KRASLEY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL KRASLEY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION

v. NO. 25-6758

COUNTY OF MONTGOMERY, et al.,

Defendants.

Pappert, J. May 6, 2026

MEMORANDUM

Michael Krasley, Ryan Krasley, Kevin Krasley, Anthony Iademarco and Rocco

D’Alessandro sued Janine Darby and Montgomery County under federal and state law

alleging Darby fired or constructively discharged them from their municipal jobs

because of their race. Darby and the County move to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint

for failure to state a claim. The Court grants their motion in part, denies it in part and

allows the plaintiffs to amend.

I

The plaintiffs—who are white—worked as “transporters” for the Montgomery

County Coroner’s Office. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3–4, 24, Dkt. No. 7.) Transporters carry

deceased individuals from where they died to the morgue. See (id. ¶¶ 9, 10). As lead

transporter, Michael Krasley supervised the other plaintiffs, (id. ¶ 4), making job

assignments “for the removal of bodies at crime scenes” and other places, (id. ¶ 9). He

also trained other transporters. (Id. ¶ 11.) None of the plaintiffs had ever received an

adverse review. See (id. ¶ 15).

In 2023, Dr. Janine Darby—who is black—was elected to serve as coroner for

Montgomery County. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 24.) Her campaign focused on diversity, equity and

inclusion. See (id. ¶ 12). She stressed that if elected she would be a “champion” for

Montgomery County residents “from historically and systematically marginalized

communities,” and she promised to “elevate those who have been marginalized.” (Id.)

She also said she would educate others about diversity. (Id.)

After she took office, Darby treated a black transporter, Augustus Davis,

differently than the plaintiffs. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 18, 20, 24.) Several people—coroner

investigators, police officers and family members of the deceased—had complained

about Davis’s attitude and his inability to cooperate with others. (Id. ¶ 21.) Darby,

however, did not discipline Davis and permitted him to report directly to her instead of

Michael Krasley, the lead transporter. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 25.) Davis also accused Ryan

Krasley and Kevin Krasley of being racist, leading Darby to threaten and chastise

them. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 26.) Ryan Krasley and Kevin Krasley later resigned. (Id. ¶ 29.)

In December of 2024, Darby fired Michael Krasley, Anthony Iademarco and

Rocco D’Alessandro “because of budgetary reasons, even though the Coroner’s budget

had been prepared and approved for the coming year months before.” (Id. ¶ 30.)

Immediately after firing these plaintiffs, Darby replaced them with a black owned and

operated body removal service. (Id. ¶ 32.) As a result, the Coroner’s Office faced

increased costs for transporting bodies. See (id. ¶ 33).

The plaintiffs sued Darby and the County under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) and the Pennsylvania Constitution. They allege

Darby fired or constructively discharged them because they are white in violation of

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and the

Pennsylvania Constitution.

II

The Court assesses the sufficiency of a pleading before discovery under Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12. Rule 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint “must contain

. . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). And Rule 12(b)(6) permits a district court to dismiss a

complaint that fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Id. 12(b)(6).

Taken together, the two rules require a plaintiff to allege sufficient “facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007). The first step in determining whether a plaintiff has stated a plausible

claim is to “tak[e] note of the elements” underlying her claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 675 (2009); Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 129–30 (3d Cir.

2010). The second step is to examine the plaintiff’s complaint and determine whether

the factual allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 679.

Plausibility requires the plaintiff to plead sufficient facts to allow “the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Id. at 678. The reasonableness of an inference depends on common sense and the

strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct. Connelly v. Lane

Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786–87 (3d Cir. 2016); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682. Plaintiffs do

not meet the plausibility burden when the facts alleged are “merely consistent with a

defendant’s liability” or show nothing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant

has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). In gauging the

plausibility of a claim, the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual

allegations, construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw

reasonable inferences from them. Connelly, 809 F.3d at 786 n.2.

III

A

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “discharge” or “otherwise . . .

discriminate” against “any individual” “because of such individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a)(1). The defendants argue the plaintiffs fail to allege facts to show they

complied with Title VII’s exhaustion requirement. Before a plaintiff may sue to enforce

Title VII, he must exhaust his “administrative remedies.” Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d

1018, 1020 (3d Cir. 1997). Title VII requires claimants to present their claims to the

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission so the agency may decide

whether to take legal action on their behalf. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Only after

the EEOC chooses not to act—or after 180 days pass—may the plaintiff proceed to

federal court. See id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). To pursue his claim in federal court, a plaintiff

must file his complaint within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC.

See id.

The plaintiffs do not meaningfully address the defendants’ exhaustion argument.

After they filed their original complaint, the defendants moved to dismiss on

exhaustion grounds. The plaintiffs immediately amended their complaint mooting the

defendants’ motion but again did not allege facts relating to exhaustion. And now the

plaintiffs state they “purposely do not argue defendants’ Title VII objection.” (Pls.’

Mem. of L. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 12, Dkt. No. 10-1.) The plaintiffs thus

concede the Title VII claims.

B

Section 1983 makes “liable” “[e]very person” who “under color of” state law

“subjects” another person “to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution” and federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (A person under § 1983

includes a municipality. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690

(1978).) Section 1983 contains no substantive rights. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,

393–94 (1989). It merely provides a cause of action for vindicating rights found in the

United States Constitution or another federal law. See id. The plaintiffs argue Darby

and the County violated their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal

Protection Clause1 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37–44); (id. at 10.)

1

“No state,” the Fourteenth Amendment says, “shall . . . deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

An equal protection employment discrimination claim shares the same elements as a

Title VII claim. See Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 915 n.5 (3d Cir.

1983). Thus, the plaintiffs must show Darby fired or constructively discharged them

because of their race. See Starnes v. Butler Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 50th Jud. Dist.,

971 F.3d 416, 426 (3d Cir. 2020); Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d

Cir. 2006).

1 The plaintiffs also purport to argue the defendants violated their rights under the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But they fail to articulate any due process theory.

The allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint permit the reasonable inference

Darby fired Michael Krasley, Anthony Iademarco and Rocco D’Alessandro because of

their race. Before Darby (a black woman) took over as Montgomery County’s coroner,

the plaintiffs (white men) worked for the office as transporters, and none of them had

ever been written up. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3–4, 12, 15, 24.) Darby focused her campaign on

diversity stressing she would be a champion for historically marginalized communities

and promising to elevate members of those communities. (Id. ¶ 12.) She also promised

to educate others about diversity. (Id.) Once she took office, Darby treated one black

transporter differently than the plaintiffs. (Id. ¶¶ 17–27.) For example, after

numerous individuals—including police officers and family members of the deceased—

complained about this employee’s work performance, Darby permitted him to report

directly to her, instead of Michael Krasley, the lead transporter. (Id.) Then Darby fired

Michael Krasley, Anthony Iademarco and Rocco D’Alessandro for budgetary reasons.

(Id. ¶ 30.) The plaintiffs allege Darby’s proffered reason for their firing was false

because the Coroner Office’s budget had already been approved. (Id.) And after she

fired the three plaintiffs, Darby replaced them with a black owned and operated body

transport service. (Id. ¶ 32.) As a result, the Coroner’s Office has faced increased costs

for transporting bodies. (Id. ¶ 33.) These allegations, taken as true, permit the

reasonable inference Darby fired Michael Krasley, Anthony Iademarco and Rocco

D’Alessandro because they are white. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,

514 (2002) (holding a plaintiff stated a plausible national-origin discrimination claim by

alleging, among other facts, the “nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons

involved with his termination”); Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 164 (3d Cir. 1999)

(holding a reasonable jury could find racial discrimination because a plaintiff showed,

among other things, his employer made statements demonstrating racial preferences in

employment before firing him); Shropshire v. Gallaway, 855 F. App’x 853, 855 (3d Cir.

2021) (per curiam) (holding a plaintiff stated a plausible claim for racial discrimination

by alleging, among other facts, his employer held members of another race to lower

performance standards); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148

(2000) (explaining evidence an employer’s stated reason for firing an employee is false

is probative of discrimination); McCarthy v. City of Cordele, 111 F.4th 1141, 1146–47

(11th Cir. 2024) (holding a white plaintiff stated a plausible claim for racial

discrimination by alleging, among other facts, his employer made statements

demonstrating a preference for black employees and then fired and replaced him with a

black employee).

Michael Krasley, Anthony Iademarco and Rocco D’Alessandro also state equal

protection claims against the County. Section 1983 does not allow plaintiffs to hold a

municipality automatically liable for the unlawful actions of its employees under a

theory of vicarious liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Plaintiffs can hold municipalities

liable “only for their own illegal acts.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011)

(citation omitted). When a municipal officer harms a private party, therefore, that

party must connect the officer’s conduct to a municipal policy or custom. Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). A single employment

decision, such as termination, qualifies as a municipal policy if the decisionmaker

possessed final authority with respect to the action. Fletcher v. O’Donnell, 867 F.2d

791, 793 (3d Cir. 1989); see also McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 368 (3d Cir. 2005);

Porter v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 2020). The plaintiffs allege

Darby—the elected coroner—had final authority to fire individuals from the Coroner’s

Office because her employment decisions are unreviewable. (Am. Compl. ¶ 31); see, e.g.,

Misjuns v. City of Lynchburg, 139 F.4th 378, 385 (4th Cir. 2025). Thus, because they

allege sufficient facts to permit the inference Darby fired them because they are white,

Michael Krasley, Anthony Iademarco and Rocco D’Alessandro also state a claim against

the County.

Kevin Krasley’s and Ryan Krasley’s equal protection claims for constructive

discharge against Darby and the County are a different matter. To succeed, they must

allege Darby “knowingly permitted conditions of discrimination in employment so

intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them would resign.” Gross v. Exxon Off.

Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984). The plaintiffs allege Davis falsely accused

Kevin Krasley and Ryan Krasley of being racist, causing Darby to chastise and

threaten them and subject them to a hostile work environment. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26,

29.) Because of the hostile work environment, the plaintiffs allege, Kevin Krasley and

Ryan Krasley resigned. (Id. ¶ 29.) But these vague, conclusory allegations do not

suffice. Without additional facts, Kevin Krasley and Ryan Krasley fail to plausibly

allege Darby permitted conditions of discrimination so intolerable a reasonable person

subject to them would resign.

2

Section 1981 provides “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States

shall have the same right in every State and Territory . . . to the full and equal benefit

of all laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981. This language prohibits a public employer from firing or

constructively discharging an employee because of his race. McCarthy, 111 F.4th at

1146; Fenter v. Mondelez Global, LLC, 574 F. App’x 213, 216–17 (3d Cir. 2014). The

“substantive elements” of an employment discrimination claim under § 1981 are

“identical to the elements of an employment discrimination claim under Title VII.”

Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 181–82 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Anderson v.

Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2010). Thus, the plaintiffs must

show Darby fired or constructively discharged them because of their race. See

Iadimarco, 190 F.3d at 163. Plaintiffs may bring a § 1981 claim against a municipality

under § 1983 in accordance with Monell. See Massey v. Borough of Bergenfield, 169

F.4th 188, 202 (3d Cir. 2026). As explained, Michael Krasley, Anthony Iademarco and

Rocco D’Alessandro state termination claims against Darby and the County, but Kevin

Krasley and Ryan Krasley fail to state constructive discharge claims against the

defendants.

C

The plaintiffs also purport to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and the

Pennsylvania Constitution. Section 1985(3) requires, among other things, a conspiracy

between two or more people. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). But the plaintiffs do not allege facts

to permit the inference Darby conspired with any other person.

The plaintiffs also fail to state a claim under the Pennsylvania Constitution.

They do not cite any specific constitutional provision, leaving the Court unable to assess

whether they have made a “showing” they are “entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2). Moreover, the plaintiffs cannot seek damages for violations of the Pennsylvania

Constitution. Pocono Mountain Charter Sch. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 442 F.

App’x 681, 687 (3d Cir. 2011) (“No Pennsylvania statute establishes, and no

Pennsylvania court has recognized, a private cause of action for damages under the

Pennsylvania Constitution.”); Rega v. U.P.M.C. Cmty. Health Choices, No. 194 WDA

2022, 2023 WL 4116006, at *6 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 22, 2023) (“[T]here is no recognized

private cause of action for monetary damages for alleged violations of the Pennsylvania

Constitution.”).

IV

Finally, the defendants ask the Court to strike the plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive

damages against the County. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits a court to

“strike from a pleading” any “immaterial” or “impertinent” “matter.” A matter is

immaterial if it has “no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief.”

Conklin v. Anthou, 10-CV-02501, 2011 WL 1303299, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2011). And

a matter is impertinent if it does not “pertain,” or is “not necessary,” to the claims for

relief. Id. Because § 1983 does not permit plaintiffs to seek punitive damages against

local governments, Doe v. County of Centre, 242 F.3d 437, 455 (3d Cir. 2001), the

plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages against the County has no essential

relationship, or does not pertain, to their § 1983 claims against the County.

V

A court should “freely give leave” to amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a)(2). If a “civil-rights complaint fails to state a claim,” a court “must grant

leave to amend the complaint unless amendment would be futile or inequitable.”

Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Ass’n, 903 F.3d 100, 113 (3d Cir. 2018).

Amendment is futile if no new facts could fix the original complaint’s problems.

Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 292 (3d Cir. 1988). And

amendment is inequitable if the plaintiff unduly delays, shows bad faith or if

amendment would unfairly prejudice the defendant. Curteon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic

Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 2001).

It would be futile for the plaintiffs to amend their claim under the Pennsylvania

Constitution because they have no cause of action to bring such a claim. But it would

not be futile or inequitable for the plaintiffs to amend their § 1983 constructive

discharge or due process claims or § 1985(3) conspiracy claim. The plaintiffs may be

able to allege facts to fix the problems with these claims. And the plaintiffs have not

unduly delayed or showed bad faith and amendment would not unfairly prejudice the

defendants. If the plaintiffs choose to amend all or some of their claims, the defendants

will have to defend against the same claims, just based on new facts.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

_/_s_/ _G_e_r_a__l_d_ J__. _P_a__p_p_e_r_t_ __

Gerald J. Pappert, J.