Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CHALLENGE AIRLINES (IL) LTD.,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER

v.

25-cv-5288 (BMC)

JET MIDWEST INC.,

Defendant.

COGAN, District Judge.

This is a trademark infringement case concerning the slogan “Challenge Accepted.”

Plaintiff is a logistics airline that specializes in transporting challenging cargo such as racecars,

pharmaceuticals, and live animals. Defendant is in the business of acquiring and dismantling

aircraft to resell parts and larger assets. Plaintiff has used the slogan in various mediums since

2014. Defendant started using it in 2022 on the advice of a third-party marketing firm.

Defendant brushed off plaintiff’s cease-and-desist letters, leading to this lawsuit, and plaintiff has

moved for summary judgment. For the reasons below, the motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

The facts that matter are undisputed.1 Plaintiff is part of an international conglomerate

known as Challenge Group, comprised of other aviation-industry entities, each of which includes

the word “Challenge” in its name. These entities collectively provide a broad array of services,

1 The parties fiercely contest facts that are relevant to the second prong of plaintiff’s trademark infringement claim,

i.e., the consumer-confusion analysis under Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.

1961). To that end, plaintiff has moved to strike defendant’s expert reports because they are “unsworn, untested,

and [were] served before [plaintiff] even could depose the experts or serve rebuttal reports.” However, as discussed

below, the Court does not reach that issue because there is a genuine issue of material fact bearing on the first prong

of the trademark infringement claim, i.e., the validity of the mark. The motion to strike is therefore moot.

including air cargo transportation; maintenance, repair, and overhaul (“MRO”) services, ground

handling, freight logistics, aircraft leasing and charters, part sales, warehousing, and airline

management services.

Plaintiff employs the slogan “Challenge Accepted” in a few different contexts, but

typically, it appears in plain text, under the Challenge Group trade name or in close proximity to

it. This appears in email signatures, marketing materials, and on plaintiffs aircraft themselves:

Challenge Group

Challenge Accepted

ma □□

Defendant is a family-owned and family-run business that acquires and dismantles

aircraft for parts, such as engines, that can then be resold to its clients. These clients include

familiar commercial airlines, MRO providers, and original equipment manufacturers.

In 2022, as defendant headed into its 25th year of business, it hired a marketing agency to

help build a new brand identity. After extensive interviews and analyses of survey responses, the

marketing agency landed on “Challenge Accepted.” The marketing agency researched the

slogan for possible use by competitors, and that search did not reveal plaintiff's use. This is

because, from defendant’s perspective, plaintiff is an airline, and airlines are clients, not

competitors. So, defendant saw no reason not to move forward with the marketing agency’s

idea, and began using the phrase in digital marketing, email signatures, etc.:

With 25 years of experience behind us, we're your partner from start to finish.

When you need a partner to help manage consignment assets, Jet Midwest delivers the right

solutions to fit your business anywhere in the world. Challenge accepted.

ha llenge Visit: Jetmidwest.com

ACCEPTED

A #aviation #experts #aviationindustry #aircraftmaintenance #aircraftleasing #aviationlovers

BG BS sali,

“gstt aHNIVEREag J ay

V0) S71. a ad a ‘

Two days before defendant intended to go public with the new slogan, one of defendant’s

executives spotted an aircraft at JFK airport with “Challenge Accepted” painted on the side. She

sent a photo of it to a senior executive along with the message, “It looks like they have the same

slogan.” The senior executive forwarded the photo to the marketing agency with one word:

“Yikes!” Nonetheless, defendant went ahead and publicly debuted their new brand identity.

Around the same time, plaintiff was undergoing its own rebranding campaign. When

defendant’s executive spotted the plane bearing “Challenge Accepted” at JFK, plaintiff was

known as “CAL Cargo Airlines.” A month later, plaintiff became Challenge Airlines. Plaintiff

thereafter filed two trademark applications with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office

(“USPTO”) for the mark “CHALLENGE GROUP CHALLENGE ACCEPTED.” One mark was

a stylized logo, and the other was the phrase’s plain text.

A month after filing the applications, plaintiff sent defendant a cease-and-desist letter.

That went unacknowledged and, a little over a year later, plaintiff sent another cease-and-desist

letter, styled as a “final demand.” Shortly after recerving the “final demand” letter, defendant

made the internal decision not use its “Challenge Accepted” logo because the senior executive

didn’t “want any hassle from Challenge Airlines.” In a similar vein, defendant made efforts to

avoid being placed in a booth next to any Challenge Group entities at tradeshows.

A few months later, plaintiff filed this lawsuit, alleging trademark infringement and

unfair competition under both the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., and common law.

Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment on all counts.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is warranted where the “movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S. H.

Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)). There is no genuine issue of material fact “where

the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving

party.” Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

A party may not defeat a motion for summary judgment solely through “unsupported

assertions” or conjecture. Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d

Cir. 1995). Rather, “‘[t]he nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2002)

(quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87); see also Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir.

2003) (“Conclusory allegations or denials are ordinarily not sufficient to defeat a motion for

summary judgment when the moving party has set out a documentary case.”); Rexnord

Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1994). Indeed, the non-moving party

must offer “concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in [its]

favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.

II. Trademark Infringement

“The elements necessary to prevail on common law causes of action for trademark

infringement and unfair competition mirror Lanham Act claims.” RVC Floor Decor, Ltd. v.

Floor & Decor Outlets of Am., Inc., 527 F. Supp. 3d 305, 322 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (quotations

omitted). The Lanham Act prohibits the “use in commerce,” without a trademark holder’s

consent, of “any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in

connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on

or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to

deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).

Conspicuously absent from the Lanham Act’s prohibition on trademark infringement is

any sort of mental-state requirement. In other words, trademark infringement is a strict-liability

offense, and thus a plaintiff “need not prove knowledge or intent.” Spin Master Ltd. v. Alan

Yuan’s Store, 325 F. Supp. 3d 413, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). Damages may be “trebled for

willfulness under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b),” BTL Indus., Inc. v. Versalini Beauty & Spa Salon, No.

23-cv-8617, 2024 WL 3342293, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2024), but that is not necessary to

establish liability.

“Under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff alleging trademark infringement must demonstrate

that (1) ‘it has a valid mark that is entitled to protection’ and that (2) the defendant’s ‘actions are

likely to cause confusion with [that] mark.’” Tiffany & Co. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 971 F.3d

74, 84 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting The Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955,

960 (2d Cir. 1996)). But where, as here, a “plaintiff cannot establish that its mark is entitled to

protection, the Court need not consider the second prong[.]” Jewish Sephardic Yellow Pages,

Ltd. v. DAG Media, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 347, 356 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), adopted, 478 F. Supp. 2d

340 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).

A. No Presumption of Validity

A trademark’s entitlement to protection (i.e., its validity) is “presumptively satisfied,”

Tiffany & Co., 971 F.3d at 84, by the trademark’s registration with the USPTO, see Guthrie

Healthcare Sys. v. ContextMedia, Inc., 826 F.3d 27, 37 (2d Cir. 2016). “When the mark is not

registered, there is no presumption of validity and the burden is upon plaintiff to prove valid

trademark use.” W. R. Grace & Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 581 F. Supp. 148, 152 n.7

(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing Reese Publ’g Co. v. Hampton Int’l Commc’ns., Inc., 620 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.

1980)).

Plaintiff contends that its “CHALLENGE ACCEPTED” mark is presumptively valid

because: (1) plaintiff registered “CHALLENGE GROUP CHALLENGE ACCEPTED” with the

USPTO; (2) the mark is “registrable” as evidenced by other entities that have registered it; and

(3) plaintiff has a Co-Existence and Consent Agreement with SOS International LLC (“SOSI”),

an entity who registered “CHALLENGE ACCEPTED.” That’s all wrong.

First, plaintiff’s registration of “CHALLENGE GROUP CHALLENGE ACCEPTED”

does not invoke the presumption of validity. The fact that “CHALLENGE ACCEPTED”

constitutes half of plaintiff’s registered mark does not magically turn it into a registered mark

that is, by itself, presumptively entitled to protection. To be sure, plaintiff could argue that

defendant’s use of the phrase infringes on plaintiff’s “CHALLENGE GROUP CHALLENGE

ACCEPTED” mark, but that is not the case plaintiff has brought. Rather, plaintiff asserts it

“owns common-law rights in CHALLENGE ACCEPTED,” but such “marks have no

presumption of validity.” Nike, Inc. v. Reloaded Merch LLC, 2023 WL 8879274, at *6

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2023) (quotations omitted).

Second, the fact that other entities have successfully registered “CHALLENGE

ACCEPTED” is irrelevant. For registration to constitute “prima facie evidence of the [mark’s]

validity,” it must be “owned by a party to [the] action.” 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a); see also 15 U.S.C.

§ 1057(b) (“A certification of registration . . . shall be prima facie evidence of the validity [and]

the owner’s exclusive right to use the registered mark”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff attempted to

register “CHALLENGE ACCEPTED” in 2019, but that application was deemed abandoned. See

USPTO Serial No. 88379273 (Feb. 17, 2022).

Finally, plaintiff’s Co-Existence and Consent Agreement with SOSI does not imbue it

with SOSI’s ownership of “CHALLENGE ACCEPTED.” True, trademarks may be assigned,

and the presumption of validity is thereby “transferred” in a sense. See, e.g., Guru Teg Holding,

Inc. v. Maharaja Farmers Mkt., Inc., 581 F. Supp. 3d 460, 472 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (“Because . . .

the trademark assignments were valid, defendants have failed to overcome the Marks’

presumption of validity.”). But that is not what plaintiff’s agreement with SOSI does; it is

essentially a pact between plaintiff and SOSI not to sue each other, so long as plaintiff and SOSI

stay in their respective lanes. Accordingly, the presumption of validity does not apply, and

plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the mark is eligible for protection.

B. Eligibility for Protection

“It is helpful to understand that trademark law designates four categories of inherent

strength [which can] help determine whether a mark is ‘entitled to protection’ in the first place.”

City of N.Y. v. Henriquez, 98 F.4th 402, 412 (2d Cir. 2024). “From weakest to strongest, these

are: (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful.” Id.

“A generic term, like automobile or aspirin, never is entitled to trademark protection,”

MirrorLite Mirror, Inc. v. Glassless Mirror Mfrs., Inc., No. 23-cv-3437, 2026 WL 1194594, at *6

(S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2026), because a mark holder “cannot deprive manufacturers . . . of the right to

call an article by its name.” Reese, 620 F.2d at 10; see, e.g., Henriquez, 98 F.4th at 412 (Marks

“such as ‘Honey Brown Ale,’ for a brown ale brewed with honey,” are entitled to “no trademark

protection.”).

“A ‘merely descriptive’ mark describes the qualities, ingredients, or characteristics of a

good or service and similar goods [and services] can be described using the same descriptive

qualities.” Now-Casting Econ., Ltd. v. Econ. Alchemy LLC, No. 18-cv-2442, 2019 WL

4640219, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2019) (citing Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc., v. Comm’r of

Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543-44 (1920)); see, e.g., PaperCutter, Inc. v. Fay’s Drug Co., 900 F.2d

558, 560, 563 (2d Cir. 1990) (“‘PaperCutter’ is purely descriptive” of a business that “design[s]

paper ornaments [which] consisted of folded paper that became three dimensional when

unfolded”). As with generic marks, descriptive marks are generally unprotected. See Bernard v.

Com. Drug Co., 964 F.2d 1338, 1340 (2d Cir. 1992). That changes if the mark holder can

establish a so-called “secondary meaning,” i.e., that the “public associat[es] the trademark with

the holder’s product or service.” Id.

“A suggestive mark, as might be expected, suggests the product [or service], though it

may take imagination to grasp [its] nature[.]” Gruner + Jahr USA Publ’g v. Meredith Corp., 991

F.2d 1072, 1076 (2d Cir. 1993); Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir.

1988) (A suggestive mark “‘requires imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion

as to the nature of goods.’” (quotation omitted)); see, e.g., Gruner, 991 F.2d at 1076 (“Orange

Crush” is suggestive of an orange-flavored beverage).

“An arbitrary mark is ‘one that has a dictionary meaning – though not describing the

product – like IVORY for soap.’” Marlinspike Hall LLC v. Bar Lab Concepts LLC, No. 23-cv-

2997, 2023 WL 6847208, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2023) (quoting Gruner, 991 F.2d at 1075-76).

“[A] ‘fanciful mark is a name that is made up to identify the trademark owner’s product like

EXXON for oil products and KODAK for photography products.’” Id. (quoting Gruner, 991

F.2d at 1076).

Here, plaintiff contends that “CHALLENGE ACCEPTED” is a valid trademark because

it is suggestive or, alternatively, descriptive with an established secondary meaning. Defendant

counters that the mark is either generic or descriptive with no secondary meaning and is

therefore entitled to no protection. As discussed below, the mark is descriptive, and questions of

fact exist as to whether plaintiff has shown a secondary meaning.

i. The Mark is Not Suggestive

Plaintiff argues that “CHALLENGE ACCEPTED” is suggestive because “[c]onnecting

‘accepting challenges’ with transporting dangerous, oversized cargo and the other Challenge

Group services requires an inferential leap.” No reasonable jury would buy that. The phrase

“challenge accepted” employs the noun version of “challenge” (defined as “a difficult task or

problem”), and the past-tense transitive-verb version of “accept” (defined as “to endure without

protest or reaction”).2

As plaintiff puts it, “CHALLENGE ACCEPTED has appeared on every aircraft in the

Challenge Group’s fleet . . . since adoption.” Thus, “[l]ittle imagination is required to realize,”

Flat Rate Movers, Ltd. v. FlatRate Moving & Storage, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 3d 371, 379 (S.D.N.Y.

2015), that “CHALLENGE ACCEPTED” refers to difficult cargo and plaintiff’s agreement to

2 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER, Challenge, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/challenge (2026); MERRIAM-

WEBSTER, Accept, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/accept (2026).

transport it, i.e., the challenge which plaintiff has accepted. Plaintiff cannot be the only one

allowed to advertise its willingness and ability to transport challenging cargo. See Cross

Commerce Media, Inc. v. Collective, Inc., 841 F.3d 155, 165 (2d Cir. 2016) (“a mark is more

likely to be descriptive, rather than suggestive, if ‘[a]ccording [it] trademark exclusivity . . .

would inhibit competitors from using descriptions of their competing [services].’” (quotations

omitted)).

ii. The Mark is Not Generic

Defendant argues that “CHALLENGE ACCEPTED” is generic, and therefore

unprotectable, because it is “a generic phrase that commonly appears in a variety of contexts,”

YouGottaEat, Inc. v. Checkers Drive-In Rests., Inc., 81 F. App’x 392, 394 (2d Cir. 2003), and

therefore its validity “is debatable,” id. Defendant’s reliance on YouGottaEat is misplaced. In

that case, the Second Circuit found it “debatable whether [the mark] is inherently distinctive . . .

[or] has acquired distinctiveness.” Id. That “distinctiveness” inquiry is not about whether a

mark is generic or descriptive, but whether a descriptive mark has a secondary meaning. See

Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (Marks are “inherently

distinctive” if their “intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source.”).

iii. The Mark is Descriptive

Second Circuit courts “more readily find a phrase descriptive when it is in common

usage.” Solid 21, Inc. v. Breitling U.S.A., Inc., 96 F.4th 265, 282 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Kelly-

Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 311 (2d Cir. 2013)). Defendant asserts, and plaintiff does not

dispute, “that ‘CHALLENGE ACCEPTED’ is a common English phrase used in pop culture and

advertising . . . in a variety of fields.” Thus, it is clear that the real dispute in this case is whether

“CHALLENGE ACCEPTED” has a secondary meaning pointing back to plaintiff.

iv. Questions of Fact Bear on Secondary Meaning

“Secondary meaning is a question of fact, with the burden of proof on the party claiming

exclusive rights in the mark.” Erchonia Corp. v. Bissoon, 410 F. App’x 416, 418 (2d Cir. 2011);

Yarmuth-Dion, Inc. v. D’ion Furs, Inc., 835 F.2d 990, 993 (2d Cir. 1987) (“The existence of

secondary meaning is an inherently factual inquiry.”). “Although the Second Circuit has stated

that district courts should be cautious in” resolving “the question of secondary meaning” at “the

summary judgment stage, it has nonetheless supported summary judgment in cases where the

[nonmovant] has failed to raise a material issue of fact on the question of secondary meaning.”

DAG Media, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 344.

The Second Circuit has identified six non-exclusive factors relevant to the

secondary meaning inquiry: “(1) advertising expenditures, (2) consumer studies

linking the mark to a source, (3) unsolicited media coverage . . . (4) sales success,

(5) attempts to plagiarize the mark, and (6) length and exclusivity of the mark’s

use.”

Easy Spirit, LLC v. Skechers U.S.A., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 3d 47, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting

Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir.

2012)). The parties, by their silence on the issue, appear to agree that no consumer studies link

“CHALLENGE ACCEPTED” to plaintiff, or that anyone has attempted to plagiarize the mark.

In support of the remaining factors, plaintiff offers the following uncontested evidence:

advertising expenditures of $2 million over the course of 14 years; unsolicited media coverage in

around 14 aviation-industry publications; sales success of $1 billion in revenue; and 12 years of

uncontested use. Defendant counters that plaintiff’s advertising costs break down to a modest

yearly amount; the publications plaintiff points to are simply reprints of its own press releases;

the $1 billion in revenue is attributable to Challenge Group, not Challenge Airlines; and

uncontested use is irrelevant when the question is exclusive use.

The question now is not whether a reasonable jury could find a secondary meaning based

on plaintiff’s evidence. The question is whether plaintiff’s evidence, when viewed in the light

most favorable to defendant, nonetheless compels that conclusion. It does not.

Advertising Expenditures. Defendant contends that plaintiff’s $2 million broken down

over 12 years amounts to only $166,666 per year, which is too meager to show weigh in favor of

a secondary meaning. Notably, “[c]ourts have held far greater expenditures insufficient to

support secondary meaning.” LVL XIII Brands, Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A., 209 F.

Supp. 3d 612, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (collecting cases). There’s a more glaring problem,

however, which is that plaintiff provides no evidence as to “whether the . . . advertising

specifically directed consumers to the mark as an indication of source.” Id.; see Easy Spirit, 515

F. Supp. 3d at 62 (“Simply ‘showing that a certain amount was spent on advertising provides

little support for secondary meaning absent some demonstration that the advertisements caused

consumers to associate the mark with the plaintiff’”) (quotations omitted and alterations

adopted). Plaintiff has not established what amount, if any, of that $2 million was specifically

geared towards attributing “CHALLENGE ACCEPTED” with Challenge Airlines.

Unsolicited News Coverage. The Court disagrees with defendant’s characterization of

the news coverage of plaintiff’s services as “merely reprints or rewrites of plaintiff’s own press

releases.” Nonetheless, the Court agrees that this factor does not weigh in plaintiff’s favor.

“‘[A] few industry-specific articles that discuss its business and goods’ . . . are insufficient to tilt

the factor of unsolicited media coverage in [plaintiff’s] favor.” Capri Sun GmbH v. Am. Bev.

Corp., 595 F. Supp. 3d 83, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (quoting Giggle, Inc. v. netFocal, Inc., 856 F.

Supp. 2d 625, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)). The publications that plaintiff points to are almost all

discrete aviation-industry publications, including the International Transport Journal, Freighter

Trends, and Cargo News Wire.

Sales Success. Sales success “is relevant to the secondary meaning analysis because it

‘might be indicative of whether consumers associate a product [or service] with its origin.’” Easy

Spirit, 515 F. Supp. 3d at 64 (quoting GeigTech E. Bay LLC v. Lutron Elecs. Co., 352 F. Supp.

3d 265, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)). Plaintiff provided its financial records which show a whopping

$1 billion in revenue. But defendant asserts, and plaintiff does not dispute, that the “vast

majority of [it] is related to air cargo services provided by Challenge Group.” In other words,

the bulk of that number apparently comes from entities other than plaintiff.

It is therefore unclear precisely how much of that $1 billion can be attributed to plaintiff.

But even if it all were, the Court’s conclusion would remain unchanged because “sales success

alone cannot establish secondary meaning.” Fashion Exch. LLC v. Hybrid Promotions, LLC,

697 F. Supp. 3d 86, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (quotations omitted). Thus, without more, this factor is

at best neutral.

Length & Exclusivity of Use. Defendant is correct that “uncontested use” is the wrong

metric because that speaks to whether the mark is generic. See USA Masters Weightlifting, Inc.

v. USA Weightlifting, Inc., No. 25-cv-6095, 2026 WL 751299, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2026)

(“Courts evaluating genericness look to evidence of widespread uncontested use by

competitors”). Plaintiff asserts, and defendant does not dispute, that “[n]o other company in the

aviation industry uses CHALLENGE ACCEPTED.” Still, the existence of plaintiff’s consent

agreement with SOSI, but not other entities that use the same phrase, suggests that plaintiff and

SOSI are at least in overlapping industries, such that plaintiff’s use was not “exclusive.”

When considering these factors in the light most favorable to defendant, it is not clear

that plaintiff has shown that “CHALLENGE ACCEPTED” has a secondary meaning.

Accordingly, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the mark is valid.

Consequently, the Court need not proceed to the second half of the trademark inquiry (i.e., the

likelihood of confusion), and a jury must resolve this case.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York U.S.D.J.

June 8, 2026

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