Nwala

UMNIITDEDDL ES TDAITSTERS IDCITS TORFI FCLTO CROIUDRA T

TAMPA DIVISION

CHIMA A. NWALA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-2813-TPB-AAS

EQUIFAX INFORMATION

SERVICES LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN PART MOTIONS TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court on the following motions to dismiss:

• “Defendant Freedom Mortgage Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss” (Doc.

20);

• “Defendant Freedom Mortgage Corporation’s Amended Motion to

Dismiss (Amended to Add Certificate of Conferral Only)” (Doc. 22);

• “Capital One, N.A. Successor by Merger to Discover Bank’s Motion to

Dismiss” (Doc. 28); and

• “Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction,

or in the Alternative, Compel Arbitration and to Stay the Action” (Doc.

34), filed by Defendant Santander Consumer USA Inc. d/b/a Chrysler

Capital.

Plaintiff Chima Nwala filed responses in opposition. See (Docs. 23; 35; 36). After

reviewing the motions, responses, court file, and the record, the Court finds as follows:

Background

Plaintiff Chima A. Nwala sues Defendants Equifax Information Services LLC,

TransUnion LLC, Experian Information Solutions Inc., Freedom Mortgage Corporation,

Navy Federal Credit Union, Discover Financial Services/Discover Bank, USAA Federal

Saving Bank, Bank of America, Chrysler Capital, TBOM/ATLS/FORTIVA MC, and

Absolute Resolutions Investments for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act,

violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), and violations of the

Consumer Financial Protection Act (“CFPA”). Although rife with legal conclusions, the

complaint reveals few operative facts. Plaintiff appears to claim that the credit files

reported by the credit reporting agency (“CRA”) Defendants contain inaccurate,

incomplete, or misleading information regarding accounts furnished by the other

Defendants. Although he does not specify or explain the nature of these inaccuracies or

errors, it appears that they may be related to improper default or charge-off reporting as

he claims that Defendants have failed to properly account for and credit “lawful payment

tenders.” According to Plaintiff, the “Furnisher Defendants,” such as Navy Federal

Credit Union, “refused to accept or account for tendered payments based on a non-

negotiable – conditions not accepted” remark.

Plaintiff alleges that on August 1, 2025, he sent a qualified written request to

Defendant Freedom Mortgage Corporation regarding a loan for proper accounting and

discharge of the debt, but Freedom has failed to provide a timely and substantive

response in violation of RESPA. Plaintiff further alleges that he has sent multiple

written disputes to the CRA Defendants regarding the reporting of disputed accounts,

that the CRA Defendants notified the Furnisher Defendants of the disputed status of the

accounts, and that despite receiving notice of the disputes, all Defendants have failed to

conduct reasonable and proper investigations. According to Plaintiff, the reinvestigation

results provided by the CRAs were insufficient and misleading as they did not provide

evidence of due diligence, and the continued reporting of inaccurate information by all

Defendants constitutes noncompliance with federal law.

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a). While Rule 8(a) does not demand “detailed factual allegations,” it does require

“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In order to

survive a motion to dismiss, factual allegations must be sufficient “to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.

When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, review is generally limited to the four

corners of the complaint. Rickman v. Precisionaire, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 232, 233 (M.D. Fla.

1995). Furthermore, when reviewing a complaint for facial sufficiency, a court “must

accept [a] [p]laintiff’s well pleaded facts as true, and construe the [c]omplaint in the light

most favorable to the [p]laintiff.” Id. (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236

(1974)). “[A] motion to dismiss should concern only the complaint’s legal sufficiency, and

is not a procedure for resolving factual questions or addressing the merits of the

case.” Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 8:09-cv-1264-T-

26TGW, 2009 WL 10671157, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 9, 2009) (Lazzara, J.).

As Plaintiff in this case is proceeding pro se, the Court more liberally construes the

pleadings. Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2018). However, a pro se

plaintiff must still conform with procedural rules and the Court does not have “license to

act as de facto counsel” on behalf of a pro se plaintiff. United States v. Padgett, 917 F.3d

1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2019).

Analysis

Capacity and Representation

The Court sua sponte raises a concern regarding Plaintiff’s capacity based on the

complaint and his responses in opposition to the pending motions. In the complaint,

Plaintiff appears to assert capacity as an individual, as an “authorized representative”

for a corporation, and as a trustee. In his responses, Plaintiff refers to the “Chima

Akagbue Nwala Revocable Living Trust” and “emphasizes that he is the Grantor,

Trustee, and Primary Beneficiary.” He also mentions that the Trust owns the assets of

nonparty Hangout Corp Real Estate Investments.

