Opinion

Weibley

Court: District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed: Jun 10, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 41.3%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AMAZON CONTENT SERVICES LLC, : Civil No. 1:25-CV-00388

et al., :

Plaintiffs, :

v. :

BRANDON WEIBLEY, et al., :

Defendants. : Judge Jennifer P. Wilson

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiffs, a group1 of media and entertainment companies, learned that

Brandon Weibley (“Weibley”) and Does 1–10, doing business as

beastmodebuilds.com and vonwik.com, (“Defendants”) run a subscription-based

streaming service offering users cheap, unauthorized access to thousands of movies

and television shows Plaintiffs own. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 1–53.) So Plaintiffs sued

Defendants for copyright infringement, contributory copyright infringement, and

inducement of copyright infringement. (Id. ¶¶ 54–86.)

Plaintiffs properly served the complaint on Weibley, Doc. 6, p. 1, but

Weibley neither answered the complaint nor participated in this litigation in any

1 The Plaintiffs are Amazon Content Services LLC; Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.; Disney

Enterprises, Inc.; Netflix US, LLC; Netflix Worldwide Entertainment, LLC; Paramount Pictures

Corporation; Sony Pictures Animation Inc.; Sony Pictures Television Inc.; Universal City

Studios Productions LLLP; Universal City Studios LLC; and Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc.

The court refers to them, collectively, as “Plaintiffs.”

way. (See Doc. 23, pp. 11–12.)2 Plaintiffs moved for default judgment against

Weibley after securing an entry of default, and that motion is before the court.

(Doc. 22.) The court will grant the motion and enter default judgment against

Weibley for the reasons explained herein.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs and their affiliates produce movies and television programs. (Doc.

1, ¶ 29.) They “own or hold the exclusive U.S. rights to, among other things,

reproduce, distribute, and publicly perform (including by means of streaming those

works over the internet)” a list of movies and television programs they allege

Weibley “has infringed” (“the copyrighted works”). (Id. ¶¶ 22, 30; see also Doc.

1-2, pp. 1–4 (listing the copyrighted works).)3 They authorize “the distribution and

public performance” of the copyrighted works through various formats. (Id. ¶ 31.)

Weibley lives in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiffs allege

that Weibley4 owns, operates, or previously operated a series of internet protocol

2 For ease of reference, the court uses the page number from the CM/ECF header.

3 Exhibit A to Plaintiffs’ complaint lists the titles of the copyrighted works, which company

registered each copyright, the registration number of the copyright, and the registration date of

the copyright. (Doc. 1–2 pp. 1–4.)

4 Plaintiffs allege that Does 1–10 act “in concert” with Weibley. (Doc. 1, ¶ 4.) They claim that

Does 1–10 “are individuals or entities previously or currently responsible for, or doing business

as, the domains beastmodebuilds.com and vonwik.com (the ‘Infringing Domains’) and working

in active concert with each other and Weibley to knowingly and willfully offer for sale the

Infringing Services through the Infringing Domains and selling the Infringing Services to

residents in the United States, including in this District.” (Id. ¶ 24.)

television (“IPTV”) services that “offer unauthorized access to thousands of live

channels that stream Plaintiffs’ copyrighted movies and television shows.” (Id. ¶¶

4, 23.) Plaintiffs allege that they have not authorized Weibley to exercise any of

their rights to the copyrighted works granted by 17 U.S.C. § 106. (Id. ¶ 32.)

Plaintiffs allege Weibley sold subscriptions to the following unauthorized IPTV

services: Beast Mode Live, BTV, Viking Media, GreenWing Media, Shrugs, and

Zing (collectively, “the infringing services”). (Id. ¶ 23.)

Weibley has sold subscriptions to the infringing services since at least 2017.

(Id. ¶¶ 34–36.) At that point, he “offered services under the name Beast Mode

Live” and advertised or managed that service through the web domain

“beastmodebuilds.com.”5 (Id. ¶ 34.) By 2023, he was also selling subscriptions to

BTV, GreenWing Media, and Viking Media on beastmodebuilds.com. (Id. ¶ 35.)

Plaintiffs allege that he used those services to violate their rights in the copyrighted

works “on a massive scale.” (Id. ¶ 41.)

Weibley’s invoices directed customers to send payment for their

subscriptions to the services to his CashApp account, and Plaintiffs allege he tried

to “conceal the purpose of subscribers’ payments . . . .” (Id. ¶¶ 38–39.) Plaintiffs

also aver that Weibley provided instructions for his subscribers to access the

5 Plaintiffs allege Weibley created and registered the beastmodebuilds.com domain. (Doc. 1, ¶

36.)

copyrighted works through “a third-party IPTV media player that could be

downloaded directly to mobile devices, computers, and smart TVs,” and that he

responded to support tickets submitted through beastmodebuilds.com. (Id. ¶ 40.)

Plaintiffs claim that between August 2022 and July 2023, beastmodebuilds.com

received hundreds of thousands of “visits.” (Id. ¶ 41.) But subscribers only visited

beastmodebuilds.com to make a purchase or renew a subscription; they accessed

the copyright works and “illicit content” through third-party IPTV players Weibley

provided. (Id.)

Plaintiffs contacted Weibley in December 2023 and demanded that he

“cease his infringing activities.” (Id. ¶ 42.) Weibley ignored them for two months

and continued to operate BTV, GreenWing Media, and Viking Media on

beastmodebuilds.com. (Id. ¶¶ 42–43.) He responded to Plaintiffs in February

2024 and told Plaintiffs’ counsel “that his lawyer would be in contact.” (Id. ¶ 43.)

Weibley’s counsel corresponded with Plaintiffs’ counsel in March 2024, but since

June 2024, Weibley has again ignored Plaintiffs’ attempts to resolve the issues

presented in the complaint. (Id.)

Weibley disabled the beastmodebuilds.com domain in February 2024 and

redirected users to a new domain called vonwik.com. (Id. ¶ 44.) On vonwik,

customers could purchase subscriptions to a new set of infringing services called

Shrugs and Zing. (Id.) Weibley sent subscribers who had previously registered for

BTV, GreenWing Media, and Viking Media on beastmodebuilds.com instructions

explaining how to register for Shrugs or Zing on vonwik.com. (Id. ¶ 45.)

Plaintiffs claim Weibley still operates the vonwik.com domain and sells

subscriptions to Shrugs and Zing. (Id. ¶ 46.) Plaintiffs claim that a subscription to

Weibley’s services “provides unauthorized access to thousands of Plaintiffs’

Copyrighted Works . . . , ” including the copyrighted works, and

contemporaneously-streamed television channels. (Id. ¶¶ 47–52.) Plaintiffs aver

that Weibley “maintains control over the beastmodebuilds.com domain and could

resume offering the Initial Infringing Services at that domain (or at additional

domains) at any time.” (Id. ¶ 53.)

