .”). “This includes discovery of documents located in available electronic

systems, deleted emails, and computer files.” Classic Soft Trim, Inc. v. Albert, No.

618CV1237ORL78GJK, 2020 WL 6731027, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2020); accord

Robinson v. Payne, No. 6:23-CV-1313-PGB-LHP, 2025 WL 2687185, at *2 (M.D. Fla.

Sept. 19, 2025) (“Discovery into electronically stored information, including forensic

examinations, is subject to the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b).”).

“A magistrate judge is afforded broad discretion in issuing nondispositive

pretrial orders related to discovery.” Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1339,

1347 (M.D. Fla. 2013); accord Tracy P. v. Sarasota County, No. 8:05CV927T27EAJ,

2007 WL 1364381, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 9, 2007) (same); see Local Rule 1.02

(authorizing magistrate judges to supervise and determine pretrial proceedings and

motions in civil cases, including discovery motions). When a magistrate judge issues

an order on such a motion, the “district judge in the case must consider timely

objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is

contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); accord 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see Jordan v.

Comm’r, Miss. Dep’t of Corr., 947 F.3d 1322, 1327 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[A] district court

reviews a magistrate judge’s ruling on non-dispositive matters under the clearly-

erroneous or contrary-to-law standard.”); Merritt v. Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 649 F.2d

1013, 1017 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Pretrial orders of a magistrate . . . are reviewable under

the clearly erroneous and contrary to law standard; they are not subject to a de novo

determination as are a magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations.”). The

party objecting to a magistrate judge’s order must show that the ruling is clearly

erroneous or is contrary to law. Howard v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 769 F. Supp.

2d 1366, 1372 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (“Under Rule 72(a), a [party] may object to a

nondispositive order entered by a magistrate judge, but in order to prevail, it must

establish that the order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”).

Clear error is a highly deferential standard of review that is rarely met. See

Holton v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 425 F.3d 1325, 1350 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Clear

error is a highly deferential standard of review.”); Cox Enters., Inc. v. News- J. Corp., 794

F.3d 1259, 1272 n.92 (11th Cir. 2015) (“To be clearly erroneous, a decision must strike

[the court] as more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must . . . strike [the court]

as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish.” (quotation

omitted)). “[A] finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support

it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S.

564, 573 (1985) (quotation omitted). “Where there are two permissible views of the

evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Id. at

574. “A ruling is contrary to law if the magistrate judge has misinterpreted or

misapplied applicable law.” A.R. v. Dudek, 151 F. Supp. 3d 1309, 1312 (S.D. Fla. Dec.

18, 2015) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, “[t]he standard for overturning a

[m]agistrate [j]udge’s [o]rder is a very difficult one to meet.” NAACP v. Florida, 122 F.

Supp. 2d 1335, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 2000).

ANALYSIS

Defendant moved to compel Plaintiff to provide amended discovery responses,

appear for a third deposition, and submit her cell phone for forensic imaging. (Dkt.

199 at 2–3.) Plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting that she had produced all the

responsive, non-privileged documents that she had. (Dkt. 200 at 1–2.) Plaintiff also

argued that Defendant’s request to forensically image her phone was “not supported

by the record.” (Id. at 3.) The magistrate judge held a hearing on Defendant’s motion,

after which he ordered Plaintiff to supplement her discovery responses, produce a

privilege log identifying the documents that she has withheld, and submit her cell

phone for forensic imaging. (Dkts. 208, 210.) Plaintiff objects to the extent that the

magistrate judge ordered her to submit her cell phone for forensic imaging. (See Dkt.

209.) The court therefore limits its discussion to that portion of the magistrate judge’s

order.

Plaintiff does not assert that the magistrate judge’s order was clearly erroneous

or contrary to law, nor does she cite any case law to that effect. (See id.) Rather,

Plaintiff objects to the proportionality of the remedy that the magistrate judge has

ordered. (See id. at 6–7.) According to Plaintiff, the magistrate judge ordered forensic

imaging of her cell phone because of a perceived “ambiguity between [her] declaration

and [her] deposition testimony regarding the scope of her search and production.” (Id.

at 1–2.) To clarify the alleged ambiguity, Plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge

should have ordered her to either clarify the conflicting representations in her

deposition testimony and her declaration or to provide a more “targeted certification”

concerning her efforts to search for responsive documents. (Id. at 2.)

