The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN THE MATTER OF: CIVIL ACTION
NO. 25-5287
HANAWAY
BANKRUPTCY
NO. 25-11563
HODGE, J. May 14, 2026
MEMORANDUM
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Debtor-Appellant Bronwyn Hanaway’s (“Appellant” or “Ms.
Hanaway”) appeal from the September 4, 2025 Order of Chief United States Bankruptcy Judge
Ashely M. Chan of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(“Bankruptcy Court Order”), which denied Appellant’s Motion to Convert Chapter 7 Case to
Chapter 13 under 11 U.S.C. § 706(a) (“Motion to Convert”). This Court has jurisdiction over the
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).1 Having reviewed the briefs and the record on appeal, and
1 Appellee suggests that the appeal is statutorily moot under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m). (Dist. ECF
No. 17 at ¶¶ 9–16.) However, the statute restricts a court’s ability to hear appeals from a bankruptcy
court’s order allowing sale of the debtor’s property. In re Flynn, 417 F. App’x 188, 190 (3d Cir.
2011) (explaining that “11 U.S.C. § 363(m) prohibits the reversal of a sale to a good faith purchaser
of bankruptcy estate property if a party failed to obtain a stay of the sale” (emphasis added)). In
contrast, the trustee’s sale of a debtor’s real property does not by itself render an appeal of a
conversion order moot. In re Smith, 757 F. App’x 77, 81 n.5 (3d Cir. 2018). Courts assess appeals
of a bankruptcy court’s conversion order and sale order separately. See, e.g., In re Culp, 545 B.R.
827, 842–44 (D. Del. 2016) (affirming the bankruptcy court’s denial of a motion to convert while
separately dismissing appeal of the sale order as moot under § 363(m) given sale of the property),
aff’d 681 F. App’x 140 (3d Cir. 2017). Because Appellant brings this appeal to the Bankruptcy
Court’s Order on the Motion to Convert (Bankr. ECF No. 57) rather than the Order Authorizing
the Sale of the Residential Property (Bankr. ECF No. 112), § 363(m) does not hinder this Court’s
ability to make a determination on the appeal.
having determined that oral argument is not necessary in this case,2 this Court affirms the
Bankruptcy Court Order for the reasons set forth below.
II. BACKGROUND3
A. Bankruptcy Proceedings Prior to Motion to Convert
On April 23, 2025, Ms. Hanaway filed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Voluntary Petition in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. (Bankr. ECF No. 1.) On
May 26, 2025, Appellant filed several schedules in support of the Chapter 7 filing. “Schedule A/B:
Property” reported that Ms. Hanaway owned a single-family home located at 802 West Bridge
Street, Parkesburg, Pennsylvania 19365 (the “Real Property”). (Dist. ECF No. 14 at 8; Bankr. ECF
No. 19 at 1.) The schedule listed the current value of the entire property as $182,162.00. (Dist.
ECF No. 14 at 8; Bankr. ECF No. 19 at 1.) Appellant also filed “Schedule D: Creditors Who Have
Claims Secured by Property,” which identified two secured claims against the Real Property: a
$150,000.00 claim held by Rushmore and a $12,695.50 claim held by Citadel. (Dist. ECF No. 14
at 11; Bankr. ECF No. 19 at 13.) Additionally, Ms. Hanaway filed “Schedule I: Your Income,”
listing a combined monthly income of $2,444.00, and “Schedule J: Your Expenses,” listing
monthly expenses of $2,993.00. (Bankr. ECF No. 19 at 27, 30.) As Trustee-Appellee (“Trustee”
or “Appellee”) notes, there was a computation error in Schedule J. (Dist. ECF No. 14 at 8.)
Accounting for this error, the schedule reported a monthly net income of negative $287.61.4 (Id.)
The meeting of creditors pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) (the “§ 341(a) Meeting”) was
initially scheduled for May 28, 2025. (Dist. ECF No. 12 at 5; Dist. ECF No. 14 at 8.) The § 341(a)
Meeting was continued to June 4, 2025 to allow time for Ms. Hanaway to provide the Trustee with
2 See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8019(b)(3).
3 The Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system.
4 The Court has independently confirmed this calculation.
the required schedules. (Dist. ECF No. 12 at 5; Dist. ECF No. 14 at 8.) On June 4, 2025, Ms.
Hanaway’s counsel informed the Trustee that she would be filing a motion to convert the case to
Chapter 13, and that neither Ms. Hanaway nor her counsel would appear at the § 341(a) Meeting
scheduled to take place that day. (Dist. ECF No. 12 at 5; Dist. ECF No. 14 at 8.) The § 341(a)
Meeting was continued to July 3, 2025. (Dist. ECF No. 12 at 5; Dist. ECF No. 14 at 8.) Counsel
for Ms. Hanaway requested two additional continuances, first due to family medical reasons and
later due to medical reasons. (Dist. ECF No. 14 at 9; Bankr. ECF Nos. 39, 50.) The § 341(a)
Meeting was eventually held on September 12, 2025, but was continued to October 1, 2025 for
Ms. Hanaway to provide documents and amend her Bankruptcy schedules. (Dist. ECF No. 14 at
9; Bankr. ECF No 67.)
B. Motion to Convert
On June 4, 2025, Ms. Hanaway filed the Motion to Convert the Chapter 7 case to Chapter
13. (Dist. ECF No. 12 at 6; Dist. ECF No. 14 at 9; Bankr. ECF No. 22 at 1.) In support of the
Motion to Convert, Ms. Hanaway averred:
1. Debtor filed this Chapter 7 case on April 23, 2025.
2. Debtor filed the schedules and other documents required.
3. A Chapter 13 is in Debtor’s best interest.
4. Debtor satisfies the requirements to be a Debtor under Chapter 13.
5. This case has not previously been converted.
6. Movant does consent to the entry of a final order or judgment by the court if it is
determined that the court, absent consent of the parties, cannot enter a final order or
judgment consistent with Article III of the United States Constitution.
(Bankr. ECF No. 22 at 1.)
On June 12, 2025, the Trustee filed an Objection to the Conversion Motion (“Objection”),
arguing that the Motion to Convert should be denied because an assessment of the totality of the
circumstances indicated that the Motion to Convert was not filed in good faith. (Bankr. ECF No.
27 at 5–6.) Specifically, the Trustee argued that Ms. Hanaway severely undervalued the fair market
value of the Real Property, did not provide documents requested by the Trustee, failed to attend a
§ 341(a) Meeting prior to filing the Motion to Convert, and was not forthcoming with the
Bankruptcy Court and creditors. (Id. at 6.) Furthermore, the Trustee asserted that Ms. Hanaway
could not propose a confirmable Chapter 13 plan because she had negative monthly net income;
conversion would prejudice creditors because Ms. Hanaway did not have net monthly income to
fund a Chapter 13 Plan and had no non-exempt assets other than the Real Property; conversion
would significantly delay the administration of Ms. Hanaway’s bankruptcy estate to the detriment
of creditors and put them at risk of nonpayment; and conversion would further an abuse of the
bankruptcy process given Ms. Hanaway’s alleged failures and misrepresentations to that point. (Id.
at 6–7.)
On June 18, 2025, after the Trustee filed the Objection, Ms. Hanaway filed amended
versions of Schedules A/B, C, I, and J, as well as employee income records. (See Bankr. ECF Nos.
29–33.) The Amended Schedules A/B and C updated the fair market value of the Real Property,
increasing the value to $361,600.00—approximately $179,000.00 more than initially disclosed.
(Bankr. ECF Nos. 30, 31; Dist. ECF No. 14 at 10.) The Amended Schedules I and J reported that
Ms. Hanaway had a higher combined monthly income ($3,537.32 compared to the $2,444.00 that
was originally reported) and a positive monthly net income of $244.32 (compared to the negative
$287.61 that was originally reported). (Bankr. ECF No. 32 at 2; Bankr. ECF No. 33 at 3.) Ms.
Hanaway asserts that she made the income revisions to correct errors in the initial schedules that
were based on counsel’s misimpression that Ms. Hanaway was paid every two weeks rather than
every week. (Dist. ECF No. 12 at 6.)
