Bonacum

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

PREFERRED DRILLING

SOLUTIONS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:25-cv-806-MSS-CPT

KEVIN J. BONACUM and

CONNELLY & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

Defendants.

ORDER

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court pursuant to the Motion to Dismiss

Counts I, III, and V of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (“Bonacum’s Motion to

Dismiss”) of Defendant Kevin J. Bonacum (“Bonacum”), (Dkt. 47), the response in

opposition thereto of Plaintiff Preferred Drilling Solutions, Inc. (“PDS”), (Dkt. 70),

the Motion to Dismiss (“CAA’s Motion to Dismiss,” together with Bonacum’s

Motion to Dismiss, the “Motions to Dismiss”) of Defendant Connelly & Associates,

Inc. (“CAA”), (Dkt. 49), PDS’s response in opposition thereto, (Dkt. 69), Bonacum’s

Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Answer Asserting Counterclaims Against

Preferred Drilling Solutions, Inc. and Dillon Bale (“Bonacum’s Motion for Leave”),

(Dkt. 109), CAA’s Motion for Leave to File Counterclaim Against Preferred Drilling

Solutions, Inc. and Third Party Complaint Against Dillon Bale and Shannon Martin

(“CAA’s Motion for Leave,” together with Bonacum’s Motion for Leave, the

“Motions for Leave”), (Dkt. 111), and PDS’s corrected response in opposition to the

Motions for Leave. (Dkt. 125) The Court finds that Bonacum’s Motion to Dismiss is

due to be denied, CAA’s Motion to Dismiss is due to be granted in part and denied in

part, and the Motions for Leave are due to be granted. Specifically, CAA’s Motion to

Dismiss is due to be granted insofar as it requests dismissal of PDS’s defamation claim

(Count VI of the Amended Complaint). The dismissal is with leave for PDS to redress

the pleading defects identified in this Order. CAA’s Motion to Dismiss is otherwise

due to be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

PDS filed its initial Complaint on April 1, 2025. (Dkt. 1) PDS filed the operative

Amended Complaint on July 8, 2025. (Dkt. 35)

The factual allegations in the Amended Complaint relevant to the Motions to

Dismiss concern a former employment relationship between PDS and Bonacum, and

Bonacum’s employment relationship with CAA. (Id.) PDS alleges that “[f]or nearly

twenty five years PDS has provided highly specialized drilling services utilizing multi-

million dollar specialty drills throughout the State of Florida and the southeastern

United States.” (Id. at 3) PDS alleges that “Bonacum was in charge of bidding on

projects for PDS.” (Id. at 6) According to PDS, “Bonacum was employed by PDS as

its Director of Safety and Business Development from December 26, 2016 through

March 14, 2024 and as its VP of Operations from March 15, 2024 through March 28,

2025.” (Id. at 2) An Employment Agreement dated March 15, 2024 is attached to the

Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 35-1) PDS alleges that “[a] material term of the . . .

Employment Agreement is that Bonacum would be employed by PDS on a full time

basis as Vice President of Operations for three years during which time he would

‘perform such duties … as the officers of the company may direct,’ ‘devote his business

activity exclusively to the Company [PDS],’ and ‘perform and discharge well and

faithfully all duties associated with his services.’” (Id. at 4) PDS alleges that “Bonacum

also agreed to return all Company business information to PDS upon the termination

of his employment.” (Id.)

According to PDS, Bonacum had access to PDS’s customer list (the “Customer

List”), which “resides on a password protected server.” (Id.) PDS alleges that

“Bonacum was one of only approximately ten officers and managers of PDS given

access to the PDS customer list. No other persons inside or outside the company had

access to the PDS customer list.” (Id.) PDS alleges that the Customer List “distills

from a universe of companies who might need specialized drilling services those

companies who often contract and pay for such specialized drilling services in PDS’s

geographic market and then identifies the key persons within those companies

necessary to contact to obtain and perform drilling projects and their email addresses.”

(Id. at 5)

Pertinent to the Motions to Dismiss, PDS alleges in Counts I and V that

Defendants are liable for the unauthorized use of the Customer List “and associated

confidential customer order history” (the “Trade Secrets”). (Id. at 9-10, 14). PDS also

alleges in Count VI that Defendants are liable for Bonacum’s defamatory statements

made “to PDS employees and customers that PDS was ‘in a lot of trouble and probably

won’t be around much longer[.]’” (Id. at 16) PDS further alleges in Count III that

Bonacum is liable for a breach of fiduciary duty as a result of his “soliciting PDS

customers and employees on behalf of CAA while still employed by PDS; forwarding

requests for quotes from PDS customers to his personal email account and not

submitting quotes to the customers on behalf of PDS, and misrepresenting to PDS

employees and customers that PDS was ‘in a lot of trouble and probably won’t be

around much longer’ so that they would leave PDS and join CAA.” (Id. at 12-13)

Bonacum has moved to dismiss Counts I, III, and V of the Amended Complaint

pursuant to Rule (12)(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. 47) CAA

has moved to dismiss Counts I, V, and VI of the Amended Complaint pursuant to

Rules 12(b)(6) and (b)(1). (Dkt. 49)

On July 23, 2025, PDS filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, (Dkt. 43),

requesting that Defendants be enjoined from using PDS’s trade secrets, as set out

therein, and that Defendants be ordered to return certain documents to PDS. The

Court held a hearing on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction on September 24, 2025.

