Printus

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GUERDISON PRINTUS,

A# 241 860 959,

Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-ev-00952

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

CRAIG LOWE,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM

On April 14, 2026, the Court received and filed a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, signed and mailed by the

pro se petitioner on April 9, 2026. Doc. 1. In this petition, Guerdison

Printus, a native and citizen of Haiti, challenges the legality of his pre-

removal immigration detention without an individualized bond hearing.

At the time of filing, Printus was being held in the custody of United

States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at Pike County

Correctional Facility, located in Pike County, Pennsylvania.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Printus presented himself at the Gateway to the Americas Port of

Entry in Laredo, Texas, on August 1, 2022, requesting asylum. Resp. Ex.

1, Doc. 7-2. Printus was paroled into the United States for one year

pending ordinary removal proceedings under Section 240 of the

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Resp. Ex. 1.

At the time of his release into the United States, Printus was served with

a Notice to Appear, which has not been included in the record before us,

but which would have directed him to appear for a hearing before an

immigration judge on a specified date. Jd.

On or about May 10, 2028, Printus filed an application for

temporary protected status (“TPS”), which was granted in December

2028 by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), with an

expiration date of August 3, 2024. Jd. On or about August 26, 2024,

USCIS received an application to renew TPS, which remained pending

as of June 25, 2025. Ja.

On August 26, 2024, an immigration judge entered an in absentia

order of removal. Jd.1

i The record provides no additional information regarding this

removal order, any subsequent proceedings, or its current status. We note

that the respondent has expressly stated that Printus 1s being detained

under § 1225(b)(2)(A) pending removal proceedings, and the exhibits

submitted by the respondent indicate that Printus is currently in the

midst of ongoing removal proceedings before an immigration judge.

(continued on next page)

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On June 24, 2025, Printus was among four individuals

apprehended by the Lancaster City Police Department. Jd, The other

three individuals were charged with retail theft, but Printus was not. Jd.

A records check, however, revealed his immigration status and,

apparently, an outstanding civil warrant for his arrest as a removable

alien. Id, After being contacted by the local police, an ICE officer

encountered Printus at the Lancaster Bureau of Police and took him into

federal immigration custody. Jd. Printus was initially transported to a

local ICE office for processing,? then to Moshannon Valley Processing

Center, where he was held in civil immigration detention for several

months, and later to Pike County Correctional Facility, where he remains

Although this December 2024 order by an immigration judge is

referenced in the respondent's brief and the attached exhibits, the

respondent nowhere suggests that Printus is being detained post-

removal under § 12381.

2 We note that Printus has appeared before the undersigned in a

federal criminal proceeding arising out of this brief period of detention at

the local ICE office in York County, Pennsylvania. Printus was charged

with destruction of government property in excess of $1,000. Following a

jury trial, Printus was convicted and sentenced to time-served,

restitution, and one year of supervised release. He remains on supervised

release at this time, and the case is currently pending on appeal to the

Third Circuit. See United States v. Printus, No. 1:25-cr-00188 (M.D. Pa.

judgment entered Nov. 26, 2025), appeal filed, No. 25-3395 (8d Cir. Dec.

5, 2025).

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in civil immigration detention today. He has been denied any opportunity

to post bond or to be released on other conditions while his removal

proceedings are pending.

II. DISCUSSION

Since the United States began restricting

immigration into this country in the late 19th century,

it has distinguished between those noncitizens seeking

entry into the country and those already residing

within it. Noncitizens “stopped at the boundary line”

who have “gained no foothold in the United States” do

not enjoy the same constitutional protections afforded

to persons inside the United States. But once a

noncitizen enters the United States, “the legal

circumstance changes,” for the constitutional right to

due process applies to all “persons” within our nation’s

borders, “whether their presence here is lawful,

unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” This distinction

between noncitizens who have entered and reside in

the United States and those who have not yet entered

“runs throughout immigration law.”

Quijada Cordoba v. Knight, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1113 (D. Idaho 2025) (first

quoting Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925); and then quoting

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 698 (2001)) (citations omitted).

Consistent with this distinction, “[tlwo statutory sections govern

the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of removal: 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225 and 1226.” Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1111 (E.D. Cal.

Sept. 23, 2025), appeal filed, No. 25-7429 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025). As

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concisely summarized by the Supreme Court: “U.S. immigration law

authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission

into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the

Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the

outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).” Jennings v.

Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (emphasis added).

Under § 1225, “an alien who ‘arrives in the United States, or ‘is

present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted,’ is treated as an

‘applicant for admission.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(a)(1)). Applicants for admission may be detained pending removal

under two separate provisions: § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2).

Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens who (A) are arriving in the

United States, see § 1225(b)(1)(A)G) (the “arriving aliens provision”), or

have been physically present in the United States for less than two years

without being admitted or paroled, see § 1225(b)(1)(A)Gii) (the

“designation provision”),? and (8B) are inadmissible either for

3 This so-called “designation provision” further limits this group of

aliens subject to expedited removal proceedings to certain categories of

aliens expressly designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, see

§ 1225(b)(1)(a)Gi), but the current scope of that designation is “the full

(continued on next page)

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misrepresenting a material fact while attempting to gain admission to

the United States or for lacking proper immigration documentation. See

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A); see also § 1182(a)(6)(C) (inadmissibility based

on misrepresentation); § 1182(a)(7) (inadmissibility for lack of

documentation). For these aliens, § 1225(b)(1) provides for expedited

removal proceedings without further hearing or review, unless the alien

expresses a fear of persecution or an intent to apply for asylum, in which

case the alien is subject to mandatory detention pending a final

determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have

such a fear, until removal. See § 1225(b)(1)(B). See generally Make the

Rd. N.Y. v. Wolf 962 F.3d 612, 618-20 (D.C. Cir, 2020) (summarizing

expedited removal provisions); Rodriguez-Acurio v, Almodovar, 811 F.

Supp. 8d 274, 291-92 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (same); Coal for Humane

scope of statutory authority,’ and thus all aliens who have not been

admitted or paroled into the United States and who have not been

physically present in the United States continuously for the two-year

period prior to determination of inadmissibility are subject to expedited

removal under § 1225(b)(1). See Designating Aliens for Expedited

Removal, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025); see also Make the Rd. N.Y. v.

Wolf 962 F.3d 612, 619-20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (providing a historic overview

of groups designated under § 1225(b)(1){a)Gi)); Coal. for Humane

Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 62-64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same),

appeal filed, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 20285).

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Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 59-64 (D.D.C, 2025) (same),

appeal filed, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cix, Aug. 11, 2025).

Section 1225(b)(2) is a “broader . . . catchall provision” that applies

to other “applicants for admission” who are “seeking admission” to the

United States.4 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287.

Under § 1225(b)(2), an applicant for admission is placed into ordinary

(not expedited) removal proceedings. See § 1225(b)(2)(A); see also id.

§ 1229a (describing ordinary removal proceedings before an immigration

judge). With limited exceptions, however, an alien is subject to mandatory

detention under § 1225(b)(2) while removal proceedings remain pending.

See § 1225(b)(2)(A); see also § 1182(d)(5) (authorizing the Secretary of

Homeland Security to grant humanitarian parole to aliens awaiting

removal proceedings); § 1225(b)(2)(C) (providing that aliens arriving on

land from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States may be

returned to that foreign territory pending removal proceedings, rather

than be detained); Quijada Cordoba, 809 F. Supp. 3d at 1118 (“Section

1225(b) mandates detention without bond hearings, except for narrow

4 The statute expressly provides that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to

those to whom § 1225(b)(1) applies, as well as other categories not

relevant here. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(B).

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humanitarian parole.”).

Meanwhile, as noted above, § 1226 “authorizes the Government to

detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of

removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289, Such aliens who are

already present in the United States may be detained pending removal

under two separate provisions: § 1226(a) and § 1226(c).

Section 1226(a) prescribes a discretionary detention framework for

these aliens when subject to removal proceedings, providing that: “On a

warrant issued by the Attorney General,!5! an alien may be arrested and

detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from

the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The statute further provides that

such an alien may be released on bond while removal proceedings remain

pending. Jd. § 1226(a)(2). The relevant implementing regulations provide

that a § 1226(a) detainee may be released on bond upon showing “that

such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the

alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F. §§ 236.1(c)(8),

5 "This statutory authority to issue immigration arrest warrants has

been delegated to a number of supervisory immigration officials listed in

the applicable regulations. See 8 C.FR. § 287.5(e)(2); see also id.

§§ 236.1(b), 1236.1(b).

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1236.1(c)(8). Immigration authorities® are tasked with an initial bond or

custody determination, see id. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8), after which the

alien may request an individualized bond hearing before an immigration

judge, see id. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(€)(1); see also § 1003.19 (setting out

procedures for the review of bond determinations by immigration judges).

See generally Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397 (2019) (If the alien is

detained, he may seek review of his detention by an officer at the

Department of Homeland Security and then by an immigration judge

(both exercising power delegated by the Secretary); and the alien may

secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that

he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community.”) (citations

omitted). An adverse bond determination by the immigration judge can

be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. See 8 U.S.C.

§§ 236.1(d)(8), 1236.1(d)(3). See generally Borbot v. Warden Hudson Cnty.

Corr, Facility, 906 F.3d 274, 275 (3d Cir. 2018) (summarizing § 1226(a)

bond procedures).

Finally, “Section 1226(c)... carves out a statutory category of

6 The same supervisory immigration officials authorized to issue

arrest warrants. See 8 C.ER. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(¢)(8).

-Q-

aliens who may not be released under § 1226(a).” Jennings, 583 U.S. at

289. This subsection specifies certain criminal histories that require

mandatory detention of aliens who would otherwise be eligible for a bond

hearing under § 1226(a). □□□ □ U.S.C. § 1226(c). Such criminal aliens may

only be released under very narrow circumstances imvolving a

determination by the Attorney General that the alien’s release is

necessary for witness-protection purposes and the alien does not pose a

flight risk or a danger to the community. See id. § 1226(c)(4); see also

Jennings, 583 U.S, at 289.

The petitioner in this case, Guerdison Printus, has been detained

by immigration authorities without a bond determination pending

disposition of his ordinary, § 1229a removal proceedings.’ Liberally

construing his pro se petition, Printus argues that, because he was

detained within the interior of the United States, he is not properly

7 The parties appear to agree that the petitioner has been putatively

detained without an opportunity for a bond determination pursuant to

§ 1225(b)(2). The respondent has identified no other basis for his

detention. Moreover, the petitioner has not been placed in expedited

removal proceedings, as would be expected for a § 1225(b)(1) detainee, he

has no predicate criminal convictions that would require mandatory

detention under § 1226(c), and immigration officials have refused to give

him a bond hearing, as required under § 1226(a).

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subject to mandatory pre-removal-order detention under § 1225(b)(2).

Rather, he may only be properly detained under § 1226(a), which requires

that he be given an opportunity for an individualized bond hearing. In

addition to this statutory argument, the pro se petition may be liberally

construed to include an argument that Printus’s prolonged detention

without an opportunity to be considered for release on bond violates his

Fifth Amendment due process rights.8

The respondent, on the other hand, purports to have detained

Printus pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), which provides for mandatory

detention without the opportunity for release on bond. But, liberally

construed, the pro se petition contends that Printus could only be

properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and under that statute, he is

entitled to an individualized bond hearing.

“[Flor section 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply, several conditions must be

met—in particular, an ‘examining immigration officer’ must determine

8 Having found a statutory basis for relief, we do not reach any

constitutional issues raised by the petitioner as alternative grounds for

relief. See generally Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485

U.S. 489, 445 (1988) (“A fundamental and longstanding principle of

judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional

questions in advance of the necessity of defending them.”).

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that the individual is: (1) an ‘applicant for admission’; (2) ‘seeking

admission’; and (3) ‘not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be

admitted.” Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 214 (D. Mass. 2025)

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)), appeal dismissed, No. 25-1902 (1st Cir.

Dec. 23, 2025); see also Kashranov v. Jamison, No. 2'25-cv-05555, 2025

WL 3188399, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2025) (citing Martinez); Ramirez-

Montoya v. Rose, No. 3:25-CV-02411, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (M.D. Pa.

Dec. 22, 2025) (citing Martinez and Kashranov); Carrero Romero v. Lowe,

No. 4:26-CV-00009, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2026) (citing

Ramirez-Montoya). Significantly, “Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to

an alien who is both an applicant for admission and ‘seeking admission.”

Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6 (emphasis in original); see also

Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (citing Kashranov and

Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d 397, 406 (D.N.J. 2025)); Carrero

Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting Ramirez-Montoya).

Section 1225 defines an “applicant for admission” as “[aln alien

present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives

in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Meanwhile, the phrase

“seeking admission” is not defined in § 1225, and the courts of this circuit

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have construed the plain language of “seeking admission” to describe

“active and ongoing conduct—physically attempting to come into the

United States, typically at a border or a port of entry.” Kashranov, 2025

WL 38188399, at *6; see also Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4

(citing Kashranov); Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (citing

Ramirez-Montoya). “This reading preserves the distinction between

‘seeking admission’ and the separate term ‘applicant for admission,’

ensuring that each phrase carries independent meaning.” Kashranov,

2025 WL 31883899, at *6; see also Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045,

at *4 (quoting Kashranov); Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4

(quoting Ramirez-Montoya). It also comports with the Supreme Court's

finding in Jennings that Ҥ 1225(b) applies primarily to aliens seeking

entry into the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297; Ramrrez-

Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (quoting Jennings); Carrero Romero,

2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting Jennings and Ramirez-Montoya). “In

sum, a plain reading of § 1225(b) demonstrates that it applies to

individuals who are attempting to enter the United States, not those

already within the country.” Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4; see

also Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *7 (considering the statutory

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context of § 1225(b)(2) and concluding that this provision “contemplates

inspection and detention at or immediately following border crossing”).

By contrast, as the Supreme Court has previously recognized,

“§ 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States.” Jennings,

583 U.S. at 303; see also Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting

Jennings). “Section 1226(a) creates a default rule for those aliens by

permitting—but not requiring—the Attorney General to issue warrants

for their arrest and detention pending removal proceedings,” and it

“permits the Attorney General to release those aliens on bond.” Jennings,

583 U.S. at 303; see also Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting

Jennings); Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 8709045, at *5 (“Unlike

§ 1225(b)(2)(A), § 1226(a) provides for bond or conditional parole.”) (citing

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)). “[Ulnder Section 1226(a) and its implementing

regulations, lan alien discretionarily detained pending removal

proceedings] is entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge

at which the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence

that he poses a danger to the community|] or... that he is a flight risk,

if it seeks to continue detaining him.” Gomes v. Hyde, 804 F. Supp. 3d

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265, 277 (D. Mass. 2025);9 see also YZ. v. Soto, 812 F. Supp. 3d 459, 462-

63 (D.N.J. 2025) (“‘Noncitizens who are arrested after having lived in the

United States for a while do not generally have to be detained. They are

instead entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration court.” (citing

Gomes) (citations and footnote omitted)). See generally Carrero Romero,

2026 WL 296215, at *4 “[I]f an individual is detained attempting to enter

the country illegally or while otherwise presenting themselves for

inspection and entry, they are subject to mandatory detention pursuant

to § 1225. If they are arrested after having already entered the country,

they are subject to detention under § 1226 and are entitled to a bond

9 We note that, applying First Circuit precedent, the Gomes court

stated that the government may prove that an alien is a danger to the

community by clear and convincing evidence, or that he is a flight risk by

the lesser preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. See Gomes, 804 F.

Supp. 3d at 277 (citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F4th 19, 41 (st Cir.

2021)). The Third Circuit, however, has held that the government must

prove either dangerousness or flight risk by clear and convincing

evidence. See German Santos v. Warden, 965 F.3d 203, 213-14 (8d Cir.

2020) (“When the Government seeks to take more than just money from

a party, we typically hold the Government to a standard of proof higher

than a preponderance of the evidence.”); see also Gayle v. Warden

Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst., 12 F.4th 321, 333 n.9 (8d Cir, 2021) ([It is

a ‘settled rule that when a party stands to lose his liberty, even

temporarily, we hold the Government to a ‘clear and convincing evidence’

standard in the context of civil detention... .”) (quoting German Santos);

Luciano-Jimenez v. Doll, 547 F Supp. 3d 462, 465 (M.D. Pa. 2021)

(quoting German Santos).

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hearing.”).

Here, § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2){A), applies to the detention of

Printus. We find that Printus is no longer seeking admission into the

United States—at the time of his arrest and detention, he was not

actively attempting to come into the United States at a border or port of

entry. Rather, he is already here, having resided within the United States

for an extended period of time. See Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1

(finding that petitioner who lived in the United States for almost two

years was not “seeking admission” but “already here”); Ramirez-

Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *5 (citing Kashranov). Thus, Printus may

only be properly detained pursuant to § 1226(a), and therefore he is

entitled to a bond hearing. See Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *5.

See generally Patel v, O'Neill, No, 3:25-cv-2185, 2025 WL 3516865, at *4

(M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (‘The overwhelming majority of federal district

courts that have addressed this issue have interpreted the INA to find

that persons similarly situated to Petitioner—noncitizens who previously

entered the United States and are currently residing in the United

States—are not subject to the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) but instead are subject to the discretionary detention

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pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and accordingly are entitled to a bond

hearing.”); id, at *4 & n.7 (collecting Third Circuit district court cases).1¢

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the petitioner is

currently detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2), and thus he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing.

Accordingly, the petition will be granted, and the government will be

10 Accord Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61, 78, 75 (2d Cir.

2026) (“Section 1226(a) plainly applies to noncitizens, like Petitioner, who

are present in the United States, but charged as inadmissible for entering

the country without inspection and admission. ... Section 1225(b)(2)(A)

applies to those noncitizens who present themselves at a port of entry for

admission, or who cross the physical border into the United States but

are apprehended at the ‘threshold of initial entry.”); Castarion-Nava v.

U.S. Dept of Homeland Sec., 175 F.4th 828, 856 (7th Cir, 2026) (“[T]he

text, statutory context, legislative history, and long-standing Executive

practice all confirm that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to ‘applicants for

admission’ who are seeking lawful entry at the border or ports of entry

and not to noncitizens unlawfully living in the country’s interior.”);

Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, 175 F.4th 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2026)

(“The text and statutory structure of the INA, bolstered by the long

history of detention across our immigration laws and the congressional

purpose in passing ITRIRA, yield the conclusion that no-bond detention

generally applies to arriving aliens seeking lawful entry to the country,

and not to aliens who are simply present here.”); Lopez-Campos Vv.

Raycratt, 175 F4Ath 718, 732 (6th Cir. 2026) (holding that noncitizens

without lawful status who had lived in the United States for years were

not “seeking admission” and thus were not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s

mandatory detention scheme).

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ordered to provide the petitioner with an individualized bond hearing

within twenty-one days or to release him from custody.

An appropriate order follows.

Dated: June_23 _, 2026 isecgt bi Mbgynrr F

6 CEPA E key via “ig

United States District Judge

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