Webb

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

JEREMIAH VERNON WEBB,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:25-cv-1942-JLB-AAS

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF

EDUCATION, et al.,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

This cause comes before the Court upon the Report and Recommendation

filed by Magistrate Judge Amanda Arnold Sansone on August 1, 2025 (Doc. 7),

recommending that Mr. Webb’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) be

DENIED and Mr. Webb’s Complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED. Plaintiff timely

objected to the Report and Recommendation. (Docs. 10 & 12).1 Upon de novo

review of the Complaint and the record, the Court adopts in part the Magistrate

Judge’s well-reasoned and thoughtful Report and Recommendation. Plaintiff may

file an amended complaint subject to the instructions provided by the Court in

this order.

1 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) provides that “[w]ithin fourteen days after being served with a

copy, any party may serve and file written objections[.]” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

6(d) requires that a party served by mail is given an additional three days to respond. The

Report and Recommendation was issued on August 1, 2025, and Plaintiff was served a copy

via mail on August 4, 2025. Thus, Plaintiff’s August 21, 2025, objections are timely.

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of his minor Child, B.A.W., filed a

Complaint against Defendants Florida Department of Education, several state

officials and employees in their individual and official capacities, the Incarnation

Catholic School, Diocese of Venice in Florida, and Step Up For Students, Inc. (Doc.

1). Plaintiff brings the following claims: (1) Monell liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

(2) unlawful seizure under section 1983; (3) retaliation under section 1983;

(4) malicious prosecution and fabrication of records under section 1983;

(5) conspiracy under section 1985(3); (6) violation of the Florida Parents’ Bill of

Rights; (7) violation of Florida’s Parental Rights in Education Act; (8) civil theft

pursuant to Florida Statutes § 772.11; (9) tortious interference with a parental

relationship; (10) negligent interference with education and therapy; (11) abuse of

process; (12) malicious prosecution; and (13) failure to report abuse pursuant to

Florida Statutes §§ 39.201 and 1006.061. (Doc. 1).

The Complaint’s general allegations are sparse. But Plaintiff’s attempts to

seek relief in this Court are vast, as noted by the Magistrate Judge. Essentially,

Plaintiff alleges that a “Parenting Plan” entered on February 27, 2025, granted

equal custody and that, from February 18, 2025, through April 18, 2025,

Defendants conspired to seize his minor child, B.A.W, fabricate records, retaliate,

and ignore ideation. (Doc. 1 at 6). Plaintiff’s general factual allegations rely heavily

on items not attached to the Complaint or otherwise filed with the Court. As relief,

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of at least

at 10).

Upon review of the Complaint, the Magistrate Judge recommended

dismissing all claims without leave to amend for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

(Doc. 7). Plaintiff objected, arguing that the Court has federal question jurisdiction.

(Docs. 10, 12).

LEGAL STANDARD

A district judge may accept, reject, or modify the magistrate judge’s report

and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district judge must “make a de

novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made.” Id.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not seek to have this Court review or otherwise

interfere with custody proceedings. Rather, it seeks damages and systemic reform

for alleged civil rights violations. (See Doc. 1); see also Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th

1206, 1213 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that the district court enjoyed subject matter

jurisdiction where the appellants “d[id] not raise these constitutional claims to undo

the state court’s child custody decision; they want[ed] money damages for

constitutional violations.”). Thus, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States.”); 28 U.S.C § 1367 (“[I]n any civil action of which the district courts

have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction

jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy . . . .”).

That said, the Complaint suffers from other procedural deficiencies.

Plaintiff’s Complaint constitutes an impermissible shotgun pleading. (See Doc. 1).

“A district court has the ‘inherent authority to control its docket and ensure the

prompt resolution of lawsuits,’ which includes the ability to dismiss a complaint on

shotgun pleading grounds.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295

(11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313,

1320 (11th Cir. 2015)). “A shotgun pleading is a complaint that violates either

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both.” Barmapov v.

Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1320).

Rule 8(a) requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Rule 10(b)

requires that a party “state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each

limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

The “self-evident” purpose of the rules is “to require the pleader to present his

claims discretely and succinctly” so the adversary “can discern what he is claiming

and frame a responsive pleading [and] the court can determine which facts support

which claims and whether the plaintiff has stated any claims upon which relief can

be granted.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1320 (citation omitted).

