The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
CHARNEAT MARIE JONES,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:25-cv-1600-WFJ-LSG
FLORIDA HOSPITAL PHYSICIAN
GROUP, INC.,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Florida Hospital Physician Group, Inc.’s
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Dkt. 20), Plaintiff’s response (Dkt. 21),
and Defendant’s Reply (Dkt. 24). After careful consideration of the allegations of
the Amended Complaint (Dkt. 10), the submissions of the parties, and the entire
file, the Court concludes the motion to dismiss is due to be granted in part and
denied in part.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Charneat Marie Jones brings this employment discrimination action
against her former employer, Florida Hospital Physician Group, Inc. d/b/a
AdventHealth Medical Group (“AdventHealth”). The three-count Amended
Complaint alleges race-based discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section
1981”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), and retaliation under
Title VII.
Incidents leading up to termination
The Amended Complaint alleges the following facts. Plaintiff Jones was
employed by AdventHealth in Tampa from June 11, 2018, through March 13,
2023, when she was terminated. Dkt. 10 ¶¶ 10, 13, 32. With over 31 years of
experience as a medical assistant, Plaintiff worked for AdventHealth as a Certified
Medical Assistant, until she was promoted on January 20, 2023, to Physician
Practice Clinical Coordinator. Id. ¶¶ 20, 21.
In November 2021, Plaintiff asserts that her director (Caucasian) “made
discriminatory comments about Ms. Jones’ [Plaintiff’s] hair.” Id. ¶ 22. In
February 2022, Plaintiff witnessed her project manager (Caucasian) instruct a
“room full of brown people” to “keep it vanilla.” Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff claims that in
March 2022, there were “false accusations of ‘aggression’ based on racial
stereotypes.” Id. ¶ 56 c.
In April 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint with Human Resources (“HR”)
concerning racial discrimination. Id. ¶ 64 a. On June 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed an
EEOC discrimination complaint. Id. ¶¶ 24, 64 b.
In January 2023, Plaintiff began reporting to new supervisors, none of whom
were African American. Id. ¶¶ 25, 26. On February 9, 2023, the Physician
Practice Manager grabbed Plaintiff’s arm and “invaded her personal space,” which
was observed by a physician. Id. ¶ 27. The next day, February 10, this manager
“made a racially charged ‘black balled’ comment during a meeting.” Id. Plaintiff
alleges that she was “subjected to demeaning behavior, including [the same
manager] stooping when speaking to her.” Id. ¶ 28.
On February 23, Plaintiff asserts she was falsely accused of an IT security
breach while she was out of the office ill. Id. ¶ 29. Interestingly, IT’s
investigation found activity from both the office and home IP addresses, and a
physician in the practice mentioned it was likely a system error with pending
prescriptions. Id. Despite these alleged facts, on February 24, Defendant revoked
Plaintiff’s system access, which hampered her ability to perform her job. Id. ¶ 30.
On March 3, 2023, Plaintiff requested a transfer to another department,
which was denied. Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff describes this denial as “a pattern of limiting
[her] advancement opportunities within the organization.” Id. Finally, on March
13, Defendant terminated Plaintiff “allegedly for violations of company policies”
without any warning or prior write-up. Id. ¶ 32.
Post-termination
Plaintiff’s allegations
On March 29, 2023, Plaintiff dual filed a charge of discrimination with the
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the
Florida Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR”). Id. ¶ 17. The charge alleged
race discrimination and retaliation. Id. On March 21, 2025, Plaintiff alleges the
EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue regarding her EEOC charge. Id. ¶ 18.
Defendant’s motion and exhibits
Defendant’s motion adds the following assertions with supporting exhibits
regarding actions taken by the FCHR. Dkt. 20 at 2–6. The FCHR investigated the
charge of discrimination, and on September 28, 2023, issued its No Cause
Determination finding in pertinent part:
The Commission’s Office of General Counsel reviewed all available
evidence and Investigative Memorandum, and made a recommendation
to me, as Executive Director of the Commission, that it is unlikely that
unlawful discrimination occurred in this matter.
