Garcia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

ADAN GARCIA,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 2:26-cv-636-JES-DNF

WARDEN, FLORIDA SOFT SIDE SOUTH

DETENTION FACILITY, et al.,

Respondents.

___________________________________

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are Petitioner Adan Garcia’s petition for

writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) and the government’s response. (Doc.

6). For the reasons below, the Court grants the petition to the

extent set forth in this Order.

I. Background

Garcia is a native and citizen of Mexico who has lived in the

United States for more than 23 years. (Doc. 1 at 1). He last

entered the United States without inspection in 2002. (Id. at 3).

He was not apprehended at the border. (Id.) Garcia has four

United States citizen children. (Id.) He has no criminal record.

(Doc. 1 at 3; Doc. 6-1 at 3). Garcia has a pending application

for asylum and protection from removal. (Doc. 1 at 3)

Garcia was taken into Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(ICE) custody on February 24, 2026 following a traffic stop. (Doc.

1 at 4). He is currently detained at the Florida Soft Side South

Detention Facility in Ochopee, Florida under the mandatory

provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (Doc. 1 At 3; Doc. 6 at 2).

Garcia argues that he is entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(a). (Doc. 1 at 10–11).

II. Discussion

The core dispute before this Court is whether 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2) or § 1226(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act

(“INA”) applies to Garcia. The distinction matters because §

1225(b)(2) mandates detention throughout removal proceedings,

whereas noncitizens detained under § 1226(a) have the right to a

bond hearing before an immigration judge.

Section 1225(b)(1) establishes the procedures for expedited

removal. It allows immigration officers to remove noncitizens

“without further hearing or review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).

As expedited removal affords substantially fewer protections to

the noncitizen's rights, the INA limits its applicability in two

ways. First, noncitizens may be eligible for expedited removal

“only if they are inadmissible on the basis that they either lack

proper entry documents or falsified or misrepresented their

application for admission.” Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights

v. Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48,61 (D.D.C. 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§

1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7)). And “[a]mong that

set, only two categories of noncitizens are eligible for expedited

removal: (1) noncitizens ‘arriving in the United States,’ and (2)

noncitizens who ‘ha[ve] not been admitted or paroled into the

United States’ and cannot affirmatively show that they have been

‘physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-

year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of

inadmissibility.’ ” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–

(iii)).

Section 1226 of the INA also “authorizes the Government to

detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome

of removal proceedings[.]” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,

289 (2018). But § 1226 provides additional safeguards, including

the right to an individualized bond hearing. Id. at 306 (“Federal

regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive

bond hearings at the outset of detention.”)(citing 8 C.F.R. §§

236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)). Noncitizens already in the country

are treated differently than those seeking entry. As the Supreme

Court observed, “our immigration laws have long made a distinction

between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission

. . . and those who are within the United States after an entry,

irrespective of its legality. In the latter instance, the Court

has recognized additional rights and privileges not extended to

those in the former category who are merely ‘on the threshold of

initial entry.’” Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958)

(quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206

(1953)); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)(“But

once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes,

for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the

United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is

lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). And until recently,

DHS has treated aliens—such as Garcia—already present in the

country as detained under § 1226 and entitled to bond hearings.1

Respondents argue that, despite having continuously resided

in the United States for more than 23 years, Garcia is properly

detained under section 1225(b).2 Indeed, the Court recognizes that

in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, et al.,166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026)

and Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-3248, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25,

1 The Government’s recent about-face toward mass mandatory

detention under § 1225 was blessed by the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) in In re Yajure Hurtado, 29 I.& N. Dec. 216, 229

(B.I.A. 2025). But the Court owes no deference to the BIA’s

statutory interpretations. In 2024, the Supreme Court concluded

that “agencies have no special competence in resolving statutory

ambiguities. Courts do.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603

U.S. 369, 400–01 (2024). And “[c]ourts interpret statutes, no

matter the context, based on the traditional tools of statutory

construction, not individual policy preferences.” Id. at 403.

2 In Patel v. Hardin, No. 2:25-cv-870-JES-NPM (M.D. Fla. Dec.

1, 2025), Respondents argued that the Court lacks jurisdiction to

consider this petition and that the petitioner has not properly

exhausted his administrative remedies. The Court rejected those

arguments in Patel and in scores of other recent cases presenting

the same issues. See, e.g., Cetino v. Hardin, No. 2:25-cv-1037-

JES-DNF (M.D. Fla. December 12, 2025); Reyes Rodriguez v. Florida

Southside Facility, No. 2:25-cv-1012-JES-DNF (M.D. Fla. December

15, 2025). In those cases, the Court was satisfied of its

jurisdiction and determined that exhaustion was excused because it

would be futile. The Court’s reasoning on these issues also

applies here.

2026) the Fifth Circuit and Eighth Circuits concluded that most

noncitizens apprehended anywhere in the United States are never

eligible for release on bond, no matter how long they have resided

inside the United States. This is contrary to the overwhelming

majority of district court judges to have considered the issue.

See also Castanon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th

1048, 1060–62 (7th Cir 2005) (concluding that the government was

unlikely to prevail on the merits that petitioner was subject to

mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A)). This Court

respectfully disagrees with the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’

analyses and finds the analysis in Castanon-Nava and the dissents

in Buenrostro-Mendez and Avila to be more persuasive on the

statutory interpretation issue. In any event, neither Buenrostro-

Mendez nor Avila are binding precedent in this Court. Thus, the

Court rejects the government’s argument that Garcia is subject to

expedited removal and concludes that Respondents’ authority to

detain him stems from section 1226(a). As a noncitizen detained

under section 1226(a), Garcia has a right to a bond hearing.

The Court will thus order Respondents to either bring Garcia

before an immigration judge for a merit-based § 1226 bond hearing

or release him within ten days. At the hearing, the immigration

court must make findings as to whether Garcia is a flight risk or

3

is a danger to the community. The Court is aware that the

Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) is the agency

that schedules bond hearings. In other cases, Respondents have

claimed they cannot direct the EOIR when to conduct a bond hearing.

Regardless, subjecting Garcia to mandatory detention under §

1225(b)(1) is unlawful. If Respondents are unable to ensure that

Garcia timely receives the meaningful and thorough bond hearing to

which he is entitled under § 1226(a), they must release him.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. Adan Garcia’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc.

1) is GRANTED to the extent set forth in this Order.

2. Within TEN (10) DAYS Respondents shall either provide

Garcia with the statutory process required under § 1226—which

includes a merit-based bond hearing—or release him under

reasonable conditions of supervision.

3. If Respondents release Garcia, they shall facilitate his

transportation from the detention facility by notifying his

counsel when and where he may be collected.

3

In recent cases in the Middle District of Florida—and

despite being ordered to do so—the immigration judge has declined

to provide a merit-based bond hearing, determining that under

Hurtado he had no discretion to issue a bond. See, e.g., Nahadian

Fard v. Bondi, et al., No. 6:26-cv-157-GAP-RMN, Doc. 23 (M.D. Fla.

Feb. 12, 2026). If the immigration judge in this case reaches the

same conclusion or otherwise declines to consider bond, Petitioner

must be released.

4, The Warden’s motion to dismiss is DENIED as moot.

5. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions

and deadlines, enter judgment, and close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on March 26, 2026.

JGHH E. STEELE

5 IGOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE