Guzman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JUAN RAMON GUZMAN,

Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-CV-01194

v.

(MEHALCHICK, J.)

JESSICA SAGE,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM

Petitioner, Juan Ramon Guzman (“Guzman”) brings this petition for writ of habeas

corpus. (Doc. 1). On May 5, 2026, Guzman filed the instant petition, requesting that

Respondent Jessica Sage1 release him from custody at the Federal Correctional Institution

Lewisburg (“FCI Lewisburg”) in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania or provide him with a bond

hearing before a neutral arbiter. (Doc. 1, at 6). On May 13, 2026, Sage filed a response to

Guzman’s petition. (Doc. 6). Guzman did not file a timely traverse. For the following reasons,

1 Pursuant to the “immediate custodian rule,” the proper respondent in this case is Jessica

Sage (“Sage”), Warden of FCI Lewisburg. “The federal habeas statute straightforwardly

provides that the proper respondent to a habeas petition is ‘the person who has custody over

[the petitioner].’” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434 (2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2242); 28

U.S.C. § 2243 (“[t]he writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having

custody of the person detained”); see Anariba v. Dir. Hudson Cnty. Corr. Ctr., 17 F.4th 434, 444

(3d Cir. 2021) (“if a § 2241 petitioner does not adhere to the immediate custodian rule, then

the district court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the petition”). As Guzman is detained at FCI

Lewisburg, Sage is the proper respondent. (Doc. 1, at 2); see Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 434.

However, the government will be bound by the Court’s judgment because Sage is acting as

an agent of the federal government by detaining Guzman on behalf of Immigration and

Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). See Madera v. Decker, 18 Civ. 7314, 2018 WL 10602037, at *9-

*10 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2018) (finding the warden acts as an agent of the ICE regional director

when ICE makes initial custody determinations including setting of a bond and review of

conditions of release); Santana-Rivas v. Warden of Clinton Cnty. Corr. Facility, 3:25-cv-01896,

2025 WL 3522932, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025), adopted in part, rejected in part, 2025 WL

3513152 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (finding same).

Guzman petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following background is derived from Guzman’s petition, Sage’s response, and

the exhibits thereto. (Doc. 1; Doc. 6). Guzman is a citizen of El Salvador, who entered the

United States without inspection, admission, or parole on or about January 1998 at or near

Brownsville, Texas. (Doc. 6-3, at 2). On May 4, 1990, Guzman applied for status as a

temporary resident, which Immigration and Naturalization Services (“INS”) approved on

July 17, 1992. (Doc. 6-3, at 2). On April 12, 1993, Guzman applied to adjust his status from

temporary to permanent resident, which the INS approved on December 5, 1996. (Doc. 1, at

1; Doc. 6-3, at 2). On April 15, 1996, the 185th District Court of Harris County, Texas

convicted Guzman of burglary of a motor vehicle with intent to commit theft. (Doc. 6-3, at

2). On March 12, 1998, the INS issued Guzman a notice to appear, and on May 15, 1998, the

INS removed Guzman from the United States to El Salvador based on a final order of

removal. (Doc. 6-3, at 2). The INS prohibited Guzman from reentering the United States at

any time. (Doc. 6-4, at 4).

On an unknown date, Guzman reentered the United States without inspection,

admission, or parole. (Doc. 6-3, at 2). On June 21, 2019, Guzman was arrested by the Suffolk

County Police Department, where ICE served him with a notice of intent/decision to

reinstate his 1998 removal order. (Doc. 1, at 1; Doc. 6-2, at 2; Doc. 6-4). On September 4,

2025, Enforcement and Removal Operations encountered Guzman at the Federal

Correctional Institution Fort Dix. (Doc. 6-3, at 2). On September 22, 2025, ICE took Guzman

into immigration custody. (Doc. 1, at 1; Doc. 6-8, at 3). On December 29, 2025, an

immigration judge denied Guzman’s request for withholding of removal. (Doc. 6-8, at 3).

