The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JULIO CEASAR SEGURA, JR., : Civil No. 1:24-CV-00960
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. :
:
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF :
CORRECTIONS, et al., :
:
Defendants. : Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
MEMORANDUM
Before the court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint.
(Doc. 61.) For the following reasons, the court will grant the motion in part and
deny the motion in part. The court will dismiss claims against Defendants Harry,
Lorah, Dean, and Ragni, the remaining retaliation claims, and the Eighth
Amendment claims against Defendants Effie and Donnison. The court will not
dismiss the remaining claims against Defendants Francis and Cline.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint in June of 2024. (Doc. 1.)
The original complaint names ten defendants: (1) the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections (“DOC”); (2) Dr. Laurel R. Harry (“Harry”), Secretary of the DOC;
(3) Micheal Gourley (“Gourley”), the Superintendent/Facility Manager of SCI-
Camp Hill; (4) Albert, Major of Security at SCI-Camp Hill; (5) John Doe 1, Shift
Commander/Captain at SCI-Camp Hill; (6) Ferringer, Lieutenant at SCI-Camp
Hill; (7) John Doe 2, Sargent at SCI-Camp Hill; (8) Vega, Correctional Officer at
SCI-Camp Hill; (9) Ebersole, Correctional Officer at SCI-Camp Hill; and (10)
John Doe 3, Correctional Officer at SCI-Camp Hill. (Doc. 1, pp. 3–5.)1
On June 11, 2024, the court entered an administrative order requiring the
payment of the filing fee or an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 6.)
On June 26, 2024, the court received and docketed Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in
forma pauperis and a certified prisoner trust fund account statement. (Docs. 8, 9.)
On July 2, 2024, the court entered an order granting Plaintiff’s motion to proceed
in forma pauperis, dismissing all claims against the DOC, and serving the
complaint on the remaining named Defendants. (Doc. 10.) On September 4, 2024,
the remaining Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. (Doc. 15.) On
October 7, 2024, Defendants filed their brief in support of the motion. (Doc. 21.)
On October 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition. (Doc. 23.) On January
29, 2025, the court received and docketed a letter from Plaintiff written as a
supplement to Plaintiff’s brief in opposition. (Doc. 24.)
On June 9, 2025, the court entered a memorandum and order granting the
motion to dismiss in part. (Docs. 28, 29.) The court dismissed all claims against
Defendants Harry, Vega, and Ebersole without prejudice for lack of personal
involvement. (Doc. 28, p. 8; Doc. 29.) The court dismissed all First Amendment
1 For ease of reference, the court uses the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.
claims of retaliation without prejudice because Plaintiff did not identify the
grievances at issue or the subjects of the grievances at issue. (Doc. 28, p. 11; Doc.
29.) The court dismissed all First Amendment denial of access to the courts claims
without prejudice because Plaintiff did not allege that he lost the chance to pursue
a non-frivolous claim. (Doc. 28, p. 12; Doc. 29.) The court dismissed all claims
under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act without
prejudice because allegations that a failure to properly treat his mental health
impairments do not support such claims. (Doc. 28, pp. 14–15; Doc. 29.) Only the
Eighth Amendment claims of excessive force, cruel and unusual punishment, and
deliberate indifference and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims2 survived
the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 28; Doc. 29.)
Defendants answered the remaining claims in the complaint on August 18,
2025. (Doc. 37.) The court then entered a case management order setting forth a
December 31, 2025 deadline to file motions to join additional parties and amend
pleadings. (Doc. 37.)
Just prior to Defendants filing an answer to the complaint in the above-
captioned action, Plaintiff initiated a second civil action in this court alleging
continued use of force occurring on August 22 and 23, 2023. Segura v. Harry, et
2 Defendants’ motion to dismiss did not address the Fourteenth Amendment claims, so the court
did not address them. (Doc. 28, p. 15.)
al., No. 1:25-CV-01384, Doc. 1 (M.D. Pa.). On August 20, 2025, the court
screened the complaint in that matter and determined that it was substantially
related to the above-captioned action because it addressed the same period of time
and named several of the same Defendants. The court then dismissed the
complaint with instructions for Plaintiff to raise his additional claims through
amending his complaint in the above-captioned action. Id., at Doc. 9.
On October 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint and
the proposed amended complaint. (Docs. 40, 40-1.) On October 31, 2025,
Plaintiff filed a second motion to appoint counsel. (Doc. 42.) Defendants did not
respond to either of these pending motions. On February 9, 2026, the court granted
the motion to amend the complaint and filed the proposed amended complaint as a
separate document on the docket to serve as the operative complaint. (Docs. 51,
52.) On February 13, 2026, the court screened the amended complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and dismissed the retaliation claims associated with
the alleged events of August 21, 2023 and all denial of access to courts claims.
(Docs. 53, 54.) The court ordered service on the new Defendants named in the
amended complaint. (Doc. 54.)
On April 10, 2026, Defendants file the instant motion to dismiss the
amended complaint and a brief in support. (Docs. 61, 62.) Plaintiff filed a brief in
opposition and a declaration. (Docs. 67, 68.) The court will now address the
pending motion.
STANDARD
In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept all well pleaded allegations as
true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Doe
v. Univ. of the Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2020). The pleadings of self-
represented plaintiffs are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by attorneys and are to be liberally construed. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d. Cir. 2011). Self-
represented litigants are to be granted leave to file a curative amended complaint
even when a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend, unless such an amendment
would be inequitable or futile. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
245 (3d Cir. 2008).
DISCUSSION
A. Summary of the Amended Complaint
The amended complaint is a copy of the original complaint with changes in
blue ink combined with the complaint filed in Segura, No. 1:25-CV-01384. (Doc.
52.) In the amended complaint, Plaintiff identified his John Doe Defendants: (1)
Jeffrey Davidson (“Davidson”), Shift Commander/Captain at SCI-Camp Hill as
John Doe 1; (2) D. Henderson (“Henderson”), Sargent at SCI-Camp Hill as John
Doe 2; and (3) Z. Cokain (“Cokain”), Correctional Officer at SCI-Camp Hill as
John Doe 3. (Doc. 40; Doc. 52, p. 4.)
He also added the following 17 Defendants: (1) Lorah, Captain at SCI-Camp
Hill; (2) Francis, Correctional Officer at SCI-Camp Hill; (3) Jeffrey Elwell
(“Elwell”), Lieutenant at SCI-Camp Hill; (4) Dean, Correctional Officer at SCI-
Camp Hill; (5) William Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”), Correctional Office at SCI-
Camp Hill; (6) Bernard Dugan (“Dugan”), Correctional Officer at SCI-Camp Hill;
(7) Samuel Larty (“Larty”), Correctional Officer at SCI-Camp Hill; (8) Edward
Lowe (“Lowe”), Correctional Officer at SCI-Camp Hill; (9) Cecelia Umeh
Maduke (“Maduke”), Registered Nurse at SCI-Camp Hill; (10) Monica Effi
(“Effi”), Registered Nurse at SCI-Camp Hill; (11) Liza Pokladwski-Diaz
(“Pokladwski-Diaz”), Licensed Practical Nurse at SCI-Camp Hill; (12) Michael
Huffman (“Huffman”), Correctional Officer at SCI-Camp Hill; (13) Robert
McSherry (“McSherry”), Correctional Officer at SCI-Camp Hill; (14) Ragni,
Correctional Officer at SCI-Camp Hill; (15) Bennings, Correctional Officer at SCI-
Camp Hill; (16) Negrun, Sargent at SCI-Camp Hill; and (17) Tidwell, Correctional
Officer at SCI-Camp Hill. (Doc. 52, pp. 4–6.)
In the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on August 21, 2023, he was
housed in the DTU/SL5 Unit designated for inmates who suffer from a severe
mental illness or diagnosis. (Id., pp. 10, 13.) He states that he was serving a 15-
day disciplinary sanction for refusing to lock-in. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he was
housed in a cell with a camera above the door and the cell was dirty with food, spit,
grime, blood, feces, and urine stains. (Id., p.13.) He alleges that he was denied
mental health treatment, stripped of all his property, and placed in a suicide smock.
(Id.) He states that he began cutting his right leg behind the knee, “which resulted
in the CO on constant watch [Defendant Vega] to spray me with OC spray.” (Id.,
pp. 13–14.) Plaintiff states that he believes he was sprayed longer than the three
second burst. (Id., p. 14.) Plaintiff alleges that there was sufficient time for staff to
be called over from other pods and enter his cell and subdue him without further
incident. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he complied with orders to cuff-up and was
escorted by staff to the medical cell for medical assessment and decontamination
of the OC spray from his eyes. (Id., pp. 14–15.) Plaintiff complained of OC spray
burning his body and Defendants Davidson and Ferringer refused to provide him a
shower, soap, clean cell, and new suicide smock. (Id., p. 15.) Plaintiff states that
Defendant Ferringer ordered him to be placed back in his cell. (Id.) Plaintiff then
alleges that he cut his leg again and was sprayed with OC spray a second time.
(Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the second use of OC spray was excessive. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that this cycle of self-harm, spraying with OC spray, and the denial
of a shower, clean cell, and new suicide smock took place a total of eight times.
(Id., pp. 15–19.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Gourley, Albert, and Davidson
were in charge of executing the actual acts and orders to the officers directly for
the use of force. (Id., p. 20.)
Plaintiff alleges that the next day, August 22, 2023, Plaintiff was placed in
an intermediate restraint system, which consisted of a Velcro nylon belt and
shackles, and had a suicide watch officer outside the cell door. (Id., pp. 31–33.)
He alleges that he was allowed a suicide smock, but no mattress, no toilet, no
shoes, and no blanket based on the events of the prior day. (Id., p. 33.) Plaintiff
states that he was in the same suicide smock from the day before and suffered
breathing complications due to the excessive exposure to OC spray. (Id.)
Likewise, Plaintiff alleges that he continued to get OC spray in his eyes due to the
spray from the day before not being properly cleaned off of him. (Id.) Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Elwell came onto his block and told the officer there to
“spray his ass if he does anything.” (Id., p. 34.) Plaintiff states that Defendant
Elwell then stated to him, “I hope [you] act out I got the golden ticket to do
whatever I want to you.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he and Defendant Elwell
engaged in verbal a back and forth when Plaintiff began to scratch his wounds
causing them to bleed. (Id.) At this point, Defendant Elwell called for Defendants
McSherry, Johnson, McSherry, and Lowe and yelled at Plaintiff “you[’re] going
[to] pay for putting a PREA on my staff.” (Id., p. 35.) Defendant Elwell then
grabbed the MK-9 spray bottle and emptied the bottle into Plaintiff’s cell. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that this resulted in further breathing complications for Plaintiff.
(Id., pp. 35–36.) Plaintiff states that Defendant Elwell called Defendants Francis
and ordered staff to assemble in a line in front of his cell including Defendants
McSherry, Huffman, Lowe, Elwell, and Johnson. (Id., at 36.) Plaintiff alleges that
he made requests to leave the cell peacefully and was denied by Defendant Lowe
who expressed a desire to use the riot shield on Plaintiff. (Id., pp. 36–37.) Plaintiff
states that he walked to the back of his cell to demonstrate that he was peaceful and
Defendant Lowe entered the cell and struck him with the riot shield while making
comments about Plaintiff’s history of filing complaints. (Id., p. 38.) Plaintiff
alleges that he hit the back wall of the cell and he felt Defendants Lowe, Johnson,
McSherry, and Huffman punching, kneeing, smacking, and dragging him. (Id.)
They then lifted Plaintiff and escorted him to E-Block without medical assessment
and was placed on a restraint chair while Defendants Johnson, Lowe, Elwell,
McSherry, and Huffman laughed at him stating “That’ll teach him to not complain
anymore and we not messing around.” (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Effi took his blood pressure, pulse, and
oxygen and offered to decontaminate his eyes while he was in the restraint chair.
(Id., p. 40.) Plaintiff alleges that he complained of breathing issues, chest pain,
pain from the OC spray, and pain from being knocked out briefly. (Id.) Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Nurses Effi and Donnison3 stated that he could not properly
be treated while in the restraint chair, and Defendant Elwell refused to remove him
from the chair. (Id., p. 40.) Plaintiff alleges that he was denied a shower or other
means to decontaminate the OC spray off his body leaving him in pain, distress,
and risk of serious infection based on the wound on his right leg. (Id., p. 42.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Francis failed to supervise his employees at
SCI-Camp Hill allowing his employees to deviate from DOC policy. (Id., pp. 42–
43.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gourley’s use of force policies and his lack of
supervision violate his Eighth Amendment rights. (Id., p. 43.) Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant Elwell stated to him that Defendant Gourley told him to spray
Plaintiff with OC spray, to skip policy, to open the door and to use force. (Id., p.
44.) Plaintiff alleges that he spoke with Defendant Gourley a day or two after the
August 22, 2023 events, expressing nothing had been cleaned following the OC
3 Donnison is not identified as a party elsewhere in the compliant. (Doc. 52.)
Spray and Defendant Gourley did nothing to remedy the situation. (Id., pp. 44–
45.)
Plaintiff also alleges that on August 22, 2023, during the 2-10 shift, he
requested psych and a shower, which was denied and ignored by Defendant
Henderson who was on watch. (Id., p. 47.) Plaintiff states that he began to cut
himself again and Defendant Rodriguez used OC Spray. (Id.) Defendants
Ferringer, Henderson, Dugan, Cline, Larty, and Ebersole assembled in front his
cell. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he told Defendant Dugan that he wanted to come
out peacefully, but Defendant Ferringer stated they were going in. (Id.) Plaintiff
stated that he complied when told to sit on his bed, and Defendant Henderson
sprayed an excessive amount of OC spray. (Id.) Plaintiff states that Defendants
Cline, Ebersole, and Larty entered the cell and punched, kneed, and slammed him
around. (Id., p. 48.) Plaintiff states he was then escorted to the triage room to be
assessed by medical. (Id.) Plaintiff then requested a shower, clean cell, clean
suicide smock, and wound care, and Defendant Ferringer denied the request. (Id.)
When he asked the same of the medical staff, Defendant Pokladowski stated it was
up to the Secretary and denied his requests for care. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that his restraints were changed and, in the process, his
smock was removed. (Id.) He states that he again requested a new smock, and
was denied. (Id., p. 49.) He then refused to put on the smock covered in OC
spray, Defendant Ferringer refused a new smock, and Defendant Henderson began
to tase him in the back, legs, and buttocks. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he was prone
on the exam bed in the triage cell when Defendants Larty and Cline also used force
on Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff was then provided a clean smock. (Id.) Plaintiff
requested a clean cell and shower, but this was denied by Defendant Ferringer and
he was placed back in the same OC sprayed cell. (Id.)
Based on these alleged facts, Plaintiff raises First Amendment retaliation
claims. (Id., pp. 45, 54.) Plaintiff raises claims against Defendants Harry and
Gourley based on his failure to provide safe, humane, fair, and adequate policy.
(Id., p. 51.) He raises Eighth Amendment claims of excessive force and failure to
treat. (Id., pp. 51–55.) He also raises claims of infliction of emotional distress and
a failure to protect Plaintiff from self-harm. (Id., p. 55.)
On February 13, 2026, the court screened the amended complaint and
dismissed all retaliation claims associated with the alleged events of August 21,
2023 and the denial of access to courts claim with prejudice. (Docs. 53, 54.) The
court served Defendants the amended complaint. (Doc. 54.)
On April 10, 2026, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint seeking a partial dismissal. (Doc. 61.) Plaintiff filed a brief in
opposition. (Doc. 67.) The court will now address the pending motion to dismiss.
B. The Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Involvement Will Be
Granted as to Defendants Harry, Lorah, Dean, and Ragni and
Denied as to Defendants Francis and Cline.
Defendants Harry, Francis, Lorah, Dean, Cline, and Ragni have moved for
dismissal based on lack of personal involvement. (Doc. 62.)
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must meet two threshold
requirements. He must allege: 1) that the alleged misconduct was committed by a
person acting under color of state law; and 2) that as a result, he was deprived of
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). It is also well established that “[a]
defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged
wrongs to be liable, and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation
which he or she neither participated in nor approved.” See Baraka v. McGreevey,
481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007).
1. Defendant Harry
Plaintiff raises Eighth Amendment claims against Defendant Harry premised
on his liability as a supervisor: “Dr. Laurel R. Harry fail[ed] to provide the Pa
DOC employees safe, humane, fair, and adequate policy to follow that is not
violating Plaintiff 8th Amendment Rights.” (Doc. 52, p. 51.)
If a plaintiff seeks to hold a supervisory official liable for unconstitutional
acts by their subordinates, the plaintiff’s allegations must satisfy one of two
theories of supervisory liability: (1) “[i]ndividual defendants who are policymakers
may be liable under § 1983 if it is shown that such defendants, with deliberate
indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or
custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm[;]” and (2) “a supervisor
may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the
plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had
knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations.” See A.M. ex rel.
J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted); Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014)
(explaining requirements for supervisory liability in section 1983 claim and
describing “two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for
unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates”), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom., Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015).
To allege a plausible claim for supervisory liability under the first theory, a
plaintiff must “identify the specific supervisory practice or procedure that the
supervisor failed to employ.” See Chavarriaga v. New Jersy Dept. of Corrections,
806 F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d
205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001)). The plaintiff must also show that:
[(1)] the existing custom and practice without the identified, absent
custom or procedure created an unreasonable risk of the ultimate injury,
[(2)] the supervisor was aware that this unreasonable risk existed, [(3)]
the supervisor was indifferent to the risk[,] and [(4)] the underling’s
violation resulted from the supervisor’s failure to employ that
supervisory practice or procedure. Put another way, the inmate must
identify the supervisor's specific acts or omissions demonstrating the
supervisor’s deliberate indifference to the inmate’s risk of injury and
must establish a link between the supervisor, the act, and the injury.
See id. (quoting Brown, 269 F.3d at 216). Plaintiff’s amended complaint lacks the
specific supervisory practice or procedure that Defendant Harry allegedly failed to
employ. (Doc. 52, p. 51.) Instead, he provides general allegations that Defendant
Harry failed to provide staff with safe, humane, fair, and adequate policy to follow
that does not violate his Eighth Amendment rights and that he wrote a letter
complaining of staff conduct. (Id.) He then provides the following list of alleged
wrongs:
a) given adequate mental health treatment which; b) means Plaintiff has
a right to be protected from self harming self and; c) be free from prison
official subjecting Plaintiff to physical brutality; d) proper staff training
and supervision and; e) failing to intervene and correct policy and hold
the Pa DOC employees accountable for wrong doing; f) harsh
condition of confinement for mentally ill individuals in SL5 DTU,
RHU, BMU, SRTU and all area of prison.
(Id.)
For the second theory of supervisory liability, generalized allegations that a
supervisory defendant is “in charge of” or “responsible for” an office or facility are
insufficient to allege personal involvement in an underlying constitutional
violation. See Saisi v. Murray, 822 F. App'x 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020) (unpublished)
(“Saisi asserted that some defendants were in charge of agencies that allowed this
to happen, and that liability stemmed merely from defendants’ ‘belief’ that their
conduct would be ‘tolerated.’ However, a director cannot be held liable ‘simply
because of [their] position as the head of the [agency].’” (quoting Evancho v.
Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 354 (3d Cir. 2005))); Zigler v. Warren, No. 21-cv-19474,
2022 WL 903383, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2022) (“In simpler terms, a supervisor is
not liable for the unconstitutional conduct of his employees solely because he is a
supervisor.”). Additionally, “[a]lthough a court can infer that a defendant had
contemporaneous knowledge of wrongful conduct from the circumstances
surrounding a case, the knowledge must be actual, not constructive.” See
Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 222 (citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1194
(3d Cir. 1995) and Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1201 n.6 (3d Cir. 1988)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he wrote a letter to Defendant Harry complaining
about staff conduct. (Doc. 52, p. 51.) But there is no allegation that this letter was
contemporaneous to or prior to the alleged misconduct of his subordinates to
establish actual knowledge. Therefore, the amended complaint does not meet the
requirements to establish supervisory liability under either theory, and the claims
against Defendant Harry will be dismissed.
2. Defendant Francis
Similarly, Plaintiff premises Defendant Francis’ liability on his supervisory
role. (Doc. 52, p. 51.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to allege and identify
with particularity that Francis was personally involved in any conduct or in a
pattern of conduct that would demonstrate deliberate indifference. (Doc. 62, p.
11.) Specifically, Defendants cite to Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Francis
failed to supervise his employees at SCI-Camp Hill, allowing his employees to
deviate from Pa DOC existing policies, guidelines, requirements, rules, procedures,
regulations, laws, and statutes set in place for staff to following prior, during, and
after unplanned and planned use of force. (Doc. 52, p. 42.) However, Plaintiff
also alleges that Defendant Francis “approved Defendant Lt. Elwell to use force on
Plaintiff while in the IRS belt and shackles.” (Doc. 52, p. 51.) This second
allegation specifically alleges that Defendant Francis had contemporaneous
knowledge of the use of force and approved the action. Therefore, the motion to
dismiss will be denied as to claims against Defendant Francis and the claims will
not be dismissed.
3. Defendants Lorah, Dean, Cline, and Ragni
Defendants allege that Plaintiff only named Defendants Lorah, Dean, Cline,
and Ragni in the caption of the amended complaint with no allegations of their
personal involvement in the text of the amended complaint. (Doc. 62, p. 12.)
However, the amended complaint alleges that Defendant Cline entered
Plaintiff’s cell, punched, kneed, and slammed Plaintiff. (Doc. 52, p. 47.) The
amended complaint also states that Defendant Cline used force against him while
he was in the triage cell. (Id., p. 49.) Therefore, the court will deny the motion to
dismiss as to the claims raised against Defendant Cline.
Otherwise, Defendants are correct that Plaintiff only named Defendants
Lorah, Dean, and Ragni in the caption of the pleading. Therefore, Plaintiff has not
established personal involvement and all claims against them will be dismissed.
C. The Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Remaining Retaliation Claim Will
Be Granted.
Defendants Elwell, Lowe, McSherry, Johnson, and Hoffman move for
dismissal of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. (Doc. 62.) Defendants allege that
Plaintiff has referenced the existence of grievances and complaints in the amended
complaint, but he has not identified the grievances or who were the subject of those
grievances or complaints. (Id., p. 13.)
It is well-settled that prison officials may not retaliate against an inmate
because he exercises his right of access to the courts. Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d
184, 191 (3d. Cir. 2015). A prisoner asserting a retaliation claim must allege the
following elements: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he
suffered an adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from
exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) the constitutionally protected conduct
was “a substantial or motivating factor” for the adverse action. See Rauser v.
Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523,
530 (3d Cir. 2003). The filing of a lawsuit or a prison grievance constitutes
protected activity under the First Amendment. Fantone, 780 F.3d at 191.
This court has repeatedly refused to find a causal connection when the
alleged perpetrator of the retaliatory activity was not the subject of the
constitutionally protected activity. See Calloway v. Bauman, No. 2:20-cv-2337,
2022 WL 4357468, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 20, 2022) citing Victor v. Lawler, 2010
WL 5014555, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2010), aff'd, 565 F. App’x 126 (3d Cir.
2014); also citing Evans v. Rozum, 2009 WL 5064490, at *22 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 17,
2009) (“There is no apparent reason why [the moving defendants] would want to
retaliate against Plaintiff for filing a lawsuit against others.”); also citing Royster v.
Beard, 308 F. App’x 576, 579 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming summary judgment in
favor of defendant on plaintiff’s claim that he was retaliated against by a defendant
who was not the target of his protected activity).
In the amended complaint, Plaintiff does not address the specifics of the
grievances or complaints he references and does not identify the staff members
who were the subjects of those grievances or complaints. (Doc. 52.) Instead, he
alleges that Defendant Elwell called on Defendants McSharry, Johnson, Hoffman,
and Lowe and stated “you[’re] going to pay for putting a PREA on my staff.” (Id.,
p. 35.) Plaintiff does not allege who was the subject of this PREA complaint.
Therefore, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to establish a causal connection
necessary for a retaliation claim. Likewise, the court reviewed the documents
attached to the amended complaint and they do not contain grievances or
complaints that predate the August 21, 2023 or August 22, 2023 events. (Docs.
52-1, 52-2.) Therefore, the court will dismiss the remaining retaliation claims.
D. The Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claim Will Be
Granted.
Defendants Effie and Donnison move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment inadequate medical treatment claim. (Doc. 62.) First, the court notes
that Donnison was never identified as a defendant prior to the filing of the
amended complaint, was not identified in the caption of the amended complaint,
and has not been served a copy of the amended complaint. (Doc. 52.) Despite
this, the court will dismiss the Eighth Amendment claims raised against both
Defendants Effie and Donnison.
Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they act with deliberate
indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 104–05 (1976). To sustain a constitutional claim under the Eighth Amendment
for inadequate medical treatment, a plaintiff must make (1) an objective showing
that his medical needs were serious, and (2) a subjective showing that the
defendants were deliberately indifferent to those medical needs. See Pearson v.
Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017). A serious medical need is
“one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or is so obvious
that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst'l Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346–47 (3d Cir.
1987) (citation omitted). A prison official is deliberately indifferent when he or
she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
In the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Effi took his
blood pressure, pulse, and oxygen and offered to decontaminate his eyes while he
was in the restraint chair. (Doc. 52, p. 40.) Plaintiff alleges that he complained of
breathing issues, chest pain, pain from the OC spray, and pain from being knocked
out briefly. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Nurses Effi and Donnison stated that he
could not properly be treated while in the restraint chair, and Defendant Elwell
refused to remove him from the chair. Nothing in these alleged facts supports
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need by Effi and Donnison. They
sought to provide treatment to Plaintiff, but were allegedly prevented by Defendant
Elwell. As such, the court will dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim brought
against them.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, the court will grant Defendants’ motion to
dismiss in part and deny the motion in part. All claims against Defendants Harry,
Lorah, Dean, and Ragni will be dismissed. All remaining retaliation claims will be
dismissed. The Eighth Amendment claims against Defendant Effie and Nurse
Donnison will be dismissed. Considering that the court provided Plaintiff the
opportunity to amend his pleading, and he has not cured the pleading defects, any
opportunity to further amend the complaint is futile and this dismissal will be with
prejudice. See Est. of Lagano v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., 769 F.3d 850,
861 (3d Cir. 2014) (Self-represented litigants are to be granted leave to file a
curative amended complaint even when a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend,
unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.)
Claims against Defendants Francis and Cline will not be dismissed.
An appropriate order follows.
s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: June 22, 2026