Kersey

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Daniel Kersey,

Plaintiff,

-v- 2:26-cv-02954

(NJC) (LGD)

Suffolk County Correctional Facility; et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Daniel Kersey, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 (“Section 1983”) against the Suffolk County Correctional Facility (“Jail”) and the

Riverhead County Jail Medical Unit (“Medical Unit” and together, “Defendants”) challenging

the adequacy of the medical care at the Jail. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Before the Court is

Kersey’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), filed along with his Complaint. (IFP

Mot., ECF No. 2.)

For the reasons explained below, Kersey’s motion to proceed IFP is granted. After

granting IFP, the Court reviewed the Complaint in accordance with the requirements of

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. Upon review, this Court dismisses the Complaint pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b) as set forth below.

BACKGROUND

On May 18, 2026, Kersey filed a Complaint pursuant to Section 1983 against the

Defendants challenging the adequacy of medical care at the Jail together with an IFP Motion.

(Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ III.B.; IFP Mot., ECF No. 2.)

I. The Complaint1

According to the Complaint, on October 1, 2025, Kersey visited the Medical Unit and

was diagnosed with a left torn Achilles tendon. (Compl. ¶ IV at 4, ¶ IV.A at 6.) Kersey was

provided with ice and Tylenol and sent back to his housing unit. (Id.) Approximately two weeks

later, during Kersey’s visit to the Medical Unit for a different injury, the treating doctor ordered

crutches for Kersey upon noticing his swollen ankle. (Id.) On October 27, 2025, Kersey filed a

grievance challenging sufficiency of the medical care provided to him for his torn Achilles

tendon. (Id.) According to the Complaint, Kersey had not been provided with “anti inflamatory

meds or pain meds despite me filing numerous medical request forms.” (Id. at 5.)

A few days after Kersey filed the grievance, he was taken to an “outside doctor” who

allegedly advised Kersey that he “should have been brought to the hospital immediately and that

it seemed [his] Achilles tendon had already started to heal but heal abnormally and on a wrong

angle.” (Id. at 4.) The Complaint alleges that, although this doctor apprised Kersey that he

“would need an MRI,” he did not receive an MRI until approximately December 12, 2025. (Id.)

On or about December 19, 2025, Kersey again saw an “outside doctor” who advised

against surgery to repair the torn Achilles tendon due to its state of healing. (Id. at 4–5.) That

doctor also ordered a “boot” for Kersey, but he did not receive it until approximately three weeks

later. (Id. at 5.) At Kersey’s next checkup appointment, Kersey was “advised that [he] could

possibly walk with this limp for life because [he] was not produced to the hospital or doctor in an

1 Excerpts from the Complaint have been reproduced here exactly as they appear in the original.

Errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammar have not been corrected or noted.

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appropriate time despite the fact that it was known from the beginning that [his] Achilles tendon

was torn.” (Id.)

As result, Kersey claims medical malpractice as well as a deprivation of his right to

adequate medical care for which he seeks to recover a damages award in the sum of $20 million

“as well as surgery & physical therapy & Rehabilitation treatment for my ankle in the case that

my ankle cannot be fixed. I would like lifetime medical care for the pain that I will be forced to

deal with.” (Id. ¶ V at 6.)

LEGAL STANDARDS

Where a plaintiff is proceeding IFP, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 instructs that “the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or

malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). At the pleading

stage, the court must assume the truth of “all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations” in

the complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010); Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–80 (2009), aff’d, 569 U.S. 108 (2013).2

This Court is required to construe pleadings “filed by pro se litigants liberally and

interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Hunter v. McMahon, 75 F.4th

62, 67 (2d Cir. 2023). “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Ceara v. Deacon, 916 F.3d 208,

213 (2d Cir. 2019).

2 Unless otherwise indicated, case quotations omit all internal quotation marks, alterations,

brackets, and citations.

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Nevertheless, a complaint must plead sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Int’l Code Council, Inc. v. UpCodes Inc., 43 F.4th 46, 53 (2d Cir. 2022).

In determining whether a claim is sufficiently plausible, a court “accept[s] all factual allegations

as true” and “draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Herrera v. Comme des

Garcons, Ltd., 84 F.4th 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2023). Nevertheless, a court is “not required to credit

conclusory allegations or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.” Melendez v. Sirius

XM Radio, Inc., 50 F.4th 294, 307 (2d Cir. 2022). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The plausibility standard

requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; accord

Schiebel v. Schoharie Central Sch. Dist., 120 F.4th 1082, 1106 (2d Cir. 2024). While “detailed

factual allegations” are not required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A

complaint fails to state a claim “if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual

enhancement.” Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Federal Claims

A. Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 provides redress for constitutional deprivations and provides that:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

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injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure

for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519

(2d Cir. 1993) (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985)); accord Jean-

Baptiste v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 23-cv-441, 2024 WL 1193062, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 20, 2024)

(noting that Section 1983 does not provide an independent source of substantive rights). To

maintain a Section 1983 action, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) acted under color of

state law (2) to deprive the plaintiff of a right arising under the Constitution or federal law. See

Sykes, 13 F.3d at 519. The Complaint challenges the adequacy of the medical care Kersey

received at the Jail as related to his left Achilles tendon. For the reasons that follow, these claims

are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii), 1915A(b)(1).

i. Improper Defendants

Kersey’s Section 1983 claims necessarily fail because he has not named a proper

defendant. The Jail and Medical Unit, as administrative arms of the municipality, Suffolk

County, are without independent legal identities and cannot be sued. Sturgis v. Suffolk County

Jail, No. 12-cv-5263, 2013 WL 245052, *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2013) (sua sponte dismissing

Section 1983 claims against the SCCF, among others, because it is an “administrative arm[ ] of

the County of Suffolk [ ] [and] lack[s] the capacity to be sued”) (citing Carthew v. County of

Suffolk, 709 F. Supp. 2d 188, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Davis v. Riverhead Correction Facility, No.

11-cv-5667, 2011 WL 6131791, at * 2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2011).

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Given Kersey’s pro se status and the special solicitude afforded such litigants, the Court

has considered whether he has alleged a plausible claim when construed as against the

municipality, Suffolk County, and finds that he has not. It is well-established that:

Municipal governments, like Suffolk County, may be held liable under Section

1983 ‘only for unconstitutional or illegal policies, not for the illegal conduct of

their employees.’ Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

Thus, Suffolk County could only face liability if Plaintiff alleged a pattern or

practice of such conduct. To state a claim against a municipality under Section

1983, ‘the plaintiff is required to show that the challenged acts were performed

pursuant to a municipal policy or custom.’ (id.)

Parker v. Suffolk County Police Dep’t, No. 22-cv-3969, 2023 WL 5047784 at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.

7, 2023). Here, even upon a liberal construction, there are no facts alleged from which the Court

could reasonably construe that the allegedly unconstitutional medical care—or lack thereof—

was the result of a policy or practice of Suffolk County. See Compl.; see also

Parker, 2023 WL 5047784, at *6 (citing Joyner-El v. Giammarella, No. 09-cv-2731, 2010 WL

1685957, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2010) (dismissing any Monell claim because the plaintiff

had “pointed to no policy or custom on the part of New York City that might plausibly have

caused any of his alleged constitutional injuries”); Overhoff v. Ginsburg Dev., L.L.C., 143 F.

Supp. 2d 379, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing Section 1983 complaint against municipality due

to plaintiff’s failure to “allege that her constitutional rights were violated pursuant to any

municipal policy or custom”). Accordingly, even when liberally construed as against Suffolk

County, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims are not plausible and are thus dismissed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii), 1915A(b)(1).

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ii. Adequacy of Medical Care

Even if Kersey had named a proper Defendant, his claim fails for the additional reason

that he has not plausibly alleged facts sufficient to state a deliberate indifference claim

challenging adequacy of medical care under Section 1983. Such a claim is governed by the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in the case of a pretrial detainee and by the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment in the case of an inmate incarcerated

post-conviction. Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017). Regardless of conviction

status, the Constitution requires that prison officials “provide humane conditions of

confinement” and “that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.”

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (“The Constitution does not mandate comfortable

prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones[.]” (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted)).

A plausible denial of adequate medical care claim requires the plaintiff to satisfy both an

objective prong and a subjective prong. Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29. The objective prong is the same

under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Horace v. Gibbs, 802 F. App’x 11, 13–14

(2d Cir. 2020) (summary order citing Darnell, 849 F.3d at 32), and requires that:

the alleged deprivation in medical care be sufficiently serious . . . . A deprivation

in medical care is sufficiently serious if (1) the prisoner was actually deprived of

adequate medical care and (2) the inadequacy in medical care is sufficiently

serious . . . . The latter inquiry contemplates a condition of urgency such as one

that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.

Culbreth v. Manuel, No. 24-cv-00497, 2025 WL 35059, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2025); see also

Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the medical need must

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be a “sufficiently serious” condition that “could result in further significant injury or the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”).