. . . .
Complainant may request an administrative hearing with the Division
of Administrative Hearings [(“DOAH”)] by filing a Petition for Relief
within 35 days[.]
Dkt. 20-2; Dkt. 20-6. Plaintiff, through counsel, filed a timely petition on October
26, 2023. Dkt. 20-3. The petition alleges racial discrimination and retaliation. Id.
The matter was referred to DOAH and assigned an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”). Dkt. 20-4. The ALJ conducted an evidentiary hearing in late June
2024. Dkt. 20 ¶ 5. On October 18, 2024, the ALJ issued a 26-page Recommended
Order finding Defendant committed no unlawful employment practice and
recommending the FCHR dismiss the petition. Dkt. 20-4. Plaintiff did not submit
exceptions to the Recommended Order, despite being granted an extension to
December 6, 2024. Dkt. 20-6 at 3.
On January 21, 2025, the FCHR entered its Final Order Dismissing Petition
for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice (“Final Order”). Dkt. 20-6. In
its Final Order, the FCHR found the ALJ’s findings of fact to be supported by
competent and substantial evidence. Dkt. 20-6 at 3. The ALJ’s application of the
law to the facts were also found “to result in a correct disposition of the matter.”
Id. The FCHR fully adopted the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and
dismissed the petition with prejudice. Id. The Final Order provided the notice and
instructions to appeal the decision to the proper Florida District Court of Appeal.
Id. The appeal period is within “thirty (30) days of the date this Final Order is
filed with the Clerk of the Commission.” Id. An appeal was not taken.
On March 21, 2025, the EEOC issued the Notice of Right to Sue, which
provides: “[Y]our lawsuit must be filed WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of
this notice.” Dkt. 20-7 at 2 (emphasis in original). The Notice further states:
[Y]ou must file a complaint in court within 90 days of the date you
receive this Notice. Receipt generally means the date when you (or
your representative) received the document.
Dkt. 20-7 at 3 (emphasis in original). This lawsuit was filed within the 90-day
period, on June 19, 2025. Dkt. 1.
The initial complaint named AdventHealth Medical Group as defendant, and
the summons was issued for service on AdventHealth Medical Group. Dkts. 1, 3,
6-1. The initial pleading identifies the Defendant AdventHealth Medial Group as a
Florida limited liability company in Altamonte Springs, Florida, conducting
business in Tampa, Florida. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 12, 13. On July 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed the
Amended Complaint, as a matter of course, to name the “correct legal entity” of
Defendant. Dkt. 10 at 1. The Defendant is now named as “Florida Hospital
Physician Group, Inc. d/b/a AdventHealth Medical Group” and identified as a
Florida not-for-profit corporation with its principal place of business in Tampa.
Dkt. 10 ¶ 12.
LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint survives dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) if the alleged facts state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The factual allegations need not be detailed, but the
plaintiff is still required to provide more than mere labels or conclusions, and the
facts must plausibly lay the grounds for an entitlement to relief. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555. The court must accept the facts, not conclusions, as true and view
them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Pielage v. McConnell,
516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008).
Documents may be considered on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, if the
documents are central to, referenced in, or attached to the complaint, as well as
matters judicially noticed. LaGrasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845
(11th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
Documents attached to the motion to dismiss may also be considered without
converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d
1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002); Haimbaugh v. Citrus Cnty. Fla. Dept. of Health, No.
5:23-cv-282-BJD-PRL, 2024 WL 3033987, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2024)
(considering Right to Sue letter without converting motion to dismiss to motion for
summary judgment). The attached documents must also be undisputed, which
means their authenticity is not challenged. Horsley, 304 F.3d at 1134; Hodge v.
