Opinion

Finch

Court: District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed: Mar 23, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 41.3%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

ANTHONY DEONTA FINCH,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:22-cv-1387-JEP-LLL

SECRETARY, FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

_____________________________________

ORDER

Finch filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

challenging his state court conviction for second-degree murder. (Doc. 1). After

reviewing the petition, the response (Doc. 8), the reply (Doc. 10), and the

relevant state court record (Doc. 9), the petition is due to be denied.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A jury found Finch guilty of second-degree murder, and the trial judge

sentenced Finch to life in prison. (Doc. 9-1 at 460–66). Finch appealed, and the

state appellate court affirmed in a written opinion. (Doc. 9-6).

Finch filed a motion for post-conviction relief under Rule 3.850, Florida

Rules of Criminal Procedure (Doc. 9-9), the post-conviction court denied relief

without an evidentiary hearing (Doc. 9-10), and the state appellate court

dismissed the appeal in a decision without a written opinion. (Doc. 9-13).

Finch’s § 2254 petition followed.

The evidence at trial proved that, after losing money and a gun during a

game of dice, Finch angrily shot and killed Kenard Hendley, who had won.

Hendley’s friend testified that he watched Finch and Hendley gambling with

dice inside an apartment in the kitchen. (Doc. 9-2 at 290–91, 293). Hendley’s

friend observed Hendley win money and Finch lose money. (Doc. 9-2 at 292).

Hendley’s friend exited the back door of the apartment to speak on the

telephone and heard a gunshot about a minute later. (Doc. 9-2 at 293–94).

Hendley’s friend called 911 after he saw Hendley on the ground and saw that

Finch had left the apartment. (Doc. 9-2 at 295–96, 302–09).

Another friend testified that he watched Finch and Hendley gambling

with the dice. (Doc. 9-2 at 339). He observed Hendley win a lot of money and

Finch become upset because he lost a lot of money. (Doc. 9-2 at 340). He

testified that, after losing all his money, Finch bet a revolver, and Hendley

rolled the dice and won. (Doc. 9-2 at 341). He testified that Hendley picked up

all the money and started to leave out the back door and that Finch shot

Hendley in the back. (Doc. 9-2 at 343–44). He did not observe Finch pull the

trigger of the gun but observed Finch holding the firearm. (Doc. 9-2 at 344). He

testified that Hendley fell to the ground and started bleeding. (Doc. 9-2 at

344–47).

Finch’s girlfriend lived in the apartment where the shooting occurred.

(Doc. 9-2 at 332–33, 338). The sister of Finch’s girlfriend, who lived next door,

testified that, after the shooting, Hendley’s friends came over and told her that

Finch shot Hendley. (9-2 at 399–402).

A detective who searched the apartment where the shooting occurred

observed red dice on the floor in the living room, white dice on the floor in the

kitchen, and a door in the kitchen that exited to a backyard. (Doc. 9-2 at

443–45). A motion-activated surveillance camera outside the front door of the

apartment where the shooting occurred did not record Finch exiting the front

door after the shooting. (Doc. 9-2 at 506–07). The camera recorded Hendley’s

friends dragging Hendley out the front door. (Doc. 9-2 at 507). A medical

examiner identified a gunshot wound on Hendley’s back and opined that the

gunshot wound caused Hendley’s death. (Doc. 9-2 at 517–18, 521–22).

After his arrest, Finch sent a letter to his girlfriend that stated, “Make

sure that they don’t do depositions.” (Doc. 9-2 at 437–38, 651). During a

telephone call in jail, Finch asked his girlfriend to dissuade witnesses from

testifying against him and asked her to refuse to testify as well. (See Doc. 9-2

at 592–623). A detective searched the home of one of Hendley’s friends who

was present during the shooting and discovered in his bedroom “two spent shell

casings,” a “0.32 caliber” handgun, “one 0.38 caliber Special live round of

ammunition,” and “one live round of nine-millimeter ammunition.” (Doc. 9-2 at

654–55). A firearms examiner testified that the bullet removed from Hendley’s

body was a 0.38 caliber bullet ordinarily fired in either a 0.38 caliber handgun

or a 0.357 Magnum handgun. (Doc. 9-2 at 668).

A detective arranged for a confidential informant to share a cell in jail

with Finch. (Doc. 9-2 at 468–69, 680). Before trial, the informant had pleaded

guilty to three attempted murders, two home invasion robberies, two armed

robberies, and possession of a firearm by a felon, and faced thirty years in

prison at sentencing. (Doc. 9-2 at 673–74). The informant had worked with the

prosecutor’s office on fifteen cases but denied that the prosecutor’s office had

promised anything for his testimony in Finch’s case. (Doc. 9-2 at 675–76).

During a recorded conversation, Finch told the informant that he had

lost a gun playing dice and that he “[doesn’t] lose guns.” (Doc. 9-2 at 688–90).

