Opinion

Court: District Court, E.D. California
Filed: Jan 21, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 41.3%

The opinion

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 ROBERT SIMS, No. 1:24-cv-00433-KES-EPG (PC)

11 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING THAT DEFENDANT’S

12 v.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE

13 SARA V. CENTENO, GRANTED

14 Defendant. (ECF No. 29)

15 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN

THIRTY (30) DAYS

17 I. INTRODUCTION

18 Plaintiff Robert Sims is a civil detainee at the Department of State Hospitals-Coalinga

19 (Coalinga) and is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant

20 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1, 6). This case proceeds on Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Sara

21 V. Centeno—an employee at Coalinga—violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights by

22 failing to protect him from a fellow patient. (ECF Nos. 7, 10, 18).

23 On September 10, 2025, Defendant Centano filed a motion for summary judgment,

24 arguing that she did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights because she “took objectively

reasonable measures to abate the risk.” (ECF No. 29-1, p. 6). For the reasons set forth below, the

Court will recommend that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment be granted.

\\\

1 II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

2 Plaintiff filed his complaint on April 11, 2024. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges that he was

3 attacked on May 30, 2023, by another patient at Coalinga named Gustavo Zelaya.1 Plaintiff

4 claims that Defendant Centeno violated his constitutional rights by failing to prevent the attack.

Plaintiff alleges that on May 23, 2023,2 David Boot3—a fellow patient—observed Zelaya

sharpening a weapon in the bathroom and notified Defendant. However, “she did nothing about it

concerning hitting her alarm or notifying DPS at Coalinga State Hospital Police.” (Id. at 12).

Plaintiff alleges that, after Defendant was notified of this information, Zelaya cut his neck and he

is “unable to speak normal[ly] from the injuries [he] sust[ained].” (Id. at 5).

The Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and permitted Plaintiff to proceed on his claim

for failure to protect against Defendant Sara V. Centeno. (ECF No. 7, 18).

III. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant Centano moved for summary judgment on September 10, 2025. (ECF No. 29).

In her motion, Defendant acknowledges that another patient, David Boot, told her that

Zelaya was spending a lot of time in the restroom, and that Zelaya later stabbed Plaintiff in the

neck with a metal object. However, Defendant argues that she did not violate Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights because she acted reasonably based on the information she had to abate the

risk of harm to Plaintiff. (ECF No. 29-2, p. 6). Specifically, Defendant has submitted evidence

18 showing that she responded to Boot’s information by inspecting the restroom that Zelaya had

19 been spending a lot of time in. She also conducted a “shakedown” of Zelaya’s dorm room, and

20 after finding nothing, “reported the suspicious activity to the following shift’s lead before leaving

21 work for the day.” (Id. at 7). Moreover, on the same day as her search, “DSH-C police conducted

22 a canine search of Zelaya’s dorm room, and no contraband was found.” (Id. at 3). Further,

23 Defendant argues that she had no reason to know that Zelaya would attack Plaintiff in particular.

25 1 The complaint uses the name “Guztavo Zeleya.” However, Defendant indicates the correct spelling is

“Gustavo Zelaya.” (ECF No. 29-2, p. 1). The Court uses “Gustavo Zelaya” for consistency.

26 2 As noted below, Defendant states that Boot alerted her to Zelaya’s suspicious activity on May 22, 2023.

(ECF No. 29-2, p. 2). And Plaintiff fails to dispute this date. Regardless, any difference as to the date is

27 ultimately immaterial for summary judgment purposes.

3 The complaint uses the name “David Booth.” However, Defendant indicates the correct spelling is

28 “David Boot.” (ECF No. 29-2, p. 2). The Court uses “David Boot” for consistency.

1 (Id. at 8). 4

2 In support of her motion for summary judgment, Defendant submits the following

3 evidence: (1) the declaration of Genesis Morales, a Coalinga employee who helped Defendant

4 search Zelaya’s dorm room; (2) Defendant’s own declaration describing the actions she took upon

learning of Zelaya’s suspicious activity; (3) portions of Plaintiff’s deposition; (4) portions of

Boot’s deposition; and (5) photos of the restroom stall and weapon at issue, (6) a search log of

Zelaya’s dorm room, and (7) a report of the police canine search of Zelaya’s dorm room. (ECF

No. 29-4 to 29-6). Defendant also provided a statement of undisputed facts in support of her

motion for summary judgment as required under Local Rule 260(a). (ECF No. 29-1, pp. 1-8).

