HINTON

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JAMAL HINTON, :

Plaintiff, :

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-CV-1674

SUNRISE SENIOR LIVING, LLC,

Defendant. ;

MEMORANDUM

WEILHEIMER, J. MAY\\ , 2026

Plaintiff Jamal Hinton filed this civil action against his former employer, Sunrise Senior

Living LLC, The Quadrangle (“Sunrise”), claiming that his rights under the Fair Credit

Reporting Act ““FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 ef seg., were violated and that he was discriminated

against when he was terminated from his employment following a failed background check. He

seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Hinton

leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss his Complaint.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS!

Hinton alleges that he accepted a job offer for employment as a full-time cook/server

from Sunrise on July 18, 2023. (Compl. at J] 4, 9, 27.) He was given a “job offer packet” that

included an online background check with a third-party provider. (/d. at □□ 5-6.) Hinton

completed the online background check on July 18, 2023, and when asked ifhe had been □

“convicted of a felony or released from prison for a felony in the past year,” he answered no.

(id. at { 8.)

' The following allegations are taken from the Complaint (ECF No. 2) and attachments thereto.

The Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system.

On August 2, 2023, Hinton was told by Sunrise’s executive director that he was being

“terminated for having a criminal background [] over 19 years ago.” (/d. at {§] 10, 29.) Hinton

explained that the online background check only asked about his criminal history for the past

year which is why he answered no. (/d. at Jf 11-12, 30-31, 51.) He also showed the executive

director a recommendation letter from his parole officer that indicated his parole was completed

in 2015 and he had “been an advent worker with no violations.” (/d. at {§ 13, 32.) Hinton was

told to come back to work the next day, and on August 3, 2023, he was terminated by “HR

Director Carol . . . for having a criminal background over 19 years ago.” (/d. at Jf 14-15, 33-34,

49.)

Hinton filed for unemployment benefits. (Ud. at JJ 18,37.) By letter dated October 27,

2023, the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry Office of Unemployment

Compensation Benefits acknowledged that Hinton’s last day of work was August 3, 2023, and

that he was discharged because of a failed background check. (/d. at J] 19-20, 38-39, 52.)

Hinton claims that this letter verifies that he “provided accurate information on his background

report” that was conducted on July 18, 2023.? (/d. at § 133.) Hinton was informed that he

qualified for unemployment benefits, effective July 30, 2023. (Ud. at J 20, 52.)

Hinton claims that he was wrongfully terminated by Sunrise on August 3, 2023, asserting

that he was terminated “for a background check that he did pass.” (Ud. at §] 17, 36, 45.) He

contends that he was never given or shown a copy of his “FCRA report” and he was unable to

verify its accuracy. (/d. at J] 16, 35, 50.) He also alleges discrimination based on his

* It does not appear from the allegations of the Complaint that Hinton was terminated for

providing a false statement. Rather, it appears that Sunrise terminated Hinton after learning that

he had a prior felony conviction when a third-party background check was conducted. As

detailed herein, Hinton avers that he did not authorize the third-party background check that was

conducted after he completed the online questionnaire on July 18, 2023.

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membership in a protected class, identifying himself as a “Kemet African American” male, and

asserts that “his rights to employment were violated” on account of his criminal background.

(Ud. at 21, 25, 43-44.) Based on the foregoing allegations, Hinton asserts a FCRA violations, a

violation of his civil rights pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and claims of defamation, fraud, and

perjury. (Ud. at 22, 25, 40.)

Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Hinton appears to be incapable of paying the filing fees to commence this

action, the Court will grant him leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(4i) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim. The

Court must determine whether the Complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). At this early stage of the litigation, the Court will

accept the facts alleged in the pro se Complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in

Hinton’s favor, and ask only whether the Complaint contains facts sufficient to state a plausible

claim. See Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other

grounds recognized by Fisher vy. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory

allegations do not suffice. Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Additionally, dismissal of a complaint based

on the statute of limitations is appropriate at the pleading stage provided the “defense is apparent

on the face of the complaint.” Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing

Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014)).

Furthermore, the Court must dismiss the Complaint if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); see also Grp. Against Smog and Pollution, Inc.

Shenango, Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 122 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “an objection to subject

matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time [and] a court may raise jurisdictional issues sua

sponte”). A plaintiff commencing an action in federal court bears the burden of establishing

federal jurisdiction. See Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir.

2015) (“The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests with the party asserting its

existence.”) (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006)).

“Jurisdictional [issues]... may be raised at any time and courts have a duty to consider them sua

sponte.” Wilkins vy. United States, 598 U.S. 152, 157 (2023) (internal quotations omitted).

Because Hinton is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt

v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala y. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,

244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). However, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their

complaints to support a claim.” Jd. (quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 245). An unrepresented litigant

“cannot flout procedural rules — they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other

litigants.” Mala, 704 F.3d at 245; see also Doe v. Allegheny Cnty. Hous. Auth., No. 23-1105,

2024 WL 379959, at *3 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2024) (per curiam) (“While a court must liberally

construe the allegations and ‘apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant

mentioned it be name,’ Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002), this does not require

the court to act as an advocate to identify any possible claim that the facts alleged could

potentially support.”).

I. DISCUSSION

A. Federal Law Claims

1. FCRA Claims

Hinton asserts that Sunrise violated the FCRA by terminating his employment based on

the results of his criminal background check without providing him with pre-adverse notice, a

copy of the background report, or a summary of his FCRA rights. (Compl. at [ 61-62.) He

alleges that he completed an online background check on July 18, 2023, but claims that the

online check only covered the past year. (/d. at § 69.) Hinton contends that Sunrise did not

inform him that it would be conducting a background check that covered more than just the past

year, claiming that Sunrise procured an unauthorized FCRA report to terminate him “for having

a criminal background over 19 years ago.” (/d. at □□ 83-86, 132, 148.) He claims that he “never

saw the FCRA report of the failed background check” and was not given a copy of the report

before his termination. (/d. at J 68.)

Hinton asserts several violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(2) and (3) of the FCRA.

Section 1681b(b)(2) sets standards an employer must follow in obtaining authorization to

procure a consumer report:

[A] person may not procure a consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be

procured, for employment purposes with respect to any consumer, unless: (i) a clear and

conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer at any time before the

report is procured or caused to be procured, in a document that consists solely of the

disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes; and (ii) the

consumer has authorized in writing (which authorization may be made on the document

referred to in clause (i)) the procurement of the report by that person.

Section 1681b(b)(3) of the FCRA provides that before an employer takes “any adverse action

based in whole or in part” on a consumer report, the employer must provide the person who is

the subject of the report with “(i) a copy of the report; and (ii) a description in writing of the

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rights of the consumer under [the FCRA].” Long v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 903 F.3d 312, 318 (3d

Cir. 2018) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)). An adverse action includes a denial of

employment. /d. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(k)(1)(B)). “Criminal background checks are

“consumer reports,’ i.e., “written . .. communication’ that bears on ‘a consumer’s credit

worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal

characteristics, or mode of living’ and ‘is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in

part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for...

employment purposes. ...’” Jd. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1)).

Under the FCRA, an action may be brought “not later than the earlier of (1) 2 years after

the date of discovery by the plaintiff of the violation that is the basis for such liability; or (2) 5

years after the date on which the violation that is the basis for such liability occurs.” 15 U.S.C. §

1681p. In an FCRA case, “[t]he date of discovery by the plaintiff is the date when ‘that party

possesses all of the material facts necessary to identify a violation.’” Manes v. JPMorgan Chase

Bank, N.A., No. 20-11059, 2022 WL 671631, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2022) (quoting Trans

Union LLC vy, Lindor, 393 F. App’x 786, 788 (2d Cir. 2010)).

