GAYLE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WAYNE SILVERIA GAYLE, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-CV-2182

:

YOUNG, MARR, MALLIS & :

ASSOCIATES LAW FIRM, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

SCHMEHL, J. APRIL 29, 2026

Plaintiff Wayne Silveria Gayle brings this civil action against several law firms and

lawyers whom he hired to serve as his defense counsel, i.e., Young, Marr, Mallis & Associates

Law Firm; Gail Marr; Neff & Sedacca, P.C. Law Firm; Marc Neff; Matt Sedacca; the Mack Law

Office Law firm; Vander Veen, Harshorn & Levin Law Firm; Mark Mack; Adam Leasure; and

Michael T. Van Der Veen. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Gayle leave to

proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss his Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1

Briefly, Gayle was charged in a criminal proceeding in Northampton County. (Compl. at

16-17.) He contracted with the Defendant-attorneys and law firms named in this civil action to

defend him against the criminal charges, but claims none of them provided him with adequate

legal services and, to the contrary, violated his rights, breached their contracts with him, and

committed “malpractice” in various respects. (See generally Compl. at 8-42.) They also did not

1 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Complaint. (ECF No. 2.)

return the money he paid them upon his request. (Id.) Accordingly, Gayle seeks damages from

the Defendants for alleged violations of federal and state law. (See generally id. 8-46.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court will grant Gayle leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that he

is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B) requires the Court to screen the Complaint and dismiss it if it is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks damages from an immune defendant.

Furthermore, the Court must dismiss the Complaint if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the

court must dismiss the action.”). A plaintiff commencing an action in federal court bears the

burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800

F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015). “Jurisdictional [issues] . . . may be raised at any time and courts

have a duty to consider them sua sponte.” Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152, 157 (2023)

(internal quotation marks omitted). As Gayle is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his

allegations liberally. See, e.g., Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir.

2013).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Federal Claims

Gayle attempts to invoke this Court’s federal question jurisdiction by raising

constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, “wholly insubstantial” claims are

insufficient to invoke federal question jurisdiction, even if they purport to be predicated on a

federal statute. Shapiro v. McManus, 577 U.S. 39, 45 (2015) (“We have long distinguished

between failing to raise a substantial federal question for jurisdictional purposes . . . and failing

to state a claim for relief on the merits; only ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous’ claims implicate

the former.” (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946)); see also Kehr Packages, Inc.

v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1408-09 (3d Cir. 1991) (dismissal of claims for lack of

jurisdiction is proper “when the claim clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the

purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or is wholly insubstantial and frivolous” (cleaned up)). It has

long been the law that lawyers who serve as defense counsel in criminal cases are not subject to

liability under § 1983. See, e.g., Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (“[A] lawyer

representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor ‘under color of

state law’ within the meaning of § 1983.” (footnote omitted)); Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp.,

Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 277 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Attorneys performing their traditional functions will not

be considered state actors solely on the basis of their position as officers of the court.” (citations

omitted)). Accordingly, the factual scenarios described in the Complaint as the basis for Gayle’s

claims, do not raise a substantial federal question for jurisdictional purposes, see, e.g., Rose v.

Husenaj, 708 F. App’x 57, 60 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (concluding that civil rights claims

were insufficiently substantial to invoke federal question jurisdiction because “Rose’s conclusory

reference to ‘civil rights’ does not convert his tort claims against non-state actors into

constitutional claims”); Yoder v. Morrow, 671 F. App’x 27, 29 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam)

(affirming dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because “[a]lthough Yoder’s

complaint purported to rely on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, her allegations do not actually implicate that

federal statute”); see also Duffy v. George, 669 F. App’x 73, 74 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam)

(“Defendants are private actors, not state actors, who generally cannot be held liable under 42

U.S.C. § 1983.”). Accordingly, the Court may not exercise jurisdiction under § 1331.2

B. State Claims

Gayle also raises assorted claims under Pennsylvania law, which is in any event a better

construction of his Complaint. District courts may exercise jurisdiction over cases raising claims

exclusively under state law if “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,

exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. §

1332(a). “Complete diversity requires that, in cases with multiple plaintiffs or multiple

defendants, no plaintiff be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.” Zambelli Fireworks

Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010). For diversity purposes, an individual is a

citizen of the state where he is domiciled, meaning the state where he is physically present and

intends to remain. See Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011). A

corporation is a citizen of the state in which it is incorporated and the state in which it has its

principal place of business. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). In contrast, “the citizenship of an LLC [or

other unincorporated entity] is determined by the citizenship of its members.” Zambelli, 592

F.3d at 420. “[W]here an LLC has, as one of its members, another LLC, the citizenship of

unincorporated associations must be traced through however many layers of partners or members

there may be to determine the citizenship of the LLC.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

It appears from the Complaint that Gayle and some, if not all, of the Defendants are

Pennsylvania citizens, meaning complete diversity of citizenship is lacking. (Compl. at 2-4, 7-

2 Gayle also lists two federal agencies, (Compl. at 8-9), but neither these references nor anything

else in the Complaint suggests any legal basis for a federal claim.

8.) Further, given the amounts Gayle claims to have paid to the Defendants, it is not clear that

the amount in controversy is met. See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303

U.S. 283, 288 (1938) (“The rule governing dismissal for want of jurisdiction in cases brought in

the federal court is that, unless the law gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff

controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith.” (footnotes omitted)); Kalick v. Nw.

Airlines Corp., 372 F. App’x 317, 322 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (affirming the district court’s

ruling that diversity jurisdiction was lacking because plaintiff’s plausible damages were well

below $75,000). Accordingly, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction under § 1332.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss this case without prejudice for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. See Associated Builders & Contractors W. Pa. v. Cmty. Coll. of

Allegheny Cnty., 81 F.4th 279, 291 (3d Cir. 2023) (“[A] dismissal for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits and thus should be ordered ‘without prejudice.’”

(quoting Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 182 (3d Cir. 1999))). The Court

concludes that amendment would be futile in this case. The dismissal does not preclude Gayle

from filing a complaint in the proper state court so he may proceed on his claims in that venue,

should he choose to do so.3

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Jeffery L. Schmehl

JEFFREY L. SCHMEHL, J.

3 The Court expresses no opinion at this time on the merits of Gayle’s state claims.