Guzman timely appealed the withholding of removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals

(“BIA”), which remains pending. (Doc. 6, at 3; Doc. 6-8, at 4). On January 31, 2026, ICE

received the travel documents necessary for Guzman’s removal to El Salvador. (Doc. 6-8, at

3).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

28 U.S.C. § 2241 governs district courts’ power to grant the writ of habeas corpus.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b), the writ of habeas corpus extends to petitioners “in custody for

an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or

decree of a court or judge of the United States.” Claims where non-citizens challenge

immigration enforcement-related detention “fall within the ‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus

and thus must be brought in habeas.” Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025) (quoting

Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 159, 167 (2022)). “For ‘core habeas petitions,’ ‘jurisdiction lies in

only one district: the district of confinement.’” J. G. G., 604 U.S. at 672. While reviewing a

noncitizen’s habeas petition, courts evaluate whether the government complied with

regulatory, statutory, and constitutional protections for noncitizens. See Martinez v. McAleenan,

385 F. Supp. 3d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding ICE failed to comply with regulatory and

constitutional notice requirements prior to detaining a non-citizen petitioner and granting the

petitioner’s habeas petition). A court may order a bond hearing or release if the Court

determines that a noncitizen habeas petitioner is entitled to such relief under relevant

constitutional or statutory protections. See A.L. v. Oddo, 761 F. Supp. 3d 822, 827 (W.D. Pa.

2025) (finding that a noncitizen habeas petitioner was entitled to a bond hearing under the

due process clause of the Fifth Amendment); see Munoz-Saucedo v. Pittman, 789 F. Supp. 3d

387, 400 (D.N.J. 2025) (finding petitioner’s continued detention without reasonably

imminent removal is unreasonable and ordering release).

III. JURISDICTION

“[F]ederal courts ‘have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter

jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.’” Hartig Drug Co. Inc. v.

Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S.

500, 514 (2006)). 28 U.S.C. § 2241 empowers federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus

where a petitioner is “in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States . . . in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1),

(3). Recently, in Khalil v. President, United States, 164 F.4th 259, 273 (3d Cir. 2026), the Third

Circuit determined that the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) strips district courts of

subject-matter jurisdiction to hear claims arising from removal actions or proceedings, when

the claims could be addressed on a petition for review of a final order of removal (“PFR”).

However, the Third Circuit clarified that district courts retain jurisdiction over habeas

petitions presenting “now or never” questions of law, that cannot be meaningfully reviewed

later on a PFR. Kahlil, 164 F.4th at 273-74.

Habeas actions based on whether a petitioner is subject to unconstitutionally lengthy

detention remain in the jurisdiction of district courts. Kahlil, 164 F.4th at 277-79 (holding

detention-specific claims, like length and conditions-of-confinement claims, do not arise from

removal proceedings and can be addressed by district courts); see Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583

U.S. 281, 294 (2018) (finding 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar to

challenges unrelated to review of an order of removal, the government’s decision to detain in

the first place, and the process by which removability will be determined); see also Zadvydas v.

Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001) (“We conclude that § 2241 habeas corpus proceedings remain

available as a forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-period

detention.”). The question of whether a petitioner’s detention has been unconstitutionally

long is wholly collateral to removal proceedings and cannot be meaningfully reviewed on a

PFR. Kahlil, 164 F.4th at 278-79 (finding that length of confinement claim “does not get

channeled into the PFR review process”). Thus, the Court retains jurisdiction over the legal

question of whether Guzman’s detention has become unconstitutionally prolonged and

unrelated to the purpose of removal. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294; Kahlil, 164 F.4th at 274-79;

Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688.

IV. DISCUSSION

Guzman contends that his eight-months of immigration detention is pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1226(c) and has become unconstitutionally prolonged. (Doc. 1, at 3). Guzman avers

that his ongoing detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and that

he is entitled to a bond hearing. (Doc. 1, at 5). Guzman provides that his detention is likely

to continue because his withholding of removal proceeding is pending. (Doc. 1, at 3).

Sage counters that Guzman is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, not § 1226(c),

because ICE reinstated Guzman’s final order of removal. (Doc. 6, at 1). Sage submits that

pursuant to § 1231(a)(6), Guzman is not entitled to a bond hearing. (Doc. 6, at 9). Sage also

avers that Guzman should not be released from custody because he cannot meet his burden

to demonstrate that there is not a significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future. (Doc. 6, at 9). Sage provides that while detained Guzman has received and

will continue to receive custody determinations, which Sage contends is the required due

process protection for Guzman under the INA. (Doc. 6, at 12). Sage submits that the

government has received the travel documents required to execute Guzman’s removal to El

Salvador. (Doc. 6, at 11). Sage avers that should the BIA affirm the immigration court’s denial

of Guzman’s petition for withholding of removal, Guzman will be removed in the reasonably

foreseeable future. (Doc. 6, at 12).

Section 1226(c) of the INA provides that “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney

General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to

be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). When detention under § 1226(c)

reaches an unreasonably prolonged duration, the petitioner-detainee is entitled to a bond

hearing at which the government bears the burden to show, by clear and convincing evidence,

that the petitioner-detainee would likely flee or pose a risk to the community if released.

German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 210-11, 214 (3d Cir. 2020).

Section 1231 of the INA provides for the detention of noncitizens with final orders of removal.

8 U.S.C. § 1231. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231, “when an alien is ordered removed, the

Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days.”

Noncitizens convicted of certain criminal offenses and noncitizens whom the Attorney

General finds to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with an order of removal

may be detained beyond the 90-day removal period. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). Noncitizens

detained under § 1231 are not entitled to a bond hearing; however, they are entitled to

supervisory release if the government has failed to remove them in a reasonable period and

they can show that there is not a significant likelihood of their removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future. Johnson v. Guman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 526 (2021); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533

U.S. 678, 699-700 (2001).

Congress also created an expedited process for the removal of noncitizens who

reentered the United States without authorization after having already been removed. 8

U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5); Johnson, 594 U.S. at 529. Section 1231(a)(5) of the INA provides that,

If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United States

illegally after having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an

order of removal, the prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date

and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed, the alien is not eligible and

may not apply for any relief under this chapter, and the alien shall be removed

under the prior order at any time after the reentry.

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)

While noncitizens with a reinstated order of removal are not subject to discretionary relief

under the INA, noncitizens with reinstated orders of removal can pursue withholding-only

relief to prevent the Department of Homeland Security from executing their removal to the

particular country designated in the reinstated removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5); Johnson,

594 U.S. at 530.

In Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 542 (2021), the Supreme Court determined

that 8 U.S.C. § 1231, not § 1226(c), applies to noncitizens with reinstated orders of removal,

whose withholding of removal proceedings are ongoing. The Supreme Court reasoned that

because the withholding of removal process is country specific and does not preclude removal

to another country, the withholding proceeding is separate from the removal proceeding for

a noncitizen with a reinstated order of removal. Johnson, 594 U.S. at 531-32, 534; Inestroza-

Tosta v. Attorney General, 105 F.4th 499, 513 (3d Cir. 2024); Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York

Cnty Prison, 905 F.3d 208, 219 (3d Cir. 2018). As such, while the withholding-only proceeding

is ongoing, the removal proceeding is not, and with a reinstated final order of removal,

noncitizens are properly detained under § 1231. Johnson, 594 U.S. at 531-32, 534; Inestroza-

Tosta, 105 F.4th at 513; Guerrero-Sanchez, 905 F.3d at 219.

Noncitizens with reinstated orders of removal are therefore ineligible for bond, but

they are eligible for supervisory release if they can show that removal is not likely in the

reasonably foreseeable future. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701; Pina v. Castille, No. 16-4280, 2017

WL 935163, at *8-*9 (D.N.J. March 9, 2017) (finding that the rights of a noncitizen with a

reinstated order of removal are governed by the post-removal-order standards of Zadvydas);

Delcid-Santos v. Soto, No. 26-1382, 2026 WL 636814, at *2-*3 (D.N.J. March 6, 2026) (finding

same); Albernaz v. Soto, No. 26-cv-942, 2026 WL 632541, at *2 (D.N.J. March 6, 2026)

(finding same).

In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690-91 (2001), the Supreme Court found that

indefinite detention of a noncitizen with a final order of removal violates the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and that detention of a noncitizen with a final order of

removal must be limited with a definite endpoint. The Supreme Court determined that to

discern whether such post-order of removal detention comports with the Due Process Clause

of the Fifth Amendment, habeas courts must ask whether the detention “exceeds a period

reasonably necessary to secure removal.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699. The Supreme Court

found that detention post-order of removal is presumed reasonable for a period under six

months. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. After the presumptively reasonable six-month period runs

and the detained noncitizen “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant

likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond

with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. As the period of

confinement grows, what counts as reasonably foreseeable future conversely shrinks.

Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. If removal is ultimately not reasonably foreseeable, habeas courts

should hold continued detention unreasonable and order release. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699-

700. Courts in the Third Circuit have found that delays due to the backlog of cases in the

immigration courts threaten indefinitely prolonged periods of detention, rendering removal

not reasonably foreseeable. Dudamel v. Jamison, No. 26-361, 2026 WL 498612, at *7 (E.D. Pa.

Feb. 23, 2026); Ologbenla v. Lowe, No. 3:25-cv-1351, 2025 WL 2375272, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug.

14, 2025); see Khalil v. Joyce, 780 F. Supp. 3d 476, 524 n. 50 (D.N.J. 2025).

While Guzman’s withholding of removal proceedings are ongoing, his removal

proceedings are complete, and he is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Johnson, 594

U.S. at 531-32, 534; Inestroza-Tosta, 105 F.4th at 513; Guerrero-Sanchez, 905 F.3d at 219.

Guzman has been detained under § 1231 for over eight months, so his presumptively

reasonable six-month period of § 1231 detention has run. (Doc. 1, at 1; Doc. 6-2, at 2; Doc.

6-4; Doc. 6-8, at 3); Zadvydas 533 U.S. at 701. By providing evidence that his request for

withholding of removal is pending on appeal, Guzman has shown good reason to believe

removal is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future. (Doc. 1, at 3).

Sage fails to rebut Guzman’s showing by providing evidence that El Salvador has

produced a travel document for Guzman’s removal. (Doc. 6-8, at 4). Sage avers that “should

the BIA affirm the Immigration Court’s decision, Petitioner will be removed,” but Sage gives

no indication that the appeal of Guzman’s withholding of removal decision will be resolved

in the reasonably foreseeable future. (Doc. 6, at 11-12). The backlog of pending cases appealed

to the BIA indicates that Guzman could remain detained for several months beyond his eight

months of § 1231 detention. At the end of the first quarter of 2026, the BIA had 219,945

appeals pending. Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics, Executive

Office for Immigration Review, Statistics and Reports,

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344986/dl?inline (last visited June 12, 2026). Even if

the BIA affirms the immigration court’s denial of Guzman’s request for withholding of

removal, Guzman has the right to appeal such a decision to the Third Circuit, which would

further extend Guzman’s § 1231 detention beyond a reasonable removal period. See, e.g.,

Inestroza-Tosta, 105 F. 4th 499, at 509. Given the ongoing withholding of removal proceeding,

there is not a significant likelihood that Guzman will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable

future. (Doc. 6, at 3); see Dudamel, 2026 WL 498612, at *7; see Ologbenla, 2025 WL 2375272,

at *3; see also Khalil, 780 F. Supp. 3d at 524 n. 50. Accordingly, Guzman’s petition for writ of

habeas corpus is GRANTED. (Doc. 1).

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Guzman’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED.

(Doc. 1). Sage is ORDERED to release Guzman from custody under appropriate conditions

of supervisory release. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this matter.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

Dated: June 15, 2026 /s/ Karoline Mehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge