ORAN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FRANCIS ORAN, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-CV-1243

:

AMY ZANELLI, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

GALLAGHER, J. MAY 11, 2026

Pro Se Plaintiff Francis Oran brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

asserting claims against Magisterial District Judge Amy Zanelli and Travelers Insurance. He

also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will grant

Oran leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the Second Amended Complaint1 pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS2

1 On February 27, 2026, prior to the Court’s review of his original Complaint, Oran filed

two duplicative Amended Complaints, (ECF Nos. 7, 8), and subsequently filed a Motion to

Amend seeking to file a Second Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 10). On April 24, 2026, the

Court granted the Motion and deemed his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) the operative

pleading in this case. (See ECF No. 13)

2 The facts set forth in this Memorandum are taken from the SAC (ECF No. 14) and

Oran’s Supplemental Brief in Support of Relief (ECF No. 12), which provides additional

information on the adjudication of his traffic offense in Florida. The Court adopts the pagination

assigned to the Complaint by the CM/ECF docketing system. Additionally, the Court includes

facts reflected in publicly available state court records, of which this Court may take judicial

notice. See Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006).

Oran’s allegations arise from three convictions in the Lehigh County Magisterial District

Court for driving with a suspended license in violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 1543(a). He asserts that

in May 2022, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation suspended his driving privileges

based on an unresolved traffic case out of Orange County, Florida. (SAC ¶¶ 4-5.) He contends

that the suspension was void ab initio because the Florida traffic matter had not yet been

adjudicated; further, he states he did not receive notice of the Florida case until February 2023.

(Id. ¶¶ 5-6; ECF No. 12 at 1.) Florida authorities ultimately issued Oran a D6 Clearance Letter

on June 6, 2024, stating that Oran’s obligations in his case were satisfied as of April 19, 2024.

(SAC ¶ 6; ECF No. 12 at 1.) Nevertheless, Oran was charged in Lehigh County with driving on

a suspended license in three cases spanning 2023-2025. See Commonwealth v. Oran, MJ-31106-

TR-0001194-2023 (MDJ Lehigh); Commonwealth v. Oran, MJ-31106-TR-0001411-2024 (MDJ

Lehigh); Commonwealth v. Oran, MJ-31106-TR-0003066-2025 (MDJ Lehigh).

Defendant Amy Zanelli, a Magisterial District Judge in Lehigh County, presided over all

three matters. (SAC ¶ 7.) Oran asserts that in each case he entered a not guilty plea and

“submitted pre-trial motions challenging the validity of the suspension, raised notice and

jurisdictional defenses, and presented evidence of the pending Florida and relevant civil

proceedings.” (Id. ¶ 8.) Oran also states that Zanelli was aware that “DL-38 suspension

notification forms were cancelled and re-filed at least nine (9) times across the two closed cases

[presenting] direct evidence of administrative instability in the suspension[.]” (Id. ¶ 9.) Zanelli

nevertheless found Oran guilty in all three cases and imposed fines, costs, and other obligations

without conducting an ability to pay hearing. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 10.) Oran subsequently filed a request

for administrative review of his license suspensions by suing the Pennsylvania DOT in the

Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas; the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on

April 17, 2026. See Oran v. Pa. Dept. of Transp. Bureau of Driver Licensing, No. CI-25-09903

(C.P. Lancaster).

On January 7, 2026, the Pennsylvania Judicial Conduct Board filed formal charges

against Zanelli based on various allegations of improper conduct, including maintaining a “Book

of Grudges” in which she documented grievances against particular litigants; displaying a

sexually-explicit desk calendar in a work area; physically removing a pro se litigant from the

courtroom and denying him an opportunity to cross-examine a witness, then convicting him;

yelling at courtroom employees; using profanity; and habitual lateness and absences. (SAC ¶

11); see also In re: Amy Zanelli (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc.) (1 JD 2026). Oran states that “[t]hese

charges corroborate the pattern of constitutional misconduct [he] experienced.” (SAC ¶ 11.)

Based on the above allegations, Oran asserts claims against Zanelli under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights and for

malicious prosecution. (SAC at 3.) He also asserts a public official bond claim against Travelers

Insurance (“Travelers”) based on Zanelli’s alleged failure to faithfully perform her official

duties. (Id.) He seeks compensatory and punitive damages against Zanelli, $50,000 against

Travelers, a declaratory judgment that his convictions under 75 Pa. C.S. § 1543(a) are

“constitutionally void,”3 expungement of his three § 1543(a) convictions, and costs of litigation.

(Id. at 4.)

3 Declaratory relief is unavailable to adjudicate past conduct, so Oran’s request for this

declaratory relief is improper. See Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (per

curiam) (“Declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct” and is also

not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.”); see also Andela v. Admin.

Office of U.S. Courts, 569 F. App’x 80, 83 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“Declaratory judgments

are meant to define the legal rights and obligations of the parties in the anticipation of some

future conduct.”). A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is

liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-

3574, 2021 WL 1191628, at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court will grant Oran leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that he

is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint if it fails to state

a claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the

same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to

determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 560 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). At this early stage of the

litigation, the Court will accept the facts alleged in the pro se complaint as true, draw all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether the complaint contains facts

sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir.

2021), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197, 204

(3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Because Oran is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. See

Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704

F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). The Court will “apply the relevant legal principle even when

the complaint has failed to name it.” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 245). However, “pro se

litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Id. (quoting

Mala, 704 F.3d at 245). An unrepresented litigant “cannot flout procedural rules — they must

available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no

threat of continuing harm.”).

abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Mala, 704 F.3d at 245; see also Doe v.

Allegheny Cnty. Hous. Auth., No. 23-1105, 2024 WL 379959, at *3 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2024) (per

curiam) (“While a court must liberally construe the allegations and ‘apply the applicable law,

irrespective of whether the pro se litigant mentioned it be name,’ Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683,

688 (3d Cir. 2002), this does not require the court to act as an advocate to identify any possible

claim that the facts alleged could potentially support.”).

Furthermore, the Court must dismiss the Complaint if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); see also Grp. Against Smog and Pollution, Inc.

v. Shenango, Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 122 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “an objection to subject

matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time [and] a court may raise jurisdictional issues sua

sponte”). A plaintiff commencing an action in federal court bears the burden of establishing

federal jurisdiction. See Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir.

2015) (“The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests with the party asserting its

existence.”) (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006)).

“Jurisdictional [issues] . . . may be raised at any time and courts have a duty to consider them sua

sponte.” Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152, 157 (2023) (internal quotations omitted). In

assessing the Second Amended Complaint, the Court is mindful of its obligation to liberally

construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings. See Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Constitutional Claims

The vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal court is 42

U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.

42, 48 (1988); see also Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F .3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995)

(“The color of state law element is a threshold issue; there is no liability under § 1983 for those

not acting under color of law.”).

Oran asserts claims against Defendant Zanelli under the Fourteenth Amendment and for

malicious prosecution. These claims are barred by judicial immunity. Judges are entitled to

absolute immunity from civil rights claims that are based on acts or omissions taken in their

judicial capacity, so long as they do not act in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978); Harvey v. Loftus, 505 F. App’x 87, 90 (3d Cir.

2012) (per curiam); Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). An act

is taken in a judge’s judicial capacity if it is “a function normally performed by a judge.” Gallas

v. Supreme Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). Moreover, “[g]enerally . . . ‘where a

court has some subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity

purposes.’” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443-44 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Barnes v.

Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1122 (6th Cir. 1997)). Because judges must feel free to act without

fear of incurring personal liability for their actions in court, judicial immunity remains in force

even if the actions are alleged to be legally incorrect, in bad faith, malicious, or corrupt, Mireles

v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991), or are taken as a result of a conspiracy with others, Dennis v.

Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). Oran’s claims against Zanelli arise out of rulings she made in

his three Magisterial District Court matters, in which he contends she ignored his motions and

relevant administrative findings, failed to conduct an ability to pay hearing before sentencing

him, and wrongly found him guilty of violating 75 Pa. C.S. § 1543(a). (SAC ¶¶ 7-10.) Even

assuming these allegations were true, the claims are barred by judicial immunity. All of the acts

and omissions described were taken by Zanelli in her judicial capacity presiding over three

magisterial district court cases. See Brigman v. Schaum, No. 20-1549, 2021 WL 3836819, at *9

(M.D. Pa. July 27, 2021) (dismissing § 1983 claims against magisterial district judge who

presided over summary traffic offenses on immunity grounds, noting that “[p]ursuant to 42 Pa.

C.S. § 1515, magisterial district judges . . . have jurisdiction over summary offenses.), report and

recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 3784295 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2021). Oran does not allege

any facts suggesting that Zanelli acted in the absence of all jurisdiction. Indeed, the relevant

Court records reflect that Zanelli was the assigned judge in the three relevant cases, thus she

clearly had jurisdiction to issue judicial rulings.4 See Oran, MJ-31106-TR-0001194-2023; Oran,

MJ-31106-TR-0001411-2024; Oran, MJ-31106-TR-0003066-2025; see also 42 Pa. C.S. § 1515.

Accordingly, Oran’s claims against Zanelli are barred by judicial immunity and will be

dismissed.

B. Injunctive Relief

Oran seeks injunctive relief in the form of “expungement” of his three § 1543(a)

convictions. The Court understands him to be asking this Court to review and overturn his three

magisterial district court convictions. This is not the type of relief that can be granted on a

§ 1983 claim. When a person who has been convicted in a state court seeks to challenge either

the fact of the conviction or the duration of their sentence imposed for the conviction, and the

relief sought is a determination that she is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release, the

4 And while Oran alleges that the Pennsylvania Judicial Conduct Board has filed

misconduct charges against Zanelli, he fails to allege that she was charged with acting in the

absence of all jurisdiction in his case (or any other), such that her actions would lie beyond the

scope of judicial immunity.

sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500

(1973); Jaffery v. Atl. Cnty. Prosecutor's Office, 695 F. App’x 38, 41-42 (3d Cir. 2017) (per

curiam) (“[T]o the extent Jaffery seeks dismissal of the charges against him as a result of

constitutional violations, such relief is only available through a writ of habeas corpus.”); Duran

v. Weeks, 399 F. App’x 756, 759 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“[T]o the extent that Duran is

seeking dismissal of the charges against him as a result of constitutional violations, he is

essentially asking for relief only available through habeas corpus.”) This means that “whenever

[a prisoner’s] challenge ultimately attacks the ‘core of habeas’ — the validity of the continued

conviction or the fact or length of the sentence — [the] challenge, however denominated and

regardless of the relief sought, must be brought by way of a habeas corpus petition.” Leamer v.

Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002). This holds true for summary offenses as

well. See Mina v. Hogan, 616 F. App’x 41, 42 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's

“Rule 60(b) motion” seeking to challenge his state court conviction for a summary offense

because “Mina cannot challenge his state-court conviction in federal court under Rule 60(b). Any

request that a federal court overturn a state-court conviction must be brought in a habeas corpus

petition” (citing Preiser).) Oran’s request to have his criminal convictions expunged also runs

afoul of Preiser. See Knight v. Crocker, No. 13-15, 2013 WL 3561187, at *5 (W.D. Ky. July 11,

2013) (“[S]hould any expungement necessarily imply the invalidity of [plaintiff’s] current

confinement or its duration, § 1983 relief is unavailable. Consequently, Plaintiff’s claims for

equitable relief relating to release and expungement under § 1983 will be dismissed.”); Dupin v.

Taylor, No. 23-286, 2023 WL 6979602, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 23, 2023) (“Because expungement

would invalidate Plaintiff’s conviction, he cannot seek for such relief under § 1983.”); see

also Johnson v. Valdez, No. 13-2173, 2013 WL 5489957, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 1,

2013) (“Expungement is not the type of relief available under § 1983, because the right to

expunge state records is not a federal constitutional right.” (citing Eutzy v. Tesar, 880 F.2d 1010,

1011 (8th Cir. 1989))); Duke v. White, 616 F.2d 955, 956 (6th Cir. 1980). Accordingly, Oran’s

claim seeking claims seeking an order seeking the expungement of his convictions will be

dismissed without prejudice. See Garrett v. Murphy, 17 F.4th 419, 430 (3d Cir.

2021) (“[W]henever a plaintiff pleads a violation of § 1983 and effectively seeks habeas relief,

the plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim. Instead, the [litigant’s] only federal remedy is through

a writ of habeas corpus after exhausting state remedies.”).

C. Bond Claim against Travelers Insurance

Oran also attempts to assert a bond claim against Travelers, based on a policy held by

Zanelli as required by state law. (SAC at 3); see 246 Pa. Code R. 110.5 Oran does not assert that

this claim involves a federal question, provide any facts indicating that the Court can exercise

diversity jurisdiction,6 or allege any other basis for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over this

5 The rule requires “[e]ach magisterial district judge . . . to give bond in such sum, not

less than $25,000 . . . with one or more sufficient sureties. . . for the benefit of the

Commonwealth and its political subdivisions and all persons who may sustain injury from the

magisterial district judge in his or her official capacity.”

6 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) grants a district court jurisdiction over a case in which “the matter

in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is

between . . . citizens of different States.” Section 1332(a) requires “‘complete diversity between

all plaintiffs and all defendants,’ even though only minimal diversity is constitutionally required.

This means that, unless there is some other basis for jurisdiction, ‘no plaintiff [may] be a citizen

of the same state as any defendant.’” Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 104

(3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) and Zambelli

Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal footnotes omitted)). As

stated, the plaintiff has the burden of pleading the existence of the court’s jurisdiction, see Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8, and ‘“in a diversity action, the plaintiff must state all parties’ citizenships such that

the existence of complete diversity can be confirmed.’” Craven v. Leach, 647 F. App’x 72, 75

(3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.3d 210,

222 n. 13 (3d Cir. 1999)). Oran does not allege the citizenship of the parties, but provides

Pennsylvania addresses for himself and Zanelli, suggesting that the parties are not completely

diverse. Smith v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., No. 08-5689, 2009 WL 1674715, *4 (E.D. Pa. June

claim. Accordingly, his state law claim against Travelers will be dismissed without prejudice for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction.7

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Oran leave to proceed in forma pauperis

and dismiss his constitutional claims with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Oran’s state law bond claim against Travelers Insurance will be

dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. His claims for injunctive

relief will be dismissed without prejudice to him seeking habeas relief if appropriate. The Court

concludes that amendment would be futile and will therefore dismiss this action without leave to

amend. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (requiring

amendment in a pro se case unless it would be inequitable or futile). An appropriate Order

accompanies this Memorandum.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ John M. Gallagher

JOHN M. GALLAGHER, J.

11, 2009) (“Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity between the parties . . . . [N]o

single Plaintiff may be a citizen of the same state as any single Defendant.”) (citations omitted).

Accordingly, Oran has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that this Court has subject

matter jurisdiction over his state law bond claim.

7 The dismissal of Oran’s claim against Travelers is without prejudice to him filing a

bond claim with the appropriate County office.