To start, Plaintiff consistently testified during her second deposition that she did

not search her text messages or emails for responsive communications because, in her

opinion, they were not discoverable. (See Dkt. 199-1 at 9–10, 14–16, 18–22, 25–27,

31, 34–35, 38, 40–43, 49–50, 52, 55, 62, 65, 86.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s declaration

that she purportedly “conducted a diligent, good-faith search” of her cell phone and

personal email account before producing “all responsive, non-privileged documents”

does not create an ambiguity, but a direct conflict, in her testimony. (See Dkt. 200-1

¶¶ 2–3; 162-1 ¶¶ 2–3.) For that reason, the magistrate judge could have disregarded

Plaintiff’s declaration. See Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1306 (11th

Cir. 2016) (explaining that a court may disregard an affidavit that flatly contradicts the

affiant’s deposition testimony); McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234,

1240 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that courts may disregard an affidavit when it is

directly contradicted by the affiant’s deposition testimony). Nonetheless, the

magistrate judge considered Plaintiff’s declaration in performing the Rule 26

proportionality analysis.

In the context of discovery, proportionality is determined by considering factors

such as “the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy,

the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the

importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense

of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” B.T. v. Battle, No. 21-10318,

2021 WL 4147087, at *3 (11th Cir. Sept. 13, 2021) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)).

At the hearing, Defendant argued that the documents and communications that

Plaintiff is withholding are paramount to resolving this case, as Plaintiff’s participation

in the Telegram chat is central to each of her causes of action. (See id. at 25–28.)

Because Plaintiff is withholding communications that are only available on her cell

phone, Defendant argued that the relative access of the parties favors discovery here,

as Defendant cannot obtain them through other means. (See id.) Although Plaintiff

argued that forensic imaging would be disproportionate to the needs of this case, she

did not explain why. (See id. at 28–45.) Accordingly, the magistrate judge concluded

that the proportionality factors favor Defendant’s request. (See id. at 52–62.) To ensure

that the burden of the imaging did not outweigh its benefit, the magistrate judge

ordered Defendant not only to pay for the examination but also directed Defendant to

retain an examiner who could perform the analysis “in the manner least inconvenient

to Plaintiff.” (Dkt. 208 at 2; see Dkt. 210 at 39.)

Still, Plaintiff asserts that the magistrate judge did not adequately consider her

privacy interests when he granted Defendant’s motion. (See Dkt. 209 at 2–3.) To be

sure, courts must consider “the privacy interest of the party whose device[] [is] to be

examined,” when deciding whether to permit forensic imaging. Garrett v. Univ. of S.

Fla. Bd. of Trs., No. 8:17-CV-2874-T-23AAS, 2018 WL 4383054, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept.

14, 2018). But Plaintiff’s privacy is only one factor that the court must consider in

deciding whether to order forensic imaging of her cell phone. See id. Indeed, when

determining whether to permit the forensic examination of an electronic device, courts

must also evaluate whether the party whose device is to be examined has complied

with prior discovery requests and whether they have withheld or refused to search for

responsive discovery. Id.; see In re Ford Motor Co., 345 F.3d 1315, 1316–17 (11th Cir.

2003) (noting that there may be “times—perhaps due to improper conduct on the part

of the responding party—[that] the requesting party itself may need to [search]” the

responding party’s electronically stored data, such as when there is a finding that the

responding party has not complied with the discovery rules); Classic Soft Trim, Inc.,

2020 WL 6731027, at *2 (“When determining whether a forensic examination is

warranted, the [c]ourt considers both the privacy interests of the parties whose devices

are to be examined and, also, whether the parties withheld requested discovery, will

not search for requested discovery, and the extent to which the parties complied with

past discovery requests.”); Procaps S.A. v. Patheon Inc., No. 12-24356-CIV, 2014 WL

11498061, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2014) (explaining that courts will order a forensic

examination of an electronic device when there is “a strong showing that [a] party . . .

intentionally thwarted discovery,” which a party does “by violating court orders to

produce, purposefully hid[ing] responsive documents and fail[ing] to initiate a

reasonable process to search for, collect and produce responsive [information]”);

Klayman v. City Pages, No. 5:13-CV-143-OC-22PRL, 2014 WL 5426515, at *5 (M.D.

Fla. Oct. 22, 2014) (explaining that before ordering the forensic examination of an

electronic device, the court “should consider whether the responding party has

withheld requested information, whether the responding party is unable or unwilling

to search for the requested information, and the extent to which the responding party

has complied with discovery requests”); Wynmoor Cmty. Council, Inc. v. QBE Ins. Corp.,

280 F.R.D. 681, 686 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (permitting forensic examination of an electronic

device because it appeared that the party had not taken reasonable efforts to produce

electronically stored information when responding to requests for discovery).

At the hearing, Plaintiff argued that her phone is “her life,” and that allowing

Defendant to forensically image it would expose “financial information, health

information, [and other] private information that has no bearing on this case.” (See

Dkt. 210 at 34, 40, 55, 58.) As before, Plaintiff did not develop this argument. (See id.

passim.) Plaintiff’s objections to the magistrate judge’s order on this basis are similarly

defective, as she cites several general principles without tying them to the facts of her

case. (See Dkt. 209 at 2–3.) Ultimately, the cursory nature of Plaintiff’s analysis on

this point is fatal to her argument, as a party abandons issues that it raises in passing,

asserts perfunctorily, buries within its brief, or uses merely to support other arguments.

Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681–82 (11th Cir. 2014); see Marsden

v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 (11th Cir. 1988) (explaining that “conclusive[] or general

objections [to a magistrate judge’s order] need not be considered by the district

court.”).

In any case, the magistrate judge considered Plaintiff’s privacy interests; he

found, however, that they were outweighed by her noncompliance with the court’s

orders and her refusal to search for responsive discovery. (See Dkt. 210 at 42–48.) As

discussed, the magistrate judge ordered Plaintiff to supplement her discovery responses

and to attend a second deposition to answer questions concerning her “efforts to

conduct a diligent search of her records in response to Defendant’s discovery

requests,” after she purportedly testified that she had not performed an exhaustive

search of her records and was withholding responsive documents and

communications. (See Dkt. 155 at 3, 5; Dkt. 179.) Despite the court’s order, Plaintiff

testified during her second deposition that she did not search her emails or text

messages for responsive communications. (See Dkt. 199-1 at 9–10, 14–21, 27, 34, 37–

38, 40–42, 49–50, 86.) On these facts, Plaintiff has not met her heavy burden to show

that the magistrate judge’s order was clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(a); see Holton, 425 F.3d at 1350.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge’s order does not include

sufficient safeguards to protect her privacy. (See Dkt. 209 at 2–3.) According to

Plaintiff, the order’s instruction that the parties must “confer and agree upon the

parameters of the search . . . consistent with the pending requests for production,”

along with its guarantee that Plaintiff alone shall review the results to identify any

privileged matters, which she may withhold, (see Dkt. 208 at 2), do not sufficiently

protect her right to privacy, as “every photo, message, file, and associated metadata,

relevant or not,” will still be copied, (Dkt. 209 at 2). Again, Plaintiff does not develop

this argument beyond her conclusory objection, thereby waiving the argument. (See

id.) See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681–82; Marsden, 847 F.2d at 1548; see also In re Ford

Motor Co., 345 F.3d at 1316–17 (noting that there may be times that a party may need

to search its adversaries’ electronically stored data, such as when they have not

complied with the discovery rules).

Plaintiff does cite two Florida state court opinions for the proposition that the

order’s safeguards will not sufficiently protect her right to privacy. (Dkt. 209 at 2 (citing

Roque v. Swezy, 390 So. 3d 193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2024); and Halikoytakis v. Future

Motion, Inc., 410 So. 3d 1242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2025).) However, the decisions that

she cites are inapposite for several reasons. To begin, this is a diversity case, so

procedural issues—like the scope of discovery—are governed by federal, not state, law.

Bearint v. Dorell Juv., 389 F.3d 1339, 1353 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “it is federal

law, and not state law, that controls discovery in diversity actions”). This distinction

matters because the decisions in Halikoytakis and Roque are grounded in the right to

privacy secured by the Florida Constitution, see Halikoytakis, 410 So. 3d at 1245; Roque,

390 So. 3d at 196, which “is broader in scope than the right of privacy implied under

the federal constitution,” State v. Conforti, 688 So. 2d 350, 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

1997); see Wharran v. Morgan, 351 So. 3d 632, 636 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022)

(“Although the discovery rules are liberal, the Florida Constitution contains an express

right to privacy. . . . The fundamental right to privacy in the Florida Constitution is

much broader in scope than that of the Federal Constitution.”); Berkeley v. Eisen, 699

So. 2d 789, 790 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (“[T]he Florida Constitution specifically

provides a constitutional right of privacy broader in scope than the protection provided

in the United States Constitution. Court orders compelling discovery constitute state

action that may impinge on constitutional rights, including the constitutional right of

privacy.” (citations omitted)). Plaintiff does not argue, let alone show, that the Florida

Constitution would govern discovery in federal court. (See Dkt. 209.) Westgate Resorts,

Ltd. v. Castle L. Grp., P.C., No. 617CV1063ORL31DCI, 2018 WL 11252097, at *1

(M.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2018) (concluding that the right to privacy guaranteed by the

Florida Constitution “would not apply in a discovery dispute in federal court”). More

importantly, given the brevity of her analysis, Plaintiff has not shown that her right to

privacy secured by the United States and Florida Constitutions precludes the forensic

imaging ordered here. (See Dkt. 209.) See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681–82; Rutledge v.

NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 464 F. App’x 825, 830 (11th Cir. 2012) (concluding that a party

waived the argument that the district court abused its discretion when it simply

concluded that the lower court had erred without explaining how the court had abused

its discretion); NLRB v. McClain of Georgia, Inc., 138 F.3d 1418, 1422 (11th Cir. 1998)

(“Issues raised in a perfunctory manner, without supporting arguments and citation to

authorities, are generally deemed to be waived.”); see also Garrett, 2018 WL 4383054,

at *2 (explaining when forensic imaging of an electronic device will be permitted in

federal court); Antico v. Sindt Trucking, Inc., 148 So. 3d 163, 166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

2014) (explaining that Florida courts allow for the inspection of an electronic device

if: (1) the evidence shows that the party has tried to thwart discovery, (2) “the device

likely contained the requested information,” and (3) “no less intrusive means existed

to obtain the requested information.”).

In any case, the decisions in Halikoytakis and Roque are poor analogues for the

present case. In Roque, the defendant moved to forensically image the plaintiff’s cell

phone at the outset of discovery, arguing that it would be “quicker and more efficient”

than traditional discovery. See Roque, 390 So. 3d at 195. Indeed, the defendant

“offered no legitimate justification or need for such intrusive discovery.” Id.

Nonetheless, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for forensic review. See id.

The appellate court reversed, holding that forensic imaging “cannot be justified merely

because it is the quickest and most efficient method to obtain the discovery sought.”

Id. at 198. In reaching this conclusion, the court stressed that the defendant had not

presented evidence to suggest that the plaintiff had not “prevented or thwarted

discovery in any way.” Id. at 196. Still, the court acknowledged that the defendant

was “not altogether foreclosed from seeking electronically stored information on [the

plaintiff’s] cellphone,” only that the trial court would need to balance the competing

interests of the parties. See id.

Halikoytakis is similarly distinguishable. In that case, the defendant moved to

forensically image the plaintiff’s cell phone after he testified that he did not have any

communications relevant to the case or video of the incident at issue. Halikoytakis, 410

So. 3d at 1242. In moving to forensically image the plaintiff’s cell phone, the defendant

argued that “[c]ontemporary experience demonstrates that people communicate and

use their mobile phones to record the most minute details of their lives,” and “that

something as important as a personal injury that results in a lawsuit would be

something that a person would discuss.” Id. at 1243. The trial court granted the

motion to compel, to permit the defendant to explore what information “may be

available” on the plaintiff’s phone. Id. at 1245. The appellate court reversed, as the

trial court had not found that relevant information was likely to be on the plaintiff’s

cell phone nor concluded that there was evidence “to suggest that [he had] thwarted

discovery.” Id. at 1247–48. Those are not the facts of this case. (Dkt. 199-1 at 37–38

(“Like I’ve said a thousand times, family and friends, private and personal, and I’m

not providing those. . . . They’re my privacy. I do not have to divulge private and

personal things to you, and I will not.” (emphasis added).)

At bottom, Plaintiff has not met her heavy burden to show that the magistrate

judge’s ruling was clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Howard, 769 F. Supp. 2d at

1372; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Given Plaintiff’s testimony that she would not search, let

alone provide, communications concerning her employment and this lawsuit, (see Dkt.

199-1 at 9–10, 14–16, 18–21, 27, 34, 38, 40–42, 49–50, 86), the court finds that

magistrate judge acted within his broad discretion to order Plaintiff to submit her cell

phone for forensic imaging, see Malibu Media, LLC, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 1347.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly:

1. Plaintiff's objections (Dkt. 209) are OVERRULED.

2. The magistrate judge’s order (Dkt. 208) is AFFIRMED.

ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on March 31, 2026.

: Lo

JULIE S. SNEED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

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