Falu

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ZENAIDA FALU, : NO. 4:25-CV-01550

Plaintiff, :

: (MUNLEY, D.J.)

v. :

: (CAMONI, M.J.)

FRANK BISIGNANO, :

Commissioner of Social Security, :

Defendant. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Zenaida Falu brought this action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of the final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security denying her claim for disability benefits

under Title II of the Social Security Act. See Transcript, doc. 7-3 at 7.

Falu argues that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred in

assessing her residual functional capacity (RFC) by failing to develop the

record and improperly assessing her pain symptoms. See Pl.’s Br., doc. 12

at 8, 13. Because the ALJ’s determination is supported by substantial

evidence, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court affirm

the decision of the Commissioner.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On February 6, 2020, Falu applied for disability insurance benefits

under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging disability as of August

31, 2013. Doc. 7-3 at 2. Following an initial denial, Falu exhausted the

administrative appeals and filed a prior civil action in this Court. See

Falu v. Kijakazi, No. 21-2061, doc. 1. The Court issued an order to

remand the case for further proceedings. See doc. 7-13 at 52; id. at 48-49

(explaining that the ALJ discounted all medical opinions and relied upon

his own lay interpretation).

After remand, the ALJ conducted a new hearing and determined

that Falu is not disabled. Doc. 7-12 at 20, 29. Falu filed a request for

review of the ALJ’s decision, which the Appeals Council denied. Id. at 2.

The ALJ’s decision, therefore, became the final decision of the

Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pending before this Court is Falu’s

action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. Complaint,

doc. 1. This case is fully briefed (docs. 12-14) and ripe for resolution.

B. The Disability Determination Process

To determine whether a claimant is disabled under the Social

Security Act, an ALJ applies a “five-step sequential evaluation process.”

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ assesses whether the claimant:

1. has engaged in substantial gainful activity since the

onset of the alleged disability;

2. had a severe medically determinable impairment;

3. suffered from an impairment listed in the regulations as

presumptively disabling;

4. could return to his past work; and

5. could perform other available work in the national

economy.

See § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v).

Between steps three and four, the ALJ also determines whether the

claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC) allows the claimant to

continue his previous employment. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). RFC “is the most

[a claimant] can still do despite” impairments. § 404.1545(a)(1). The

claimant bears the burden of persuasion through step four, while at step

five, the burden shifts to the Secretary to show that the claimant can

perform substantial gainful employment other than the claimant’s past

relevant work. Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1181 (3d Cir. 1992),

citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).

C. Issues on Appeal

After following the five-step sequential analysis, the ALJ

determined that Falu “was not under a disability . . . at any time from

August 31, 2013, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2018, the

date last insured.” Doc. 7-12 at 20. Although the ALJ determined that

Falu has the medically determinable severe impairment of “degenerative

disc disease of the spine and a history of atrial septal defect,” the ALJ

assessed that Falu has the RFC to perform light work: “except the

claimant can lift 25 pounds occasionally and frequently with occasional

overhead with the dominant right upper extremity. The claimant can sit,

stand, and walk 6 hours each in an 8-hour workday.” Id. at 13 (step-two

analysis), 15 (RFC finding).

Falu raises two issues, arguing that the ALJ erred at the RFC stage

by: (1) failing to fully develop the record; and (2) making errors with

symptom evaluation. Doc. 12 at 8, 13. Adhering to the deferential

standard of review outlined below, the undersigned respectfully

recommends that the Court affirm the decision of the Commissioner.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision denying a claimant’s

application for benefits, the Court is limited to determining whether the

findings of the final decision-maker are supported by substantial

evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (incorporating 42

U.S.C. § 405(g) by reference); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d

198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D.

Pa. 2012). Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court examines an

existing administrative record and asks whether it contains sufficient

evidence to support the agency’s factual determinations. Biestek v.

Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019). Substantial evidence does not mean a

large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather “such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Id. at 103; see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565

(1988). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence

but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

(1971). A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ

ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by

the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). In an

adequately developed factual record, however, substantial evidence may

be “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of

drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent

[the ALJ’s decision] from being supported by substantial

evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “In

determining if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial

evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.” Leslie v.

Barnhart, 304 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). In reviewing the

record for substantial evidence, “[n]either the district court nor [the Third

Circuit] is empowered to weigh the evidence or substitute its conclusions

for those of the fact-finder.” Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182. To reverse the

ALJ’s findings and decision, the Court “must find that the evidence not

only supports [a contrary] conclusion but compels it.” Immigr. &

Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992).

The question before the Court, therefore, is not whether Falu is

disabled, but whether the Commissioner’s finding that Falu is not

disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based

upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No.

12-2417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been

held that an ALJ’s errors of law denote a lack of substantial

evidence.”); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa.

1981) (“The [Commissioner]’s determination as to the status of a claim

requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright

v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of

review on legal matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (“[T]he

court has plenary review of all legal issues decided by the

Commissioner.”). In determining that question, the Court must evaluate

whether the ALJ’s decision meets the burden of articulation necessary to

enable judicial review; that is, the ALJ must articulate the reasons for

his decision beyond stating bare conclusions. Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000).

III. ANALYSIS

Falu argues two issues on appeal. She contends that the ALJ erred

at the RFC stage by: (1) failing to fully develop the record; and (2) making

errors with symptom evaluation. Doc. 12 at 8, 13. The undersigned

addresses each argument in turn.

A. The ALJ fully developed the record at the RFC stage.

The crux of Falu’s argument is that the ALJ found persuasive the

medical opinion of Dr. Tedesco, who did not review two relevant MRIs.

See id. at 10-11. And because Dr. Tedesco did not review these MRIs, the

ALJ improperly dismissed the MRIs when he concluded that they are “far

removed from the date last insured.” Id. at 12. The undersigned finds this

argument unpersuasive for two reasons.

First, the ALJ’s burden of articulation at the RFC stage is not high.

The ALJ “may consider many factors yet base a decision on just one or

two.” Zaborowski v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 115 F.4th 637, 639 (3d Cir.

2024). The ALJ need only explain the “dispositive reasons for their

decisions, not everything else that they considered.” Id. “[I]n most cases,

a sentence or short paragraph would probably suffice.” Cotter v. Harris,

650 F.2d 481, 482 (3d Cir. 1981). The ALJ here satisfied his burden of

articulation at the RFC stage by explaining his reasoning for finding Dr.

Tedesco’s opinion persuasive while affording less weight to the MRIs,

which fell outside the relevant period of disability. See doc. 7-12 at 17-18.

In finding Dr. Tedesco’s opinion persuasive, the ALJ properly

explained that Dr. Tedesco “had the benefit of reviewing the objective

records from the alleged onset date through the date last insured.” Id. at

18 (emphasis added). As for the two MRIs that Falu contends Dr. Tedesco

should have reviewed, the ALJ explained that they fell outside the

relevant disability period. Id. at 17.

For a claim of disability insurance benefits, as Falu applied for in

this case, it is the claimant who bears the burden of establishing

disability “between the onset date of disability and the date that her

insured status expired.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 612 (3d Cir.

2014); see 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.131. Evidence

generated after a claimant’s date last insured can relate to the conditions

during the insured period, but that evidence does not necessarily compel

the Commissioner to find that the claimant’s condition during the

insured period was as severe as it became after the date last insured. See

Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 614. “Further, a medical condition which begins

during a claimant’s insured period, but does not become disabling until

after its expiration, may not be the basis for qualification for disability

benefits under the Act.” Capoferri v. Harris, 501 F. Supp. 32, 36 (E.D. Pa.

1980), aff’d, 649 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1981).

Here, Falu had the burden of establishing her disability between

August 31, 2013, and December 31, 2018. See doc. 7-12 at 16. The ALJ

accurately noted that many of the records received since the hearing prior

to the Court’s remand order post-date the date last insured. Id. In fact,

the two MRIs that Falu argues should have been considered by Dr.

Tedesco was taken more than a year after the date last insured. See doc.

12 at 11 (noting cervical MRI taken February 2, 2020, and lumbar MRI

taken October 15, 2020). While the MRIs may relate to Falu’s conditions

prior to the date last insured, the Commissioner was not required to

make a disability finding based on these MRIs. See Pearson v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 839 F. App’x 684, 689 (giving minimal weight to evidence

generated after a claimant’s date last insured); see also Gillhooley v.

Kijakazi, No. 22-1581, 2023 WL 7170641, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2023),

citing Ortega v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 232 F. App’x 194, 197 (3d Cir. 2007)

(noting that evidence post-dating a claimant’s date last insured is less

relevant because a claimant must prove disability in the relevant time

period).

Second, Falu confusingly argues that “the ALJ failed to consider

that Dr. Tedesco did have have [sic] the opportunity to review pertinent

diagnostic studies.” Pl.’s Reply Br., doc. 14 at 3.1 And she further assumes

that the ALJ, who was not qualified, reviewed the MRIs to assess Falu’s

RFC, because the ALJ remarked that the MRIs were far removed from

the date last insured and could not be clinically correlated with Ms. Falu’s

relevant period. Id. at 4. But the ALJ did not enter a lay opinion to assess

the MRIs for their medical information.

Rather, the ALJ followed the regulation and observed that because

the MRIs fell outside the relevant disability period, he would not give

them significant weight in determining Falu’s disability. That was not

error, and Falu does not persuade otherwise. Instead, it appears she is

asking the Court to independently make a factual finding that those

MRIs relate significantly to the disability conditions during the relevant

period, and that the Court should remand for further consultative

examinations. See doc. 12 at 12-13. Under the deferential standard of

1 Dr. Tedesco’s evaluation reveals that he in fact received medical records

post-dating the date last insured and incorporated them into his RFC

finding. See doc. 7-3 at 10-11 (noting receipt of reconsideration evidence

dating 9/17/20, 9/8/20, and 5/15/20), 15-16 (RFC explanation). True, Dr.

Tedesco did not base his RFC findings on the MRIs that post-date the

date last insured. Still, Dr. Tedesco reviewed other reconsideration

evidence as far out as July 21, 2020, which noted that Falu’s physical

examination was “essentially normal.” Id. at 16.

review, the Court cannot make such a finding. Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182

(noting that the Court is not “empowered to weigh the evidence or

substitute its conclusions for those of the fact-finder.”).

Falu further argues that Dr. Tedesco, not the ALJ, should have

considered the two MRIs because “lumbar degeneration is not a sudden

illness but a slow, decades-long decline of spinal discs.” See doc. 14 at 4.

The ALJ, however, never denied Falu’s lumbar degeneration, and had

already found a severe degenerative disc disease of the spine at step two.

Doc. 7-12 at 13. Likewise, Dr. Tedesco considered Falu’s degenerative

disc diseases of both the cervical and lumbar spines to determine the

RFC. Doc. 7-3 at 15.

On the record before him, the ALJ correctly assessed the RFC based

on a thorough review of years of treatment records and Dr. Tedesco’s

medical opinion, which he found persuasive. Even accepting, as Falu

contends, that Dr. Tedesco’s opinion was based on an incomplete record,

the ALJ himself “did consider the complete record and determined that

it was consistent with [Dr. Tedesco’s] conclusion, and the ALJ, not

physicians or consultants, must make the ultimate disability

determinations.” Scouten v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 722 F. App’x 288, 290-91

(3d Cir. 2018), citing Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361

(3d Cir. 2011). Thus, the ALJ did not err in his RFC determination by

failing to further credit the MRIs that fell outside the relevant disability

period. See Manzo v. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (D.N.J. 1991)

(“Evidence of an impairment which reached disabling severity after the

date last insured, or which was exacerbated after this date, cannot be the

basis for the determination of entitlement to a period of disability and

disability insurance benefits, even though the impairment itself may

have existed before plaintiff's insured status expired.”).

“If substantial evidence exists, [the Court] must affirm the ALJ’s

interpretation of the evidence even if [the Court] might have interpreted

the evidence differently in the first instance.” Balsavage v. Dir., Off. of

Workers’ Comp. Programs, 295 F. 3d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation

modified). The ALJ’s factual findings are supported by substantial

evidence, and so the undersigned recommends that the Court affirm the

decision of the Commissioner.

B. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s symptom

evaluation.

Falu next argues that the ALJ made multiple errors with symptom

evaluation that compel reversal. Doc. 12 at 13. Not so. The Court “defers

to the ALJ's assessment of credibility” provided that the ALJ “specifically

identif[ied] and explain[ed] what evidence he found not credible and why

he found it not credible.” Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 612-13. The ALJ here did

just that. He explained that Falu’s testimony concerning the severity of

her symptoms was not entirely credible because it conflicted with the

treatment notes, the medical opinion evidence, and her activities of daily

living. See doc. 7-12 at 17, 19.

The Court ordinarily defers to an ALJ's credibility determination

because he or she has the opportunity at a hearing to assess a witness’s

demeanor. Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 380 (3d Cir. 2003), citing

Atl. Limousine, Inc. v. NLRB, 243 F.3d 711, 718 (3d Cir. 2001). “The

credibility determinations of an administrative judge are virtually

unreviewable on appeal.” Hoyman v. Colvin, 606 F. App’x 678, 681 (3d

Cir. 2015), citing Bieber v. Dep't of the Army, 287 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed.

Cir. 2002). Here, the ALJ appropriately weighed the record evidence,

including Falu’s hearing testimony, and concluded that her statements

concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the

symptoms were less than fully persuasive “to the extent they are

inconsistent with the . . . [RFC].” Doc. 7-12 at 18.

Because the ALJ considered all the evidence and adequately

explained the decision for including or discounting certain limitations as

established by the evidence, the undersigned finds no error with the

decision. Under the deferential standard of review that applies to appeals

of Social Security disability determinations, the undersigned concludes

that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's evaluation of this case,

and recommends that the Court affirm the Commissioner’s decision.2

IV. RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that:

1. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Falu’s

benefits under the Social Security Act be AFFIRMED; and

2. The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to CLOSE this case.

2 The undersigned has considered Falu’s remaining arguments as to the

ALJ’s errors in symptom evaluation and find them to be unavailing. See

doc. 14 at 5-9 (listing six ways the ALJ erred in evaluating Falu’s

symptoms). The undersigned flags one argument in particular because

Falu’s attorney mischaracterizes the record. Falu argues that the ALJ

erred in considering her “provid[ing] extensive care for [her] husband

during the period at issue,” because the ALJ “failed to enquire what this

care entailed[.]” Doc. 12 at 13-14. The hearing transcript says otherwise.

The ALJ specifically asked Falu at the oral hearing, “Your husband was

unwell, and you were providing care for him. What kind of care did you

do for him?” Doc. 7-12 at 35. Falu responded that she provided

medications, took him to the bathroom, made his bed, and tried to put

him in the bed. See id. at 36. Thus, the record clearly supports the ALJ’s

decision, which considered Falu’s role in taking care of her husband.

The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule

72.3:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed

findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter

described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation

for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition

within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof.

Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the

magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall

specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings,

recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis

for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local

Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination

of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,

however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion

or where required by law, and may consider the record developed

before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination

on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further

evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the

magistrate judge with instructions.

Date: May 29, 2026 s/Sean A. Camoni

Sean A. Camoni

United States Magistrate Judge