Finch said that, when the person who won tried to pick up the gun, he refused

to allow the person to leave with the gun. (Doc. 9-2 at 692). He said that he did

not plan on shooting the person who won, but when the person appeared to

“kind of [come] towards [him]” and started “making his way toward” the gun,

he shot the person once. (Doc. 9-2 at 689–93). He said that he planned to shoot

a second time, but his friend shoved him hard to make him realize what he had

done. (Doc. 9-2 at 694–95). He said that he told his girlfriend that he shot the

person who won because the person had stolen money that belonged to her.

(Doc. 9-2 at 699). He said that his girlfriend had learned that he—Finch—stole

the money from her bedroom, that he became angry when he lost the stolen

money playing dice, and that he started shooting after he lost. (Doc. 9-2 at

699–700).

During the defense’s case, an officer testified that he was the first officer

to arrive at the scene of the shooting. (Doc. 9-2 at 741). He testified that he

observed a male lying on his back and a group of persons trying to render aid.

(Doc. 9-2 at 741–42). He testified that the male told him that he suffered a

gunshot wound to his back. (Doc. 9-2 at 742). He testified that, when he asked

the male to identify the shooter, the male did not respond. (Doc. 9-2 at 742).

He testified that the persons rendering aid also did not identify the shooter or

provide any relevant information. (Doc. 9-2 at 742–43).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. AEDPA

Pursuant to the Antiterrorism Effective Death Penalty Act, a federal

court may not grant federal habeas relief with respect to a claim adjudicated

on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The phrase “clearly established Federal law” encompasses

only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court “as of the time of the

relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).

“[S]ection 2254(d)(1) provides two separate bases for reviewing state

court decisions; the ‘contrary to’ and ‘unreasonable application’ clauses

articulate independent considerations a federal court must consider.” Maharaj

v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corrs., 432 F.3d 1292, 1308 (11th Cir. 2005). Williams, 529

U.S. at 412–13, explains the meaning of each clause:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal court may

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the United States

Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state

court decides a case differently than [the United

States Supreme Court] has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from [the United States

Supreme Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

“[A] state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being

presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an

error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility

for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).1

Finally, under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court may grant a writ of habeas

corpus if the state court’s decision “was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). However, the state court’s “determination

of a factual issue . . . shall be presumed correct,” and the habeas petitioner

“shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

“[A] state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely

because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in

the first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). “[E]ven if

‘[r]easonable minds reviewing the record might disagree’ about the finding in

question, ‘on habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the trial court’s

. . . determination.” Wood, 558 U.S. at 301 (citation omitted).

1 In considering the “unreasonable application inquiry,” the Court must determine

“whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was objectively

unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. Review is limited to the record before the state

court. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180–81 (2011).

B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Before seeking habeas relief in federal court, a state prisoner must

exhaust all state court remedies that are available for challenging his

conviction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). To do so, he must “fairly present[ ]”

every issue raised in his federal petition to the state’s highest court, either on

direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351

(1989) (emphasis omitted). Thus, to properly exhaust their claims, “state

prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any

constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established

appellate review process,” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999),

thereby alerting the appropriate state court of “the federal nature of the

claim[s],” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004). See also Pope v. Rich, 358

F.3d 852, 854 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting “that Boerckel applies to the state

collateral review process as well as the direct appeal process.”).

A state prisoner’s failure to properly exhaust available state remedies

results in a procedural default, which raises a potential bar to federal habeas

review. Under the doctrine of procedural default:

[A] federal court will not review the merits of claims,

including constitutional claims, that a state court

declined to hear because the prisoner failed to abide by

a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 747–48 (1991); Wainwright

v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84–85 (1977). A state court’s

invocation of a procedural rule to deny a prisoner’s

claims precludes federal review of the claims if, among

other requisites, the state procedural rule is a

nonfederal ground adequate to support the judgment

and the rule is firmly established and consistently

followed. See, e.g., Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316

(2011); Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 60–61 (2009).

The doctrine barring procedurally defaulted claims

from being heard is not without exceptions. A prisoner

may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by

showing cause for the default and prejudice from a

violation of federal law. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2012) (internal citations modified).

“To show cause, the petitioner must demonstrate ‘some objective factor

external to the defense’ that impeded his effort to raise the claim properly in

state court.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). Once cause is established, “the

petitioner also must show actual prejudice from the alleged constitutional

violation.” Id. (citing Sykes, 433 U.S. at 84). “[I]n order to show prejudice, a

petitioner must demonstrate that ‘the errors at trial actually and substantially

disadvantaged his defense so that he was denied fundamental fairness.’” Id.

(quoting McCoy v. Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 1992)).