On August 12, 2025, Ms. Hanaway filed an Opposition to the Trustee’s Objection to the
Motion to Convert (the “Opposition”). (Bankr. ECF No. 49.) In the Opposition, Ms. Hanaway
asserted that she had an absolute right to convert absent bad faith and that the bad faith exception
did not apply. (Id. at 2–3.) Ms. Hanaway averred that the case was initially filed under Chapter 7
due to “Debtor’s counsel[’s] inadvertent use of an outdated valuation of the real estate in the
amount of $182,162.00” and “[g]iven the recent valuation information, Debtor has enough non-
exempt equity to pay allowed unsecured claims in full.” (Id. at 2.) Ms. Hanaway further asserted
that the Motion to Convert was filed “immediately upon realizing the [Real Property] valuation
had not been updated,” the Motion to Convert was intended to keep her home while paying arrears
on secured debt and paying in full unsecured claims in accordance with a five-year plan, she had
been forthcoming with the Bankruptcy Court and creditors, and “errors made by [her] counsel
were corrected as soon as discovered.” (Id.) On September 2, 2025, Ms. Hanaway filed a Chapter
13 plan in support of the Motion to Convert, which proposed a sixty-month plan with a total base
amount of $24,900.00 to be paid to the Chapter 13 Trustee. (Dist. ECF No. 12 at 6; Bankr. ECF
No. 54 at 1.)
C. Hearing on Motion to Convert
On September 3, 2025, the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on the Motion to Convert.
(Bankr. ECF No. 55.) Counsel for Ms. Hanaway appeared telephonically, while counsel for the
Trustee appeared in the courtroom. (Bankr. ECF No. 82 at 4:4–10.) Chief U.S. Bankruptcy Court
Judge Ashely M. Chan summarized the Motion to Convert and arguments raised in the Trustee’s
Objection to the motion, and allowed counsel for Ms. Hanaway to respond. (Id. at 4:19–5:20.)
Appellant’s counsel asserted that the factual allegations in the Objection were no longer accurate
given the filing of amended bankruptcy schedules. (Id. at 5:18–6:3.) Appellant’s counsel also
emphasized that Appellant’s filings initially undervalued the Real Property because counsel had
not updated the valuation information herself, but rather relied on information supplied by her
client. (Id. at 6:4–7:7, 8:22–9:23.) In response, Appellee’s counsel asserted that “the [valuation]
numbers are unbelievable” and flagged discrepancies between Appellant’s initially filed “Schedule
D (Creditors Who Have Claims Secured by Property)” and the Bankruptcy Claims Register. (Id.
at 10:7–22; Bankr. ECF No. 19 at 13–15; see also Dist. ECF No. 14 at 11.) The Schedule D listed
two mortgages encumbering the Real Property in the aggregate amount of $162,659.50.5 (Bankr.
ECF No. 19 at 13.) Yet two creditors filed proofs of claim, Claim Nos. 1 and 4, on the Bankruptcy
Claims Register reflecting an aggregate mortgage balance of only $116,757.77. (Dist. ECF No. 14
at 11; Bankr. Claims Register No. 25-11563.)
Judge Chan concluded that the valuation errors, the failure to attend the § 341(a) Meeting
on June 4, 2025, and delay in providing the Trustee with required documents “smack[ed] of bad
faith.” (Id. at 7:25–8:11.) She further determined that it appeared given “the totality of the
circumstances that [Ms. Hanaway] was trying to undercut the value of the real property” in her
initial filings, which supported a finding of bad faith. (Id. at 12:19–25.) Judge Chan then denied
the Motion to Convert based upon bad faith. (Id. at 13:1–8.) The Bankruptcy Court Order was not
accompanied by a memorandum but stated that the motion was denied “for the reasons stated on
the record.” (Bankr. ECF No. 57.)
III. LEGAL STANDARD
District courts have appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, orders, and decrees of a
bankruptcy court. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). This Court reviews the bankruptcy court’s findings
of fact under a clearly erroneous standard and its conclusions of law under a de novo standard. In
re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 454 (3d Cir. 2006). A trial court’s findings of fact are
5 On July 17, 2025, Ms. Hanaway filed an Amended Schedule D, which listed the same
aggregate mortgage balance of $162,659.50. (Bankr. ECF No. 44.)
clearly erroneous when, after reviewing the record, the appellate court is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. In re Piccoli, No. 06-2142, 2007 WL 2822001,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2007) (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 565 (1985)). A
district court may affirm, modify, or reverse a bankruptcy court’s judgment, order, or decree, or
remand for further proceedings. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013.
A bankruptcy court’s denial of a motion to convert based on a finding of bad faith is
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. In re Piccoli, 2007 WL 2822001, at *4 (citing In
re Myers, 491 F.3d 120, 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2007)). To assess whether there was an abuse of
discretion, the district court must consider the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact and law. See In
re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Mindful that an abuse of discretion
exists where the district court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant
conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to fact, we review the findings of fact leading
to the decision for clear error and exercise plenary review over the court’s conclusions of law.”)
(citation modified). The Third Circuit has explained that the determination of bad faith is a “fact
intensive determination better left to the discretion of the bankruptcy court,” and reviewing courts
accordingly do not “set aside the Bankruptcy Court’s factual findings unless they are clearly
erroneous.” In re Myers, 491 F.3d at 125 (quoting In re Lilley, 91 F.3d 491, 496 (3d Cir. 1996)).
IV. DISCUSSION
Appellant raises two issues on appeal. First, Appellant asserts that the Bankruptcy Court
erred as a matter of law by denying the Motion to Convert without analysis or consideration of the
Third Circuit’s established factors for deciding such a motion. (ECF No. 12 at 8.) Second,
Appellant argues that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in not hearing any testimony
from Ms. Hanaway during the hearing on the Motion to Convert in contravention of Federal Rule
of Bankruptcy Procedure 9014. (Id.)
A. Bankruptcy Court Analysis of Good Faith
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 706(a), a debtor may convert a bankruptcy case commenced under
Chapter 7 to a Chapter 13 proceeding. The right to convert is not absolute; rather, it is conditioned
upon the petitioner’s ability to qualify as a “debtor” under the chapter to which she seeks to
convert. See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 372 (2007). Importantly, the court
may deny the motion to convert if conversion would be in bad faith. Id. at 373–74 (“[A] ruling that
an individual’s Chapter 13 case should be dismissed or converted to Chapter 7 because of
prepetition bad-faith conduct, including fraudulent acts committed in an earlier Chapter 7
proceeding, is tantamount to a ruling that the individual does not qualify as a debtor under Chapter
13.”). While the Bankruptcy Code does not define good faith, courts in the Third Circuit have held
that “at the very least, good faith requires a showing of honest intention.” In re Tamecki, 229 F.3d
205, 207 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation modified). The good faith analysis must be performed in light of
“totality of the circumstances” surrounding the motion. In re Piccoli, 2007 WL 2822001, at *6
(quoting In re Lilley, 91 F.3d at 496).
1. Facts Considered by the Bankruptcy Court
Appellant asserts that the Bankruptcy Court did not give Ms. Hanaway “the benefit of the
doubt of good faith.” (Dist. ECF No. 12 at 11.) Here, the Trustee created a question of bad faith,
thus shifting the burden to Appellant to demonstrate good faith. See In re Tamecki, 229 F.3d at
207 (“Once a party calls into question a petitioner’s good faith, the burden shifts to the petitioner
to prove h[er] good faith.”). The Trustee’s Objection to the Motion to Convert asserted several
facts indicating that Ms. Hanaway was not seeking to convert to Chapter 13 in good faith, including
the initial undervaluation of the fair market value of the Real Property, the failure to share
documents with the Trustee, and the debtor’s failure to appear at a § 341(a) Meeting. (Bankr. ECF
No. 27 at 6.) The Bankruptcy Court referenced these facts in the context of the good faith analysis
before giving Ms. Hanaway the opportunity to respond. (Bankr. ECF No. 82 at 6:10–15, 7:15–
8:11.)
Appellant also asserts that the Bankruptcy Court “did not consider any evidence or
argument in rebuttal to the Trustee’s objection, despite [the fact] that Debtor’s counsel had
submitted a brief in opposition to the Trustee’s objection well in advance of the hearing.” (Dist.
ECF No. 12 at 13.) Appellant is correct that Judge Chan did not explicitly state during the hearing
that she had reviewed Appellant’s Opposition brief, however, this does not on its own indicate that
the Bankruptcy Court did not read the brief or consider the arguments therein. Moreover,
Appellant’s counsel restated essentially the same information regarding bad faith as was provided
in the Opposition brief. The transcript states:
MS. MASTERS: Your Honor, the first statement is not exactly true because -- well, I
guess it’s true in so far as the -- the amount is undervalued because the information that I
had at the time was that the property was worth 186,000 -- 182,162. However, when I did
the schedule, even that number, okay, would have -- would have been -- would have created
a non-exempt equity. And so when I did an update on the information and found that the
property was valued higher, as soon as I went to do the schedules, I realized that this can’t
be a 7. We thought that the amount of the unsecured debt -- I mean, the amount of the
mortgage debt was substantially higher than it actually is. So there is non-exempt equity.
And so I filed -- immediately filed a motion to convert the case, but -- as soon as I realized
that I told the trustee that I wouldn’t be attending the 341 meeting, that I was going to file
a motion to convert the case. She said, fine. She said, make sure that it’s 100 percent. I did
that. It was 100 percent plan. And then the next thing I know, an objection was filed.
(Bankr. ECF No. 82 at 6:20–7:14.) Thus, the Bankruptcy Court heard Ms. Hanaway’s argument
in support of good faith directly from counsel, including that the initial valuation error was the
result of counsel’s failure to review the figures provided by Ms. Hanaway, counsel filed the Motion
to Convert immediately after she became aware of the valuation error, counsel informed the
Trustee in advance that she would be filing the motion to convert in lieu of attending the § 341(a)
Meeting, and Ms. Hanaway’s Chapter 13 plan would propose paying the unsecured claims in full.
(See Dist. ECF No. 12 at 12–13.)
2. The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Clearly Err in Finding Bad Faith
As noted above, bankruptcy courts assessing whether a motion to convert was filed in good
faith consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the motion, which may include, among
others: (1) the nature of the debt; (2) the timing of the petition; (3) how the debt arose; (4) the
debtor’s motive in filing the petition; (5) how the debtor’s actions affected creditors; (6) the
debtor’s treatment of creditors both before and after the petition was filed; and (7) whether the
debtor has been forthcoming with the bankruptcy court and the creditors. In re Piccoli, 2007 WL
2822001, at *6 (quoting In re Lilley, 91 F.3d at 496). While “a debtor’s conduct pre-bankruptcy
and in chapter 7 before conversion are relevant factors in analyzing a debtor’s motive or bad faith
in seeking conversion[,] . . . [m]ore important in this good faith analysis is her motivation in
seeking conversion.” In re Pakuris, 262 B.R. 330, 336 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001).
At the motion hearing, Judge Chan did not specifically enumerate her analysis and findings
with respect to each Lilley factor, but the Bankruptcy Court followed the guidance from Lilley in
reaching its decision. Judge Chan identified several facts that support a finding of bad faith: (1)
the initial significant undervaluation of the property, (2) the inaccurate disclosures regarding the
secured claims on the property, (3) Ms. Hanaway’s failure to provide any requested documents to
the Trustee, and (4) Ms. Hanaway’s failure to attend the § 341(a) Meeting prior to filing the Motion
to Convert. (Bankr. ECF No. 82 at 8:12–21, 11:3–9.) The Bankruptcy Court explained:
There’s this perception that when a Debtor files a Chapter 7, undervalues the real property,
and then tries to quickly convert the case when it looks like the Chapter 7 trustee wants to
sell it, I’ve had a number of these cases. It’s just evidence that the Debtor might be trying
to get away with something. And the fact that you decided to not attend a 341 meeting and
not give the Chapter 7 Trustee documents further supplements the viewpoint that you were
just in it to try to see if you could get it through in a Chapter 7, if you can’t, you’re going
to try and convert it to a Chapter 13, but it smacks of bad faith.
(ECF No. 82 at 8:1–11.) Thus, the Bankruptcy Court’s assessment addressed the second, fourth,
fifth, sixth, and seventh Lilley factors.
The Court finds that the Bankruptcy Court did not clearly err by concluding that Ms.
Hanaway filed the Motion to Convert in bad faith. At the motion hearing, Ms. Hanaway’s counsel
asserted that her client provided the initial valuation figure that counsel inadvertently incorporated
into the schedules filed with the Bankruptcy Court. (Bankr. ECF No. 82 at 12:8–18.) Counsel did
not provide a plausible reason for why the initial error occurred or why she herself failed to conduct
her due diligence in confirming figures before filing them with the Bankruptcy Court. Furthermore,
while the Bankruptcy Court did not address it at the hearing, Appellee notes on appeal that Ms.
Hanaway’s Motion to Convert did not mention the discrepancy in the initial Real Property
valuation even though counsel was aware of the issue at the time the Motion was filed. (Dist. ECF
No. 13 at 3.) With respect to bankruptcy filings, “[t]he debtor is imposed with a paramount duty
to carefully consider all questions included in the Schedules and Statement and see that each is
answered accurately and completely.” In re Kasal, 217 B.R. 727, 734 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998), aff’d,
Casey v. Kasal, 223 B.R. 879 (E.D. Pa. 1998); see also In re Marrama, 430 F.3d 474, 482 (1st Cir.
2005), aff’d, Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365 (2007) (“The bankruptcy court is
entitled to demand utmost good faith and honesty from debtors in the preparation of their schedules
and statements of affairs.”). Given these standards, the Bankruptcy Court had reason to find that
the undervaluation of the only significant asset that Ms. Hanaway claimed in her bankruptcy
schedules indicated bad faith. Indeed, the Bankruptcy Court explained that “the totality of the
circumstances” indicated that Ms. Hanaway was attempting to undercut the value of the Real
Property, which “gave [the court] the impression that the Debtor acted in bad faith.” (Bankr. ECF
No. 82 at 12:19–25.)
The other facts cited by the Bankruptcy Court—Ms. Hanaway’s inaccurate disclosures
regarding the secured claims on the property, failure to provide the requested documents to the
Trustee, and failure to attend the § 341(a) Meeting—also point to bad faith. This Court agrees that
Ms. Hanaway’s failure to provide creditors with the requisite documents ahead of the § 341(a)
Meeting6 scheduled for June 4, 2025, as well as her last-minute decision not to attend the meeting
on the day it was scheduled, further suggested that the debtor was withholding information to the
detriment of the creditors. Moreover, the initial filing of schedules with higher secured claims
balances than were filed on the Bankruptcy Register also supported a bad faith finding. (See Bankr.
ECF No. 82 10:18–11:9.)
Based on the above, the Court is not left with a definite and firm conviction that the
Bankruptcy Court clearly erred in finding that the Motion to Convert was filed in bad faith. See In
re Piccoli, 2007 WL 2822001, at *3. Because a court may deny a motion to convert where
conversion would be in bad faith, the Bankruptcy Court was not required to assess other factors.
Marrama, 549 U.S. at 372; In re Pakuris, 262 B.R. at 335–36. Therefore, because the Bankruptcy
Court’s decision to deny Ms. Hanaway’s Motion to Convert was not clearly erroneous, the Court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the Motion.
6 The Court notes that the § 341(a) Meeting was subsequently continued two more times at
Ms. Hanaway’s request, and was eventually held only after the Bankruptcy Court ruled on the
Motion to Convert. (Dist. ECF No. 14 at 9; Bankr. ECF No 67.)
B. Motion Hearing Testimony
Appellant also asserts that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion by not hearing
testimony from Ms. Hanaway when she was on the hearing call and willing to testify. (Dist. ECF
No. 12 at 5.) However, Appellant cites no point in the hearing transcript—and the Court has been
unable to identify any instance—where Ms. Hanaway’s presence on the call was noted for the
Bankruptcy Court. Similarly, the Court identifies no portion of the hearing where counsel
requested that Ms. Hanaway be allowed to testify in support of the Motion to Convert. To the
extent that Appellant argues that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion by ruling on the
Motion to Convert without an evidentiary hearing (Dist. ECF No. 12 at 8), the Court notes that a
motion for conversion pursuant to § 706(a) does not automatically qualify as a contested matter
governed by Bankruptcy Rule 9014.7 See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1017(f)(1) (“Rule 9014 governs a
proceeding to dismiss or suspend a case or to convert it to another chapter--except under § 706(a)
. . . .”) (emphasis added); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1017 advisory committee’s note to 1987 amendment.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion by not hearing
testimony from Ms. Hanaway where that testimony was neither offered nor required.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court affirms the Bankruptcy Court’s Order of
September 4, 2025. The Motion to Stay Pending Appeal (Dist. ECF No. 11) is denied as moot. An
appropriate Order follows.
7 Rule 9014 requires that if a motion subject to the Rule cannot be decided without resolving
a disputed material issue of fact, an evidentiary hearing must be held at which testimony of
witnesses is taken. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014 advisory committee’s note to 2002 amendment.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Kelley B. Hodge
HODGE, KELLEY B., J.