Although an individual plaintiff may proceed pro se in his own name, there are

restrictions on his ability to represent trusts, corporations, and other entities. It is well-

established that “a corporation is an artificial entity that can act only through agents,

cannot appear pro se, and must be represented by counsel.” See, e.g., Palazzo v. Gulf Oil

Corp., 764 F.2d 1381, 1385 (11th Cir. 1985). And “[a] trust, like a corporation, is an

artificial entity that can act only through agents, cannot appear pro se, and must be

represented by counsel.” J.J. Rissell, Allentown, PA Trust v. Marchelos, 976 F.3d 1233,

1235 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Palazzo, 764 F.2d at 1385). Because he is not an attorney,

Plaintiff may not represent the interests of the referenced trust or corporation.

The Court will be allowing Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint,

if he may do so in good faith. Should Plaintiff file an amended complaint, he should take

care to only bring claims in his individual capacity, and he should avoid references to

corporations and trusts whose interests he cannot represent.

Unserved Defendants

At the outset, the Court notes that this case was filed on October 14, 2025. To

date, Plaintiff has failed to file actual returns of service for Defendants Equifax

Information Services LLC, TransUnion LLC, Experian Information Solutions, Inc., Navy

Federal Credit Union, USAA Federal Saving Bank, Bank of America,

TBOM/ATLS/FORTIVA MC, and Absolute Resolutions Investments. Instead, Plaintiff

filed a “notice of the filing of the Return of Service, demonstrating service of process upon

all Defendants through their respective registered agents,” and explained that “[s]ervice

was effected via United States Postal Service Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested,

in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h), Florida Statutes § 48.081, and

Local Rule 1.10(a).” But service by registered mail was not proper or authorized here.

The Defendants who have filed motions to dismiss and failed to address this issue

– Freedom Mortgage Corporation, Discovery Financial Services/Discover Bank, and

Chrysler Capital – have waived the service defect. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4).

As to the remaining Defendants – Equifax Information Services LLC, TransUnion

LLC, Experian Information Solutions, Inc., Navy Federal Credit Union, USAA Federal

Saving Bank, Bank of America, TBOM/ATLS/FORTIVA MC, and Absolute Resolutions

Investments – Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants are dismissed without

prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 and Local Rule 1.10. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 4(m) (requiring service of process within 90 days of the filing of the complaint);

Local Rule 1.10(a) (“Within twenty-one days after service of a summons and complaint or

receipt of a waiver, a party must file proof of service or the waiver.”); Local Rule 1.10(d)

(“Failure to comply with a deadline in this rule can result in dismissal of the claim or

action without notice and without prejudice.”).

Motions to Dismiss

Defendants Freedom Mortgage Corporation (“Freedom”), Capital One, N.A. (as

successor by merger to Discover Bank) (“Discover”), and Santander Consumer USA Inc.

d/b/a Chrysler Capital (“Chrysler Capital”) have filed motions to dismiss, raising various

arguments for relief.

Shotgun Pleading

In its motion to dismiss, Discover argues that the complaint constitutes a shotgun

pleading because Plaintiff impermissibly lumps together at least eight defendants

without differentiating the purported acts of each defendant or what facts support the

causes of action brought against each defendant. In addition, Discover further argues

that the complaint offers little more than conclusory statements without sufficient

supporting facts.

A shotgun pleading is one where “it is virtually impossible to know which

allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief” and the defendant

therefore cannot be “expected to frame a responsive pleading.” See Anderson v. Dist. Bd.

of Trustees of Cent. Fla. Cmty. College, 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996). The Eleventh

Circuit has identified four primary types of shotgun pleadings:

(1) complaints containing multiple counts where each count adopts the

allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to

carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of

the entire complaint;

(2) cpormecpeldaiinngt sc otuhnatt sd bou nto at rceo mgumilitty t ohfe t mheo rvteanli asiln s ionf roef -baellienggi nregp alellt e with

conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to

any particular cause of action;

(3) complaints that commit the sin of not separating into a different

count each cause of action or claim for relief; and

(4) complaints that assert multiple claims against multiple defendants

without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which

actions or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought

against.

See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2015).

As a threshold matter, the Court sua sponte finds that Plaintiff’s complaint

violates the first prong of Weiland because each count “re-alleges and incorporates the

preceding paragraphs.” By incorporating in this way, each count adopts the allegations

of all preceding counts. This defect alone is grounds for dismissal.

But there are other shotgun issues with the complaint. Most significantly,

Plaintiff’s complaint “lacks factual allegations that would explain the context and basis”

of his claims. See CNI Express, LLC v. BMO Harris Bank National Association, No. 8:23-

cv-1577-CEH-JSS, 2023 WL 5758932, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2023). Ultimately, “the

factual and legal bases for [Plaintiff’s] claims are virtually impossible to understand” and

“fail to give Defendants adequate notice of the causes of action being asserted against

them.” See id. Plaintiff’s claims ultimately rely on conclusory statements about various

violations by Defendants without providing sufficient facts about what violations

allegedly occurred. Plaintiff also does not separate into different counts each cause of

action or claim of relief against each Defendant, which is particularly confusing with so

many Defendants involved.

In an abundance of caution, the Court will grant an opportunity to amend, if

Plaintiff may do so in good faith. In an amended complaint, Plaintiff should set out each

of his separate causes of action in a separately numbered count, each of which should

assert a single claim for relief against a single Defendant. Each count should set forth

specific factual allegations that explain the basis for that cause of action. Plaintiff should

include all of his allegations in the amended complaint and not refer to the original

complaint.

Count II – Fair Credit Reporting Act (Against Furnishers)

Freedom and Discover argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim in Count II for a

violation of the FCRA. To prevail on an FCRA claim against a furnisher, a consumer

must allege and prove: (1) the furnisher received a notice from a CRA that the consumer

disputed the tradeline; (2) the furnisher breached its duty to conduct a reasonable

investigation into the dispute; and (3) had the furnisher conducted a reasonable

investigation, “the furnisher would have discovered that the information it reported was

inaccurate or incomplete, triggering the furnisher’s obligation to correct the information.”

Felts v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 893 F.3d 1305, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2018). Significantly,

the furnisher’s obligation is limited to “conduct[ing] an investigation with respect to the

disputed information.” 15 U.S.C. §1681s-2(b)(1)(A); see also Hunt v. JPMorgan Chase

Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 770 F. App’x 452, 458-59 (11th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal of an

FCRA claim where the plaintiff did not allege that the defendant received notification

from the CRAs of specific information that plaintiff claimed was inaccurate). To be clear,

a plaintiff cannot recover on this type of FCRA claim without (1) actually identifying

inaccurate or incomplete information, and (2) pointing to some facts that a furnisher

could have uncovered during a diligent investigation that would establish “that the

reported information was, in fact, inaccurate or incomplete.” Milgram v. Chase Bank

USA, N.A., 72 F.4th 1212, 1218 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotations and citations omitted).

In this case, Plaintiff fails to allege what information (if any) was inaccurate. He

fails to allege that a reasonable investigation would have identified the inaccuracy.

Plaintiff’s vague allegations and bare legal conclusions that merely recite the elements of

an FCRA claim are not sufficient to state a claim for relief. The motions to dismiss are

granted as to this ground, with leave to amend.

Count III – RESPA violation (Against Freedom Mortgage Corp.)

Freedom argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim in Count III for a violation of

RESPA. Plaintiff’s claim is based on Freedom’s alleged failure to respond to a QWR. A

QWR is defined as written correspondence from the borrower that (1) identifies the name

and account of the borrower, and (2) either (a) “asserts an error in the borrower’s account

or (b) requests information related to the servicing of the borrower’s account.” Ranger v.

Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 757 F. App’x 896, 901 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing 12 U.S.C. §

2605(e)(1)); Smith v. Bank of America Home Loans, 968 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1170 (M.D.

Fla. 2013). A loan servicer only has a duty to respond if the information request is

related to loan servicing. Id. Additionally, RESPA defines “servicing” as “receiving any

scheduled periodic payments from a borrower pursuant to the terms of any loan . . . and

making the payments of principal and interest and such other payments with respect to

the amounts received from the borrower as may be required pursuant to the terms of the

loan.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(i)(3). Finally, a plaintiff must show “actual damages” from the

servicer’s failure to respond, along with a “causal link” between the violation and alleged

damages. See Ranger, 757 F. App’x at 901.

In this case, Plaintiff alleges, in conclusory fashion, that the August letter is a

QWR. But he provides no facts showing that the August letter qualifies as a QWR – for

instance, that the letter identified the name and account of the borrower, or that it

requested information regarding the servicing of his loan.1 Although Plaintiff is not

required to attach a copy of the letter to his complaint, his failure to do so means the

Court is unable to review the letter in its evaluation of the sufficiency of claim. Finally,

even though Plaintiff alleges in a conclusory fashion that he suffered financial harm, he

does not allege actual damages, nor does he allege any causal link between the alleged

violation and his damages. Consequently, the Court concludes that Count III fails to

state a claim. This claim is dismissed without prejudice, with leave to amend, if Plaintiff

may do so in good faith.2

Count IV – 12 U.S.C. § 5531

Freedom and Discover also argue that the Consumer Financial Protection Act does

not provide a private right of action. The Court agrees. “The [CFPA] does not confer any

specific, individually enforceable rights and therefore there is no basis for private

1 RESPA does not require a loan servicer to provide information concerning the validity of a loan,

and that disputes about the validity of a debt do not relate to servicing and cannot support a

RESPA claim. See Smith, 968 F. Supp. 2d at 1170-71 (collecting cases).

2 RESPA permits servicers to designate a specific address to which all QWRs must be sent before

the servicer’s duties to respond are triggered. Bivens v. Bank of Am., N.A., 868 F.3d 915, 919-20

(11th Cir. 2017). Therefore, if Plaintiff failed to send a QWR to the designated address, he would

not be able to ultimately prevail on his claim. It does not appear that this mailing requirement

must be pleaded as part of a prima facie claim, and so it may not be proper to address this

argument at the pleading stage. However, in the interest of judicial economy, the Court warns

Plaintiff that before filing an amended complaint, he should consider whether he met this

mailing requirement and will ultimately be able to prevail in order to not waste important

enforcement.” Cornwall v. Third Fed. Sav. & Loan, No. 8:15-cv-2616-T-EAK-AAS, 2016

WL 4034782, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 25, 2016); Schooley v. Option One Mortg. Corp., No.

5:21-cv-219-AW/MFJ, 2022 WL 3703184, at *3 (N.D. Fla. June 17, 2022); see also

Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 281 (2004). This claim is dismissed with prejudice,

without leave to amend.

Chrysler Capital’s Motion to Dismiss or Compel Arbitration

In its motion, Chrysler Capital requests the Court (1) dismiss the complaint for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or (2) in the alternative, compel arbitration and stay

the claims against it pending arbitration. According to Chrysler, Plaintiff (acting as a co-

buyer and president of Hangout Corporation) entered into a retail installment sale

contract with Brandon Automall Fiat to purchase a 2021 Tesla Model Y, which was

financed by Chrysler Capital. The contract was assigned to Chrysler Capital. In the

contract, Chrysler Capital asserts that Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate any and all claims

relating to the contract, including any statutory claims under the Fair Credit Reporting

Act and Consumer Financial Protection Act because any alleged reporting would clearly

arise from the purchase of the vehicle and relate to the contract and servicing of the loan

(including default and payments owed under the contract).

This argument may be well-taken.3 Unfortunately, due to the shotgun nature of

the complaint and failure to sufficiently state any claims for relief, the Court is not able

to definitively make this determination at this time. Instead, the Court will deny the

3 Should the Court compel arbitration, Plaintiff’s claims against Chrysler Capital would be

stayed rather than dismissed. See, e.g., Milestone v. Citrus Specialty Grp., Inc., No. 8:19-cv-2341-

T-02JSS, 2019 WL 5887179, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 12, 2019) (citing Bender v. A.G. Edwards &

Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 699 (11th Cir. 1992)); 9 U.S.C. § 3; Giraud v. Woof Gang Bakery, No.

motion without prejudice to any right Chrysler Capital may have to re-raise the

argument should Plaintiff file an amended complaint against it.

Warning for Pro Se Litigant

The Court notes that even pro se plaintiffs must follow procedural rules,

including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of the

Middle District of Florida. Litigation - particularly in federal court - is

difficult, and Plaintiff should consider hiring an attorney. If he is unable to

afford counsel, he should consider the resources available to pro se litigants,

including the Legal Information Program operated by the Tampa Bay Chapter

of the Federal Bar Association, and the Middle District of Florida's guide to

assist pro se litigants proceeding in federal court, which is located on the

Court's website. The Court is unlikely to grant another opportunity to amend.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

1. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Equifax Information Services LLC,

TransUnion LLC, Experian Information Solutions, Inc., Navy Federal Credit

Union, USAA Federal Saving Bank, Bank of America, TBOM/ATLS/FORTIVA

MC, and Absolute Resolutions Investments are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. The Clerk is directed to terminate any pending motions and

deadlines associated with these Defendants, and to terminate them as parties

to this action.

2. Because Plaintiff’s claims against the CRAs are dismissed without prejudice,

Count I of the complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Defendant may not refile these claims against the CRAs in his amended

complaint.

3. The motions to dismiss are GRANTED to the extent that Counts IT and II of

Plaintiff's complaint are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with leave to

amend.

4. The motions to dismiss are GRANTED to the extent that Count IV is

dismissed with prejudice, without leave to amend.

5. Chrysler Capital’s Motion to Dismiss or Compel Arbitration is DENIED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Chrysler Capital may raise these arguments in

future filings if an amended complaint is filed.

6. Plaintiff is directed to file an amended complaint on or before April 15, 2026.

Failure to file an amended complaint as directed will result in this Order

becoming a final judgment. Plaintiff should not include Count I, or any claims

against the dismissed Defendants (who should not be named as Defendants in

the amended complaint). Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 and 11, should Plaintiff

file an amended complaint, he is directed to provide a handwritten signature.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, this 25th day of March,

2026.

NAP. GA.

TOMBARBER =————(ai‘“‘C:;C;~*~™

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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