Kumar

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JITENDRA KUMAR

Petitioner, : 3:26-cv-1614

: (JUDGE MARIANI)

V.

_ WARDEN, PIKE COUNTY

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et al.,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner Jitendra Kumar (“Petitioner”), a citizen of India residing in the United

States since 2024, with no criminal record and pending asylum application, filed a

counseled petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1).

Petitioner is detained at the Pike County Correctional Facility within the Middle District of

Pennsylvania and names as Respondents, Warden of the Pike County Correctional Facility,

ICE Field Office Director, and Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. (/d.,

15-17).

On June 21, 2024, Border Patrol Agents encountered Petitioner near the Canadian

border in Mooers, New York. (Doc. 4 at 4). Petitioner admitted he was a citizen of India

and that he was not in possession of any documents permitting him to legally remain in the

United States. (/d. at 4-5). Petitioner was detained and served with a Notice to Appear

charging him as rernovable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) for being present in the

United States without being admitted or paroled. (/d.). Petitioner was thereafter released

into the United States on his own recognizance. (/d. at 5).

On May 27, 2026, ICE arrested Petitioner during a vehicle stop near Williamsport,

Pennsylvania. (/d.). He has remained detained without bond since. Petitioner has a

master hearing before an Immigration Judge (“lJ”) on June 29, 2026. (/d.). As such,

Petitioner asylum application remains pending, and he does not have a final order of

removal.

Petitioner claims he is being unlawfully detained by Respondents without a bond

hearing under the mandatory detention provision of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), instead of

the discretionary detention provision of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).’ This distinction

matters because noncitizens detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) are not entitled to a

bond hearing, whereas noncitizens detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) are entitled to a

bond hearing before an IJ. Patel v. O’Neil, 2025 WL 3516865, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025)

(citations omitted). Petitioner further claims that his detention without a bond hearing

violates his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

1 Although counsel for Petitioner claims Petitioner has been detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)

since June 21, 2024, (Doc. 1, ] 21) Respondents represent that Petitioner has been detained pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b) since May 27, 2026. (Doc. 4 at 2). Petitioner did not file a traverse, and, upon review of

the record, the Court agrees with Respondents that Petitioner has been detained pursuant to Section 1225(b)

since May 27, 2026.

As directed by the Court, the Respondents filed a response to the Petition on June

22, 2026. (Doc. 4). The Respondents do not dispute the factual allegations contained in

the Petition. Rather, the Respondents set forth legal arguments as to why Petitioner's

detention is lawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b.) (/d at 2) (“Petitioner is properly detained under

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and is not eligible for release under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); therefore, his

Petition should be denied.”). But, as discussed more fully below, Respondents’

interpretation of the INA—the same one they advance here—has already been rejected by

this Court and the overwhelming majority of federal judges to address this issue. See Patel,

2025 WL 3516865, at *4 n.7 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025 (collecting cases). Indeed, the United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the same interpretation advanced by

Respondents. See Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2026) (“Today,

although we part ways with two other circuits that have addressed this question, we join the

overwhelming majority of federal judges across the Nation to consider it and conclude that

the government's novel interpretation of the immigration statutes defies their plain text. That

text makes clear that Section 1226(a) governs detention of noncitizens like Petitioner.

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to such noncitizens, who are present in the United

States after entering the country without inspection and admission, and who were not

apprehended while entering the country or shortly thereafter.”). The United States Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the Sixth Circuit have also rejected the Respondents’

interpretation of the statutory provision at issue here. See Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden

Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, 175 F.4th 1258, 1262 (11 Cir. 2026) (“We are unpersuaded by the

Government's re-interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A).”); see also Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft,

175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026) (similar).

Il. | STANDARD OF REVIEW

Absent suspension, the Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas

corpus “to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.

507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art l, § 9, cl. 2). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a

federal district court may grant a habeas petition where a petitioner’s immigration detention

is “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §

2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the

legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been

strongest.” [.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Claims brought by immigration

detainees seeking relief from their confinement “fall within the core of the writ of habeas

corpus.” Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025). Itis well established that a federal

habeas corpus petitioner generally has the burden of proving facts entitling him to a

discharge from custody. Goins v. Brierley, 464 F.2d 947, 949 (3d Cir. 1972) (citations

omitted).

Ill. © ANALYSIS

Although not raised by either party, the Court has jurisdiction to consider the

petition.

Turning to the merits of the Petition, the Court will first consider the two statutory

provisions of the INA at issue. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) is a statute entitled “Inspection by

immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.”

It provides, in relevant part:

(b) Inspection of applicants for admissions

(2) Inspection of other aliens

(A) In General

Subject to subparagraph (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an

applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines

that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt

entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding

under section 1229a [removal proceedings] of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 8 U.S.C. § 1226, in contrast, is entitled “Apprehension and

detention of aliens.” It provides, in relevant part:

(a) Arrest, detention, and release

On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained

pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.

Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, the Attorney

General—

(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and

(2) may release the alien on—

(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing

conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or

2 The Court incorporates by reference its prior analyses set forth in similar habeas petitions filed by

Civil immigration detainees. See Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *1-7; see also Richeme v. Warden, 2026 WL

937546, at “1-7 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2026). Furthermore, Petitioner is not required to exhaust his administrative

remedies. /d,

(B) conditional parole; but

(3) may not provide the alien with work authorization (including an ‘employment

authorized’ endorsement or other appropriate work permit), unless the alien

is lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise would (without

regard to removal proceedings) be provided such authorization.

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), Respondents are detaining Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2). It is undisputed that Petitioner has not been charged with or convicted of a

criminal offense and does not have a final order of removal.

As the Court previously found, “the overwhelming majority of federal district courts

that have addressed this issue have interpreted the INA to find that

persons similarly situated to Petitioner—noncitizens who previously entered the United

States and are currently residing in the United States—are not subject to the mandatory

detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) but instead are subject to the discretionary

detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and accordingly are entitled to a bond hearing.”

Patel, 2025 WL 3519895, at *4 (collecting cases). “These courts have further found that the

statutory provisions of the INA that Respondents’ claim divest this Court of jurisdiction do

not apply to persons similarly situated to Petitioner and that there is no need to exhaust

administrative remedies prior to filing a habeas petition.” Id.

As before, “the Court finds that the near universal rejection of Respondents’

interpretation of the INA by federal district courts to be highly persuasive and will adopt the

same approach.” /d. at *5. Petitioner's detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) is unlawful

under the INA because the plain language of this provision and the statutory framework of

the INA compels a finding that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens who are

affirmatively seeking admission to the United States, not noncitizens like Petitioner who

have resided in the United States for years. See Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, 807 F. Supp.

3d. 397, 408 (D.N.J. 2025) (“For all these reasons, the Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2)(A)

applies only to noncitizens who are actively, i.e., affirmatively, ‘seeking admission’ to the

United States. Accordingly, it does not apply to individuals like Petitioner, who has been

residing in the United States ‘for over seven years.””); see also Patel, 2025 WL 3516865 at

*5 (same).

Like other Courts to address this issue, the Court finds that Respondents’

interpretation of the phrase “seeking admission” violates the rule against surplusage, would

negate the plain meaning of the text, and make redundant Section 1226(c) mandatory

detention of noncitizens who have committed or are charged with certain specified crimes.‘

See Centeno Ibbara, 2025 WL 3294726, at *5-6 ("The government's interpretation of §

3 The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that 8 U.S.C. § 1226 “generally governs the process of

arresting and detaining ... aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.”

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288-89 (2018) (emphasis added); /d. at 303 ("As noted, § 1226 applies

to aliens already present in the United States.”). In addition, despite the Board of Immigration Appeals holding

in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 |. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to

noncitizens like Petitioner, “[t]his Court owes no deference to an agency's interpretation that conflicts with

the statute’s unambiguous text.” Bethancourt Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 408 (citing Loper Bright Enters. v.

Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 400-01 (2024)).

4 “If possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect (verba cum effectu sunt

accipienda). None should be ignored. None should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to

duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:

The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (Thomson/West eds., 1st Ed. 2012).

1225(b}(2) violates the rule against surplusage. If ‘an applicant seeking admission’ is the

same as ‘an applicant for admission,’ then ‘seeking admission’ is surplusage. Congress has

also recently adopted provisions in § 1226 that would be made superfluous under the

government's interpretation. If a noncitizen enters the country illegally and is subsequently

convicted or charged with certain crimes, these new provisions require that noncitizens be

detained without a bond hearing. Under the government's interpretation, § 1225 would

require such mandatory detention regardless of criminal charges or conviction. If this was

the case, Congress would have no need to create additional requirements for mandatory

detention.”).

Here, although Petitioner is an “applicant for admission,” he is not “seeking

admission” into the United States. Because Petitioner is not “seeking admission’ into the

United States, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to him.5 See Barbosa da Cunha, 175

F.4th at 74 (“Here, although Petitioner is an applicant for admission under the statutory

definition because he is present in the country and has never been admitted, it simply

cannot be said that he is ‘seeking admission,’ as he is not requesting lawful entry into the

United States.”). Accordingly, the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition.

5 The Court acknowledges that Respondents cite to the Fifth Circuit's recent decision in Buenrosto-

Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 484 (5th Cir. 2026), in which the Fifth Circuit—in a 2-1 decision—held that

noncitizens like Petitioner were “applicants for admission” to the United States who were “seeking admission”

and were thus subject to the INA’s mandatory detention provision. The Fifth Circuit's ruling is not binding on

this Court. Similarly, the Court is aware of the Eighth Circuit's decision in Avila v. Bondi, holding that

noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention as an “applicant for admission” who was “seeking admission.”

Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026). The Eighth Circuit's holding is not binding on this Court.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's habeas petition will be granted because his

mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) without a bond hearing is unlawful.

Because the Respondents maintains that a bond hearing is not required and the

Respondents’ interpretation is inconsistent with the INA, Respondents will be directed to

immediately release Petitioner Jitendra Kumar from the custody of the Warden of Pike

County Correctional Facility and file a declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 confirming

that Petitioner has been released from custody. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,

779 (2008) (acknowledging that a habeas court has “the power to order the conditional

release of an individual unlawfully detained—though release need not be the exclusive

remedy and is not the appropriate one in every case in which the writ is granted.”); see also

Bethancourt Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 410 (ordering immediate release); Flores Obando,

2025 WL 3452047, at *3 (same); Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *8 (same); Patel, 2025

WL 3516865, at “6 (same).

Respondents will further be permanently enjoined from detaining Petitioner under 8

U.S.C. § 1225, absent a compelling change in circumstances. See Bethancourt Soto, 807

F. Supp. 3d at 410 (permanently enjoining respondents from detaining petitioner under §

1225 where petitioner did not file a motion for temporary restraining order or motion for

preliminary injunction); see also Maldonado, 2025 WL 2985256, at *7 (“The Court grants the

writ of habeas corpus and orders Respondents to release Petitioner within 24 hours. . . .

Following Petitioner's release, Respondents are permanently enjoined from rearresting or

otherwise detaining Petitioner under § 1225(b)(2).”); Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *7

If Respondents elect to later detain Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the

Respondents must provide Petitioner with notice and an opportunity to be heard at a timely

individualized bond hearing, where an lJ will assess whether he is a danger or flight risk. A

separate Order follows.

tin Y

ee Sh □

. Robert D. Maria

United States District Judge

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