In the absence of a showing of cause and prejudice, a petitioner may still

receive consideration on the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if he can

show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would occur:

“[I]n an extraordinary case, where a constitutional

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one

who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of

cause for the procedural default.” Carrier, 477 U.S. at

496. “This exception is exceedingly narrow in scope,”

however, and requires proof of actual innocence, not

just legal innocence. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d

1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2001).

Ward, 592 F.3d at 1157 (internal citations modified).

“To meet this standard, a petitioner must ‘show that it is more likely

than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him’ of the underlying

offense.” Johnson, 256 F.3d at 1171 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327

(1995)). Additionally, “‘[t]o be credible,’ a claim of actual innocence must be

based on reliable evidence not presented at trial.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523

U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). With the rarity of such

evidence, in most cases, allegations of actual innocence are ultimately

summarily rejected. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Ground One

Finch asserts that the trial judge violated his federal rights by denying

his motion to suppress his statements recorded by the informant in jail.

(Doc. 1 at 5–12).

The trial judge denied the motion to suppress as follows (Doc. 9-1 at

173–76) (state court record citations omitted):

This cause came before the court on Defendant’s

Motion to Suppress Statements, Admissions, and

Confessions filed on or about April 4, 2018. The court

held a hearing regarding the aforementioned motion

on August 23, 2018, and heard argument of counsel,

reviewed the videotaped interview of the Defendant,

as well as the deposition of Desmaine Grier. The Court

being otherwise fully advised in the premises, finds as

follows:

The Defendant argues that his confession was

obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment Right to

Remain Silent, as he invoked his right to remain silent

at least seven times during his interview with the

Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office.

The statements sought to be suppressed, however, are

statements recorded by Mr. Desmaine Grier, an

inmate in the Duval County Jail who temporarily

shared a cell with the Defendant, Anthony Finch.

The Defendant was arrested on July 18, 2017,

pursuant to an arrest warrant for the murder of

Kenard Hendley. Immediately after his arrest he was

advised of his rights and interrogated by detectives.

At a point the interrogation stopped and resumed with

a different detective wanting to question the

Defendant about a separate murder of a gentleman

known as “Tiny Man.” That detective read the

Defendant his Miranda Rights again and asked him

questions about the “Tiny Man” matter.

At various times during that interview, the Defendant

says things such as “I am just saying please take me

to jail, please.” “I want to go. Please. I want to lay

down, bro.” “Man, I just want to lay down, please.”

“Can I please go? I’m tired of being here, man. I just

want to lay down, man. I’ve been here for too long.” At

a point, the interview ended without the Defendant

admitting guilt. Before the Defendant was escorted to

the Duval County Detention Facility, Jacksonville

Sheriff’s Office detectives arranged to have Mr. Finch

placed in the same cell as inmate Desmaine Grier.

They provided Mr. Grier with a recording device to

record any conversation with Defendant, Anthony

Finch.

Mr. Grier describes his encounter with the Defendant

in his deposition dated January 16, 2018. . . . During

the conversation between Grier and Finch, the

Defendant allegedly confessed to the murder.

The defense relies primarily on the case of Deviney v.

State, 112 So. 3d 57 (Fla. 2013), for the proposition

that the Defendant’s statements during the interview

with detectives were an unambiguous invocation of his

right to remain silent.

The State points to the case of Ford v. State, 801 So.

2d 318 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), for the proposition that

the Defendant’s repeated statement during

interrogation “Just take me to jail” was not an

unambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent;

and thus, the interrogating officer was under no

obligation to cease questioning or to clarify whether

the Defendant wanted the interrogation to cease.

A review of the interrogation itself reveals that the

Defendant was quite talkative and that on the heels of

making the aforementioned statements, he continued

to converse with the detectives.

A suspect must articulate his desire to cut off

questioning with sufficient clarity that a reasonable

police officer under the circumstances would

understand the statement to be an assertion of the

right to remain silent. If the statement is ambiguous

or equivocal, then the police have no duty to clarify the

defendant’s intent, and they may proceed with

interrogation. State v. Owens, 696 So. 2d 715, 718

(Fla. 1997); Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1424

(11th Cir. 1994).

The State in their argument first contended that the

Defendant did not unequivocally invoke his right to

remain silent, but that even if the Defendant’s

statements were considered to be an invocation, the

Defendant reinitiated conversation with the detectives

and did not demonstrate that he wanted the

interrogation to cease.

The State also points out that the statements about

wanting to be taken to jail were primarily given to the

detective who was discussing the “Tiny Man” case and

not with the detective who was investigating the case

for which the Defendant was under arrest. So, the

State in essence argued that if the Defendant’s

conduct was considered an invocation, it only related

to the “Tiny Man” case as opposed to the case at hand.

The State went on to argue that even if there was an

invocation that encompassed the present case,

Miranda does not apply in a jailhouse informant

situation. Conversations between incarcerated

suspects and undercover agents posing as fellow

inmates do not necessarily implicate the concerns

underlying Miranda. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292

(1990).