Additionally, Defendant has provided Plaintiff with a Rand5 warning informing him what is

required to oppose summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and a summary

of Local Rule 260 regarding statements of undisputed facts. (ECF No. 29-3, pp. 1-2).

After Plaintiff failed to timely oppose Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the

Court issued an order granting him a single sua sponte extension to November 14, 2025, to do so.

(ECF No. 31). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an opposition, which he dated November 10, 2025. (ECF

No. 32). In that opposition, Plaintiff states as follows:

16 As ordered by the Courts to file a timely opposition, movant declares to file

opposition order by the Courts to grant Plaintiff a single sua sponte extension to

November 14, 2025. Plaintiff Robert Sims motions this Honorable Court to strike

18 any and all testimony by Gustavo Zeleya, when Attorney General Julio A.

Hernandez questioned, Mr. Zeleya. Gustavo extorted the Attorney General Julio

19 A. Hernandez offering in the amount of 6000.00 to testify on Sara Centeno behalf.

This was ulterior motive on Gustavo Zeleya to force the Court to pay Gustavo on

20 demand for his testimony. This is my opposition under the scheduling order.

21 (ECF No. 32, pp. 1-2) (minor alterations for readability).

22 On December 2, 2025, Defendant filed a reply arguing that, “[b]y failing to contest any of

23 the undisputed facts and legal argument before the court, the opposition fails to raise a genuine

24 issue of fact, warranting granting of Defendant Centeno’s motion.” (ECF No. 33, p. 3).

25 On December 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed a document titled, in part, “Reply to the Opposition

of Plaintiff Sims to Motion for Summary Judgment,” which the Court construes as a surreply.

27 4 Because the Court is recommending that Defendant be granted summary judgment, it will not address her

argument that she is also entitled to qualified immunity. (ECF No. 29-2, p. 9).

28 5 See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998).

1 (ECF No. 34) (capitalization omitted). Generally, Plaintiff argues that it is undisputed that (1)

2 Zelaya attacked him; and (2) that Boot warned Defendant about Zelaya’s suspicious activity.

3 Plaintiff contends that Defendant should have held Zelaya “in the bathroom till DPS arrived to

4 search Gustavo in the bathroom and would have found the manufactured weapon used to attempt

to kill Robert Sims.” (Id. at 2).6

IV. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment in favor of a party is appropriate when there “is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a); Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“If there is a genuine

dispute about material facts, summary judgment will not be granted.”). A party asserting that a

fact cannot be disputed must support the assertion by

citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,

13 documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,

stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,

14 interrogatory answers, or other materials, or showing that the materials cited do

not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party

15 cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

17 A party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the

18 district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,

19 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

20 any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex

21 Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “Where the non-

moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only prove that there is an

absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627

F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). If the moving party does so, “the burden then shifts to the non-

moving party to designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial,”

which is not a light burden, the party “must come forth with evidence from which a jury could

27 6 Although Plaintiff was not given leave to file a surreply, the Court has considered this filing. See Taylor

v. Carbullido, No. 2:19-CV-2550-KJM-CKD P, 2023 WL 3168402, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2023)

28 (noting that “[s]ur-replies are generally not permitted”).

1 reasonably render a verdict in the non-moving party’s favor.” Id.; see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

2 Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the

3 plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably

4 find for the plaintiff.”). “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

Additionally, “[a] summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by relying solely on conclusory

allegations unsupported by factual data.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

In reviewing the evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court “must draw all

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Comite de Jornaleros

de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2011). It need only

draw inferences, however, where there is “evidence in the record . . . from which a reasonable

inference . . . may be drawn”; the Court need not entertain inferences that are unsupported by fact.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330 n. 2 (citation omitted). In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the

Court may consider other materials in the record not cited to by the parties but is not required to

do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026,

1031 (9th Cir. 2001).

16 B. Failure to protect

17 As the Ninth Circuit has noted, the Fourteenth Amendment, as opposed to the Eighth

18 Amendment, governs the legal standards regarding the treatment that civil detainees receive. See

19 Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Though it purported to analyze [a civil

20 detainee’s] conditions of confinement claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, the district court

21 actually applied the standards that govern a claim of cruel and unusual punishment under the

22 Eighth Amendment. The court mistook the amendment that was to be applied.”).

23 The Ninth Circuit has provided the following standards for a failure-to-protect claim

brought under the Fourteenth Amendment:

Putting these principles together, the elements of a pretrial detainee’s

Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against an individual

26 officer are:

(1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the

27 conditions under which the plaintiff was confined;

28 (2) Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious

1 harm;

2 (3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that

risk, even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have

3 appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of

the defendant’s conduct obvious; and

(4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s

5 injuries.

6 With respect to the third element, the defendant’s conduct must be

objectively unreasonable, a test that will necessarily “turn[ ] on the ‘facts

7 and circumstances of each particular case.’” [Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135

S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015)] (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396,

8 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)); see also Restatement (Second)

of Torts § 500 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 2016) (recognizing that “reckless

disregard” may be shown by an objective standard under which an

10 individual “is held to the realization of the aggravated risk which a

reasonable [person] in his place would have, although he does not himself

11 have it”).

12 Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (footnote omitted); see Hill

13 v. Lynch, No. 2:22-CV-0342-TLN-JDP (P), 2024 WL 4884575, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2024),

report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 5125890 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2024) (applying

Castro to claim brought by civil detainee).

V. UNDISPUTED FACTS

Based on the evidence presented, the Court finds that the following facts are undisputed:

The events at issue occurred at Coalinga, which “houses civil detainees who have been

committed for treatment by the courts and primarily treats patients that have been committed or

have been accused of committing crimes linked to their mental illness.” (ECF No. 29-1, pp. 1-2).

On May 22, 2023, patient David Boot visited the nurses’ station where Defendant Centano, a

psychiatric technician at Coalinga, was located. (Id. at 2-3). Defendant “spoke with Boot and

another patient, Norman Bell.” (Id. at 3). “Boot informed [Defendant] that he had observed

another patient, Gustavo Zelaya, spending a lot of time in the restroom, which is a suspicious

24 activity.” (Id.). Thereafter, Defendant and a fellow employee, Genesis Moralas, “went to the

25 restroom to investigate the suspicious activity.” (Id.). “At that last toilet stall [they] noticed dust-

26 like dark-colored debris on the ground,” but “could see no obvious sources of the debris.” (Id.).

27 “After discovering the debris in the restroom, Centeno concluded that a shakedown of

28 Zelaya’s dorm room and personal property was warranted,” with the dorm room housing Zelaya

1 and three other patients. (Id. at 4). “To conduct a shakedown of any dorm room at DSH-C, the

2 room must first be cleared of any patients, and the patients are informed that a shakedown will be

3 conducted.” (Id.). “Following shakedown protocols, [Defendant] informed Zelaya that his dorm

4 room and belongings would be subject to a search.” (Id.). Defendant, Morales, and two other

Coalinga employees “conducted a thorough shakedown of Zelaya’s dorm room and personal

property.” (Id.).

“The shakedown [lasted approximately twelve minutes and] began with a thorough search

of Zelaya’s bed, including searching underneath the mattress and through the bedsheets, and

continued with a complete search of his personal property, wardrobe cabinet, and shelves.” (Id. at

5). However, “[n]o contraband or weapons were found.” (Id.). “After the completion of the

shakedown, Centeno and Morales personally initialed the search log, confirming that a search had

been completed on May 22, 2023, and no contraband was located.” (Id.).

Later on May 22, 2023, “DSH-C police conducted a canine search of Zelaya’s dorm room,

and no contraband was found.” (Id. at 6). “At the end of her shift, on May 22, 2023, Centeno

informed the incoming shift lead of the reports of the suspicious activity, and she did not return to

DSH-C until after May 30, 2023.” (Id.).

16 “On May 30, 2023, [P]laintiff Sims was sitting in a day room at DSH-Coalinga eating

17 breakfast, when Zelaya came from behind and stabbed Sims in the neck with a metal object with

18 a black handle.” (Id.).

19 Prior to the attacked, “Sims and Zelaya had exchanged pleasantries.” (Id.). “At no time

20 prior to the attack did Boot have a discussion with Sims about Zelaya’s suspicious activity.” (Id.

21 at 7). “At no time prior to the attack was Centeno informed, . . . [that] Plaintiff was being targeted

22 by Zelaya or posed a threat to Plaintiff.” (Id.).

23 VI. ANALYSIS

After reviewing the evidence presented, the Court recommends finding that Defendant has

met her initial burden of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. That evidence shows that Defendant Centeno took reasonable measures to abate the

risk posed to Plaintiff by Zelaya’s suspicious activity, namely, “she initiated a search of the

restroom where the suspicious activity occurred, determined that a shakedown of Zelaya’s dorm-

1 room and personal property for contraband was warranted, and informed the incoming shift lead

2 that there was a report of Zelaya’s suspicious activity.” (ECF No. 29-2, p. 6).

3 Moreover, there is nothing to indicate that Defendant made an intentional decision with

4 respect to the conditions under which Plaintiff was confined that put Plaintiff at substantial risk of

suffering serious harm. Nothing in the record shows that Defendant possessed any information

indicating that Zelaya would attack Plaintiff, or that Defendant Centano failed to take reasonable

measures to abate the risk that Zelaya posed.

In light of the extensive record establishing that Defendant did not fail to protect Plaintiff

under the relevant Fourteenth Amendment standards, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate

a genuine issue of material fact for trial. However, Plaintiff has offered no evidence in opposition

to Defendant’s evidence, nor has he disputed any of the facts in Defendant’s statement of

undisputed facts.

Rather, Plaintiff’s opposition argues only that the Court should strike Zelaya’s testimony.

(ECF No. 32, p. 2). However, Defendant Centeno has not offered any testimony from Zelaya in

support of her motion for summary judgment.7 (ECF No. 33, p. 6).

In his surreply, Plaintiff argues that that it is undisputed that (1) Zelaya attacked him; and

16 (2) that Boot warned Defendant about Zelaya’s suspicious activity. (ECF No. 34, p. 2). However,

17 these facts alone fail to show that Defendant Centeno violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

18 Plaintiff also argues that Defendant should have held Zelaya “in the bathroom till DPS arrived to

19 search Gustavo in the bathroom and would have found the manufactured weapon used to attempt

20 to kill Robert Sims.” (Id. at 2). However, Plaintiff does not submit any evidence to support this

21 statement. On the contrary, Defendant’s evidence indicates that the restroom was empty when

22 Defendant searched the stall. (ECF No. 29-1, p. 3). Regardless, even if Zelaya were still in the

23 restroom during the search, Plaintiff fails to provide any evidence that Defendant’s response was

objectively unreasonable.

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to come forth with evidence from which a jury

could reasonably render a verdict in his favor, the Court will recommend that Defendant’s motion

27 7 Defendant explains that defense counsel attempted to depose Zelaya on June 26, 2025; however, he

demanded money to testify. (ECF No. 33, p. 6). Defense counsel refused the demand for payment, Zelaya

28 refused to testify, and the deposition did not take place. (Id.).

1 | for summary judgment be granted and this case be dismissed.

2 VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

3 Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that

4 1. Defendant Centeno’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 29) be granted,

5 2. Judgment be entered in Defendant Centeno’s favor, and

6 3. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.

7 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

g assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30) days

9 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

" Findings and Recommendations.” Any objections shall be limited to no more than fifteen (15)

" pages, including exhibits. Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen

2 (14) days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

13 within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772

14 | □ 3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (Sth Cir. 1991)).

16 | IT IS SO ORDERED.

'T | Dated: _ January 21, 2026 hey —

18 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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