After the hearing, the Court entered a Preliminary Injunction Order (the “Injunction

Order”), which set forth the explicit directives of the Court to the parties. (Dkt. 97)

The Injunction Order did not serve as an adjudication on the merits and did not find

any party entitled to damages.

According to Bonacum, “[a]fter the Injunction Order was entered, Mr.

Bonacum and [CAA] were made aware of a statement made by [PDS’s] President, Dr.

Dillon Bale [(“Bale”)], that was issued by [PDS] to its customers, vendors, and other

third parties declaring that [PDS] had its ‘trade secrets and confidential information

stolen by another company,’ that a ‘federal judge found them guilty,’ and that ‘they

have taken 2 million dollars from us.’” (Dkt. 109 at 2-3) The copy of the email

Bonacum provided indicates it was sent on October 20, 2025. (Dkt. 109-2 at 2)

Bonacum continues, “The email included a copy of the Injunction Order, which

clearly identifies Mr. Bonacum and [CAA] as the targets of these false and misleading

statements. [PDS] and Dr. Bale doubled down on their inappropriate comments on

October 23, 2025, when [PDS] issued a second statement from Dr. Bale stating, among

other things, that Mr. Bonacum and [CAA] ‘took confidential data, poached key

employees, and spread false claims about [PDS’s] financial stability.’” (Dkt. 109 at 2-

3) CAA alleges that PDS executive Shannon Martin (“Martin”) sent the October 20

and 23 statements. (Dkt. 111 at 2-3)

PDS alleges that it sent the October 20 and 23 statements “in response to the

Defendants falsely stating to clients and vendors that the Defendants ‘won’ the motion

for preliminary injunction and boasted ‘we cannot be stopped.’” (Dkt. 125 at 2) PDS

also alleges that “when counsel for Bonacum and [CAA] notified [PDS’s] counsel of

the two emails complained of . . . they demanded a retraction by October 27, 2025,

failing which they threatened to file a counterclaim.” (Id.) According to PDS, “[o]n

October 27, 2025, [PDS’s] counsel sent a retraction email to Defendants’ counsel

which [PDS] sent to the same persons to whom the emails complained of . . . were

sent.” (Id.)

In Bonacum’s Motion for Leave, (Dkt. 109), Bonacum requests leave to file a

counterclaim against PDS and a third party claim against Bale.1 (Dkt. 109-1) Both

counts in Bonacum’s proposed supplemental pleading assert a defamation claim

premised on the October 20 and 23 statements. (Id.) Count I is directed against PDS;

Count II is directed against Bale. (Id.) In CAA’s Motion for Leave, (Dkt. 111), CAA

requests leave to file a counterclaim against PDS and a third party complaint against

Bale and Martin. (Dkt. 110) Count I in CAA’s proposed supplemental pleading asserts

a claim for injurious falsehood. Count II asserts a claim for tortious interference with

an advantageous business relationship. (Id.) Both counts in CAA’s proposed

supplemental pleading are directed at PDS, Bale, and Martin, and both counts are

premised on the October 20 and 23 statements. (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The threshold for surviving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a low one. Quality Foods de Centro Am.,

S.A. v. Latin Am. Agribusiness Dev. Corp., S.A., et al., 711 F.2d 989, 995 (11th Cir.

1983). A plaintiff must plead only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1968-69 (2007)

(abrogating the “no set of facts” standard for evaluating a motion to dismiss

established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Although a complaint

challenged by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

1 Bonacum refers to the pleading as a “counterclaim” against PDS and Bale, but it is a

counterclaim against PDS and a third-party complaint against Bale. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a).

allegations, a plaintiff is still obligated to provide the “grounds” for his entitlement to

relief, and “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”

Berry v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1364 (S.D. Fla. 2007)

(quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint

in light of a motion to dismiss, the well pleaded facts must be accepted as true and

construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Quality Foods, 711 F.2d at 994-

95. However, the court should not assume that the plaintiff can prove facts that were

not alleged. Id. Thus, dismissal is warranted if, assuming the truth of the factual

allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint, there is a dispositive legal issue which precludes

relief. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motions to Dismiss

i. Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Count III)

The Court first considers the only count challenged in the Motions to Dismiss

which is directed at one defendant: Count III, “Breach of Fiduciary Duty (against

Defendant Bonacum).” (Dkt. 35 at 12-13)

Bonacum contends that PDS’s “fiduciary duty claim is grounded in contractual

performance and amounts to no more than a reinvention of the contract action[,]”

and, as a result, is barred under Florida’s independent tort doctrine. (Dkt. 47 at 6)

Bonacum frames the independent tort doctrine as barring a tort claim where the acts

complained of are “inextricably intertwined with his performance under the

employment agreement[.]” (Dkt. 47 at 5) Indeed, “there must be a tort ‘distinguishable

from or independent of [the] breach of contract’ in order for a party to bring a valid

claim in tort based on a breach in a contractual relationship.” Tiara Condo. Ass’n, Inc.

v. Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc., 110 So. 3d 399, 408-09 (Fla. 2013) (Pariente,

J., concurring) (quoting Lewis v. Guthartz, 428 So. 2d 222, 224 (Fla. 1982)).