“Tn the context of § 1681b(b)(2)(A) background report issues, courts have held that ‘a

plaintiff discovers the facts giving rise to [his] claim when [he] learns that the defendant actually

procured the background report’” without proper authorization.? Wirt vy. Bon-Ton Stores, Inc.,

134 F. Sips 3d 852, 858 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (observing that “the discovery of the actual facts, and

3 Although Hinton asserts that a background report was procured by Sunrise without proper

authorization, he attaches to his Complaint a copy of an email that was sent to him by Grace

Diangelo on July 18, 2023. (See ECF No. 2 at 42.) The email indicates that Hinton must

complete “background forms” included in the “Background Packet” to proceed with his

acceptance of the employment offer. (/d.) The background forms are not attached to the

Complaint.

not the knowledge that those facts give rise to a cause of action, is what causes the statute of

limitations to run” and rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the two-year period began to run

when “attorneys were able to ascertain the alleged violation”) (quoting Moore v. Rite Aid

Headquarters Corp., No. 13-1515, 2015 WL 3444227, at *8 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 2015)). “A

plaintiff ‘discovers [the] facts [that] constitute a legal violation’ of § 1681b(b)(3) when [he]

becomes aware a defendant relied on [his] consumer report to fire [him] without giving [him] the

report or a written description of [his] rights.” Anderson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 266 F.

Supp. 3d 1175, 1191 (D.S.D. 2017) (quoting Mack v. Equable Ascent Fin., LLC, 748 F.3d 663,

665-66 (Sth Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (finding that consistent with the “general approach under the

discovery rule,” the FCRA limitations period begins to run when a plaintiff discovers the facts

that constitute a FCRA violation, and not when a plaintiff becomes aware of a violation of

federal law).

Accordingly, in this case, the latest possible date for Hinton to discover the facts

underlying either a § 1681b(b)(2) or § 1681b(b)(3) violation is his August 3, 2023 termination

date, because at that point he learned that Sunrise procured a criminal background report, and

took an adverse employment action against him without providing a copy of the report or a

written explanation of rights. Anderson, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1191; see also Milbourne v. JRK

Residential Am., LLC, No. 12-861, 2016 WL 1071569, at *6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 15, 2016) (applying

the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation in Mack); Datt v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 19-1216, 2019

WL 5722384, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2019) (same); Yurkovic v. New Jersey Higher Educ.

Student Assistance Auth., No. 16-5339, 2019 WL 7602361, at *3 (D.N.J. July 15, 2019); Steed vy,

Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 14-437, 2016 WL 7888040, *10-11 (N.D. Ga. July 15, 2016),

report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 7888039 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 31, 2016) (rejecting

plaintiff's argument that the statute of limitations began to run when she consulted her attorneys

and became more aware of the legal issues). Because Hinton filed this case to raise his FCRA

claims on March 13, 2026, more than two and half years after he was terminated, his FCRA

claims are time-barred.

2. Claims Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981

Hinton contends that “his rights to employment were violated” because of his race and

criminal background.’ (Compl. at § 44.) He asserts membership in a protected class, identifying

himself as a “Kemet African American/Black man.” (/d. at J{] 43, 105.) Hinton avers that

Sunrise violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 “for intentionally and willfully terminating [him] for a failed

background report, which was later proven false by Pennsylvania Unemployment Benefits.” (/d.

at § 53.) He claims that Sunrise used a “blanket policy” that was “unposted” and “different”

from its online application to terminate him for a criminal conviction that had occurred more

than nineteen years ago. (/d. at J§58-59.) He alleges that “the standard guidelines for an FCRA

report [are] seven years and up to 10 years if needed,” and he suggests that Sunrise found a

background check from nineteen years ago, because “they were looking for a reason to terminate

him which is discrimination.” (Jd. at § 110.) Hinton contends that “termination of an employee

who passed a background check for employment but was told he failed and was terminated for a

failed background check is willful discrimination” in violation of his civil rights under § 1981.

(/d. at 60.) Hinton appears to thus acknowledge that any Title VII claim would be untimely,

see Mandel v. M&O Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing 42 U.S.C. §

‘ Hinton identifies himself as a convicted felon. (Compl. at § 44.) However, a felony conviction

is not one of the “racial minorities” covered by § 1981.

2000e-5(e)(1)) (providing a 300 day period to file an EEOC complaint), and thus limited himself

to attempting to assert the claim under § 1981.°

“To establish a right to relief under § 1981, a plaintiff must show (1) that he belongs to a

racial minority; (2) ‘an intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant; and (3)

discrimination concerning one or more of the activities enumerated in’ § 1981, including the

right to make and enforce contracts.” Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 288 F.3d 548,

569 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2001)). “In

employment discrimination cases, [§ 1981] claims are subject to the same analysis as

discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc.,

581 F.3d 175, 181-82 (3d Cir. 2009). To survive statutory screening under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that

discovery will reveal evidence that his membership in a protected class was “either a motivating

or determinative factor” in his employer’s adverse employment action against him. Connelly v.

Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016).

Hinton has alleged that he is African American, so he meets the first criteria for pleading

a§ 1981 claim. Pryor, 288 F.3d at 569. But that is the only criteria he has met. Hinton must

plausibly allege that Sunrise harbored a race-based discriminatory intent when it terminated him

on August 3, 2024. Id. Yet, while the Complaint brims over with hypotheses related to his

termination, those allegations concern his criminal background. No facts alleged in the

Complaint support a racially discriminatory intent for Sunrise’s actions, and nothing in the

> Hinton acknowledges that while § 1981 coincides with Title VII, § 1981 does not have any

“caps for compensatory and punitive damages” and it provides a “4 year timeline to file. . .

directly in Federal Court” without having to file a charge of discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Compl. at 111.)

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Complaint otherwise suggests that racial discrimination was “either a motivating or

determinative factor” in his termination. Connelly, 809 F.3d at 789. Hinton “has not sufficiently

pleaded that his discharge occurred under conditions that suggest unlawful discrimination,” so he

has failed to plausibly allege an employment discrimination claim in his Complaint. Santos v.

Tron Mountain Film and Sound, 593 F. App’x 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quotations

and citations omitted). Accordingly, Hinton’s § 1981 claim is not plausible and will be

dismissed with leave to amend if he can allege additional facts to state a plausible claim.

3. Civil Claims Based on Criminal Statutes

Hinton cites several federal criminal statutes in his Complaint, namely 18 U.S.C. § 1001

(criminalizing certain false statements); § 1621 (perjury), and § 1623 (false declaration before a

grand jury). To the extent he seeks to assert civil liability based on those statutes, his claims are

not plausible. Criminal statutes generally do not give rise to a basis for civil liability. See Brown

City of Philadelphia Office of Human Res., 735 F. App’x 55, 56 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam)

(“Brown alleges that the defendants violated various criminal statutes, but most do not provide a

private cause of action.”). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has stated that, unless

specifically provided for, federal criminal statutes rarely create private rights of action.

Nashville Milk Co. vy. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 377 (1958) (stating that where a statute

“contains only penal sanctions for violation of it provisions; in the absence of a clear expression

of congressional intent to the contrary, these sanctions should under familiar principles be

considered exclusive, rather than supplemented by civil sanctions of a distinct statute”); Cent.

Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994) (“We

have been quite reluctant to infer a private right of action from a criminal prohibition alone.”).

The fact that a federal statute has been allegedly violated and some person harmed does not

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automatically give rise to a private cause of action for the injured person. Touche Ross & Co. v.

Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689

(1979):

Specifically, § 1001 does not provide a basis for a private cause of action, See Federal

Savings & Loan Ins. Corp. vy. Reeves, 816 F.2d 130, 137 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that no private

right of action exists under 18 U.S.C. § 1001); Mathis v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 644 F. App’x

113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (concluding that § 1001 does not create a private cause of

action). The perjury statute, § 1621, also does not give rise to civil liability. Howard v. Paye,

188 F. Supp. 3d 496, 499 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (collecting cases and holding that “Howard cannot

state a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1621 because that federal criminal statute does not give rise to

civil liability”). Finally, the grand jury statute, § 1623, does not provide a plaintiff with a private

cause of action. Olexsak vy. Jones, No. 21-20026, 2022 WL 2980985, at *4 (D.N.J. July 28,

2022). Hinton’s claims based on these federal criminal statutes will be dismissed with prejudice.

B. State Law Claims

Because Hinton’s federal claims will all be dismissed, the Court will not exercise

supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) over any state law claims.° Accordingly,

the only independent basis for jurisdiction over any such claims is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which

® It is not clear whether Hinton intended to lodge any state law claims. For example, although

he refers to “defamation”—a matter of state tort law—he cites a definition in the federal statute

for “defamation,” related to foreign judgments. (See Compl. at 1 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 4101).)

This statement does not support a claim to relief. See Campbell v. LVNV Finding, LLC and

Resurgent Capital Servs., No. 21-5388, 2022 WL 6172286, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2022) (stating

that a “passing reference’ to jurisprudential precepts without more does not bring that issue

before the Court in that it provides no basis for a ruling one way or the other” (citing Laborers’

Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO y. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir.

1994))); Smith v. Comcast, No. 20-5749, 2020 WL 6888570, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2020)

(noting that 28 U.S.C. § 4101 is “irrelevant” unless a plaintiff “possess a judgment from a

foreign jurisdiction”). However, to the extent that Hinton intended to bring any state law claims,

the Court expresses no opinion on their timeliness or merits.

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grants a federal district court jurisdiction over a case in which “the matter in controversy exceeds

the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of

different States.” Section 1332(a) requires “complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all

defendants,” which “means that, unless there is some other basis for jurisdiction, ‘no plaintiff

[may] be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.’” Lincoln Benefit Life Co., 800 F.3d at

104 (quoting Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) and Zambelli Fireworks Mfg.

Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010)). An individual is a citizen of the state where he

is domiciled, meaning the state where he is physically present and intends to remain. See

Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011). “[T]he citizenship of an LLC

[or other unincorporated entity] is determined by the citizenship of its members.” Zambelli

Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 420 (3d Cir. 2010). It is the plaintiff's burden to

establish diversity of citizenship. See Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 72 (1939); Quaker State

Dyeing & Finishing Co., Inc. v. ITT Terryphone Corp., 461 F.2d 1140, 1143 (3d Cir. 1972)

(stating that, in diversity cases, the plaintiff must demonstrate complete diversity between the

parties and that the amount in controversy requirement has been met); Jackson v. Rosen, C.A.

No. 20-2842, 2020 WL 3498131, at *8 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2020).

Hinton does not allege the citizenship of the parties. Rather, he provides Pennsylvania

addresses for himself and Sunrise, which suggests that diversity is lacking. Accordingly, he has

not sufficiently alleged that the parties are diverse for purposes of establishing the Court’s

jurisdiction over any state law claims he intends to pursue. Lincoln Benefit Life, 800 F.3d at 104.

The state law claims will be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

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IV. CONCLUSION

The Court will grant Hinton leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss his

Complaint. Hinton’s FCRA claims and his claims based on federal criminal statues will be

dismissed with prejudice. No leave to amend will be granted with respect to these claims.

Hinton’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are dismissed without prejudice, and his state law

claims are dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mindful of

Hinton’s pro se status, the Court will grant him an opportunity to file an amended complaint as

to any claims dismissed without prejudice in the event he can address the defects the Court has

noted as to those claims. An appropriate Order regarding amendment follows.

BY THE COURT:

GAIL A. WEILHEIMER, J.

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