Orlando Util. Comm’n, No. 6:09-cv-1059-Orl-19DAB, 2009 WL 5067758, at *3
n.2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2009) (citing Horsley and Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272,
1275 (11th Cir. 2005)).
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from bringing Count
I for violations of Section 1981. As to Counts II and III, Defendant asserts that the
Title VII claims are untimely and must be dismissed with prejudice. Defendant
also challenges the Amended Complaint as an impermissible “shotgun pleading”
based on improper commingling of distinct legal theories—disparate treatment,
hostile work environment, and retaliation. Taking the Amended Complaint’s
allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the
Court addresses each ground.
Collateral Estoppel as to Count I for violations of Section 1981
This case involves an unreviewed state administrative decision. The
FCHR’s Final Order, after a full hearing with witnesses and both parties, set forth
the instructions to appeal the decision to the state appellate court. See Dkt. 20-6.
Plaintiff did not file an appeal with the court. The EEOC issued its Notice of Right
to Sue two months after the Final Order, and this case was filed.
“Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, requires that once a court decides
an issue necessary to its judgment, that decision precludes relitigation of the same
issue on a different cause of action between the same parties.” Barrington v. Fla.
Dep’t of Health, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2000). When the FCHR,
as here, has acted “in a judicial capacity and resolves issues of fact properly before
it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate,” its findings are
entitled to preclusive effect, even if the agency factual findings are not reviewed by
a state court. Quinn v. Monroe, Cnty., 330 F.3d 1320, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003)
(citing Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986)). In Florida, collateral
estoppel applies where: (1) identical issues were presented in a prior proceeding;
(2) the issues in the prior litigation were a critical and necessary part of the prior
determination; (3) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the
prior proceeding; (4) the issues were actually litigated in the prior proceeding; and
(5) the parties in the two proceedings are identical. Pumphrey v. Dep’t of Child. &
Fams., 292 So. 3d 1264, 1266 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (citation omitted). Collateral
estoppel applies to administrative orders and decisions and extends to facts and
legal issues concerning those facts. See McCrimmon v. Daimler Chrysler Corp.,
No. 6:05-cv-10-Orl-19DAB, 2005 WL 8159946, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2005)
(finding that Section 1981 claims were actually litigated in FCHR proceeding and
Plaintiff was collaterally estopped from challenging FCHR’s findings in the
complaint).
Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claims mirror the issues resolved and involve the
identical parties—whether Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff based on her
race. Although Plaintiff’s claims were brought before the FCHR under the FCRA,
the burden of establishing a prima facie case is the same in this Section 1981 case.
See Bender v. Miami Shores Village, 578 F. App’x 822, 824 n.2 (11th Cir. 2014)
(noting prima facie case of race discrimination under Section 1981 is same as Title
VII, which applies to FCRA) (citations omitted).1 At the proceedings before the
1 See also Blain v. Centurion of Fla., LLC, No. 8:20-cv-49-T-24SPF, 2020 WL 821457, at *3
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2020) (“Discrimination and retaliation claims brought under [Section] 1981
and Title VII are analyzed under the same framework.”); Ducksworth v. Strayer Univ., Inc., No.
2:16-cv-1234-JEO, 2019 WL 1897278, at *15 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 29, 2019) (same).
FCHR, Plaintiff was represented by counsel and participated in a three-day
evidentiary hearing before an ALJ. Plaintiff presented testimony from four
witnesses, submitted exhibits, testified on her own behalf, and cross-examined
each of Defendant’s witnesses. The ALJ, in a thorough 26-page Recommended
Order, found that Plaintiff failed to establish her prima facie case of
discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. See Dkt. 20-4. As to any improper
discriminatory or retaliatory motive, the ALJ found that Defendant terminated
Plaintiff “because it found she had violated its Standards of Conduct by not being
truthful about the February 23 incident.”2 Id. at 24. The ALJ’s recommendation
was adopted in a Final Order. See Dkt. 20-6.
Section 1983, unlike Title VII, is a “Reconstruction civil rights statute” that
does not foreclose “the adaptation of traditional principles of preclusion” to the
“factual findings of a state administrative agency.” Elliott, 478 U.S. at 799. Elliott
reached a different conclusion as to Title VII, holding that “Congress did not
intend unreviewed state administrative proceedings to have preclusive effect in
Title VII actions in federal court.” Id. at 796; Crapp v. City of Miami Beach, 242
F.3d 1017, 1022 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Elliott); Quinn, 330 F.3d at 1328–29
2 “Advent Health learned about two incidents that appeared as if [Plaintiff’s] credentials were
being used to access the system. First, that morning [Defendant’s office employee] received a
call from a patient asking about a message she received electronically from Jones earlier that
morning about a urine culture. [Defendant’s office employee] confirmed with the patient’s
physician there had been no authorization for ordering the urine culture and learned that the
physician had not spoken to [Plaintiff] about ordering the culture.” Dkt. 20-6 at 11.
(discussing collateral estoppel and Elliott). Although Elliott specifically addressed
§ 1983, the reasoning applies equally to Section 1981. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
Section 1981 claim is barred by collateral estoppel, and Count I is due to be
dismissed with prejudice.
The Court next addresses the issue of whether the Amended Complaint
adding Florida Hospital Physicians Group, Inc. as a defendant relates back to the
timely-filed original complaint.
Timeliness of the Title VII claims
Under Title VII, a plaintiff must file a lawsuit within 90 days after the giving
of the EEOC’s notice that the charge is dismissed. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1);
Zillyette v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 179 F.3d 1337, 1339 (11th Cir. 1999). The 90-
day deadline is mandatory, but not jurisdictional. Fort Bend Cnty., Tex. v. Davis,
587 U.S. 541, 550-52 (2019) (holding Title VII’s charge-filing provisions are non-
jurisdictional but nonetheless mandatory). Even though mandatory, the 90-day
period is subject to equitable tolling, which requires a showing of extraordinary
circumstances. Stamper v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 863 F.3d 1336, 1342 (11th Cir.
2017). To that end, the plaintiff must show circumstances beyond her control and
“unavoidable even with diligence.” Sandvik v. U.S., 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th
Cir. 1999).
Timeliness concerning the 90-day window must be decided “on a case-by-
case basis to fashion a fair and reasonable rule for the circumstances of each case.”
Zillyette, 179 F.3d at 1340–41. The Court examines the pleadings, the motion to
dismiss, response, reply, all undisputed exhibits, and the applicable law. See Day,
400 F.3d at 1276; Horsley, 304 F.3d at 1134. Public records from Florida’s
sunbiz.org may also be considered. See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d
1271, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999).
Relation back
In cases where federal law provides the statute of limitations, Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15(c) governs the “relation back” of amendments to pleadings.
Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 541 (2010). An amended pleading
“can relate back to an earlier pleading, thus allowing it to adopt the latter’s filing
date and not be time-barred.” Makro Capital of Am., Inc. v. UBS AG, 542 F.3d
1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008). When the pleading is amended to add or substitute a
party, Rule 15(c)(1)(C) controls whether the amended complaint relates back.
Powers v. Graff, 148 F.3d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other
grounds, Mungin v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 89 F.4th 1308, 1321 (11th Cir.
2024).3
3 Mungin clarifies the appellate standard of review of Rule 15(c) is no longer the district court’s
equitable discretion.
Rule 15(c)(1)(C) provides:
(1) When an Amendment Relates Back. An amendment to a pleading
relates back to the date of the original pleading when:
. . .
(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against
whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within
the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and
complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment:
(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in
defending on the merits; and
(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been
brought against it, but for the mistake concerning the proper
party’s identity.
Id. (emphasis in original). This rule has four elements. First, the amended
complaint must assert a claim that arose out of the same occurrence as set out in
the earlier-filed complaint. Second, the added party must receive notice of the
amended pleading within the time for service under Rule 4(m), which is 90 days.
Third, the new or substituted party cannot be prejudiced in defending the action.
Fourth, the new defendant either knew or should have known about the action “but
for a mistake” in initially identifying the proper party. The plaintiff carries the
burden of establishing she met Title VII’s 90-day filing requirement. Green v.
Union Foundry Co., 281 F.3d 1229, 1233–34 (11th Cir. 2002).
The parties contest only the mistake provision, Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). The
Court first decides whether the plaintiff made a “mistake concerning the proper
party’s identity.” Reaching the second inquiry—whether the proper party knew or
should have known the action would be brought against it but for an error—is
contingent upon a finding of mistake. See Krupski, 560 U.S. at 548–49; U.S. v.
Estate of Schoenfeld, 344 F. Supp. 3d 1354, 1364 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (referring to
“two-part inquiry” of Krupski).
Relevant chronology
Prior to this action, throughout the entire two years of administrative
proceedings, the respondent was “AdventHealth Medical Group,” not Florida
Hospital Physician Group, Inc. Notably, both counsel who appeared and
participated before FCHR, DOAH, and EEOC are the precise counsel representing
their respective clients in this action.
On June 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit within 90 days from receipt of
the EEOC Notice of Right to Sue. The initial complaint identified Plaintiff’s
employer as “AdventHealth Medical Group, a Florida Limited Liability
Company.” Dkt. 1. A summons was issued and served on “AdventHealth Medical
Group” at 900 Hope Way, Altamonte Springs, Florida.4 Dkts. 3, 6. According to
the sunbiz.org record provided, AdventHealth Medical Group is not an LLC but is,
instead, a fictitious name or “d/b/a” registered and owned by Florida Hospital
Physician Group, Inc. Dkt. 20-8. The owner’s address is listed in Tampa.
4 On AdventHealth’s website, the national corporate headquarters is located at this address. See
www.adventhealth.com; https://jobs.adventhealth.com/our-locations/adventhealth-corporate/
On July 13, 2025, before responding to the complaint, Defendant’s counsel,
somehow having notice of the lawsuit, emailed Plaintiff about the incorrect party
Defendant. Dkt. 20-9 at 4. The email identified the correct Defendant as Florida
Hospital Physician Group, Inc., and stated that AdventHealth Medical Group is “a
fictious entity [that] cannot be sued in its own name.” Id. Defendant’s counsel
asked if Plaintiff would be willing to amend the complaint “to identify the correct
legal entity” so that it could respond substantively. Id.
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint two days later on July 15, which was
116 days after the EEOC Notice, and named “Florida Hospital Physician Group,
Inc. d/b/a AdventHealth Medical Group” as the Defendant. Dkt. 10. Defendant’s
counsel emailed Plaintiff again to point out that the summons was incorrectly
issued to AdventHealth Medical Group at an Altamonte Springs address. Dkt. 20-
9 at 2. The email included an attached sunbiz.org record for Florida Hospital
Physician Group, Inc., listing it as a Florida not-for-profit corporation with the
correct address for service on the registered agent. Dkt. 20-9 at 2, 6. Plaintiff
corrected the summons, and Defendant’s counsel agreed to waive service. Dkts.
13, 14.
Mistake versus lack of knowledge
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s naming a nonexistent LLC was not a
mistake but lack of knowledge or diligence on her part and, therefore, does not
relate back for purposes of Title’s VII’s EEOC limitations period. Case law
discusses a mistake in the context of Rule 15(c) concerning “John Doe” fictitious
names and also in misnaming or misidentifying a corporate entity. These facts fall
within a unique category: relation back when the earlier complaint was filed
against a nonentity.
Undoubtedly, Plaintiff incorrectly described AdventHealth Medical Group’s
legal structure as an LLC. As to legal structure, the sunbiz.org filings show that
AdventHealth Medical Group was not a Florida LLC. Dkt. 20-8. A review of the
public records at sunbiz.org, however, further reveals a plethora of various
AdventHealth entities. In any event, Plaintiff sued a non-existent LLC, a non-
entity.
As Plaintiff now knows, AdventHealth Medical Group is the fictitious name
or “d/b/a” registered to Florida Hospital Physician Group, Inc., a not-for-profit
corporation. See Dkt. 20-8 (sunbiz.org filings). A company’s registered fictitious
name does not create a separate legal entity but merely establishes another name
for conducting business with no independent existence. See Mastro v. Seminole
Tribe of Fla., 578 F. App’x 801, 803 (11th Cir. 2014) (unpublished opinion) (citing
Florida law); United States v. Mesadieu, 180 F. Supp. 3d 1113, (M.D. Fla. 2016)
(“Notably, a “d/b/a” designation standing alone is not sufficient to join an
independent entity as a defendant in a lawsuit.”). Even though Advent Health
Medical Group is a fictitious or “doing business as” name registered to Florida
Hospital Physician Group, Inc., a “d/b/a” does not have a legal identity separate
from the registering company and therefore cannot be sued. See Doe K.R. v.
Choice Hotels, No. 6:23-cv-1012-JSS-LHP, 2025 WL 3469855, at *3 (M.D. Fla.
Dec. 3, 2025) (noting that a plaintiff cannot sue a non-existent entity).5
The original complaint was served at an Altamonte Springs address, which
Defendant asserts is not associated with either the registered principal office or
agent of Florida Hospital Physician Group, Inc. or associated with AdventHealth
Medical Group. See Dkt. 24 at 4 n.2; Dkt. 20-8. As Defendant contends, any
ostensible service on a fictitious name, with no legal existence apart from the
corporation, “cannot be attributed to the real party in interest.” Garcia v.
Consumer Credit Union, No. 24-cv-81141, 2024 WL 4813985, at *2 (S.D. Fla.
Nov. 18, 2024) (citing Gulisano v. Burlington, Inc., 34 F.4th 935, 943 (11th Cir.
2022)), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4995929 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 6,
2024). Yet the Altamonte Springs address happens to be the national headquarters
of AdventHealth.
Following the fundamental principle that a “d/b/a” does not exist apart from
its owner, the general rule in federal court does not permit “fictitious-party
5 See also Anglin v. FL Fountainebleau Miami, No. 22-cv-2181, 2022 WL 17344893, at *1 (S.D.
Fla. Nov. 30, 2022) (dismissing pro se complaint where defendant “does not exist and is not the
intended defendant of this lawsuit”).
pleading.” Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010).
Exceptions are permitted, however, in “John Doe” cases. See Powers, 148 F.3d at
1226–27 (permitting relation back “only where there has been an error made
concerning the identity of the proper party and where that party is chargeable with
knowledge of the mistake, but it does not permit relations back where . . . there is a
lack of knowledge of the proper party”) (emphasis in original). The issue in “John
Doe” cases is whether the plaintiff has sufficiently identified a real person in the
required time to accomplish notice of suit. See, e.g., Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d
1098, 1103 (11th Cir. 1999), overruled in part on other grounds by Manders v.
Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1328 n.52 (11th Cir. 2003 (en banc); Bostick v. McGuire, No.
6:15-cv-1533-Orl-37GJK, 2016 WL 2811246 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2016), report
and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 2759114 (M.D. Fla. May 16, 2016).6
A “John Doe” exists as a real person, however, and therefore a fictitious “d/b/a”
does not fit neatly within that analysis because it does not exist apart from its
owner—it is not a real entity.
The Court next turns to the cases addressing a mistaken identity of a real
entity, keeping in mind that Plaintiff characterizes the amendment as a name
6 See also Dkt. 20 at 14 (citing Rodriguez v. Quinones, 508 F. Supp. 3d 1198, 1202 (S.D. Fla.
2020)). Rodriguez analyzes mistake in the context of “John Doe.”
correction or a misnomer.7 Defendant strongly urges that this situation amounts to
Plaintiff’s lack of knowledge or diligence, not a mistake about identity. Relation
back of Plaintiff’s Title VII claims requires under Rule 15(c) a finding of mistake
on the part of Plaintiff.
For purposes of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), a mistake is defined as “an error,
misconception, or misunderstanding; an erroneous belief; a misunderstanding of
the meaning or implication of something; a wrong action or statement proceeding
from faulty judgment, inadequate knowledge, or inattention.” Krupski, 560 U.S. at
548–49 (citation modified). In Krupski, the plaintiff initially named Costa Cruise
rather than Costa Crociere. The cruise passenger ticket listed both companies, and
both companies were viable entities. When the defendant informed the plaintiff of
the correct entity, however, the plaintiff waited a while before seeking to amend.
In reversing the finding of no relation back, the Supreme Court wrote:
That a plaintiff knows a party’s existence does not preclude her from
making a mistake with respect to that party’s identity. . . . The
reasonableness of the mistake is not itself an issue. As noted, a plaintiff
might know that the prospective defendant exists but nonetheless
harbor a misunderstanding about his status or role in the events giving
rise to the claim at issue, and she may mistakenly choose to sue a
different defendant based on that misimpression. That kind of
deliberate mistaken choice does not foreclose a finding that
Rule15(c)(1)(C)(ii) has been satisfied.
7 As stated by Plaintiff concerning a mistake, she “merely corrected the formal name of the
defendant entity” from AdventHealth Medical Group to Florida Hospital Physician Group, Inc.,
and “both entities refer to the same defendant.” Dkt. 21 at 9, 10.
Id. at 549. Krupski added that the plaintiff’s dilatory conduct is not part of the
analysis of the Rule’s requirements. Id. at 552–53. A court, however, may
consider the conduct in terms of the prospective defendant’s understanding, not the
plaintiff’s, of whether the plaintiff initially made a mistake. Id. at 554.
Although Krupski involved confusion between two real entities, its
reasoning is persuasive. Here, Plaintiff knew the party’s existence, but was
operating under the assumption that “AdventHealth Medical Group” was the
correct name of the entity. This knowledge does not prevent her from making a
mistake as to identity under Krupski. Moreover, the reasonableness of the mistake
is not an issue to be considered, particularly when Plaintiff mistakenly sues an
incorrectly named entity.
Through the entire proceedings before FCHR, both Plaintiff and Defendant
were represented by counsel. From the charge of discrimination to the Final Order
adopting the ALJ’s recommendation, the entity named was always “AdventHealth
Medical Group.” Plaintiff was unaware that she had failed to correctly name her
employer until Defendant’s counsel revealed that the proper identity is Florida
Hospital Physician Group, Inc., and that “AdventHealth Medical Group” is its
registered fictitious name. Upon her learning of this mistake, Plaintiff amended
the complaint within two days. Defendant suffered no prejudice whatsoever.
Indeed, counsel knew of this lawsuit because Plaintiff served the complaint at the
address of AdventHealth’s national corporate headquarters in Altamonte Springs.
Notwithstanding an error in naming, Defendant maintains that Plaintiff was
required to sue a real entity, even if improperly identified. See Brown v. VCNA
Prestige Concrete Prods., Inc., No. 6:13-cv-979-Orl-31TBS, 2014 WL 1293266, at
*3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2014); Hodge v. Orlando Util. Comm’n, No. 6:09-cv-1059-
Orl-19DAB, 2009 WL 5067758 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2009). In Brown, an
employment discrimination case, the plaintiff misunderstood the complex
corporate structure of his employer, VCNA. The court granted relation back and
found that the “rule that a plaintiff may not rely on a lack of knowledge to establish
a mistake for purposes of relation back” did not apply because “an incorrect choice
based on information is not the same as a lack of knowledge.” Brown, at *3.
There, as noted by Defendant, the plaintiff initially chose a real entity related to his
employer.8
In Hodge, a personal injury case, the plaintiff initially named his employer
as Baker’s Transport Service but knew the correct identity was Dedicated
Transport, as evidenced by the EEOC charge filed against Dedicated Transport.
There, the plaintiff consciously chose between two real entities. The Hodge court
8 See also Estate of Schoenfeld, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 1365 (comparing cases on what circumstances
give rise to a finding of mistake).
found that the plaintiff’s prior knowledge evidenced a deliberate choice and denied
relation back.
The Court finds instructive a case that distinguishes Hodge in the context of
Title VII. See Follese v. Jassas Capital LLC, No. 2:18-cv-40-FtM-99MRM, 2018
WL 1426398 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2018). The plaintiff in Follese filed suit against
Best Western International, Inc., and did not realize the proper party and owner of
the hotel was Jassas Capital LLC. In granting relation back, the court noted that
the EEOC Right to Sue Letter only referred to Best Western Airport Inn and
therefore did not demonstrate the plaintiff’s knowledge of Jassas Capital LLC’s
identity. The court contrasted Hodge “where the plaintiff knew the identity of the
newly-named party at the time the initial complaint was filed and deliberately
chose not to sue that party in the initial complaint.” Follese, at *2 (quoting
Hodge). As in Follese, Plaintiff’s EEOC Notice referred to AdventHealth Medical
Group, and Plaintiff did not realize the proper party was Florida Hospital Physician
Group, Inc.
Even though the Court should not consider Plaintiff’s prompt, non-dilatory
amending the complaint within two days of learning of the correct name, it is
difficult to reconcile that the respondent named throughout the administrative
proceedings, including the Final Order of FCHR and the EEOC Notice, was
always “AdventHealth Medical Group” with Defendant’s position that Plaintiff
knew and understood the corporate structure of AdventHealth at the time of filing
suit. These circumstances support a finding of mistaken identity followed by a
timely name correction as opposed to a deliberate but incorrect choice to sue one
of two known entities. In short, Plaintiff harbored a misunderstanding, given the
prior proceedings moved forward solely against AdventHealth Medical Group.
The Court finds that her deliberate but mistaken decision to name the only entity
recognized in the administrative proceedings does not foreclose relation back.
Finally, the Court addresses Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff should have
known the correct name of her employer per her own tax documents. See Dkt. 20
at 16 (“During the underlying administrative proceedings, Plaintiff marked her W-
2s as exhibits identifying Florida Hospital Physician Group, Inc. as her
employer.”). The W-2 exhibits purportedly used during the administrative
proceedings do not establish that Plaintiff should have known the identity of the
correct defendant. Like the cruise ticket in Krupski listing two different entities,
that Plaintiff may have known the contents of the tax documents does not foreclose
the possibility that she misunderstood crucial facts about her employer’s corporate
structure. The face of the initial complaint indicates a misunderstanding, and
Defendant has articulated no strategy that it thought Plaintiff was pursuing in suing
a defendant that could not legally provide relief.
Having determined Plaintiff's error was a mistake, the Court unequivocally
finds that Florida Hospital Physician Group, Inc. was not prejudiced. Defendant
knew or should have known that it would be named in the original complaint as
evidenced by its participation in the lengthy administrative proceedings.
Therefore, the Title VII claims in the Amended Complaint relate back to the filing
of the initial complaint, and equitable tolling need not be reached.’
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 20) is granted as to Count
I and denied as to Counts II and III. Count I is dismissed with prejudice. Counts II
and III will proceed. Defendant must file its answer and defenses to Counts II and
III within fourteen (14) days.
DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on March 19, 2026.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
COPIES FURNISHED TO: Counsel of Record
As to Defendant’s shotgun pleading arguments, the Court finds that Defendant is sufficiently
on notice of the claims brought against it in Counts II and III.
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