As for the subjective prong, the analysis differs under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments. The Eighth Amendment requires a showing “that a prison official had the requisite

‘culpable intent,’ which is present if the official ‘has knowledge that an inmate faces a

substantial risk of serious harm and he disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures

to abate the harm.’ . . . As such, ‘mere negligence will not suffice.’” Smith v. New York State,

No. 23-6601-cv, 2024 WL 4746554, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 2024) (quoting Hayes v. N.Y.C.

Dep’t of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1996)). Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the

subjective prong requires the plaintiff to “show[ ] that the officer acted with at least deliberate

indifference to the challenged conditions.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29. In other words, “a detainee

asserting a ‘claim for deliberate indifference to his medical needs can allege either that the

defendants knew that failing to provide the complained of medical treatment would pose a

substantial risk to his health or that the defendants should have known that failing to provide the

omitted medical treatment would pose a substantial risk to the detainee’s health.’” Culbreth,

2025 WL 35059, at *6 (quoting Darby v. Greenman, 14 F.4th 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2021))

Here, Kersey has not alleged his conviction status. (Compl., in toto.) However, even

affording the Complaint a liberal construction, the Court finds that the Complaint alleges

insufficient facts from which the Court could reasonably construe satisfaction of the deliberate

indifference test under either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments.

As to the objective prong, at this stage, the Court accepts as true the allegation that the

delay in treatment for Kersey’s left ankle injury resulted in further significant injury or the

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unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. However, as to the subjective prong, the Complaint

does not name any officers involved in the challenged events as defendants, nor does it allege

that any Defendant acted with deliberate indifference to deprive Kersey of constitutionally

adequate medical care. (See generally Compl.) Thus, the Complaint does not plausibly allege

that the medical care at the Jail was constitutionally deficient. Accordingly, Kersey’s Section

1983 claims are dismissed pursuant to §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1).

II. State Law Claims

A district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . .

[where it] has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction . . . .” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3). “In the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the

balance of factors will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-

law claims.” Chinniah v. FERC, 62 F.4th 700, 703 (2d Cir. 2023). Having dismissed the federal

claims alleged in the Complaint for the reasons set forth above, the Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims, including medical malpractice.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Cohen v. Postal Holdings, LLC, 873 F.3d 394, 405 (2d Cir. 2017)

(Calabresi, J., concurring) (the Second Circuit “takes a very strong position that state issues

should be decided by state courts”).

Thus, the Court declines to extend supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims

that may be liberally construed from the allegations in the Complaint. However, Kersey may

pursue any valid claims he may have in state court.

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III. Leave to Amend

A pro se plaintiff should ordinarily be given the opportunity “to amend at least once

when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.”

Shomo v. Cty. of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 2009). However, leave to amend is

properly denied where amendment would be futile. Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d

Cir. 2000) (where amendment would be “futile,” leave to amend the complaint should be

denied).

In an abundance of caution, Kersey is granted leave to file an amended complaint to

afford him an opportunity to allege a plausible claim. If Kersey chooses to amend his complaint,

he shall: (1) do so within thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum and Order; (2)

clearly labeled it “Amended Complaint”; (3) and include the same docket number as this Order,

No. 26-cv-02954. Kersey must include those individuals who were allegedly involved in the

deprivation of his federal rights as defendant(s) in the caption and in the statement of claim. If

Kersey does not know the name of a defendant, he may refer to that individual as “John Doe” or

“Jane Doe” in both the caption and the body of the amended complaint. Further, Kersey is

reminded to review the Court’s guidance set forth above concerning the requirements to allege

facts supporting plausible deliberate indifference claims and Monell claims against Suffolk

County.

Kersey is cautioned that the amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement,

the original complaint, so any facts or claims that Kersey wants to include from the original

complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint. If Kersey does not timely file an amended

complaint, judgment shall enter without further notice, and this case will be closed.

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Alternatively, Kersey may pursue any valid claims he may have, including negligence or medical

malpractice against the Defendants in state court.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this Court grants Kersey’s IFP Motion (ECF No. 2) and

dismisses the Complaint (ECF No. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) and

1915A(b)(1) and with leave to file an amended complaint.

The Clerk of the Court shall mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to Kersey at his

address of record and shall note such mailing on the docket.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order

would not be taken in good faith and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of any appeal.

See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).

Dated: Central Islip, New York

June 9, 2026

/s/ Nusrat J. Choudhury

NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY

United States District Judge

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