Plaintiffs sued Defendants on March 4, 2025. (Doc. 1.) They bring a

claim, Id. ¶¶ 66–77, and an inducement of copyright infringement claim, Id. ¶¶ 78–

86, against all Defendants. They seek various forms of injunctive, compensatory,

and declarative relief. (Id. ¶¶ 1–11.)6

Plaintiffs filed an affidavit of service confirming that they had personally

served Weibley with the summons and complaint on April 7, 2025. (Doc. 6.)

Weibley did not answer the complaint or otherwise participate in the litigation of

6 Plaintiffs restarted their paragraph numbering in the “Request for Relief” section of their

complaint, so these paragraph citations refer to that section, specifically.

this case. So, Plaintiffs filed an application for an entry of default against Weibley

only, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) on May 21, 2025. (Doc.

15.) The Clerk of Court entered an entry of default against Weibley on May 22,

2025. (Doc. 17.)

Plaintiffs moved for default judgment against Weibley on October 9, 2025,

and filed a brief in support of that motion the next day. (Docs. 22, 23.)7 Weibley

did not respond to Plaintiffs’ motion. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ motion for default

judgment is ripe for review.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. §

1331 because the case arises under the laws of the United States. The court has

personal jurisdiction over Weibley because, accepting the allegations of the

amended complaint as true, he resides8 in Mechanicsburg and “directs his

7 Plaintiffs did not move for entry of default judgment against the other defendants.

8 Pennsylvania’s longarm statute, which authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction “to the fullest

extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States and may be based on the most

minimum contact with this Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the United States,”

42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5322(b), governs this court’s jurisdiction over Weibley. Aldossari ex rel

Aldossari v. Ripp, 49 F.4th 236, 257 (3d Cir. 2022). Although Plaintiffs do not include

allegations about Weibley’s domicile in their complaint, they allege that he directs his control of

the infringing services from the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Doc. 1, ¶ 26, so the court finds

that he purposefully directed his infringing activities toward Pennsylvania by operating the

website and conducting business from this state, and therefore it may exercise specific personal

jurisdiction over him without offending the norms of fair play and substantial justice. Aldossari,

49 F.4th at 257 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923

(2011)); see Broad. Music, Inc. v. 3817 Pac. LLC, No. 23-CV-22782, 2024 WL 3451885, at *3

(D.N.J. July 18, 2024) (finding, in the default judgment context, that a defendant who was a

infringement of Plaintiffs’ Copyrighted Works from this jurisdiction,” which is the

Middle District of Pennsylvania, and he was personally served pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 4. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 23, 26; Doc. 6, p. 1); see Fed. R. Civ. P.

4k(1). Venue is proper in this court because Weibley resides in the Middle District

of Pennsylvania. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1); (Doc. 1, ¶ 23.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court may enter a default judgment following an entry of default. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Parties seeking a default judgment are not automatically

entitled to it, and entering a default judgment is “left primarily to the discretion of

the district court.” Bugg v. Just Wing It, LLC, No. 18-cv-02399, 2020 WL

1675953, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 2020) (quoting Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d

1178, 1180 (3d Cir. 1984)); see BMO Harris Bank N.A. v. JRD Trucking, LLC, No.

3:21-cv-02161, 2022 WL 18635326, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2022).

The court considers three factors in determining whether to enter a default

judgment: “(1) prejudice to the plaintiff if default is denied, (2) whether the

defendant appears to have a litigable defense, and (3) whether defendant’s delay is

due to culpable conduct.” Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir.

2000). In analyzing these factors, “the court proceeds knowing ‘the factual

member of the LLC that operated, maintained, and controlled the New Jersey establishment at

issue and who managed that establishment had purposefully directed his conduct towards the

state of New Jersey, so the court could exercise specific jurisdiction over him).

allegations in the complaint are treated as proven, except for the contentions

related to damages.’” Laughing Smith, LLC v. PPNC, Inc., No. 1:23-CV-01285,

2024 WL 4253346, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2024) (quoting Bugg, 2020 WL

1675953, at *3). And the court must ensure that the “unchallenged facts” of the

complaint “constitute a legitimate cause of action.” United States v. Kline, No. 18-

cv-02174, 2019 WL 1354150, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2019) (quoting 10A

Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2688

(3d ed. 2007)).

DISCUSSION

The court analyzes the Chamberlain factors and then determines whether

Plaintiffs adequately plead claims for copyright infringement, contributory

Weibley. 210 F.3d at 164; Doc. 1 ¶¶ 54–86. After that, it addresses damages and

injunctive relief.

A. The Chamberlain Factors Weigh in Favor of Entering Default

Judgment Against Weibley.

Under the first Chamberlain factor, the court considers the prejudice

Plaintiffs will suffer if the court declines to enter default judgment. 210 F.3d at

164. This factor weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor because, as Plaintiffs note, without an

entry of default judgment, “they will be unable to recover damages from [Weibley]

or stop his infringing conduct, and therefore will lack any remedy.” (Doc. 23, p.

13); Adlife Mktg. & Commc’ns Co. v. Ad Post Graphics Media Mktg., Inc., 708 F.

Supp. 3d 567, 573 (M.D. Pa. 2023) (“Absent the default judgment, Plaintiff will be

faced with an indefinite, and possibly permanent, delay in the adjudication of the

claim against the defaulting parties, including obtaining the damages allegedly

owed.”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. George Moore Enters., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 166,

170 (W.D. Pa. 2016) (“Plaintiffs will suffer prejudice if default is denied because

they will be unable to proceed with their action and because their copyrighted

works may continue to be infringed.”) (first quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Kujo

Long, LLC, No. 1:14–CV–449, 2014 WL 4059711, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 14,

2014); and then quoting Frank Music Corp. v. Emerson’s Pub, Inc., No. 4:08-CV-

0532, 2009 WL 744964, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2009)).

Second, Weibley did not file an answer or any responsive pleading to

Plaintiffs’ complaint, so he does not appear to have a litigable defense. Prepared

Food Photos, Inc. v. Burch Farms, Inc., No. 1:24-00346, 2026 WL 783719, at *3

(W.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2026); Laughing Smith, 2024 WL 4253346, at *3; Broad.

Music, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 170.

Third, the court finds that the delay is a result of Weibley’s culpable

conduct. Culpable conduct is conduct taken “willfully or in bad faith.”

Chamberlain, 201 F.3d at 164 (quoting Gross v. Stereo Component Sys., Inc., 700

F.2d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1983)). “A presumption of bad faith arises when ‘a

defendant fails to respond to a complaint and offers no reason for its failure to

engage in the action.’” Laughing Smith, 2024 WL 4253346, at *3 (quoting Bugg,

2020 WL 1675953, at *5). Plaintiffs properly served Weibley, Doc. 6, p. 1, but he

neither responded to the complaint nor participated in this litigation in any way,

even after he engaged an attorney to respond to Plaintiffs’ initial communications.

(Doc. 1, ¶ 43); see Globe Turner, LLC v. ConversationPrints, LLC, No. 24-6673,

2025 WL 2346883, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2025) (“The fact that an attorney

purportedly representing [the defendant] has been in contact with [the plaintiff]

about the lawsuit but has not entered an appearance or otherwise participated in the

case may indicate culpability.”) (citing Thorn Flats, LLC v. BuildPro Constr. LLC,

No. 21-cv-5412, 2022 WL 1720014, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 2022)). Therefore,

the court finds the delay at issue is a result of Weibley’s culpable conduct because

he acted willfully and in bad faith. See Chamberlain, 201 F.3d at 164.9

All three Chamberlain factors weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor, so the court finds

Plaintiffs are entitled to default judgment so long as they properly allege their

9 Some courts consider the third Chamberlain factor neutral when “the defendant’s motivations

for not participating in the litigation are unclear . . . .” Globe Turner, 2025 WL 2346883, at *7

(citing Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. MRH Contractor, Inc., No. 23-cv-1567, 2024 WL 3904049, at

*3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2024)). Even if the court took this approach, two of three Chamberlain

factors would weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor, and the court would still find that default judgment is

appropriate. Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 164.

B. Plaintiffs Adequately Plead Claims of Copyright Infringement,

Contributory Copyright Infringement, and Inducement of Copyright

Infringement Against Weibley.

Having found that the Chamberlain factors weigh in favor of granting

Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment, the court now determines whether

Plaintiffs have properly pleaded their claims of copyright infringement, Doc. 1, ¶¶

54–65, contributory copyright infringement, Id. ¶¶ 66–77, and inducement of

default judgment is appropriate.

1. Copyright Infringement

Plaintiffs first bring a copyright infringement claim against Weibley

pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 501. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 54–65.) Copyright protection covers

“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now

known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or

otherwise communicated . . .” including “motion pictures and other audiovisual

works.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), (a)(6). The owner of a copyright “has the exclusive

rights to do and to authorize . . . in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and

choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual

works, [the performance of] the copyrighted work publicly . . . .” Id. § 106(4).

phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of

ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending . . . .” Id. § 106(3).

To state a copyright infringement claim, Plaintiffs must allege (1) that they

own a valid copyright of a specific work and (2) that Weibley copied “constituent

elements” of that work that are original. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,

499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,

471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985)).

A certificate of copyright registration is “prima facie evidence of the validity

of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate” so long as it is made

before or within five years after the first publication of the copyrighted work. 17

U.S.C. § 410(c). For each copyrighted work, Plaintiffs provide the copyright

registrant, the copyright registration number, and the date of the copyright’s

registration. (Doc. 1-2, pp. 1–4.)10 Plaintiffs also allege that they have “timely

obtained Certificates of Copyright Registration for their Copyrighted Works.”

(Doc. 1, ¶ 22.) Therefore, the court finds they properly plead the first element of

their copyright infringement claim. See Adlife Mktg., 708 F. Supp. 3d at 574 (“A

review of the cited material, particularly the Amended Complaint and attached

10 Plaintiffs also proffered the copyright registration certificates for the copyrighted works by

attaching the certificates to their motion for default judgment. (Doc. 22-2, pp. 24–194.)

Exhibits, shows that the names of the copyrighted material, the registration

numbers and date of the copyrights, are provided. Thus, the Court concludes that

Plaintiff has shown that he owns the copyrights to the Works.”).

Plaintiffs also plead the second element of their copyright infringement

claim. That element contains two components: “(a) actual copying and (b)

material appropriation.” Grondin v. Fanatics, Inc., No. 23-2149, 2024 WL

5231194, at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 27, 2024) (citing Tanksley v. Daniels, 902 F.3d 165,

173 (3d Cir. 2018)). Plaintiffs plead actual copying because they allege that

Weibley makes direct copies of the copyrighted works available to subscribers on

the infringing services. (See Doc. 1, ¶¶ 47, 57); Grondin, 2024 WL 5231194, at *1

(“Plaintiffs can prove actual copying . . . directly (e.g., with ‘smoking gun’

evidence of the defendant cutting-and-pasting the copyrighted work) . . . .”) (citing

Tanksley, 902 F.3d at 173). They include, in their complaint, screen captures of

their copyrighted works playing via the infringing services. (Doc. 1, ¶ 52.)

Material appropriation asks whether “a lay-observer would believe that the

copying was of protectible aspects of the copyrighted work.” Tanksley, 902 F.3d

at 174 (quoting Dam Things from Den. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 562

(3d Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs satisfy this

component of the second element because, again, they allege that that Weibley

simply took the copyrighted works and provided them without alteration to the

infringing services subscribers, thus violating Plaintiffs’ exclusive right to

reproduce, distribute, and publicly perform the copyrighted works. 17 U.S.C. §

106(1)–(4).

The complaint specifically alleges that Weibley and Defendants “publicly

perform Plaintiffs’ Copyrighted Works . . . by transmitting performances of the

Copyrighted Works over the internet to subscribers of the Infringing Services.”

(Doc. 1, ¶ 58.) And the complaint contains several still images pulled from

screenings of the copyrighted works on the infringing services. (Id. ¶ 52.)

Plaintiffs allege the copyrighted works themselves are streamed on the infringing

services, so Plaintiffs adequately allege that Weibley has copied the original

elements of those works. See Tanksley, 902 F.3d at 175 (explaining the substantial

similarity analysis). The court finds Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded the

material appropriation component of the second element of their claim and have

therefore stated a prima facie claim of copyright infringement. See Feist, 499 U.S.

at 361; Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, No. 20-5122, 2022 WL 952728, at *3 (E.D.

Pa. Mar. 30, 2022) (“Plaintiff has also alleged that Defendant copied constituent

elements of those works when Defendant downloaded, reproduced, and distributed

Plaintiff's works through the BitTorrent protocol.”) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

2. Contributory Copyright Infringement

Plaintiffs also bring a claim of contributory copyright infringement against

Defendants. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 66–77.) To plead a contributory copyright infringement

claim, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a third party directly infringed the plaintiff's

(3) the defendant materially contributed to or induced the infringement.” Leonard

v. Stemtech Int’l Inc, 834 F.3d 376, 387 (3d Cir. 2016) (first quoting Gershwin

Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971);

and then quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1171 (9th

Cir. 2007), cert. denied sub nom Stemtech Intern., Inc. v. Leonard, 583 U.S. 114,

138 S. Ct. 975 (2018) (Mem.).11 “The provider of a service is contributorily liable

for the user’s infringement only if it intended that the provided service be used for

infringement . . . A provider induces infringement if it actively encourages

infringement through specific acts.” Cox Commc’ns, Inc. v. Sony Music Ent., 607

U.S. ----, 146 S. Ct. 959, 967 (2026) (first citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios

11 In Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment, the Supreme Court of the United

States appeared to describe contributory copyright infringement as a two-element claim; “The

provider of a service is contributorily liable for a user's infringement if it intended its service to

be used for infringement.” 607 U.S. ----, 146 S. Ct. 959, 964 (2026). The court reiterated that a

provider’s “mere knowledge” that subscribers will use a service to infringe copyrights does not

establish the provider’s “required intent to infringe.” Id. at 968. Here, the court includes the

knowledge element set forth in Leonard, 834 F.3d at 387, in its analysis, but it does not find that

Weibley’s knowledge of his subscribers’ infringement, alone, establishes his intent to contribute

to or induce the infringement.

Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005); then citing Sony Corp. of Am. v.

Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 440–41 (1984); and then citing

Grokster, 545 U.S. at 942 (Ginsburg, J. concurring)). In other words, “[t]he intent

required for contributory liability can be shown only if the party induced the

infringement or the provided service is tailored to that infringement.” Id.

Plaintiffs allege that the subscribers to the infringing services infringed their

copyrights by reproducing and publicly performing the copyrighted works by

streaming them. (Doc. 1 ¶ 68.) They allege Weibley knew about this infringement

because Plaintiffs told Weibley it was happening. (Id.) And they allege Weibley

facilitated his subscribers’ infringement by operating the infringing services and

“supplying the IPTV content . . . .” (Id. at 69.)

Plaintiffs satisfy the first element by alleging that the subscribers—the third

party here—streamed the copyrighted works from the infringing services to their

computers, thus making copies of the copyrighted works on their computers and

potentially publicly performing them. See Amazon Content Servs. LLC v. DeBarr,

793 F. Supp. 3d 1242, 1252 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (“Plaintiffs allege that the third-party

subscribers . . . directly infringed upon Plaintiffs’ valid copyrighted works insofar

as they illegally streamed the works and/or uploaded them to the internet . . . This

conduct infringes Plaintiffs’ exclusive rights under the Copyright Act to reproduce

and publicly perform their copyrighted works.”) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (4))

(quoting ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 442 (2014)); see also Cox, 146 S.

Ct. at 965 (“Today, anyone with an Internet connection and easily obtained

software can upload digital copies of copyrighted music and make them available

for others to down-load. This practice often infringes the owners’ exclusive rights

to copy and distribute their works. [17 U.S.C.] §§ 106(1), (3).”)

Plaintiffs satisfy the second element because they allege Weibley knew his

subscribers were infringing Plaintiffs’ copyrights. (See Doc. 1, ¶¶ 42–43.)

Plaintiffs contacted Weibley multiple times about the infringing services. (Id.)

Weibley responded to one of these notices, his attorney corresponded with

Plaintiffs, and Weibley later moved the infringing services to a different domain.

(Id. ¶¶ 42–45.) The court finds that Weibley knew of his subscribers’ alleged

infringement because he and his attorney responded to Plaintiffs’ warnings. See

Bodyguard Prods., Inc. v. RCN Telecom Servs., LLC, No. 3:21-cv-15310, 2022

WL 6750322, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2022) (finding that the defendants had

knowledge of copyright infringement by third parties because they were notified of

the infringement by the plaintiffs’ investigator and their attorney).

Finally, Plaintiffs must plead that Weibley intended to materially contribute

to, or induce, the subscribers’ infringement. Leonard, 834 F.3d at 387. They must

establish that Weibley either induced the infringement or provided a service

tailored to the infringement. Cox, 146 S. Ct. at 967. A service provider induces

infringement if it “actively encourages infringement through specific acts.” Id.

(citing Grokster, 545 U.S. at 942 (Ginsburg, J. concurring)). A service is “tailored

to infringement” if it cannot be used in a substantially non-infringing way. Id.

(quoting Grokster, 545 U.S. at 942 (Ginsburg, J. concurring)).

Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants configure and promote the use of the

Infringing Services to connect subscribers to unauthorized streams of Plaintiffs’

Copyrighted Works.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 69.) Weibley “offer[s] for sale thousands of live

television channels, movies, and television series containing Copyrighted Works

that can only be lawfully accessed through a limited number of legitimate services,

in specific geographic regions, and in specific content packages,” and sell access to

streams of the copyrighted works despite knowing these restrictions. (Id. ¶ 68.)12

Moreover, Plaintiffs allege Weibley attempted to hide the purpose of the infringing

services subscribers’ payments, and after Plaintiffs contacted him about

Defendants’ infringement, he simply changed the infringing services’ domain. (Id.

¶¶ 38, 44–45.) And he charges subscription fees “well below what consumers

would otherwise pay to access [the copyrighted works] through legitimately

licensed distribution platforms.” (Id. ¶ 8.)

12 Plaintiffs also allege that if Defendants “transferred the Infringing Services and/or Infringing

Domains to third parties,” Defendants “materially contributed to the infringement of those third

parties through their illicit transfer” and contributed to that infringement by “shielding the

identities of Does from Plaintiffs.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 70.)

Plaintiffs sufficiently plead that Weibley, by offering the copyrighted works

to subscribers via the infringing services, encouraged infringement of Plaintiffs’

copyrights through specific acts. See Cox, 146 S. Ct. at 967. In Cox, the Supreme

Court held that the copyright holder did not establish inducement because it did not

provide evidence of the alleged infringer’s promotion, marketing, or intention to

promote infringement of the holder’s copyright. Id. at 968 (quoting Grokster, 545

U.S. at 926, 930). Moreover, the court recognized that the alleged infringer

“repeatedly discouraged copyright infringement by sending warnings, suspending

services, and terminating accounts.” Id.

Here, Plaintiffs allege that Weibley and the other defendants provided cheap,

unauthorized access to Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works and attempted to conceal that

access. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 8, 38, 44–45, 68–69.) Moreover, they specifically allege that

Defendants intentionally and knowingly induced the third parties’ infringement of

their copyrights. (Id. ¶ 72.) Therefore, the court finds that Plaintiffs have

adequately pleaded a claim of contributory copyright infringement. See Amazon,

793 F. Supp. 3d at 1253 (“By operating [a copyright-infringing IPTV service’s]

domains and supplying subscribers with unauthorized access to Plaintiffs’

copyrighted works, Defendants have facilitated, encouraged, and enabled the direct

infringement of Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works.”)

3. Inducement of Copyright Infringement

Finally, Plaintiffs bring an inducement of copyright infringement claim

against Defendants. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 78–86.) Plaintiffs must allege “(1) the

distribution of a device or product[;] (2) acts of infringement[;] (3) an object of

promoting its use to infringe copyright[;] and (4) causation” to state an inducement

of copyright infringement claim. Live Face on Web, LLC v. The Control Grp.

Media Co., Inc., 150 F. Supp. 3d 489, 500 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting Columbia

Pictures Indus. v. Gary Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1032 (9th Cir. 2013) (setting forth

the four-element test derived from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Grokster, 545

U.S. at 936–37)).13

As to the first element, Plaintiffs appropriately allege that Weibley

distributed the infringing services, the “product[s],” to the infringing services’

subscribers. (Doc. 1, ¶ 79); Live Face, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 500; Amazon, 793 F.

Supp. 3d at 1253 (“Defendants distributed and sold subscriptions to [a service that

provides unauthorized streaming of copyrighted works], which constitutes ‘the

distribution of a device or product.’”) (quoting Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d at

1033); Cox, 146 S.Ct. 967 (“[I]n Grokster, [545 U.S. at 941,] we held that a jury

13 Plaintiffs do not cite, and the court is not aware of any Third Circuit precedent recognizing the

type of stand-alone inducement of copyright infringement claim recognized in Grokster, 545

U.S. at 936–37, and Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d at 1032. Nonetheless, even if the Third Circuit

construes the elements of that type of claim differently than the court does in the instant merits

analysis, Plaintiffs’ alleged damages would remain the same.

could find two file-sharing software companies liable for inducement.”) Plaintiffs

also satisfy the second element because, as explained above, third parties infringed

their copyrights by streaming the copyrighted works from the infringing services.

(Doc. 1 ¶ 68.)

A plaintiff must identify affirmative steps a defendant took to encourage

direct copyright infringement to satisfy the third element. Cox, 146 S. Ct. at 967;

Live Face, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 500 (quoting Grokster, 545 U.S. at 935); see also

Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d at 1034 (explaining that an inducement plaintiff may

demonstrate a defendant’s objective of promoting a product’s use to infringe

Here, Plaintiffs allege that Weibley supplied and promoted the infringing services,

which “has the singular function of connecting Defendants’ customers to

unauthorized online sources that copy and stream Plaintiffs’ Copyrighted Works,”

and, as the court addressed in analyzing Plaintiffs’ contributory copyright

infringement claim, that Weibley “actively induc[ed], encourage[ed], and

promot[ed] the use of the Infringing Services for copyright infringement.” (Id. ¶

79.)

Moreover, Weibley actively advertised the infringing services’ capabilities

and posted customer reviews that described the “movies” and “latest tv shows”

available on the beastmodebuilds.com domain. (Id. ¶¶ 34–35); see Grokster, 545

U.S. at 935 (explaining that advertising the infringing capabilities of an infringing

service provided evidence of an “unlawful purpose”). And Weibley sought to

fulfill a demand for the infringing streaming of the copyrighted works by moving

the infringing service to a new domain after pressure from Plaintiffs. (Doc. 1, ¶¶

44–45); see Warner Bros. Ent. v. Tusa, No. 2:21-cv-05456, 2021 WL 6104399, at

*5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2021) (holding that a defendant in an inducement of

for copyright infringement by “rebranding and relaunching on infringing services”)

(quoting Grokster, 545 U.S. at 939). Each of these allegations supports the

conclusion that Weibley intended to promote the use of the infringing services to

infringe Plaintiffs’ copyrights, so the court finds Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded

the third element. Live Face, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 500.

The fourth and final element of an inducement of copyright infringement

claim requires the plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s actions caused a third-

party’s infringement of the plaintiff’s copyright. Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals described this element as follows; “[I]f one provides a service that could

be used to infringe copyrights, with the manifested intent that the service actually

be used in that manner, that person is liable for the infringement that occurs

through the use of the service.” Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d at 1037 (citing

Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937). Plaintiffs allege that Weibley intentionally promoted

the infringing services and encouraged his subscribers to access the copyrighted

works without authorization, and they allege those subscribers went on to infringe

Plaintiffs’ copyrights by accessing the copyrighted works through the infringing

systems. (See Doc. 1, ¶ 79.) The court finds Plaintiffs satisfy the causation prong

and adequately allege an inducement of copyright infringement claim against

Weibley. Live Face, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 500; see Amazon, 793 F. Supp. 3d at 1253

(“Defendants distributed and promoted [the product at issue] with the clear intent

that subscribers would publicly perform Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works without

authorization, and ‘infringing conduct predictably followed.’”) (quoting Tusa,

2021 WL 6104399, at *5).

C. The Court Will Grant Plaintiffs the Relief they Request.

Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment requests four forms of relief: (1)

maximum statutory damages for willful infringement of each of the 60 copyrighted

works totaling $9,000,000; (2) attorneys’ fees; (3) post-judgment interest; and (4)

an entry of permanent injunction. (Doc. 22, p. 2.) The court addresses each in

turn.

1. Statutory Damages

Plaintiffs seek $9,000,000 in statutory damages pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §

504(c)(1)–(2). (Doc. 23, p. 22.) A copyright owner may recover:

[S]tatutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with

respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable

individually, or for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly

and severally, in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as

the court considers just.

17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). When the copyright owner proves and the court finds that

the defendant infringed the copyright willfully, the statute raises the maximum

statutory damages sum to $150,000. Id. § 504(c)(2).

The availability of statutory damages depends on the timing of the

infringement and when the plaintiff registered their copyright. Parry v. URBN US

Retail LLC, 809 F. Supp. 3d 255, 262 (E.D. Pa. 2025) (discussing 17 U.S.C. §

412). “[F]or a plaintiff to recover statutory damages, the copyrighted work must

have been registered prior to commencement of the infringement, unless the

registration is made within three months after first publication of the work.” Id.

(citing Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

2008)). Put differently, a plaintiff may not recover statutory damages or attorneys’

fees for any infringement of a copyright of an unpublished work that began before

the effective date of the unpublished work’s copyright registration. 17 U.S.C. §

412(1). Nor may a plaintiff recover those types of damages for infringement of the

before the effective date of its copyright registration unless the copyright holder

registers the copyright three months after the first publication of the work. Id. §

412(2).

Plaintiffs allege that Weibley’s infringement of the copyrighted works is

ongoing, Doc. 1, ¶¶ 10, 60, and provide the individual copyright registration dates

of each copyrighted work, Doc. 1-2, pp. 1–4. They allege that Weibley’s

infringement of their copyrights is ongoing and postdates the registration of those

copyrights, so the court finds that Section 412 does not bar their claims for

statutory damages and attorneys’ fees against Weibley.14

The court has wide discretion to determine statutory damages. Adlife, 708 F.

Supp. 3d at 577 (first citing 17 U.S.C. § 504(c); and then citing F.W. Woolworth

Co. v. Contemp. Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 231–32 (1952)). “Statutory damages

serve the dual purpose of punishing and deterring the infringer while compensating

the copyright holder for the infringement.” Watson Music Grp., LLC v. FlavorGod

LLC, No. 24-10582, 2025 WL 2474596, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2025) (quoting

Malibu Media, LLC v. Tsao, No. 15-6672, 2016 WL 3450815, at *4 (D.N.J. June

20, 2016)).

Courts in the Third Circuit often examine the following four factors when

calculating statutory damages: “(1) expenses saved and profits reaped by the

infringer; (2) revenues lost by the plaintiff; (3) the strong public interest in insuring

14 The court also finds that, based on the list of copyrighted works and the registration

certificates Plaintiffs attached to their brief in support of default, Doc. 1-2, pp. 1–4; Doc. 22-2,

pp. 24–194, the works are distinct, so the court finds that Plaintiffs present 60 infringed works.

See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c); Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, No. 20-5122, 2022 WL 952728, at *4–6

(E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2022).

the integrity of the copyright laws; and (4) whether the infringement was willful

and knowing or innocent and accidental.” Broad. Music, Inc. v. George Moore

Enters., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d at 171 (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Spring Mount

Area Bavarian Resort, Ltd., 555 F. Supp. 2d 537, 544 (E.D. Pa. 2008)); BGSD, Inc.

v. SpazeUp, LLC, No. 5:23-CV-4855, 2024 WL 1619279, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15,

2024) (quoting Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. J.F. Reichert, Inc., 658 F.

Supp. 458, 465 (E.D. Pa. 1987)). The court considers the facts alleged in the

complaint to calculate statutory damages when the plaintiff seeks damages above

the minimum. BGSD, Inc., 2024 WL 1619279, at *7 (citing Broad. Music, Inc.,

555 F. Supp. 2d at 544–45). As for willfulness, courts in the Third Circuit have

recognized that a defendant’s infringement may be considered willful when the

defendant defaults, Adlife, 708 F. Supp. 3d at 567 (quoting Malibu Media, LLC v.

Flanagan, No. 2:13-CV-5890, 2014 WL 2957701, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 2014)),

or when the defendant continues to infringe on a copyright despite the plaintiff’s

repeated objections, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. 3817 Pacific LLC, No. 23-CV-

22782, 2024 WL 3451885, at *7 (D.N.J. July 18, 2024).

Plaintiffs argue that the court should award them $9,000,000 in statutory

damages—that is, $150,000 for each of the 60 copyrighted works—for several

reasons. (Doc. 23, pp. 22–26.) First, they claim Weibley acted willfully, so the

court should impose the statutory maximum amount of damages. (Id. at 23–24.)

Second, they argue that their list of 60 copyrighted works is merely a

representative sample of the content Weibley offered via the infringing services; he

in fact infringed many more copyrights than those included in the representative

list. (Id. at 24.) Third, they argue that the statutory damages award they seek is

proportional to the harm Weibley inflicted, because he likely infringed many more

copyrights beyond those included in the representative sample of 60 works, his

infringement diminished the value of their copyrights, he deprived Plaintiffs of

their control over their copyrighted material, and he undermined the legitimate

streaming services market. (Id. at 25–26.)

The court cannot accurately assess Weibley’s profits and savings because he

has not defended this action. Nor can the court accurately assess Plaintiffs’ lost

revenues because, although one of the declarations they attach to their motion for

default judgment describes their normal distribution and licensing agreements as

“heavily negotiated and complex,” they do not specify the licensing fees they lost

due to Weibley’s conduct. (Doc. 22-3, ¶¶ 19–20.)

Nonetheless, the court will grant Plaintiffs’ request for $9,000,000 in

statutory damages for three reasons. First, enforcing copyright protections serves

the public interest. Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,

1255 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Klitzner Indus., Inc. v. H. K. James & Co., 535 F.

Supp. 1249, 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1982)), abrogation on other grounds recognized in TD

Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 278–79 (3d Cir. 2019). Second, Plaintiffs provide

only a representative sample of copyrights Weibley infringed; they claim he

infringed many more. (Doc. 1, ¶ 47); Amazon, 793 F. Supp. 3d at 1254 (noting, in

awarding statutory damages, that Plaintiffs provided only a representative list of

infringed copyrights and that a “complete accounting” of the defendants’

infringing would include many more).

Third and finally, the court finds that Weibley willfully infringed Plaintiffs’

copyrights, so awarding the enhanced maximum for each infringed work is

appropriate. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). Multiple facts support this conclusion. First,

Weibley did not defend this action. Adlife, 708 F. Supp. 3d at 577 (recognizing

that courts in the Third Circuit have held that copyright infringement may be

considered willful when a defendant defaults) (quoting Malibu Media, LLC v.

Flanagan, 2014 WL 2957701, at *3). Second, Weibley continued to operate the

infringing services even after Plaintiffs demanded that he stop. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 43–44.)

Third, after Plaintiffs spoke with Weibley and his attorney, Weibley simply moved

the infringing services to a new domain. (Id.)

Upholding copyright protections supports the public interest, and statutory

damages are meant to both compensate the plaintiff and deter future infringement.

Adlife, 708 F. Supp. 3d at 577 (recognizing that statutory damages are meant to

compensate copyright holders while deterring infringers) (quoting Schiffer Publ’g,

Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, LLC, No. 03-4962, 2005 WL 67077, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan.

11, 2005)). Therefore, the court will award Plaintiffs statutory damages of

$150,000 per copyrighted work for a total of $9,000,000.

2. Attorneys’ Fees

The court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in a

to the same pre-registration requirement as statutory damages.” Michael Grecco

Prods., Inc. v. Al Día Newspaper, Inc., No. 21-4907, 2023 WL 1971164, at *3

(E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2023) (first citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 412, 505; and then citing All-

Star Mktg. Grp., LLC v. Media Brands Co., 775 F. Supp. 2d 613, 629 (S.D.N.Y.

2011)). The court must make an individualized assessment of the reasonableness

of the requested attorneys’ fees, and it considers such factors as “frivolousness,

motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components

of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of

compensation and deterrence,” with “extra” weight on the “objective

unreasonableness factor,” in making this assessment. Leonard, 834 F.3d at 403

(first quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994); and then

quoting Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 579 U.S. 197, 202 (2016)).

Weibley willfully infringed on Plaintiffs’ copyrights and then failed to

defend this action, so the court finds awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees is

appropriate. See EETHO Brands, Inc. v. Common Cents Distributors LLC, No.

2:24-CV-08962, 2025 WL 2044421, at *9 (D.N.J. July 21, 2025). Plaintiffs

request $63,241 in attorneys’ fees. (Doc. 22-4, p. 4.) Plaintiffs submit the

declaration of Scott R. Commerson, a partner at the law firm Davis Wright

Tremaine LLP who entered his appearance on behalf of Plaintiffs in this case.

(Doc. 22-2.) Therein, Attorney Commerson provides a detailed log of his firm’s

work on this matter and notes that his firm discounted its hourly rates in

calculating this fee request. (Id. at 4–18.)

The court has reviewed Attorney Commerson’s declaration and finds that

the attorneys’ fees Plaintiffs request are reasonable. Therefore, the court will

award Plaintiffs $63,241.00 in attorneys’ fees.

3. Post-Judgment Interest

Plaintiffs request post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a).

The court awards post-judgment interest because it is mandatory under the statute.

28 U.S.C. § 1961(a); see EETHO Brands, 2025 WL 2044421, at *9 (citing Broad.

Music, Inc., 2024 WL 3451885, at *8).

4. Permanent Injunction

The court may “grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it

may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” 17

U.S.C. § 502(a). To decide whether to grant a permanent injunction pursuant to

this provision, the court must consider whether:

(1) [T]he moving party has shown actual success on the merits; (2)

the moving party will be irreparably injured by the denial of

injunctive relief; (3) the granting of the permanent injunction will

result in even greater harm to the defendant; and (4) the injunction

would be in the public interest.

Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 482 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing ACLU v. Black

Horse Pike Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1477 n.2–3 (3d Cir.1996)); see

Adlife, 708 F. Supp. 3d at 575 (quoting Shields, 254 F.3d at 482); TD Bank N.A. v.

Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 278 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,

547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)). “An injunction is a drastic and extraordinary remedy,

which should not be granted as a matter of course.” Free Speech Coal., Inc. v.

Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 974 F.3d 408, 430 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Monsanto Co. v.

Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 165 (2010)). On one hand, when the

“defendant does not respond and the plaintiff cannot quantify its damages,” and

when past infringement suggest infringement will continue, the four preliminary

injunction factors may weigh in favor of granting injunctive relief. Grant Heilman

Photography, Inc. v. Gallagher, No. 3:23-CV-1129, 2024 WL 666147, at *5 (M.D.

Pa. Feb. 16, 2024) (quoting Freddy S.p.A. v. Kalai, No. 20-628, 2022 WL

1411690, at *3 (D. Del. Apr. 28, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No.

20-628, 2022 WL 2915765 (D. Del. July 25, 2022)) (collecting cases). On the

other, the court may be “cautious” to enter a permanent injunction in the default

judgment context without the benefit of the defendant’s opposition. Victory’s

Dawn, Inc. v. Clemons, No. 21-9744, 2022 WL 3402491, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 12,

2022).

Here, Plaintiffs request that the court enjoin Weibley, “his officers, agents,

servants, employees and attorneys, and other persons who are acting in active

concert or participation with him who receive actual notice of this injunction,”

from:

a) [O]perating Shrugs, Zing, Beast Mode Live, BTV, Viking Media, and

GreenWing Media (together, “Infringing Services”), or any other

unlicensed streaming service currently operated under their control or

to which they are providing any material assistance.

b) [O]perating any website, system, software, or service that is

substantially similar to the Infringing Services or other services, by any

brand or name, that facilitate access to the Copyrighted Works, and

other works in which Plaintiffs validly own or control the copyrights or

exclusive rights, without authorization.

c) [I]nfringing, whether directly or secondarily, any of Plaintiffs’

Copyrighted Works, and other works for which Plaintiffs validly own

or control the copyrights or exclusive rights, by any means, including

by publicly performing, reproducing, or otherwise infringing the

Copyrighted Works, or other copyright material owned or controlled by

Plaintiff, in any manner (including by materially contributing to or

intentionally inducing the infringement of), any of Plaintiffs’ exclusive

rights under the Copyright Act.

d) [D]irectly or indirectly taking any additional steps to release publicly,

distribute, transfer, or give any source code, other technology, domain

names, trademarks, brands, assets, or goodwill in any way related to the

Infringing Services.

e) [K]nowingly taking any action for the purpose, or that has the effect of,

circumventing the requirements of [the] Injunction.

(Doc. 22-4, pp. 5–6.) Plaintiffs also seek an injunction against third parties, and

request that the court order:

a) [T]hat any domain name registrars and registries for

beastmodebuilds.com and vonwik.com (together with any other

domains associated with Defendant’s infringing conduct, “Infringing

Domains”), as well as all other persons in active concert or participation

with Defendant who receive notice of this Injunction, are ordered to

disable public access to the Infringing Domains; to prevent the

Infringing Domains from being modified, sold, transferred to another

owner, or deleted; and to take all reasonable steps to transfer ownership

of the Infringing Domains to a registrar to be appointed by Plaintiffs to

re-register the domain names in Plaintiffs’ names, or the name(s) of

their designee(s), and under Plaintiffs’ ownership.

b) [T]hat the hosting service providers of the websites associated with the

Infringing Domains are ordered to suspend any services to such

websites and place an administrative lock on the websites to prevent

third parties from accessing and downloading the websites’ content or

transferring the websites’ contents to another domain name or hosting

service.

c) [T]hat Plaintiffs’ counsel may complete service of process on

Defendant and any officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys and

persons who are acting in active concert or participation with Defendant

of this Order and Injunction by Overnight Mail. This Injunction shall

bind Defendant and all of his agents, servants, employees, and all

persons in active concert or participation or in privity with Defendant

who receive actual notice of this Injunction.

(Id. at 6–7.) Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to this injunctive relief for

several reasons. (Doc. 23, pp. 28–32.) First, they claim that Weibley’s actions

have irreparably harmed them by “undermining the value of the Copyrighted

Works, damaging Plaintiffs’ standing in the marketplace, interfering with

Plaintiffs’ relationships and goodwill with licensees, and threatening customer

confusion.” (Id. at 28.) Second, they claim that Weibley’s continued infringement

of their copyrights warrants a permanent injunction. (Id.) Weibley’s past and

continued infringement, Plaintiffs argue, make a permanent injunction necessary.

(Id. at 28–29.) Third, they argue monetary damages would neither protect their

copyrights from future infringement nor compensate them for specific harm they

have suffered, such as loss of control over the copyrighted works and damage to

their business goodwill. (Id. at 29.) And they note that Weibley’s failure to

engage in this action indicates that he will likely not satisfy a damages award. (Id.)

Fourth, they claim an injunction is equitable. (Id. at 29–30.) Weibley will not be

harmed by an injunction that simply prevents him from infringing Plaintiffs’

copyrights, whereas Plaintiffs would continue to suffer the harms of infringement

without a permanent injunction. (Id.) Fifth and finally, Plaintiffs note that the

public interest is served by enforcing copyright protections. (Id.)

Moreover, Plaintiffs claim the broad injunction they request in their

proposed order is appropriate. (Id. at 30–31.) They argue that “Courts routinely

order the transfer of domains associated with infringing activities” and that courts

have also ordered hosting providers who receive notice of an injunction to suspend

services to domains and prevent the content on those domains from being

transferred. (Id. at 31–32.)

The court finds Plaintiffs’ requested injunction is warranted after

considering the relevant factors. TD Bank, 928 F.3d at 278. First, as explained

above, Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded each of the three claims they raise

against Weibley, and Weibley’s default prevents the court from fully adjudicating

this case on the merits, so Plaintiffs’ success on the merits of their claims is likely.

See Adlife, 708 F. Supp. 3d at 575 (finding that Defendant’s default prevented the

court from deciding the case on the merits and that adequately pleading a copyright

infringement claim satisfied the success on the merits prong); BGSD, Inc., 2024

WL 1619279, at *6 (“The substantive analysis of BGSD’s claims as outlined above

satisfies the first element.”).

Second, the court finds Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they will face

irreparable harm if the court does not issue their requested injunction. The facts

alleged in the complaint indicate that Weibley is likely to continue infringing

Plaintiffs’ copyrights if the court does not grant the injunctive relief Plaintiffs’

request. Specifically, Weibley’s decision to continue operating the infringing

services despite Plaintiffs’ notices and his deliberate efforts to conceal his

infringing activity suggest his infringement will continue. (See Doc. 1, ¶¶ 38, 42–

46.) Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief against third parties is also necessary to

prevent irreparable harm because Weibley’s default demonstrates that he is

unlikely to heed the court’s orders and may simply transfer the infringing services

to a third domain. (Id.)

Continued infringement alone, however, does not establish irreparable harm.

T.D. Bank, 928 F.3d at 280. Here, Plaintiffs argue that if they are not afforded

injunctive relief, they are likely to continue suffering the harms of continued

infringement, such as a detriment to the value of their copyrighted works, a loss of

control over the copyrighted works, damages to their business goodwill, and harm

to the general marketplace for creative works. (See Doc. 23, p. 29). In a

declaration submitted in support of Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment,

Executive Vice President and Chief Content Protection Officer for the Motion

Picture Association, Inc. Larissa L. Knapp explains that Weibley’s infringement

also causes irreparable harm by: “(a) threatening streaming businesses, which in

turn, harms Plaintiffs and their relationship with authorized distributors; (b)

increasing the demand for infringing content by accustoming consumers to low-

cost, infringing services; and (c) hampering Plaintiffs’ anti-piracy efforts and

exposing them to the risk of further piracy.” (Doc. 22-3, pp. 9–10.)

These harms extend beyond mere economic losses and threaten Plaintiffs’

industry, and their ability to do business, rendering other remedies at law

inadequate. See Tang v. Longyan Blue Whale Info. Tech. Co., No. 2:25-CV-01850,

2026 WL 73759, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2026) (finding that harms such as

undercutting the price of the plaintiff’s original works and reducing the visibility of

her products online constituted irreparable harm that justified a preliminary

injunction in part because they “ero[ded] . . . the legitimate marketplace in which

she operates”); Chen v. Adediy, No. 2:24-CV-1516, 2025 WL 624450, at *4 (W.D.

Pa. Feb. 26, 2025) (finding that the risk of irreparable harm to plaintiff’s

“reputation, value, and goodwill” posed by copyright infringement could not be

remedied at law); See also Ottomanson, Inc. v. UCAI, LLC, No. 19-8775, 2020 WL

205945, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 10, 2020) (recognizing that irreparable harm is no

longer presumed in copyright cases but granting a permanent injunction against an

infringer in the “specialized context of a default judgment” because the plaintiff

could not quantify its past or future damages). Accordingly, the court finds the

second factor weighs in favor of injunctive relief.

Third, enjoining Weibley from infringing Plaintiffs’ copyrights will not

harm Weibley. Based on the uncontested allegations of the complaint, the domains

and services the requested injunction would affect are used to unlawfully offer

defendant from continual infringement does not harm the defendant. See Broad.

Music, Inc., 2024 WL 3451885, at *7; Globe Turner, LLC, 2025 WL 2346883, at

*8 (“The third factor favors injunctive relief because the only harm imposed on

ConversationPrints is that it is enjoined from infringing on Globe Turner’s

copyrights, which it is not entitled to do.”).

Fourth and finally, the court finds that enforcing copyright protections

promotes the public interest. Apple Comput., 714 F.2d at 1255; Globe Turner,

LLC, 2025 WL 2346883, at *8 (citing Apple Comput., 714 F.2d at 1255).

After considering these factors, the court finds injunctive relief is

appropriate. Accordingly, the court will grant Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive

relief against Weibley, his agents, and any other individuals who are in active

concert or participation with him.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained herein, the court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion for

default judgment. An order follows.

s/Jennifer P. Wilson

JENNIFER P. WILSON

United States District Court Judge

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: June 10, 2026

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.