A defendant does not make out a violation of the Sixth

Amendment right to counsel simply by showing that

the informant, either through prior arrangement or

voluntarily, reported the defendant’s incriminating

statements to police. United States v. Birbal, 113 F.3d

342 (2d Cir. 1997). Ploys to mislead a suspect, or lull

him into a false sense of security that do not rise to the

level of compulsion or coercion to speak, are not within

Miranda’s concerns.

A defendant’s videotaped conversation with a “false

friend” recruited by police to visit the defendant in jail,

which took place before the defendant was charged

with murder and after the defendant had been advised

of his Miranda rights and invoked his right to remain

silent during interrogation by the police, did not

constitute a custodial interrogation under Miranda;

and therefore, the defendant’s assertion of the right to

remain silent did not apply to incriminating

statements he made during these conversations. Halm

v. State, 958 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

Lastly, the State points out that there are two

constitutional bases for the requirement that a

confession must be voluntary in order to be admitted

into evidence: the Fifth Amendment right against self-

incrimination and the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

The State argues that the Defendant’s due process

rights were not violated in that the Defendant’s will

was not overborn by the circumstances surrounding

the giving of the confession. A due process test for

evaluating the voluntariness of a confession takes into

consideration the totality of all surrounding

circumstances, both the characteristics of the accused

and the details of the interrogation.

In this case the Defendant was placed into a cell with

another inmate who recorded the conversation. The

deposition of the inmate indicates that the Defendant

was not threatened, coerced, or intimidated into

making the statements to inmate Grier.

Based on the foregoing, [ ] Defendant’s Motion to

Suppress Statements, Admissions, and Confessions is

hereby denied.

In his motion to suppress, Finch alleged that, on July 18, 2017, police

arrested him for murder pursuant to a warrant. (Doc. 9-1 at 62). He alleged

that, right after his arrest, detectives interrogated him about the murder and

another related murder. (Doc. 9-1 at 62–63). He alleged that, even though he

repeatedly informed the detectives that he wanted to leave, the detectives

continued to interrogate him. (Doc. 9-1 at 63–64). He alleged that, after

several more hours of interrogation, the detectives took him to jail. (Doc. 9-1

at 64). He alleged that the detectives arranged for him to share a cell with an

informant who worked for the detectives and that the detectives directed the

informant to obtain incriminating statements from him about the murder.

(Doc. 9-1 at 64).

During a deposition, the informant testified that Finch arrived at his

cell on the evening of his arrest and moved out of his cell the following morning

after a hearing in court. (Doc. 9-1 at 219–20). The informant testified that

Finch made the incriminating statements on the evening of his arrest. (Doc.

9-1 at 220–21).

In his federal petition, Finch asserts that the detectives violated his

federal right against self-incrimination by continuing to interrogate him after

he invoked his right to silence and by employing the informant to obtain

incriminating statements after he invoked his right to silence. (Doc. 1 at

6–10). He asserts that the detectives violated his federal right to counsel by

employing the informant to obtain the incriminating statements without

providing him counsel. (Doc. 1 at 10). Lastly, he asserts that the detectives

violated his federal right to due process by engaging in deceptive and

manipulative tactics to obtain his incriminating statements. (Doc. 1 at 10–12).

Federal Right against Self-Incrimination

Interrogation Room

Finch asserts that the detectives violated his right against

self-incrimination in the interrogation room by continuing to interrogate him

after he invoked his right to silence. (Doc. 1 at 6–9).

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), prohibits a prosecutor

from “us[ing] statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from

custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of

procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-

incrimination.” Before interrogation, a detective must warn a defendant that

“he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used

as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,

either retained or appointed.” 384 U.S. at 444.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444–45, explains that a defendant may waive

those rights and may revoke his waiver at any time during the interrogation:

The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights,

provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly

and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any

manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes

to consult with an attorney before speaking there can

be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone

and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to

be interrogated, the police may not question him. The

mere fact that he may have answered some questions

or volunteered some statements on his own does not

deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any

further inquiries until he has consulted with an

attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.

However, a defendant must unambiguously and unequivocally invoke

his right to remain silent. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381 (2010);

Owen v. Fla. Dep’t Corrs., 686 F.3d 1181, 1192–93 (11th Cir. 2012). “The

inquiry as to whether a suspect’s invocation of his right to remain silent was

ambiguous or equivocal is an objective one.” Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d

1095, 1101 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459

(1994)). “‘A suspect must articulate his desire to cut off questioning with

sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would

understand the statement to be an assertion of the right to remain silent.’”

Medina, 59 F.3d at 1101 (citation omitted).

“‘[A]n accused’s post-request responses to further interrogation may not

be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request itself.’”

Medina, 59 F.3d at 1101 (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 100 (1984))

(italics in original). “[H]owever, [ ] ‘an accused’s request . . . may be

characterized as ambiguous or equivocal as a result of events preceding the

request or of nuances inherent in the request itself.’” Medina, 59 F.3d at 1101

(quoting Smith, 469 U.S. at 100).

On July 18, 2017, at 1:45 P.M., police arrested Finch pursuant to a

warrant for murder and brought him to the police station. (Doc. 9-1 at 23–30).

That afternoon, a detective interrogated Finch about the murder. The record

in this case contains a copy of a video recording of the interrogation.2

Before the interrogation, a detective complied with Miranda and

advised Finch of his rights, and Finch acknowledged and waived those rights.

(Video Recording at 14:44–46). Finch does not assert that he unknowingly or

involuntarily waived his rights.

2 The relevant record on federal habeas is “the record that was before the state court

that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181. Before ruling on the

motion to suppress, the trial judge viewed the recording of the interrogation. (Doc. 9-1 at

173). A judicially noticed docket from the direct appeal demonstrates that the state trial clerk

transmitted the recording to the state appellate court. Finch v. State, No. 1D18-3993 (Fla.

1st DCA). In his brief on direct appeal, Finch cited and quoted the recording. (Doc. 9-3 at 19–

21). Consequently, when reviewing the claim under § 2254(d), this Court viewed and relied

on the recording, instead of a partial transcription of the recording by the court reporter at

the hearing on the motion to suppress. (See Doc. 9-1 at 657–91).

Two detectives interrogated Finch about the murder of Hendley. Finch

denied that he shot Hendley and claimed that another person named Isaiah

shot Hendley because Hendley had learned that Isaiah murdered a person

nicknamed “Tiny Man.” (Id. at 14:46–15:53). After interrogating Finch for an

hour about the murder of Hendley, the detectives gave Finch a half-hour

break. (Id. at 16:02).

After the break, another detective advised Finch of his rights again, and

Finch acknowledged and waived those rights. (Video Recording at 16:25–26).

Two detectives interrogated Finch about the murder of “Tiny Man,” and Finch

admitted that he was present when the murder occurred but denied that he

committed the murder and stated that Isaiah committed the murder. (Id. at

16:26–48). When Finch became upset during the interrogation, the detectives

gave him a break. (Id. at 16:48–55).

After the second break, Finch told the detectives that, “I want to go,

please. I want to lay down . . . I don’t got a good feeling. Please.” (Video

Recording at 16:55). One of the detectives told Finch that he was offering

Finch a chance to help himself, advised that “[a]sking to lay down is not

helping,” and told him to answer the other detective’s questions. (Id. at 16:55–

57). About ten minutes later, after more questions, Finch told the detectives,

“I just want to go home . . . I know that I’m not going home . . . This is crazy.”

(Id. at 17:05). Finch added a short time later, “I need to go home,” and a

detective responded that he could not let Finch go home. (Id. at 17:08).

Finch agreed to help the detectives by calling and speaking with Isaiah

about the murder and repeated that he was “trying to go home.” (Video

Recording at 17:16–17). After a forty-five-minute break, the detectives

returned, and Finch agreed again to call Isaiah and another person who was

present during the murder of Hendley and the murder of “Tiny Man.” (Id. at

18:01–08). When the detective told Finch that he faced several problems

because he was at the park where the murder of “Tiny Man” occurred and

because he knew that other persons had planned the murder before he arrived

at the park, he responded, “I really want to go to my cell . . . It’s all on

me . . . I’m fucked!” (Id. at 18:06–07). He repeated that he agreed to call Isaiah

and the other person who was present during both murders. (Id. at 18:07).

Finch called and spoke with the person who was present during both

murders, and the person hung up the phone. (Video Recording at 18:10–12).

Also, Finch called and spoke with Isaiah, and Isaiah provided no helpful

information. (Id. at 18:12–18). After the phone calls, Finch told the detective,

“Can I please go? I’m tired of being in here . . . I just want to lay down . . . I’ve

been in here for too long. Please don’t walk away and be gone for long.” (Id. at

18:23). After speaking with the detective a few more minutes, Finch told the

detective, “Can I please leave? I don’t want to stay in here no more.” (Id. at

18:26–27). The detective gave Finch a ten-minute break, let him use the

restroom, handcuffed him, and took him to jail. (Id. at

19:05–07).

The post-conviction court’s determination that Finch requested to leave

and lie down is presumed correct, and Finch fails to rebut that determination

with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Because the video

recording supports the determination, the post-conviction court did not

unreasonably determine a fact. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

Also, the video recording demonstrates that Finch failed to

unequivocally invoke his right to silence. Finch knew that he had the right to

terminate the interrogation at any time by invoking his right to silence. Before

the interrogation about the murder of Hendley, the detective advised him of

the right, and he acknowledged and waived the right. Also, before the

interrogation about the murder of “Tiny Man,” another detective advised him

of the right, and he again acknowledged and waived the right.

Also, during the interrogation, Finch did not simply tell the detectives

that he wished to terminate the interrogation because he no longer wanted to

speak. He instead asked to leave because he wanted to lay down, because he

wanted to go home, and because he wanted to go to his cell. When he made

these requests to leave, Finch also agreed to assist the detectives by calling

persons who had knowledge about the murders because he thought that his

assistance would help him go home. No reasonable police officer would

objectively interpret these ambiguous and nuanced requests, coupled with an

eagerness to assist law enforcement, as an assertion of the right to remain

silent. Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 382 (“Thompkins did not say that he wanted to

remain silent or that he did not want to talk with the police. Had he made

either of these simple, unambiguous statements, he would have invoked his

‘right to cut off questioning.’”) (citation omitted).

Because Finch fails to demonstrate that “the state court’s ruling [ ] was

so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded

disagreement,” the claim is meritless. Richter, 562 U.S. at 103.

Even if Finch had unequivocally invoked his right to silence, the

prosecutor did not introduce into evidence at trial any statement by Finch

during the interrogation with the detectives. Consequently, Finch cannot

demonstrate that any error substantially and injuriously affected the jury’s

verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).

Jail Cell

Finch further asserts that the detectives violated his right against

self-incrimination in the jail by employing the informant to obtain

incriminating statements after he invoked his right to silence. (Doc. 1 at 10).

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, defined “custodial interrogation [as]

questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been

taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any

significant way.” Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990), explains that

“[c]onversations between suspects and undercover agents do not implicate the

concerns underlying Miranda” because “[w]hen a suspect considers himself in

the company of cellmates and not officers, the coercive atmosphere is lacking.”

Consequently, Perkins, 496 U.S. at 300, holds that “an undercover law

enforcement officer posing as a fellow inmate need not give Miranda warnings

to an incarcerated suspect before asking questions that may elicit an

incriminating response.” See also United States v. Stubbs, 944 F.2d 828,

831–32 (11th Cir. 1991) (“If the Fifth Amendment is not implicated when the

incarcerated person speaks freely to an undercover agent, we see no

justification for concluding the result should be different where, as here, the

cellmate is not actually an undercover law enforcement agent but instead is—

at best—a confidential informant.”).

During a deposition, the informant testified that he was an inmate in

the county jail, and that the detectives both informed him that Finch was

assigned to his cell and was charged with murder and asked him to speak with

Finch about the charge. (Doc. 9-1 at 181, 218–19). The informant testified that

he recorded a conversation between him, Finch, and other inmates about the

murder, while Finch spent the night in his cell. (Doc. 9-1 at 219–21).

Because Finch did not know that the informant worked for the

detectives when he made the incriminating statements in jail, the detectives

did not violate Finch’s right against self-incrimination by employing the

informant to elicit and record the statements. Consequently, the post-

conviction court did not unreasonably deny the claim. Bowen v. Sec’y, Fla.

Dep’t Corrs., 92 F.4th 1328, 1336 (11th Cir. 2024) (“[I]n conversations where

‘the suspect does not know that he is speaking to a government agent,’ there

is ‘no reason to assume the possibility that the suspect might feel coerced’—

which means Miranda protections do not apply.”) (quoting Perkins, 496 U.S.

at 299).

Bowen, 92 F.4th at 1336, cited Perkins and other opinions by the United

States Supreme Court to explain that “police actions that lead to a suspect

making incriminating statements to a third party are the functional

equivalent of interrogation only if they involve some ‘psychological ploy’ with

sufficient coercive elements.” In Bowen, 92 F.4th at 1331, the defendant, who

invoked his right to silence after a detective advised him of his Miranda

rights, made incriminating statements to a co-defendant when the detective

placed the defendant and the co-defendant in the same room. The court of

appeals held that the detective did not engage in a “psychological ploy” with

coercive elements because the co-defendant acted independently from the

detective and because the defendant did not believe that he spoke in the

presence of the detective when he incriminated himself. Bowen, 92 F.4th at

1336–37.

During a deposition, the informant testified that the detective only

mentioned that Finch was charged with murder, did not tell him any details

about Finch’s case, and asked whether he could elicit statements from Finch

about his case. (Doc. 9-1 at 216, 218). He testified that generally a detective

who asks him to record statements by another inmate instructs him to not

directly ask the inmate about his case and to allow the inmate to first initiate

the discussion about the case. (Doc. 9-1 at 250–51). He testified that, when

Finch arrived, he asked whether Finch brought any drugs into jail and

whether Finch was “straight,” or if anything bad had happened to him. (Doc.

9-1 at 220–21). He testified that Finch responded that he was not “straight,”

and proceeded to freely speak about the murder charge. (Doc. 9-1 at 221). He

testified that he asked Finch more questions about the crime because he had

heard about the crime and because he knew the victim. (Doc. 9-1 at 221).

The detective did not know whether Finch would incriminate himself

while speaking with the informant. The detective did not disclose to the

informant details about the crime and did not direct the informant to ask

Finch particular questions. Finch freely spoke about the crime, after the

informant generally asked if he was “straight.” The informant asked Finch

additional questions because the informant knew about the crime. The

detective did not engage in a “psychological ploy” with “sufficient coercive

elements” by employing the informant to record incriminating statements by

Finch. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299 (1980) (identifying examples

of “psychological ploys” described in Miranda as a line-up with a coached

witness, a “reverse line-up” with a coached witness who accuses a suspect of a

fabricated crime, a statement that minimizes the moral seriousness of an

offense, or a statement that casts blame on society or the victim).

Because Finch did not know that the detective asked the informant for

help, that the informant had a recording device, or that the detective would

hear his recorded statements about the crimes when he made them, the

detective’s actions were not the functional equivalent of interrogation under

Miranda. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 (“[T]he term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda

refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the

part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit

an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this

definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than

the intent of the police.”); Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529–30 (1987)

(“Officers do not interrogate a suspect simply by hoping that he will

incriminate himself. . . . In deciding whether particular police conduct is

interrogation, we must remember the purpose behind our decisions in

Miranda and Edwards: preventing government officials from using the

coercive nature of confinement to extract confessions that would not be given

in an unrestrained environment.”).

Even if Finch had invoked his right to silence before the detectives

arranged for the informant to meet with Finch, Finch fails to identify clearly

established law by the Supreme Court of the United States that requires

suppression of his statements. Consequently, Finch is not entitled to relief.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). United States v. Kimbrough, 477 F.3d 144, 150 (4th

Cir. 2007) (“We note at the outset that Appellee faces a difficult challenge in

advancing this argument. He cites no cases, nor can we locate any, in which

statements or confessions elicited through private questioning have been

suppressed.”); see Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (“We therefore

conclude that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in

custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his

‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored.’”).

Lastly, even if the detective had violated Finch’s right to silence by

employing the informant to ask him questions about the crime, other

compelling evidence at trial proved Finch’s guilt. Two witnesses observed that,

during a game of dice, Hendley won money, and Finch lost money. (Doc. 9-2

at 290–93, 340). Shortly after, one witness heard a gunshot, saw Hendley with

a gunshot wound on the ground, and saw that Finch had left. (Doc. 9-2 at

293–96, 302–09). The other witness saw Finch bet a firearm, heard a gunshot

when Hendley started to leave with money that he won, and saw Finch

holding the firearm. (Doc. 9-2 at 343–44). Immediately after the shooting, both

witnesses told the sister of Finch’s girlfriend, who lived next door, that Finch

shot Hendley. (Doc. 9-2 at 399–402).

After his arrest, Finch sent a letter to his girlfriend asking that she

dissuade any witness from testifying in a deposition. (Doc. 9-2 at 437–38, 651).

During a telephone call in jail, Finch also asked his girlfriend to dissuade

witnesses from testifying against him at trial and asked her to refuse to testify

as well. (See Doc. 9-2 at 592–623). This evidence demonstrated consciousness

of guilt. Special v. West Boca Med. Ctr., 160 So. 3d 1251, 1261–62 (Fla. 2014)

(“Florida courts permit evidence of threats or witness intimidation if the

threats are attributable to the opposing party. It is admissible because it is

‘evidence of a consciousness of guilt,’ and there is nothing more sacred than

judicial proceedings that are free from attempts to tamper with or intimidate

witnesses.”) (citations omitted).

Even without Finch’s statements to the informant, other compelling

evidence proved Finch’s guilt. Consequently, even if the detective had violated

Finch’s right to silence by employing the informant, Finch cannot demonstrate

that any error substantially and injuriously affected the jury’s verdict. Brecht,

507 U.S. at 637.

Federal Right to Counsel

Finch asserts that the detectives violated his right to counsel by

employing the informant to obtain the incriminating statements without

providing him counsel. (Doc. 1 at 10).

“The Sixth Amendment right of the ‘accused’ to assistance of counsel in

‘all criminal prosecutions’ is limited by its terms: ‘it does not attach until a

prosecution is commenced.’” Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., Tex., 554 U.S. 191, 198

(2008) (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991)). A prosecution

commences after “‘the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—

whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,

information, or arraignment.’” Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 198 (quoting United

States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984)).

During a deposition, the informant testified that Finch arrived at his

cell on the evening of his arrest and moved out of his cell the following morning

after a first appearance hearing in court. (Doc. 9-1 at 219–20, 227). The

informant testified that Finch made the incriminating statements on the

evening of his arrest. (Doc. 9-1 at 220–21).

Also, on July 18, 2017, police arrested Finch (Doc. 9-1 at 23, 26–27), and

on July 19, 2017, a trial judge appointed Finch counsel. (Doc. 9-1 at 34). On

August 3, 2017, the prosecutor filed an information charging Finch with

second-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon. (Doc. 9-1 at 38).

Because Finch made the incriminating statements before the trial judge

appointed him counsel and before the prosecutor filed an information, the

detectives did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by employing

the informant to elicit the statements without providing counsel. Kight v.

Singletary, 50 F.3d 1539, 1548 (11th Cir. 1995). Also, because Finch did not

request an attorney before or during the interrogation, his right to counsel

under Miranda did not attach, either. Gore v. Sec’y, Dep’t Corrs., 492 F.3d

1273, 1299–1300 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Absent a request for counsel—an

indication to the police that the suspect wishes to interact with them through

counsel alone—the Fifth Amendment right does not attach.”).

Federal Right to Due Process

Finch asserts that the detectives violated his federal right to due process

by engaging in deceptive and manipulative tactics to obtain his incriminating

statements. (Doc. 1 at 10–12).

“[C]ertain interrogation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to

the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized

system of justice that they must be condemned under the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985).

“Faced with statements extracted by beatings and other forms of physical and

psychological torture, the Court held that confessions procured by means

‘revolting to the sense of justice’ could not be used to secure a conviction.”

Miller, 474 U.S. at 109 (quoting Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286

(1936)). “[T]actics for eliciting inculpatory statements must fall within the

broad constitutional boundaries imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s

guarantee of fundamental fairness.” Miller, 474 U.S. at 110.

“Convictions based on evidence obtained by methods that are ‘so brutal

and so offensive to human dignity’ that they ‘shoc[k] the conscience’ violate

the Due Process Clause.” Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 774 (2003)

(quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 174 (1952)). “[O]nly the most

egregious official conduct can be said to be ‘arbitrary in the constitutional

sense[.]’” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (citation

omitted). “In reviewing charges that official conduct rose to a constitutionally

impermissible level, the cases turn on the totality of the circumstances

without any single controlling factor.” Owen v. Wainwright, 806 F.2d 1519,

1521 (11th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).

Finch fails to cite clearly established law as determined by the United

States Supreme Court that holds that the use of an informant to elicit

incriminating statements violates a suspect’s federal right to due process.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,

431–32 (1973) (“While we may some day be presented with a situation in

which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process

principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial

processes to obtain a conviction, the instant case is distinctly not of that

breed.”) (citation omitted).

The detective recruited the informant to speak with Finch about the

murder and provided him a recorder to record the conversation. (Doc. 9-1 at

215–16). The detective carefully did not disclose the details of the crime and

did not direct the informant to ask any particular question. (Doc. 9-1 at 219).

The informant knew to not initially ask an inmate about a crime and to

instead wait until the inmate first spoke about the crime. (Doc. 9-1 at

250–51). When the informant asked Finch if he was “straight,” Finch

responded by freely speaking about the crime. (Doc. 9-1 at 220–21). The

informant asked Finch further about the crime because the informant had

heard about the crime. (Doc. 9-1 at 221–22). The informant pleaded guilty to

his charged crimes, the prosecutor waived any mandatory minimum sentence

for the crimes, and the informant faced thirty years in prison at sentencing.

(Doc. 9-1 at 237). The informant hoped that he would receive a sentence that

was less than thirty years in prison because of his assistance to law

enforcement. (Doc. 9-1 at 238).

The totality of these circumstances does not demonstrate that the

detective employed investigative methods “‘so offensive to human dignity’ that

they ‘shoc[k] the conscience.’” Chavez, 538 U.S. at 774. Consequently, the state

court did not unreasonably deny the federal due process claim. Waddell v.

Hendry Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 329 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003) (“A

government interest is advanced by using confidential informants. . . . Some

confidential informants have blemishes on their own records which make

them more acceptable to the criminal element on which they are to inform.

The government cannot be expected to rely exclusively upon the virtuous in

enforcing the law.”).

Accordingly, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED and this action is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

2. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment dismissing this action

with prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.

3. If Petitioner appeals this Order, the Court denies a certificate of

appealability.3 Because the Court has determined that a certificate of

appealability is not warranted, the Clerk of the Court shall terminate from the

pending motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may

be filed in this case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.

3 The court should issue a certificate of appealability only if a petitioner makes “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make

this substantial showing, a petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find

the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v.

Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or

that “the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,’”

Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335–36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,

893 n.4 (1983)). Upon due consideration of the record as a whole, this Court denies a

certificate of appealability.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida on March 238, 2026.

c JORDAN E. PRATT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies:

Pro Se Defendant

Counsel of Record

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