Hoffman

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOEY DEAN HOFFMAN, : Civil No. 1:25-CV-01176

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

PRIME CARE MEDICAL, INC. et al., :

:

Defendants. : Judge Jennifer P. Wilson

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the court is motion to dismiss the amended complaint filed

by Defendants Kyle Brim, PA-C and Adina M. Lightner, LPN. (Doc. 22.) Joey

Dean Hoffman (“Plaintiff”), a self-represented litigant currently housed at Dauphin

County Prison proceeding in this action in forma pauperis, also filed a motion for

appointment of counsel. (Doc. 25.) The court will grant the motion to dismiss the

amended complaint, dismiss the amended complaint, and deny the motion for

appointment of counsel.

BACKGROUND

On June 27, 2025, the court received and docketed a complaint naming

Prime Care Medical, Inc as the sole defendant. (Doc. 1.) The alleged facts in the

complaint consisted of the following paragraph:

My medical request slips were ignored for over 3 months demanding

help getting medical bottom bunk status. And when I sprained my ankle

it took 6 days for a x-ray and longer to see anyone (PA) to look at it.

And 6 months later its still not right and hurts all the time. And medical

ignores me. I have written records and 40+ copies of request slips.

(Doc. 1.)

On September 23, 2025, the court dismissed the complaint for failing to state

a claim for which relief may be granted. (Docs. 9, 10.) Specifically, the court

determined that a private corporation contracted by a prison to provide health care

for inmates cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory, but only for

constitutional violations if it has a custom or policy exhibiting deliberate

indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. (Doc. 9.) The court granted

Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 10.)

The court received and docketed Plaintiff’s amended complaint on

November 18, 2025. (Doc. 14.) This amended complaint names three defendants:

(1) Prime Care Medical, Inc.; (2) Kyle Brin (“Brim”)1, a Physician’s Assistant; and

(3) Adena (“Lightner”)2, a nurse. (Id.) On December 18, 2025, the court screened

the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), dismissed all

claims against Prime Care Medical, Inc., and served the individual defendants with

a copy of the amended complaint. (Doc. 16.)

1 Defendant Brim’s name was corrected in his motion to dismiss the amended complaint. (Doc.

22.)

2 Defendant Adina M. Lightner’s name was corrected in her motion to dismiss the amended

complaint. (Doc. 22.)

On January 2, 2026, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. (Doc. 22.)

The second amended complaint alleges a refusal to treat his injured ankle by

Defendants Brim and Lightner. (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff states that on

December 19, 2024, he was walking down the steps for lunch trays when he rolled

his ankle on the last step. (Id., p. 3). Plaintiff alleges that his cellmate carried him

up the stairs to his cell. (Id., p. 4.) He states that he showed his ankle to non-party

prison officials, expressing that he needed medical attention, and was told to wait.

(Id., p. 4.) He states that at 8:07, Nurse Lightner gave him extra pills including

Motrin and Tylenol. (Id., p. 5.) He alleges that she stated that she had the slip for

his bottom bunk status, but she had not turned it in, and it was on her cart all day.

(Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that on December 21, 2025, Nurse Mallory stated that he

was prescribed Tylenol and Motrin, but that he could not get the Motrin because it

was too much for his stomach with his already prescribed medications. (Id.) He

states “so Adena never checked my meds.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that on

December 27, 2024, he asked Defendant Lightner to see the doctor and was told

there were no openings. (Id.) He alleges that on the evening of December 28,

2024, he asked Leann, and she told him that he had stretched his ligaments or

tendons and “wrote me into the computer to see medical.”

Plaintiff states that on December 30, 2024, he “seen medical for the first

time. Severe ankle sprain. X-ray they did few days ago looks good ordered x-ray

of knee. Finally says I can do Ice Packs and ordered an ankle wrap. Gave me perm.

bottom bunks status.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that he only got one ice pack and an

ankle wrap on January 1, 2025. (Id.)

Based on these alleged facts, Plaintiff brings Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference claims against Defendant Brim in his role as the head physician for

Prime Care Medical, Inc. at Dauphin County Prison and against Defendant

Lightner, who he identified as the nurse who was responsible for giving him

medications without checking his chart, dragging out the process of his bottom tier

status, and withholding medical knowledge that could have prevented “all this.”

(Doc. 21).

Defendants Brim and Lightner filed the instant motion to dismiss the second

amended complaint on February 17, 2026. (Docs. 17, 22.) Plaintiff filed a brief in

opposition to the motion to dismiss on March 2, 2026. (Doc. 24.) He then filed a

motion to appoint counsel on June 8, 2026. (Doc. 25).

The court will now address the pending motion to dismiss and the motion for

appointment of counsel.

STANDARD

In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept all well pleaded allegations as

true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Doe

v. Univ. of the Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2020). The pleadings of self-

represented plaintiffs are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings

drafted by attorneys and are to be liberally construed. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d. Cir. 2011). Self-

represented litigants are to be granted leave to file a curative amended complaint

even when a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend, unless such an amendment

would be inequitable or futile. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,

245 (3d Cir. 2008).

DISCUSSION

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they act with deliberate

indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97, 104–05 (1976). To sustain a constitutional claim under the Eighth Amendment

for inadequate medical treatment, a plaintiff must make (1) an objective showing

that his medical needs were serious, and (2) a subjective showing that the

defendants were deliberately indifferent to those medical needs. See Pearson v.

Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017). A serious medical need is

“one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or is so obvious

that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”

Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst'l Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346–47 (3d Cir.

1987) (citation omitted). A prison official is deliberately indifferent when he or

she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).

However, “[p]rison medical authorities are given considerable latitude in the

diagnosis and treatment of medical problems of inmates and courts will ‘disavow

any attempt to second guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of

treatment . . . which remains a question of sound professional judgment.’” Byrd v.

Shannon, No. 1:09-CV-1551, 2010 WL 5889519, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2010)

(quoting Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d

Cir.1979)). Mere disagreement over proper treatment does not state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990);

Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst'l Inmates, 834 F.2d at 346 (“Courts, determining what

constitutes deliberate indifference, have consistently held that mere allegations of

malpractice do not raise issues of constitutional import. . . Nor does mere

disagreement as to the proper medical treatment support a claim of an eighth

amendment violation.”).

A. All Deliberate Indifference Claims Against Defendant Brim Will Be

Dismissed.

Plaintiff fails to allege any involvement on the part of Defendant Brim

beyond his role as a supervisor within the prison medical system. He never alleges

that Defendant Brim saw him for his ankle injury or that he sought treatment from

Defendant Brim. (Doc. 21.) “A defendant in a civil rights action must have

personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable, and cannot be held

responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor

approved.” See Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007). Without

specific allegations of deliberate indifference on the part of Defendant Brim, the

court must dismiss all deliberate indifference claims raised against him.

Likewise, his role as a supervisor does not necessarily create liability.

Supervisory liability under § 1983 utilizes the same standard as municipal liability.

See Carter v. City of Philadelphia,181 F.3d 339, 356 (3d Cir. 1999). A supervisor

will only be liable for the acts of a subordinate if he fosters a policy or custom that

amounts to deliberate indifference towards an individual’s constitutional rights.

See Id. at 357. To establish supervisory liability, a plaintiff must show that (1) a

superior officer failed to employ a specific supervisory practice; (2) the existing

custom created an unreasonable risk of injury in the absence of the specified

supervisory practice; (3) the supervisor was aware that the risk existed; (4) the

supervisor was indifferent to the risk; and (5) the underlying violation resulted

from the failure to employ the supervisory practice. Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp.,

269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118

(3d Cir. 1989)). Nothing alleged in the second amended complaint triggers

liability under Carter. Therefore, all Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference

claims against Defendant Brim raised in the second amended complaint will be

dismissed.

B. All Deliberate Indifference Claims Against Defendant Lightner Will

Be Dismissed.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lightner erroneously gave him medications

without checking his current medications list, drug out the process for his bottom

tier status, and withheld medical knowledge that could have prevented “all this.”

(Doc. 21, p. 2.) Nothing in these allegations amounts to deliberate indifference.

As stated above, “Courts, determining what constitutes deliberate

indifference, have consistently held that mere allegations of malpractice do not

raise issues of constitutional import. . . Nor does mere disagreement as to the

proper medical treatment support a claim of an eighth amendment violation.”

Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst'l Inmates, 834 F.2d at 346. Here the administration of

Motrin at his request for treatment may be an allegation of malpractice, but not an

allegation of an Eighth Amendment violation, especially where Plaintiff does not

allege any harm as a result of the oversight. Furthermore, it is unclear how

Defendant Lightner delayed the processing of his bottom tier status, when he

alleges that she kept the paperwork for his bottom bunk on her cart all day. There

is no allegation that he was forced to use a top bunk and that the use of a top bunk

resulted in injury. Additionally, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Lightner

withheld any medical knowledge that could have prevented the injury to his ankle

or the delay in treatment of his ankle. Therefore, the deliberate indifference claim

against Defendant Lightner will be dismissed.

C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel Will Be Denied.

Plaintiff has filed a motion for appointment of counsel that was received and

docketed by the court on June 8, 2026. (Doc. 25.)

Although prisoners have no constitutional or statutory right to appointment

of counsel in a civil case, the court has discretion to “request an attorney to

represent any person unable to afford counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); see

Houser v. Folino, 927 F.3d 693, 697 (3d Cir. 2019). The appointment of counsel is

a privilege, not a statutory or constitutional right. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d

187, 192 (3d Cir. 2011); Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993).

However, representation by counsel may be appropriate under certain

circumstances after a finding that the plaintiff’s case has arguable merit in fact and

law. Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155. If the court finds that the plaintiff has crossed this

threshold inquiry, the court should consider the following factors in deciding

whether to request a lawyer to represent an indigent plaintiff:

(1) the plaintiff’s ability to present his or her own case;

(2) the complexity of the legal issues;

(3) the degree to which factual investigation will be necessary and the

ability of the plaintiff to pursue such investigation;

(4) the plaintiff’s ability to retain counsel on his or her own behalf;

(5) the extent to which a case is likely to turn on credibility

determinations, and;

(6) whether the case will require the testimony of expert witnesses.

Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155-57. This list of factors is non-exhaustive, and no single

factor is determinative. Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 499 (3d Cir. 2002)

(citing Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 1997)). Instead, these

factors serve as guideposts for the district courts to ensure that the precious

commodity of volunteer attorney time is not “wasted on frivolous cases.” (Id.)

Since the second amended complaint failed to state a claim for which relief

may be granted, Plaintiff has not made the threshold showing that the case has

arguable merit in fact and law. Therefore, the motion will be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, the court will grant Defendants’ motion to

dismiss the second amended complaint and dismiss the remaining claims against

Defendants Brim and Lightner. The court will not grant Plaintiff any further

opportunity to cure the defects in his pleadings. This is Plaintiff’s third attempt at

pleading Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims associated with the

ankle injury he sustained at Dauphin County Prison. Considering Plaintiff’s

repeated unsuccessful attempts, the court finds that further attempts to bring such

claims would be futile. As such, the court will dismiss the complaint with

prejudice.

Because there are no operable claims in the matter, the court will deny

Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel.

An appropriate order follows.

s/Jennifer P. Wilson

JENNIFER P. WILSON

United States District Judge

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: June 15, 2026