There are four categories of shotgun pleadings. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321–

23. The first and most common type “is a complaint containing multiple counts

where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each

of the entire complaint.” Id. The second is a complaint “replete with conclusory,

vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of

action.” Id. The third type of shotgun pleading is one that does not “separat[e] into

a different count each cause of action or claim for relief.” Id. The fourth and final

category of shotgun pleading is one that “assert[s] multiple claims against multiple

defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which

acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.” Id.

Plaintiff’s Complaint falls into the first and second categories of a shotgun

pleading. Each count of Plaintiff’s Complaint adopts all preceding allegations.

(Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 47–59). Further, the Complaint is “replete with conclusory, vague,

and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action.”

Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321–23. For example, Plaintiff requests relief without

explaining why the relief is appropriate under any cause of action. See Amin v.

Pepperman, No. 8:23-CV-02345, 2023 WL 6975978, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 23, 2023)

(dismissing a complaint as a shotgun pleading where the plaintiff failed to explain

why the relief was appropriate for the causes of action). Additionally, none of the

Complaint’s thirteen claims “plead the elements of a viable cause of action,

supporting each element with specific factual allegations.” Gaddiel David Perez v.

Off. of Foreign Assets Control, No. 24-CV-21258, 2024 WL 6967222, at *1 (S.D. Fla.

Apr. 24, 2024). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint without

prejudice. Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1357 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[A]

District Court retains authority to dismiss a shotgun pleading on that basis alone.”).

an attorney and, therefore, must appear through counsel to pursue an action on his

child’s behalf. See Devine v. Indian River County School Board, 121 F.3d 576 (11th

Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v.

Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007) (holding that neither section 1654 nor

Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c) permit a non-lawyer parent to represent a child in federal

court). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to bring claims on behalf of B.A.W.,

he cannot do so without an attorney.

The Court will provide Plaintiff with one opportunity to file an amended

complaint to cure the deficiencies. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should

freely give leave when justice so requires.”); see also Silberman v. Miami Dade

Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1132 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd.

of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2018) (“A [pro se] plaintiff must be given at least

one chance to amend the complaint before the district court dismisses the action

with prejudice’. . . where ‘a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim.’”).

No new claims may be added to the amended complaint. Should Plaintiff choose to

file an amended complaint pro se, he must either pay the filing fee or file a new

motion to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (allowing a litigant to

commence a civil action without prepayment of the filing fee if the litigant submits

an affidavit showing they are unable to pay). If Plaintiff chooses to file the

amended complaint, the Court will allow Plaintiff 21 days to file an amended

complaint. Should Plaintiff wish to raise claims on behalf of his son, he must retain

counsel to advance claims on behalf of his son within 14 days of the date of this

they seek relief on behalf of his minor child.

It is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

(1) The Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Doc. 7) is

ADOPTED in part as explained in this Order.

(2) Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice.

(3) Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is DENIED

without prejudice.

(4) Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within 21 days from the date

of this Order. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, no new

claims may be added. And Plaintiff is not permitted to advance claims

on behalf of his minor child without first retaining an attorney to

represent his minor son in these proceedings.

(5) Should Plaintiff retain an attorney to represent his minor child,

Plaintiff is DIRECTED to instruct that attorney that the attorney

must file a notice of appearance within 14 days of the date of this

Order.

(6) Failure to comply with any directive in this Order may result in the

dismissal of this case without further notice from the Court. Plaintiff

is to be especially mindful of his litigation history with this Court

arising from the state court’s custodial dispute, which has been

detailed by the Magistrate Judge in her well-reasoned Report and

Recommendation. This is, as best the Court can tell from a review of

the docket, the fourth case filed in this Court related to this custodial

dispute. Although Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he is nevertheless

required to adhere to all Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this

Court’s Local Rules. Failure to adhere to these rules may result in the

Court assessing Plaintiff with monetary sanctions, classifying him as

a vexatious litigant (requiring him to retain counsel and pay the filing

fee in every future case), and other sanctions within the Court’s

discretion.

DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on March 25, 2026.

JOHN L. BADALAMENTI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE