Lin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

QUAN LIN,

Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-CV-01453

v.

(MEHALCHICK, J.)

CRAIG A. LOWE, et al.,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM

Petitioner, Quan Lin (“Lin”) brings this petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1).

On May 28, 2026, Lin filed the instant petition, requesting that Craig A. Lowe, Brian

McShane, Todd Lyons, and Todd Blanche1 release him from custody at the Pike County

Correctional Facility in Lords Valley, Pennsylvania or provide him with a bond hearing.

(Doc. 1, at 7). The government filed a timely response to Lin’s petition on June 8, 2026 (Doc.

8), and on June 11, 2026, Lin filed a traverse. (Doc. 9). For the following reasons, Lin’s

1 The proper respondent in this case is Craig A. Lowe (“Lowe”), Warden of the Pike

County Correctional Facility. “The federal habeas statute straightforwardly provides that the

proper respondent to a habeas petition is ‘the person who has custody over [the petitioner].’”

Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434 (2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2242); 28 U.S.C. § 2243

(“[t]he writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the

person detained”); see Anariba v. Dir. Hudson Cnty. Corr. Ctr., 17 F.4th 434, 444 (3d Cir. 2021)

(“if a § 2241 petitioner does not adhere to the immediate custodian rule, then the district court

lacks jurisdiction to entertain the petition”). As Lin is detained at the Pike County

Correctional Facility, Lowe is the proper respondent. (Doc. 1, at 1); see Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at

434. As such, Brian McShane, Todd Lyons, and Todd Blanche are DISMISSED. However,

the government will be bound by the Court’s judgment because Lowe is acting as an agent of

the federal government by detaining Lin on behalf of Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(“ICE”). See Madera v. Decker, 18 Civ. 7314, 2018 WL 10602037, at *9-*10 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 28,

2018) (finding the warden acts as an agent of the ICE regional director when ICE makes initial

custody determinations including setting of a bond and review of conditions of release);

Santana-Rivas v. Warden of Clinton Cnty. Corr. Facility, 3:25-cv-01896, 2025 WL 3522932, at *8

(M.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025), adopted in part, rejected in part, 2025 WL 3513152 (M.D. Pa. Dec.

8, 2025) (finding same).

petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED.2

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following background is derived from Lin’s petition, the Lowe’s response, and the

exhibits thereto. (Doc. 1; Doc. 8). Lin is a citizen of the Peoples Republic of China, who

entered the United States on or about September 10, 2023. (Doc. 8, at 1). United States Border

Patrol subsequently encountered Lin and issued him a notice to appear. (Doc. 8, at 2). After

entering the United States, Lin lived and worked in New York, where he has family. (Doc. 1,

at 6). Lin submits that he regularly attended his ICE check-in appointments prior to his arrest.

(Doc. 1, at 6).

On July 3, 2025, the Pennsylvania State Police arrested Lin and charged him with theft

by deception—false impression and criminal conspiracy. (Doc. 8, at 2). On December 17,

2025, Lin pled guilty to both offenses, and the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas

sentenced Lin to six to twenty-three months of confinement. (Doc. 8, at 2). On January 5,

2026, ICE transferred Lin to immigration detention pursuant to an immigration detainer and

warrant. (Doc. 8, at 2). On April 3, 2026, an immigration judge ordered Lin removed to

2 The Court notes that Lin also filed a motion for temporary restraining order on May 28,

2026, requesting that the Court order Lowe to not transfer or remove Lin, order ICE to

provide notice before any transfer or removal, and order an expedited schedule for Lowe’s

response and a bond hearing if needed. (Doc. 2, at 1-2). To the extent that Lin requests the

Court to stay his removal and provide notice of removal, the Court is stripped of jurisdiction

to review orders of removal and the execution of orders of removal under section 1252(g) of

the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). 8 U.S.C. 1252(g) (“no court shall have

jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision

or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute

removal orders”). Regarding Lin’s request that the Court order no transfer and an expedited

schedule, on June 1, 2026, in its order to show cause, the Court ordered Lowe to not transfer

Lin during the pendency of the habeas action and set an expedited briefing schedule. (Doc.

5). Accordingly, Lin’s motion for temporary restraining order (Doc. 2) is DENIED in part

for lack of jurisdiction and DENIED in part as moot.

China. (Doc. 8, at 2). Lin timely appealed his removal order to the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) on April 12, 2026, which remains pending. (Doc. 8, at 2). Lin is currently

detained at the Pike County Correctional Facility. (Doc. 1, at 1). Lin has been in ICE custody

for over five months. (Doc. 8, at 2).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

28 U.S.C. § 2241 governs district courts’ power to grant the writ of habeas corpus.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b), the writ of habeas corpus extends to petitioners “in custody for

an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or

decree of a court or judge of the United States.” Claims where non-citizens challenge

immigration enforcement-related detention “fall within the ‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus

and thus must be brought in habeas.” Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025) (quoting

Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 159, 167 (2022)). “For ‘core habeas petitions,’ ‘jurisdiction lies in

only one district: the district of confinement.’” J. G. G., 604 U.S. at 672. While reviewing a

noncitizen’s habeas petition, courts evaluate whether the government complied with

regulatory, statutory, and constitutional protections for noncitizens. See Martinez v. McAleenan,

385 F. Supp. 3d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding ICE failed to comply with regulatory and

constitutional notice requirements prior to detaining a non-citizen petitioner and granting the

petitioner’s habeas petition). A court may order a bond hearing if it determines that a

noncitizen habeas petitioner is entitled to one under relevant constitutional or statutory

protections. See A.L. v. Oddo, 761 F. Supp. 3d 822, 827 (W.D. Pa. 2025) (finding that a

noncitizen habeas petitioner was entitled to a bond hearing under the Due Process Clause of

the Fifth Amendment); see also Cantu-Cortes v. O’Neill, No. 25-cv-6338, 2025 WL 3171639, at

*2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025) (finding a habeas petitioner was entitled to a bond hearing under

relevant statutory protections).

III. JURISDICTION

“[F]ederal courts ‘have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter

jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.’” Hartig Drug Co. Inc. v.

Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S.

500, 514 (2006)). 28 U.S.C. § 2241 empowers federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus

where a petitioner is “in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States. . . in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1),

(3). Recently, in Khalil v. President, United States, 164 F.4th 259, 273 (3d Cir. 2026), the Third

Circuit determined that the INA strips district courts of subject matter jurisdiction to hear

claims arising from removal actions or proceedings, when the claims could be addressed on a

petition for review of a final order of removal (“PFR”).

Habeas actions based on whether a petitioner is subject to unconstitutionally lengthy

detention remain in the jurisdiction of district courts. Kahlil, 164 F.4th at 277-79 (holding

detention-specific claims, like length and conditions-of-confinement claims, do not arise from

removal proceedings and can be addressed by district courts); see Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583

U.S. 281, 294 (2018) (finding 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar to

challenges unrelated to review of an order of removal, the government’s decision to detain in

the first place, and the process by which removability will be determined). The question of

whether a petitioner’s detention has been unconstitutionally long is wholly collateral to

removal proceedings and cannot be meaningfully reviewed on a PFR. Kahlil, 164 F.4th at

278-79 (finding that length of confinement without a bond hearing claim “does not get

channeled into the PFR review process”). Lin’s petition is soundly before the Court because

Lin filed the instant petition while detained within the jurisdiction of the Court, is still

currently detained by ICE, and asserts that his continued detention violates due process. See

J. G. G., 604 U.S. at 672 (acknowledging that immigration-related detainees’ claims “fall

within the ‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus”) (quoting Nance, 597 U.S. at 167); see also Kahlil,

164 F.4th at 274-79.

IV. DISCUSSION

Lin contends that Lowe has violated his Fifth Amendment procedural due process

rights by failing to provide a meaningful, individualized custody determination. (Doc. 1, at

6). Lowe counters that Lin’s mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) is constitutional

because it has not been prolonged or arbitrary. (Doc. 8, at 5). Lowe also avers that Lin’s claim

is a substantive, not procedural due process claim, and that Lin has no substantive due process

right to a bond hearing. (Doc. 8, at 10-15).

The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Due Process Clause of the

Fifth Amendment “applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including [noncitizens],

whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis,

533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). While it is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens

to due process of law in deportation proceedings, the Supreme Court has recognized that

detention during deportation proceedings is a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation

process. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). Detention of noncitizens pending their

removal proceedings serves the purpose of preventing noncitizens from fleeing before or

during the removal proceedings. Demore, 538 U.S. at 528. However, the Due Process Clause

limits detention without a bond hearing to a “reasonable period.” German Santos v. Warden

Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2020). Therefore, due process affords

detained noncitizens a bond hearing once the length of their detention becomes unreasonable.

Santos, 965 F.3d at 211.

Section 1226(c) of the INA provides for the mandatory detention of, among others,

noncitizens convicted of certain crimes during removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(c); Jennings, 583 U.S. at 305. Although 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) provides for

mandatory detention and the Supreme Court has determined that “[d]etention during

removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of” the removal

process, prolonged detention raises due process concerns. Demore, 538 U.S. at 531; Santos,

965 F.3d at 210. Noncitizens detained under § 1226(c) have the basic due process right to an

individualized bond determination once the length of their detention becomes unreasonable.

Santos, 965 F.3d at 210-11. To determine whether a noncitizen’s detention under § 1226(c)

has become unreasonable, courts evaluate four factors established by the Third Circuit in

Santos: (1) the length of the detention; (2) whether the detention is likely to continue; (3) the

reasons for any delay that prolongs detention; and (4) whether the noncitizen’s conditions of

confinement are meaningfully different from criminal punishment. 965 F.3d at 211. The

Court will evaluate each Santos factor to determine whether Lin’s detention has become

unreasonable.

A. LENGTH OF DETENTION

Lin submits that he has been detained for over ten months, since July 3, 2025. (Doc.

1, at 6). While Lin has been detained since July 3, 2025, according to DHS records, Lin has

only been in civil immigration detention since January 5, 2026. (Doc. 8, at 2; Doc. 8-3). Lin

contends that his mandatory detention has reached an unreasonable length. (Doc. 1, at 6).

Lowe counters that Lin’s five months of immigration detention is directly tied to the

adjudication of his removal proceedings, and further, that periods of mandatory detention

longer than five months have been deemed constitutional. (Doc. 8, at 17-18).

The Third Circuit has identified the first Santos factor, duration of detention, as the

“most important factor” in evaluating the reasonableness of a noncitizen’s detention during

removal proceedings. Santos, 965 F.3d at 211. While the Third Circuit has not adopted a

presumption of reasonableness or unreasonableness for any duration of detention, the Third

Circuit has found that detention becomes increasingly suspect after five months. Santos, 965

F.3d at 211 (citing Demore, 538 U.S. at 515; Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 234 (3d

Cir. 2011)); Michelin v. Warden Moshannon Valley Corr. Ctr., 169 F.4th 418, 433-34 (3d Cir.

2026) (citing Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 783 F.3d 469 (3d Cir. 2015)) (re-

affirming that detention without opportunity for bond becomes unreasonable between six

months and one year after it began).

Lin has been in ICE custody for over five months. (Doc. 8, at 15). As Lin’s detention

is at the Third Circuit’s five-month tipping point, Lin’s length of detention slightly favors a

finding of unreasonableness. See Santos, 965 F.3d at 211; see Michelin, 169 F.4th at 433-34.

Accordingly, the first Santos factor, duration of detention, weighs slightly in favor of

unreasonable detention.

B. LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUED DETENTION

Lin contends that without relief from the Court, his detention is likely to extend

because ICE decided to continue his mandatory detention while his BIA appeal is pending.

(Doc. 1, at 2, 5). Lin also avers that even if the BIA dismisses his appeal, his detention is likely

to continue because the government has not identified what travel document requests have

been made, whether a removal flight is scheduled, or whether there is a removal timeline for

Lin. (Doc. 9, at 6). The government counters that the only impediment to finalizing Lin’s

removal is the adjudication of his appeal before the BIA. (Doc. 8, at 20).

When a noncitizen’s removal proceedings are unlikely to end soon, continued

detention without a bond hearing weighs towards a finding of unreasonable detention. Santos,

965 F.3d at 211. Courts in the Third Circuit have found that an immigration detainee

appealing his or her order of removal creates a likelihood of continued detention that favors

granting habeas relief. J.G.J. v. Sage, No. 3:26-cv-706, 2026 WL 915576, at *10 (M.D. Pa.

April 3, 2026) (citing Joseph v. Warden, No. 3:25-cv-02428, 2026 WL 497532, at *2 (M.D. Pa.

Feb. 23, 2026)). Further, delays of an undefined duration continue to accrue during

administrative proceedings that may be necessary following an appellate court decision. Bah

v. Doll, No. 3:18-CV-1409, 2018 WL 6733959, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2018).

As a result of his appeal to the BIA, Lin’s order of removal is not yet final, and he

remains in pre-order of removal detention. 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(c); see J.G.J. v. Sage, 2026 WL

915576, at *10. At this time, the undersigned cannot determine precisely how long Lin’s

removal proceedings will remain pending. However, as Lin appealed his order of removal on

April 12, 2026, and the BIA has yet to set a briefing schedule for the appeal, it is unlikely that

Lin’s removal proceedings will be resolved in the near future. Automated Case Information,

Executive Office of Immigration Review, https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation

(last visited June 15, 2026); see Santos, 965 F.3d at 212; see also J.G.J. v. Sage, 2026 WL 915576,

at *10. Depending on the outcome of the BIA appeal, further petition for review to the Third

Circuit could follow, which would further prolong the duration of Lin’s removal proceedings.

See Bah, 2018 WL 6733959, at *8. As such, the second Santos factor weighs in favor of a

finding of unreasonableness. See Santos, 965 F.3d at 212; see Bah, 2018 WL 6733959, at *8; see

also J.G.J. v. Sage, 2026 WL 915576, at *10.

C. REASONS FOR DELAYS

While Lin does not address the reasons for the delays in his removal proceedings,

Lowe contends that Lin’s proceedings have moved forward at a normal rate for noncitizens

who contest their removability. (Doc. 8, at 20). The government also avers that it has not

intentionally delayed or unreasonably prolonged Lin’s proceedings. (Doc. 8, at 20).

In evaluating the third Santos factor, courts look at the reasons for the delay, such as a

detainee’s request for continuances or bad-faith errors in the removal proceedings that caused

unnecessary delay. Santos, 965 F.3d at 211. Courts should not hold a noncitizen’s good-faith

challenge to removal against him, even when his appeals or petitions for review have drawn

out the proceedings. Santos, 965 F.3d at 211. Courts should also decline to hold legal errors

against the government unless there is evidence of carelessness or bad faith. Santos, 965 F.3d

at 211. Nevertheless, detention can still grow unreasonable in the absence of governmental

bad faith. Santos, 965 F.3d at 211.

While Lin’s removal proceedings have been ongoing for over five months, the

government has not demonstrated carelessness or bad faith that would cause unnecessary

delay. See Santos, 965 F.3d at 212 (citing Diop, 656 F.3d at 224-25) (finding unnecessary delay

where an immigration judge repeatedly issued decisions that were so unclear that they

required remands for clarification and the government was slow to produce evidence relevant

to whether petitioner was properly detained). Likewise, Lin’s appeal to the BIA should not

be held against him in evaluating the reasons for delay. See Santos, 965 F.3d at 211.

Accordingly, the reasons for the delay of Lin’s removal proceedings are a neutral factor in

weighing whether Lin’s detention is unreasonable.

D. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

Lin submits that his detention at the Pike County Correctional Facility has caused him

to feel isolated and depressed because he is unable to see or contact his family. (Doc. 1, at 6).

Lin contends that continued confinement is unnecessary because conditions of supervisory

release, including required reporting, GPS monitoring, and any other reasonable conditions,

can address any government concern with release. (Doc. 9, at 7). Lowe counters that the

conditions of Lin’s detention are not punitive because Lin is not confined to his cell for

twenty-three hours a day. (Doc. 8, at 20).

To evaluate the conditions of confinement, courts examine whether the noncitizen’s

conditions of confinement are “meaningfully different” from criminal punishment. Santos,

965 F.3d at 211. If a noncitizen’s civil detention under § 1226(c) looks penal, that shifts the

scale towards finding the detention unreasonable. Santos, 965 F.3d at 211. When an

immigration detainee is housed in a criminal facility among criminal detainees, their

conditions do not meaningfully differ from criminal punishment. Santos, 965 F.3d at 212;

Lopez v. Warden, Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 3:26-cv-673, 2026 WL 1147839, at *3 (M.D. Pa.

April 28, 2026). The Pike County Correctional Facility is a county jail that houses criminal

detainees alongside civil immigration detainees. Santos, 965 F.3d at 213; Rahmatov v. Lowe,

No. 3:26-cv-553, 2026 WL 837974, at *3 (M.D. Pa. March 26, 2026); Lopez, 2026 WL

1147839, at *3.

The Court is not persuaded by Lowe’s argument that Lin’s detention is not penal

because he is not confined to his cell for twenty-three hours a day. (Doc. 8, at 20). An

immigration detainee need not be subject to extreme punitive conditions, such as twenty-three

hours of confinement a day, for their detention to be akin to criminal punishment. Lopez, 2026

WL 1147839, at *3. Lin is detained at the Pike County Correctional Facility alongside

criminal detainees. (Doc. 1, at 1; Doc. 8, at 20). Accordingly, the Court finds Lin’s conditions

of confinement to be indistinguishable from criminal punishment, weighing in favor of

unreasonable detention. See Santos, 965 F.3d at 213; see Rahmatov, 2026 WL 837974, at *3; see

Lopez, 2026 WL 1147839, at *3. Taking the four Santos factors together, the length and

conditions of Lin’s detention weigh towards unreasonable detention in violation of the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Santos, 965 F.3d at 211; see Michelin, 169 F.4th

at 433-35. Lin’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is GRANTED.

E. REMEDY AND APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Lin requests relief in the form of release from custody or, in the alternative, a bond

hearing at which the government must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that

continued detention is necessary. (Doc. 1, at 7). The appropriate remedy is for the Court to

appoint counsel and to provide Lin with a bond hearing at which the government bears the

burden of proof to justify Lin’s continued detention with clear and convincing evidence.

Santos, 965 F.3d at 213. District courts may conduct bond hearings in habeas corpus cases

brought by immigration detainees. J.G.J., 2026 WL 915576, at *11 n.19 (collecting cases).

District courts in the Third Circuit have exercised such authority to conduct bond hearings

under habeas jurisdiction, particularly where there is a risk of further injury due to delay. See

Centeno-Martinez v. Jamison, No. 25-3593, 2025 WL 3157711, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2025) (citing

Leslie v. Holder, 865 F. Supp. 2d 627, 634-35 (M.D. Pa. 2012); Thaxter v. Sabol, No. 14-02413,

2016 WL 3077351, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 1, 2016).

While habeas petitioners do not have a constitutional right to counsel in habeas corpus

proceedings, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) provides district courts with discretion to appoint

counsel to financially eligible habeas petitioners when “the interests of justice so require.” 18

U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B); Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247, 263 (3d Cir. 1991), superseded on

other grounds by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Leslie, 865 F. Supp. 2d at 631. In exercising

discretion to appoint counsel, district courts must “decide if the petitioner has presented a

nonfrivolous claim and if the appointment of counsel will benefit the petitioner and the court.”

Reese, 946 F.2d, at 263-64. Factors courts consider in determining whether to appoint counsel

include “the complexity of the factual and legal issues in the case, as well as the pro se

petitioner’s ability to investigate facts and present claims. Reese, 946 F.2d, at 263-64 (citing

Battle v. Armontrout, 902 F.2d 701, 702 (8th Cir. 1990)).

Considering the risk of further injury with delays and continued detention, the Court

will conduct Lin’s individualized bond hearing. See J.G.J., 2026 WL 915576, at *11 n.19

(collecting cases); see Centeno-Martinez, 2025 WL 3157711, at *3 (citing Leslie, 865 F. Supp. 2d

at 634-35; see also Thaxter, 2016 WL 3077351, at *3. Given the complex legal and factual issues

at play in immigration matters, both Lin and the Court will benefit from the Court appointing

Lin counsel for the bond hearing. See Leslie, 865 F. Supp. 2d at 631. While the government

bears the burden to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that Lin’s continued detention

is necessary, the assistance of counsel to rebut such a showing will aid the Court in making

an appropriate bond determination. Santos, 965 F.3d at 213; see Reese, 946 F.2d, at 263-64.

With Lin in ICE custody, appointed counsel will be better able to investigate facts, prepare a

rebuttal, and present potential third-party custodians for Lin. See Leslie, 865 F. Supp. 2d at

631. In the interest of justice and to avoid the risk of further delay, the Federal Public

Defender’s Office is conditionally appointed to represent Lin for his bond hearing before the

Court. As Lin has not shown that he is financially unable to obtain counsel, the Court’s

appointment of the Federal Public Defender’s Office to represent Lin is subject to review of a

financial affidavit to be completed with the federal public defender. See United States v.

Stevenson, 2012 WL 1038832, at *2 (W.D. Pa. March 28, 2012) (quoting Guidelines for

administering the CJA and related statutes, Chapter 2, § 210.40.30(b),

https://www.uscourts.gov/administration-policies/judiciary-policies/guidelines-

administering-cja-and-related-statutes-4#a210_40 (last visited June 16, 2026)) (“[a]ny doubts

as to a person’s eligibility should be resolved in the person’s favor . . . erroneous

determinations of eligibility may be corrected at a later time.”)

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Lin’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is

GRANTED. The Court ORDERS a bond hearing to be held before the undersigned on

THURSDAY JULY 9, 2026 at 9:30 a.m. in Courtroom #1 of the William J. Nealon Federal

Building and United States Courthouse. The Court conditionally appoints the Federal Public

Defender’s Office to represent Lin for the purposes of the bond hearing, subject to review of

a financial affidavit to be completed with the federal public defender.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

Dated: June 17, 2026 /s/ Karoline Mehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge