Moomey

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

ADAM M. MOOMEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:24-cv-00579-BL

)

NURSE TERRY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Adam M. Moomey, an inmate proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). The Complaint names Nurse Terry, Nurse Zack, Nurse

Meghan, and Warden Jackson1 as defendants, all of whom were employed at the

Elmore County Jail at the time of the alleged events. (Id. at 1–3). It alleges that,

beginning in June of 2024, the Plaintiff injured his right shoulder during an

altercation with another inmate and “medical staff refused medical attention” in

violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. (Id. at 3–5). As a result, the Plaintiff

seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages. (Id. at 5).

1 The Defendants have demonstrated that the individual the Plaintiff identifies as “Nurse Terry” is

in fact named Terri Sowash, the individual the Plaintiff identifies as “Nurse Zack” is in fact named

Zachary Turnbull, and the individual the Plaintiff identifies as “Nurse Meghan” is in fact named

Meagan Fenn. (See doc. 39-1). The clerk of court is DIRECTED to update the docket

accordingly, and the court will hereafter address the Defendants by their proper names.

The medical Defendants have filed a joint Motion for Summary Judgment

(doc. 39) with supporting evidentiary materials, Defendant Jackson has filed a

separate Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 47), and the Plaintiff has filed a

response to both motions (doc. 58). Upon review and consideration of the parties’

filings, and for the reasons explained below, the Defendants’ Motions for Summary

Judgment (docs. 39 & 47) will be GRANTED as to the Plaintiff’s federal claims,

and the court will DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any

purported state law claims.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a reviewing court must

grant a motion for “summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “By its very terms, this standard provides that

the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat

an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is

that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the record as a whole

could lead a reasonable trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Redwing

Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). “An issue is ‘material’ if it might affect the outcome of

the case under the governing law.” Id.

The party seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility

of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those

portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). The movant can meet this burden by

presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that

the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of

his case on which he bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322–23.

Once the movant has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party must “go

beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324. In doing so, and to avoid summary

judgment, the nonmovant “must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The parties must support their

assertions “that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed” by “citing to particular

parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically

stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations[], admissions,

interrogatory answers, or other materials” or by “showing that the materials cited do

not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party

cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(1)(A)–(B).

If the nonmovant “fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as

required by Rule 56(c),” then the court may “consider the fact undisputed for

purposes of the motion” and “grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting

materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is

entitled to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2)–(3).

“In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden, the court must

stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the

truth of the matter.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998–99 (11th

Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). “Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 999

(internal quotations and citations omitted). However, “mere conclusions and

unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary

judgment motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation

omitted). Furthermore, “[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing

party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury

could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th

Cir. 1990); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (“If the evidence [on which the

nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,

summary judgment may be granted.”) (internal citations omitted).

III. FACTS BEFORE THE COURT2

As an initial matter, when considering a motion for summary judgment, the

court may consider other materials in the record, but it need consider only those

materials specifically cited by the parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); (see also

Doc. 49 at 1, informing the Plaintiff that the court “is not required to consider

documents or parts of documents that have not been specifically cited by page

number”). However, as the court previously informed the parties, “[u]nsworn

statements may not be considered by a district court in evaluating a motion for

summary judgment.” Roy v. Ivy, 53 F.4th 1338, 1347 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Carr

v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1273 n.26 (11th Cir. 2003), as amended (Sept. 29,

2003)). Indeed, in its Order directing the Plaintiff to respond to the Defendants’

motions, the court specifically cautioned:

Plaintiff cannot rely on unsworn pleadings but instead must oppose the

motions by filing sworn affidavits, declarations, depositions, or other

evidentiary materials to demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute as

2 The “facts” set forth herein are merely for purposes of resolving summary judgment and may not

be the actual facts. See Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1400 (11th Cir.),

opinion modified on reh’g, 30 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[W]hat we state as ‘facts’ … for

purposes of reviewing the rulings on the summary judgment motion [] may not be the actual

facts.”).

to a material fact for trial in this case. Additionally, if Plaintiff fails to

provide acceptable evidence under Rule 56, the Court may accept the

moving party’s evidence as true for purposes of the motion, grant the

motion, and enter judgment in favor of the moving party without a trial.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

(Doc. 49 at 2 (footnotes omitted)).

Under this standard, the Plaintiff has failed to provide any sworn statements

the court must consider in opposition to summary judgment. First, although his

signature on his Complaint is authenticated by a notary in an attached “Alabama

Notary Acknowledgement” (see doc. 1 at 7), the document is not sworn under oath

before the notary. See Roy, 53 F.4th at 1347 (“At the summary judgment stage,

parties may submit traditional affidavits sworn under oath before a notary (or another

oath-taker) affixed with the notary seal.”) (emphasis added). This court has

previously explained that a notary acknowledgement does not render a document

properly sworn:

In an acknowledgement, unlike a jurat, the signer does not swear under

oath or make statements under penalty of perjury, but typically appears

in person at the time of notarization to be positively identified and to

declare (“acknowledge”) that the signature on the document is his or

her own and that it was willingly made. See Notaries Public: The

Handbook, The Alabama Secretary of State’s Handbook for Notaries

Public (First Ed.), at 6 (2019).[] “For a jurat, the signer must appear in

person at the time of notarization to sign the document and to speak

aloud an oath or affirmation promising that the statements in the

document are true.” Id. [at 8.]

McNeal v. Macon Cnty. Bd. of Ed., No. 3:19-cv-122-SRW, 2021 WL 6883429, at

*3 (M.D. Ala. May 26, 2021); see also Tharrington v. Dir., Va Dep’t of Corr., No.

3:14-cv-720, 2015 WL 4606174, at *7 n.7 (E.D. Va. July 30, 2015). Because the

Plaintiff’s Complaint contains only an acknowledgement of his signature, and not a

jurat, the court may not consider any statements therein when deciding summary

judgment.3

Similarly, the Plaintiff’s response (doc. 58) to the Defendants’ motions is

neither sworn under oath nor signed under penalty of perjury and, as such, the court

may not consider any statements therein. And similarly, even if it was properly

sworn or verified, it is far too conclusory to establish a genuine issue of material

fact. See Owens, 812 F. App’x at 870. Indeed, the response does not cite to any

materials in the record, and it provides only the following statements in their entirety:

In response to the claim against Warden Jackson (ECSO Jail) for

negligence on a county or state level employee.

In response to claim against Defendants nurses Meagan Fenn, Terri

Sowash, and Zack Turnbull for medical negligence and medical

malpractice.

3 Importantly, even if the Complaint was in fact properly sworn, it fails to state any allegations

specific to the four named Defendants sufficient to overcome summary judgment. It alleges only

that, while incarcerated at the Elmore County Jail in June of 2024, the Plaintiff was attacked by

another inmate “who broke/dislocated [his] right shoulder.” (Doc. 1 at 4). The Plaintiff “[a]sked

for medical to x-ray the dislocation and was refused.” (Id.). He “requested medical attention and

[kept] getting no assistance.” (Id. at 5). On August 26, 2024, “an x-ray tech … came and did an

x-ray and confirmed [that it was] completely dislocated and still no relief or attention.” (Id.).

These statements—which wholly fail to identify any of the four Defendants—are too conclusory

to establish a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment. See Owens

v. Sec’y of Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 812 F. App’x 861, 870 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Leigh v. Warner

Bros., 212 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[The Eleventh Circuit] has consistently held that

conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value.”)).

I Plaintiff Adam M. Moomey have exhausted all ways with grievances

and sick calls according to the Prison Litigation Reform Act to support

these claims.

(Doc. 58).4

Accordingly, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), the court considers

the following evidence—proffered by the Defendants in affidavits signed under

penalty of perjury—undisputed for purposes of summary judgment:

• From the date of the Plaintiff’s arrival at the Elmore County Jail on June 9,

2024, until the date of the alleged inmate altercation on June 26, 2024, the

medical Defendants regularly assessed the Plaintiff and provided treatment

for a right arm wound sustained prior to his incarceration. (Doc. 39-1 at 64–

67, 73–74). He was seen by Defendant Fenn on June 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16,

17, and 25; he was seen by Defendant Sowash on June 15, 20, 21, and 22; and

he was provided multiple pain medications and wound care to his right arm.

(Id.).

• On June 26, 2024, Defendant Sowash assessed the Plaintiff after an alleged

inmate altercation. (Id. at 74, 375). At that time, the Plaintiff complained of

“right elbow and arm pain.” (Id.). Defendant Sowash noted that the Plaintiff

had been involved in a train accident in May and that treatment was being

provided for injuries he sustained in the train crash, including injuries to his

right arm. (Id.). Defendant Sowash noted that the Plaintiff had full active

range of motion and passive range of motion. (Id.). That same day, Defendant

4 Attached to the response is a single grievance submitted by the Plaintiff on February 26, 2026—

nearly 18 months after the Complaint was filed—asking when he will receive follow up

appointments for his neck and shoulder. (Doc. 58-1). The following day, Lieutenant Shackelford

responded:

since you are incarcerated again in this facility all personal appointments you had

prior to you being arrested are invalid. you have to go through qchc. your pending

lawsuit with qchc does not affect your treatment while here. you choosing not to

cooperate with the nurses is only hurting you. Once you sign the nurse’s paperwork

and do your intake, then the doctor can get your stuff scheduled if its needed.

(Id.). This filing is not sworn, is not responsive to the facts asserted in the Defendants’ summary

judgment motions, and does not establish wrongdoing by any of the Defendants.

Fenn ordered an x-ray of the Plaintiff’s arm, and the Plaintiff was moved out

of general population as a precautionary measure. (Id. at 67, 74, 375). That

same day, the Plaintiff’s right forearm was x-rayed, and the resulting

radiology report indicated “no acute osseous abnormality,” “status post

radial/ulna fixation,” and “no acute fracture or dislocation.” (Id. at 74, 372).

• The Plaintiff continued to be assessed and treated by these Defendants on June

27, 28, and 29, as well as July 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, and

18. (Id. at 68, 74–76).

• On July 30, 2024, the Plaintiff submitted a sick call request with complaints

of a cough, runny nose, and body aches. (Id. at 82, 298). That same day,

Defendant Turnbull assessed the Plaintiff in response to his sick call request,

provided the Plaintiff with a medication to treat cold symptoms, and

encouraged the Plaintiff to return to sick call if more serious symptoms

developed. (Id. at 82, 301).

• On August 20, 2024, the Plaintiff submitted a sick call request reporting

shoulder pain resulting from an altercation with another inmate, and

Defendant Turnbull responded the same day. (Id. at 83, 285). Defendant

Turnbull advised the Plaintiff that he was on the list to see the site physician

and that, because the Plaintiff was already receiving pain medication,

additional pain medication could not be given at that time. (Id.). In response

to the Plaintiff’s complaints of shoulder pain, the site physician ordered an x-

ray. (Id. at 83).

• On August 26, 2024, the Plaintiff received an x-ray of his shoulder. (Id. at

76, 83, 279). The resulting radiology report indicated no shoulder fracture,

separation, or dislocation. (Id. at 76, 83, 280). It did, however, reveal mild

degenerative joint disease of the right shoulder. (Id.).

• On August 31, 2024, Defendant Turnbull assessed the Plaintiff again. (Id. at

83). At that time, the Plaintiff complained that his “arm [wasn’t] right when

[he leaned] against the wall” and that it had been throbbing and aching for

several days. (Id.). The Plaintiff did not appear in acute distress, and there

was no visible deformity, abrasion, swelling, or tenderness on palpitation.

(Id.). The Plaintiff continued to be prescribed acetaminophen. (Id. at 275).

• On November 4, 2024, a physician assessed the Plaintiff, at which time the

Plaintiff reported right shoulder pain from an altercation in the jail. (Id. at

77). The physician noted that the Plaintiff had suffered a severe injury prior

to his incarceration, which resulted in him having little to no use of his right

shoulder/arm. (Id.). The physician examined the Plaintiff’s shoulder and

noted that, while there was no swelling or obvious deformity present, the

Plaintiff did have a large area involving the acromioclavicular joint. (Id.).

Thus, the physician referred the Plaintiff to an orthopedic surgeon for

evaluation and recommendation. (Id.).

• On November 13, 2024, the Plaintiff was referred to Southern Orthopaedic

Surgeons with a chief complaint of right shoulder pain. (Id.). Based on

Defendant Sowash’s review of the resulting medical records, the Plaintiff was

then referred to the UAB Brachial Plexus Clinic. (Id. at 78).

• On February 20, 2025, the Plaintiff was seen at UAB Highlands Orthopedic

Clinic for a preoperative appointment for a right brachial plexus injury. (Id.).

On March 10, 2025, the Plaintiff received surgery for his right brachial plexus

injury. (Id.). On March 20, 2025, the Plaintiff attended a postoperative follow

up appointment. (Id.).

• The Plaintiff was not denied access to medical evaluation or treatment at any

time, and his medical needs were treated timely and appropriately. (Doc. 27-

1; Doc. 39-1 at 64, 69, 73, 78, 82, 84, 487–490). His requests for evaluation

were never ignored, and his treatment was never delayed. (Id.). None of the

Defendants disregarded a risk of serious harm to the Plaintiff, and the

treatment provided to the Plaintiff exceeded the standard of care. (Doc. 39-1

at 69, 78–79, 84, 487–490).

IV. DISCUSSION

a. Federal Deliberate Indifference Claims

The undisputed evidence fails to demonstrate that any of the named

Defendants acted with deliberate indifference in violation of the Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights.5 To establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must

demonstrate in part “that the defendant acted with ‘subjective recklessness as used

in the criminal law,’ … and to do so he must show that the defendant was actually,

subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm

to the plaintiff.” Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024).6 “When

the need for treatment is obvious, medical care that is so cursory as to amount to no

treatment at all may amount to deliberate indifference.” Simpson v. Holder, 200 F.

App’x 836, 839 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351

(11th Cir. 2004)). However, a “simple difference in medical opinion” does not

constitute deliberate indifference. Simpson, 200 F. App’x at 839 (quoting Waldrop

v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989)).

The Plaintiff has proffered no evidence demonstrating that any Defendant was

5 In his Complaint, the Plaintiff claims that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by the

Defendants. (Doc. 1 at 3). However, assuming the Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of

the alleged events rather than a convicted prisoner, a medical deliberate indifference claim arises

under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. Regardless, the distinction

is irrelevant here because the standard under both Amendments is the same. See, e.g., Scott v.

Miami Dade Cnty., 657 F. App’x 877, 881 n.4 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Where, as here, the plaintiff is a

pretrial detainee …, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, governs our analysis.[] Because

the standard is the same in both contexts, we apply decisional law involving Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference claims.”) (citations omitted).

6 “[C]ivil law generally calls a person reckless who acts or (if the person has a duty to act) fails to

act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should

be known.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1256 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)). By

contrast, “criminal law … generally permits a finding of recklessness only when a person

disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware.” Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836–37).

subjectively aware that his or her conduct would result in a risk of serious harm to

the Plaintiff. To the contrary, the undisputed evidence makes clear that the medical

Defendants frequently assessed and treated the Plaintiff, prescribed him various

pain medications, responded promptly to his sick call requests, and referred him to

the on-site physician and off-site specialists for evaluation and treatment of his right

arm and shoulder.

On assessment, it was noted that the Plaintiff was not in distress, and his

shoulder exhibited no visible deformity, abrasion, swelling, or tenderness on

palpitation. Upon receiving an x-ray of his shoulder, he was found to have no

shoulder fracture, separation, or dislocation. Nevertheless, upon noting an

abnormality involving the Plaintiff’s acromioclavicular joint, he was sent to

multiple outside specialists for further evaluation until ultimately receiving surgery

for a brachial plexus injury. At no time does it appear that the Defendants

disregarded a serious risk of harm to the Plaintiff of which they were subjectively

aware; rather, it is undisputed that they did not disregard any such risk and that they

treated the Plaintiff timely and appropriately.

To the extent the Plaintiff believes that the Defendants should have taken

alternative or additional action—such as an x-ray—earlier than they did, the

Supreme Court has explained:

[T]he question whether an X-ray or additional diagnostic techniques or

forms of treatment is indicated is a classic example of a matter for

medical judgment. A medical decision not to order an X-ray, or like

measures, does not represent cruel and unusual punishment. At most it

is medical malpractice[.]

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976); see also Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774

F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Although [the plaintiff] may have desired

different modes of treatment, the care the jail provided did not amount to deliberate

indifference.”).7 Indeed, even if the Defendants did in fact incorrectly diagnose or

treat the Plaintiff, it is well-settled that accidental inadequacy, negligence in

diagnosis or treatment, and medical malpractice are insufficient to establish a

constitutional violation. See Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000)

(citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06).

Furthermore, because the Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of

material fact as to a deliberate indifference claim against the medical Defendants,

any related claim against Defendant Jackson must also fail. Indeed, it is well-

established that “[t]here can be no policy-based liability or supervisory liability

when there is no underlying constitutional violation.” Knight through Kerr v.

7 See also Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2020):

With respect to prisoners’ medical care … we have held that the Eighth Amendment

doesn’t require it to be “perfect, the best obtainable, or even very good.” [Harris

v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1510 (11th Cir. 1991)] (quotation omitted). Rather, we

have emphasized, “[m]edical treatment violates the [E]ighth [A]mendment only

when it is so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the

conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Id. at 1505 (quotation

omitted).

Miami-Dade Cnty., 856 F.3d 795, 821 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing City of Los Angeles

v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (“If a person has suffered no constitutional

injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the departmental

regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is

quite beside the point.”)).

Accordingly, the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the

Plaintiff’s federal deliberate indifference claims.

b. State Law Negligence or Medical Malpractice Claims

For a federal court “[t]o exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction over state law

claims not otherwise cognizable in federal court, the court must have jurisdiction

over a substantial federal claim and the federal and state claims must derive from a

common nucleus of operative fact.” L.A. Draper & Son v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc.,

735 F.2d 414, 427 (11th Cir. 1984) (internal quotations omitted). “If the federal

claims are dismissed prior to trial, Gibbs strongly encourages or even requires

dismissal of the state claims.” Id. at 428 (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v.

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed

before trial, … the state claims should be dismissed as well.”)).

Accordingly, because the Defendants will be granted summary judgment on

the Plaintiff’s federal deliberate indifference claims, the court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over any purported state law claims. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over a claim … if … the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has

original jurisdiction.”); Arnold v. Tuskegee Univ., 212 F. App’x 803, 811 (11th Cir.

2006) (“When the district court has dismissed all federal claims from a case, there is

a strong argument for declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

remaining state law claims.”) (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,

350 n.7 (1988)); Baggett v. First Nat. Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1353

(11th Cir. 1997) (“State courts, not federal courts, should be the final arbiters of state

law.”).

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED that:

1. The Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (docs. 39 & 47) are

GRANTED as to the Plaintiff’s federal claims, and such claims are DISMISSED

with prejudice.

2. The court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

Plaintiff’s purported state law claims, and such claims are DISMISSED without

prejudice.

Final Judgment will be entered separately.

DONE and ORDERED this the 2nd day of July, 2026.

MOO

BILL LEWIS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

16