Oldham

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

OCALA DIVISION

TIMOTHY OLDHAM,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 5:24-cv-708-JRK

FRANK BISIGNANO,

Commissioner of Social Security,1

Defendant.

/

OPINION AND ORDER2

I. Status

Timothy Oldham (“Plaintiff”) is appealing the Commissioner of the Social

Security Administration’s (“SSA(’s)”) partially favorable final decision granting

his claims for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security

income (“SSI”) from December 16, 2022 forward, but finding that prior to that

date, Plaintiff was not disabled and ineligible for DIB and SSI. Plaintiff’s

alleged inability to work is the result of chronic pain, fibromyalgia, fatigue,

1 Frank Bisignano is now the Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to Rule

25(d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. Bisignano should be substituted as Defendant in

this suit. No further action need be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence

of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

2 The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States

Magistrate Judge. See Order Regarding Consent to Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction in Social

Security Appeals (Doc. No. 117), Case No. 3:21-mc-1-TJC (outlining procedures for consent

and Defendant’s generalized consent to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in social security

appeals cases); consent by Plaintiff indicated in docket language for Complaint (Doc. No. 1).

gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), diabetes, and hypertension.

Transcript of Administrative Proceedings (Doc. No. 11; “Tr.” or “administrative

transcript”), filed March 24, 2025, at 86, 94, 105, 114.

On November 15, 2021, Plaintiff protectively filed applications for DIB

and SSI, alleging a disability onset date of February 1, 2020. Tr. at 250-53

(DIB), 254-61 (SSI).3 The alleged disability onset date was later amended to

March 18, 2020. Tr. at 17. The applications were denied initially, Tr. at 86-93,

135-38 (DIB); Tr. at 94-101, 130-33 (SSI), and upon reconsideration, Tr. at 105-

12 (DIB); Tr. at 114-21 (SSI).4

On May 1, 2024, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing,

during which she heard from Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, and a

vocational expert (“VE”).5 Tr. at 40-85. On June 6, 2024, the ALJ issued a

Decision finding Plaintiff not disabled through December 16, 2022, but disabled

beginning on that date through the date of the Decision. See Tr. at 17-29.

Thereafter, Plaintiff requested review of the Decision by the Appeals

Council. Tr. at 4-5 (Appeals Council exhibit list and order), 245-47 (request for

3 The applications were both completed on November 15, 2021. See Tr. at 250

(DIB), 254 (SSI). The protective filing date for both the DIB application is listed elsewhere in

the administrative transcript as November 15, 2021, and the SSI application is November 3,

2021. Tr. at 86, 105 (DIB), 94, 114 (SSI).

4 Some of these documents are duplicated in the administrative transcript.

Citations are to the first time a document appears.

5 The hearing was held via telephone, with Plaintiff’s consent. Tr. at 42, 212-13.

review). On November 14, 2024, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request

for review, Tr. at 1-3, making the ALJ’s Decision the final decision of the

Commissioner. On December 23, 2024, Plaintiff commenced this action under

42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) by timely filing a Complaint (Doc. No. 1),

through counsel, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision.

Plaintiff on appeal argues the ALJ erred in 1) finding his “mental

impairment was non-severe prior to December 16, 2022”; and 2) “failing to

develop the record to determine if [Plaintiff] had past relevant work as a

professor.” Memorandum in Opposition to the Commissioner’s Decision (Doc.

No. 14; “Pl.’s Mem.”), filed May 23, 2025, at 3, 6 (capitalization and emphasis

omitted). On August 4, 2025, Defendant filed a Response Brief in Support of the

Commissioner’s Decision (Doc. No. 17; “Def.’s Mem.”) addressing Plaintiff’s

arguments. After a thorough review of the entire record and consideration of

the parties’ respective arguments, the undersigned finds that the

Commissioner’s final decision is due to be affirmed.

II. The ALJ’s Decision

When determining whether an individual is disabled,6 an ALJ must

follow the five-step sequential inquiry set forth in the Regulations, determining

6 “Disability” is defined in the Social Security Act as the “inability to engage in

any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected

(Continued…)

as appropriate whether the claimant (1) is currently employed or engaging in

substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has an impairment

or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one listed in the

Regulations; (4) can perform past relevant work; and (5) retains the ability to

perform any work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see

also Simon v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 7 F.4th 1094, 1101-02 (11th Cir. 2021)

(citations omitted); Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004).

The claimant bears the burden of persuasion through step four, and at step five,

the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5

(1987).

Here, the ALJ followed the five-step inquiry. See Tr. at 20-29. At step one,

the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “has not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since March 18, 2020, the amended onset date.” Tr. at 20 (emphasis and

citation omitted). At step two, the ALJ found:

Since the amended onset date of disability, March 18,

2020, [Plaintiff] has had the following severe

impairments: cervical degenerative disc disease,

degenerative joint disease, obesity, diabetes mellitus,

neuropathy, sensorineural (SNL) hearing loss,

tinnitus. Beginning on the established onset date of

disability, December 16, 2022, [Plaintiff] has had the

following severe impairments: somatic symptom

disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), other

to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),

1382c(a)(3)(A).

trauma related disorder (subthreshold PTSD), anxiety

disorder, depression, and adjustment disorder.

Tr. at 20 (emphasis and citation omitted). At step three, the ALJ found that

“Since February 1, 2020, [Plaintiff] has not had an impairment or combination

of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed

impairments in 20 [C.F.R.] Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” Tr. at 21

(emphasis and citation omitted).

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the following residual functional

capacity (“RFC”):

[P]rior to December 16, 2022, the date [Plaintiff]

became disabled, [he] had the [RFC] to perform light

work as defined in 20 CFR [§§] 404.1567(b) and

416.967(b) except [Plaintiff] can never climb ropes,

ladders, or scaffolds but frequently perform other

postural movements. [Plaintiff] can occasionally

operate foot controls bilaterally. He can frequently

push/pull, handle, finger, and feel bilaterally. He could

not work in proximity to hazards or unprotected

heights. He could occasionally work in extreme cold or

in concentrated industrial vibration. He needs to work

in an environment with moderate noise or less.

. . .

[S]ince December 16, 2022, [Plaintiff] has had the

[RFC] to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR [§§]

404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except [he] can never climb

ropes, ladders, or scaffolds but frequently perform

other postural movements. [Plaintiff] can occasionally

operate foot controls bilaterally. He can frequently

push/pull, handle, finger, and feel bilaterally. He could

not work in proximity to hazards or unprotected

heights. He could occasionally work in extreme cold or

in concentrated industrial vibration. He needs to work

in an environment with moderate noise or less.

Mentally, [Plaintiff] can tolerate frequent interaction

with coworkers and supervisors, but only occasional

work with the public. He can maintain attention and

concentration for 2-hour periods throughout the

workday with customary breaks. He cannot work at an

assembly line pace or have strict productivity quotas.

Tr. at 21-22, 26.

At step four, the ALJ relied on the VE’s hearing testimony and found that

“[p]rior to December 16, 2022, [Plaintiff] was capable of performing past

relevant work as a faculty member.” Tr. at 25 (citation omitted). But,

“[b]eginning on December 16, 2022, [Plaintiff’s RFC] has prevented [him] from

being able to perform past relevant work.” Tr. at 28. The ALJ then proceeded to

the fifth and final step of the sequential inquiry for December 16, 2022 forward.

Tr. at 28-29. After considering Plaintiff’s age (“advanced age”), education (“at

least a high school education”), work experience, and RFC, the ALJ relied on

the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Part 404 Subpart P, Appendix 2

(Grids) and found “there are no jobs that exist in significant numbers in the

national economy that [Plaintiff] can perform.” Tr. at 28 (some emphasis and

citation omitted). The ALJ concluded Plaintiff “was not disabled prior to

December 16, 2022 . . . but became disabled on that date and has continued to

be disabled through the date of th[e D]ecision.” Tr. at 29 (emphasis and citation

omitted).

III. Standard of Review

This Court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision as to disability

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Although no deference is given

to the ALJ’s conclusions of law, findings of fact “are conclusive if . . . supported

by ‘substantial evidence.’” Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir.

2001) (citing Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir. 1998)). “Substantial

evidence is something ‘more than a mere scintilla, but less than a

preponderance.’” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987)). The substantial

evidence standard is met when there is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Falge, 150 F.3d at 1322

(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)); see also Biestek v.

Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019); Samuels v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 959

F.3d 1042, 1045 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). It is not for this Court to

reweigh the evidence; rather, the entire record is reviewed to determine

whether “the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial

evidence.” Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation

omitted). The decision reached by the Commissioner must be affirmed if it is

supported by substantial evidence—even if the evidence preponderates against

the Commissioner’s findings. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155,

1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).

IV. Discussion

Plaintiff’s arguments are addressed in turn.

A. Mental Impairment Severity Prior to December 16, 2022

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in finding he did not have a severe

mental impairment prior to December 16, 2022. Pl.’s Mem. at 3-6. According to

Plaintiff, the ALJ relied on a treatment note to find Plaintiff’s “depressive and

anxiety-related symptoms were not considered clinically significant prior to

December 2022,” Tr. at 26 (citation omitted), but it was an “outlier[]” and does

not provide substantial evidence upon which to base the severity finding, Pl.’s

Mem. at 4-5, 5. Moreover, Plaintiff contends the ALJ should have included some

mental limitations in the RFC prior to December 16, 2022, even without a

severe mental impairment finding. Id. at 5-6. Responding, Defendant argues

the ALJ relied on more than just the one treatment note, and the ALJ was not

required to place any mental limitations in the RFC prior to December 16, 2022.

Def.’s Mem. at 4-8.

Step two of the sequential evaluation process requires the ALJ to

determine whether a claimant suffers from a severe impairment. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). At this step, “[a]n impairment can be considered as not

severe only if it is a slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the

individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual’s ability

to work[.]” Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 1984). “This step is a

‘threshold inquiry’ and ‘allows only claims based on the most trivial

impairments to be rejected.” Schink v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 935 F.3d 1245, 1265

(11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1031

(11th Cir. 1986)).

“[T]he ‘severity’ of a medically ascertained disability must be measured

in terms of its effect upon ability to work, and not simply in terms of deviation

from purely medical standards of bodily perfection or normality.” McCruter v.

Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1547 (11th Cir. 1986). In the context of a Social Security

disability benefits case, a condition is severe if it affects a claimant’s ability to

maintain employment. See id. A claimant has the burden of proving that

impairments are severe. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5 (recognizing the

claimant’s burden of proof at step two to show “a medically severe impairment

or combination of impairments”). Further, the impairment either “must have

lasted or must be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months.”

20 C.F.R. § 404.1509; see also Walker v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 835 F. App’x

538, 542 (11th Cir. 2020) (unpublished).

A severe impairment interferes with a claimant’s ability to perform “basic

work activities.” See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; Simon v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec.

Admin., 7 F.4th 1094, 1101 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)). The

Regulations provide six examples of “basic work activities”: “(1) Physical

functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching,

carrying, or handling; (2) Capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; (3)

Understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) Use of

judgment; (5) Responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual

work situations; and (6) Dealing with changes in a routine work setting.” 20

C.F.R. § 404.1522; see also Walker, 835 F. App’x at 541-52. “The finding of any

severe impairment, based on either a single impairment or a combination of

impairments, is enough to satisfy step two because once the ALJ proceeds

beyond step two, he is required to consider the claimant’s entire medical

condition, including impairments the ALJ determined were not severe.” Burgin

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 420 F. App’x 901, 902 (11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).

Any error in identifying severe impairments at step two is harmless if

“the ALJ considered all of [the] impairments in combination at later steps in

the evaluation process.” Burgin, 420 F. App’x at 903 (citation omitted); see

Schink, 935 F.3d at 1268 (a step two error “could be harmless if the ALJ

nevertheless proceeded in the sequential evaluation, duly considered [the

claimant’s] mental impairment when assessing his RFC, and reached

conclusions about [the claimant’s] mental capacities supported by substantial

evidence”); Heatly, 382 F. App’x at 825 (stating that an “ALJ is required to

demonstrate that [he or she] has considered all of the claimant’s impairments,

whether severe or not, in combination”); Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635

(11th Cir. 1984) (finding that an ALJ must make “specific and well-articulated

findings as to the effect of the combination of impairments”).

The RFC assessment “is the most [a claimant] can still do despite [his or

her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). It is used at step four to determine

whether a claimant can return to his or her past relevant work, and if necessary,

it is also used at step five to determine whether the claimant can perform any

other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1545(a)(5). In assessing a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ “must consider

limitations and restrictions imposed by all of an individual’s impairments, even

those that are not ‘severe.’” SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 at *5; see also Pupo v.

Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 17 F.4th 1054, 1064 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Schink,

935 F.3d at 1268); Swindle v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 222, 226 (11th Cir. 1990)

(stating that “the ALJ must consider a claimant’s impairments in combination”)

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545; Reeves v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 519, 525 (11th Cir.

1984)).

Here, the ALJ recognized at step two that Plaintiff had “reported some

depressive and anxiety-related symptoms,” but found prior to December 16,

2022 that they were “generally . . . mild in nature, and mental status

examinations have been normal with cooperative behavior, logical thought

process, appropriate thought content, adequate concentration, intact memory,

and good insight/judgment.” Tr. at 20 (citing Ex. 28F/32, 39, 46, 84, located at

Tr. at 4975, 4982, 4989, 5027). Then, the ALJ assessed the broad areas of

mental functioning set forth in the Regulations and 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart

P, Appendix 1, and found Plaintiff has no restriction in understanding,

remembering, or applying information; mild restriction in interacting with

others; mild restriction in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and

mild restriction in adapting or managing oneself. Tr. at 21. Accordingly, the

ALJ did not assign any severe mental impairments at step two prior to

December 16, 2022. See Tr. at 20-21.

Later, when addressing the medical evidence and assessing the RFC prior

to December 16, 2022, the ALJ wrote:

At initial determination, State agency consultants . . .

[assessed m]ild impairment . . . with regard to mental

impairment. I find these opinions to be persuasive. . . .

I note that [Plaintiff] was diagnosed with somatic

symptom disorder in September 2020, and he

subsequently received counseling for unspecified

anxiety disorder. However, depressive and anxiety-

related symptoms were not considered clinically

significant prior to December 2022.

Tr. at 24 (citations omitted).

When assessing the RFC after December 16, 2022, the ALJ wrote:

The record documents progressively worsening

depressive symptoms since 2022. It is reiterated that

[Plaintiff] was diagnosed with somatic symptom

disorder in September 2020, and he subsequently

received counseling for unspecified anxiety disorder. In

fact, depressive and anxiety-related symptoms were

not considered clinically significant prior to December

2022. However, the PHQ9 (Depression) and the GAD7

(Anxiety) have identified moderate to moderately

severe depressive and anxiety related symptoms since

December 2022. He has endorsed complex feelings of

anxiety about his medical and financial situation that

are quite draining. Associated depressive symptoms

have included irritability, altered sleep pattern,

anhedonia, and lack of motivation. In consideration of

[Plaintiff’s] depression and anxiety, the [RFC] since

December 16, 2022, provides for frequent interaction

with coworkers and supervisors, but only occasional

work with the public, and inability to work at an

assembly line pace or have strict productivity quotas.

. . .

Victoria Frehe-Torres, Ph.D. completed a mental

disorders benefits questionnaire in December 2023 in

which she diagnosed adjustment disorder and assessed

occupational and social impairment with reduced

reliability and productivity. This opinion is persuasive

as of the established onset date based on the evidence

of record. Of note, the mental disorders benefits

questionnaire completed in January 2022 shows no

diagnosed mental impairment. Further, depressive and

anxiety-related symptoms were not considered

clinically significant prior to December 2022. However,

records since that time have identified moderate to

moderately severe depressive and anxiety related

symptoms.

Tr. at 26-28 (citations omitted).

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings with respect to step two

and the RFC. In finding that prior to December 16, 2022, Plaintiff did not have

a severe mental impairment and did not have any mental limitations in his

RFC, the ALJ relied on treatment notes from that timeframe and also on state-

agency medical consultants who opined Plaintiff did not have a severe

impairment. See Tr. at 24. Plaintiff mainly challenges the ALJ’s reliance on the

treatment notes, citing a few notes pre-dating December 16, 2022 that include

scores “indicative of moderate symptoms.” Pl.’s Mem. at 4-5 (citing Tr. at 7415,

7457, 7468). But, those scores are based on “self-report assessment[s] and [are]

not sufficient to use alone for diagnostic purposes.” Tr. at 7457 (some emphasis

omitted). And, two of the notes cited by Plaintiff state his mental status was

“[w]ithin normal limits.” Tr. at 7415, 7468.

Moreover, the ALJ did not just rely on the treatment notes in finding

Plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment prior to December 16, 2022.

She also relied on the opinion of a state-agency medical consultant (that

Plaintiff does not challenge). See Tr. at 24. The medical consultant reviewed the

file and found Plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment, citing specific

evidence to support his findings. Tr. at 88-89, 96-97; see also Tr. at 107-09, 116-

18 (reconsideration findings). The ALJ determined the opinion was “persuasive”

for the timeframe prior to December 16, 2022, Tr. at 24, and substantial

evidence supports that determination. The ALJ also observed that a VE mental

disorder benefits questionnaire authored by Michael Spellman, Ph.D. in

January 2022 did not diagnose any mental impairment. See Tr. at 27,7 8109-23

(questionnaire). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings.

7 The ALJ did not refer to Dr. Spellman by name, but she cited Exhibit 41F/172,

which is one of the pages of Dr. Spellman’s January 2022 questionnaire. See Tr. at 8109-23.

B. Past Relevant Work Prior to December 16, 2022

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in determining he could return to past

relevant work as a faculty member8 prior to December 16, 2022 because he “only

performed the job part-time and may not have performed it long enough to meet

the duration requirements . . . to have successfully learned to do the job.” Pl.’s

Mem. at 6-7. Responding, Defendant argues that the VE testimony provides

substantial evidence upon which to base the step four findings. Def.’ s Mem. at

8-10.

At step four of the sequential inquiry, an ALJ must assess a claimant’s

RFC and determine whether the claimant can perform his or her past relevant

work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). “[T]o constitute past

relevant work, the position in question must have been done within a fifteen

year period, lasted long enough for the claimant to learn to do it, and be

performed at a substantial gainful activity level.” Brown v. Barnhart, 410 F.

Supp. 2d 1287, 1297 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (citing, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1565(a)). “At

step four, the claimant carries a heavy burden of showing that his impairment

prevents him from performing his past relevant work.” Washington v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 906 F.3d 1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). To aid in

8 Plaintiff calls this work an “Adjunct University Professor” or “adjunct

professor,” Pl.’s Mem. at 6-7, but the finding actually made by the ALJ was “faculty member,”

Tr. at 25-26.

making the required findings at steps four and five, an ALJ may pose a

hypothetical question to a VE as part of his or her determination of whether the

claimant can perform past relevant work or obtain work in the national

economy. See Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing

Wolfe v. Chater, 86 F.3d 1072, 1077-78 (11th Cir. 1996)) (discussing reliance on

a VE’s testimony at step five); Hines-Sharp v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 511 F. App’x

913, 915-17 (11th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (discussing reliance on a VE’s

testimony at step four).

Here, after listening to Plaintiff’s testimony about his past work, the VE

testified that Plaintiff had past work as a “faculty member, university” with a

“DOT number 090.227-010” and classified as “light work, SVP 8.” Tr. at 79.

After being presented with a hypothetical including Plaintiff’s RFC prior to

December 16, 2022, the VE testified Plaintiff could return to his past relevant

work as a faculty member. Tr. at 81-83. Plaintiff’s counsel did not challenge the

alleged part-time nature of the job or the length of time Plaintiff performed it.

Tr. at 84. The ALJ in the written Decision found that the faculty member “work

was substantial gainful activity, was performed long enough for [Plaintiff] to

achieve average performance and was performed within the relevant period.”

Tr. at 25. The ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, including

the VE testimony.

V. Conclusion

The ALJ’s Decision is supported by substantial evidence. In light of the

foregoing, it is

ORDERED:

1. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment pursuant to

sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and § 1383(c)(3), AFFIRMING the

Commissioner’s final decision.

2. The Clerk is further directed to close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida on March 26, 2026.

Verge Boo KAS

JAMES R. KLINDT

United States Magistrate Judge

kaw

Copies:

Counsel of Record

17