“[A]n action that breaches a contract may also constitute an independent tort if

the action breaches an independently-existing tort duty.” Simmons v. USI Ins. Servs.,

LLC, No. 8:23-CV-201-TPB-AAS, 2024 WL 946287, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2024);

see also Tiara Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Marsh, USA, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1279

(S.D. Fla. 2014) (denying summary judgment on claims for breach of fiduciary duty

based on the independent tort doctrine where fiduciary duty claim was “based on the

breach of duties which are not contractually grounded, and therefore, inevitably fall

outside the reach of the ‘independent tort rule’ in any event”). “When an employer

entrusts an employee with confidential information or authorizes the employee to

negotiate on behalf of the employer, society, that is, public policy, imposes on the

employee a duty of loyalty and a fiduciary duty, both of which require scrupulous

adherence to avoid the attachment of tort liability.” Jabil, Inc. v. Essentium, Inc., No.

8:19-CV-1567-T-23SPF, 2020 WL 10353824, at *6 (M.D. Fla. May 29, 2020). Thus,

notwithstanding that “the parties memorialized their relation (and the concomitant

expectations and obligations) in an agreement[,] . . . the [employee’s] duties to act

prudently and loyally on behalf of, and under the employment of, [the employer]

derived not explicitly or initially from the employment-related agreements but rather

implicitly and initially from a societally imposed duty to safeguard another’s interests

and resources, if acting on another’s behalf.” Id. (distinguishing Travelers Indem. Co.

of Connecticut v. Richard McKenzie & Sons, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 3d 1332, 1346 (M.D.

Fla. 2018), aff'd, 10 F.4th 1255 (11th Cir. 2021) (finding no “tort duty” because the

duty “derived not implicitly from a source external to the contract but rather explicitly

from the contract”)). The fact of “[t]he contract’s duplication of, or intersection with,

societally imposed duties fails to eviscerate [the employer’s] tort claims.” Id. (citations

omitted); accord Acousti Eng’g Co. of Fla. v. Velasco, No. 6:23-CV-424-WWB-EJK,

2024 WL 6881505, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2024) (“[T]he employee duty of loyalty is

independent of any contractual duty”) (citing Jabil, No. 8:19-CV-1567-T-23SPF, 2020

WL 10353824, at *6).

PDS alleges that “Bonacum as a vice president of PDS owed a fiduciary duty

of loyalty to PDS.” (Dkt. 35 at 12) PDS alleges that Bonacum breached his duty by

“soliciting PDS customers and employees on behalf of CAA while still employed by

PDS; forwarding requests for quotes from PDS customers to his personal email

account and not submitting quotes to the customers on behalf of PDS, and

misrepresenting to PDS employees and customers that PDS was ‘in a lot of trouble

and probably won’t be around much longer’ so that they would leave PDS and join

CAA.” (Id. at 12-13) These allegations are “untethered to any specific contractual

provision or agreement. … Thus, the independent tort doctrine is not applicable in this

context.” Mainsail Parent, LLC v. Jewell, No. 24-22875-CIV, 2024 WL 6964671, at

*3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2024). That the Employment Agreement states that Bonacum

must “devote his business activity exclusively to [PDS],” and “perform and discharge

well and faithfully all duties associated with his services[,]” (Dkt. 35-1), does not

“eviscerate” the tort claim notwithstanding “[t]he contract’s duplication of, or

intersection with, societally imposed duties[.]” Jabil, No. 8:19-CV-1567-T-23SPF,

2020 WL 10353824, at *6.

Bonacum also contends that insofar as the breach of fiduciary duty claim is

premised on Bonacum’s alleged misrepresentation to PDS employees and customers

“that PDS was ‘in a lot of trouble and probably won’t be around much longer[,]’”

(Dkt. 35 at 13), the claim is impermissibly duplicative of PDS’s defamation count

under Florida’s single publication rule (which case law refers to interchangeably as the

single action rule). (Dkt. 47 at 7-8)

The single action rule does not require dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty

claim. While courts remain “deeply divided about the correct application of the single

action rule,” there is persuasive authority for the position that “the single action rule

only bars a tort claim premised on a defamatory statement when a defamation claim

has failed.” Emergency Recovery, Inc. v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 773 F. Supp. 3d 1304,

1314 n.4, 1316 (M.D. Fla. 2025) (Mizelle, J.) (observing that “[t]he Florida Supreme

Court has not addressed the scope of the [single action] rule in this context where the

tort claim arises solely from the same publication as the defamation claim that has not

yet failed[,]” and holding that “where a defendant has not successfully invoked an

affirmative defense to defamation, the single action rule presents no bar to a plaintiff's

tortious interference claim premised on the same publication”).2 Here, Bonacum’s

Motion to Dismiss does not request dismissal of the defamation claim, and Bonacum

has not offered an affirmative defense to it. PDS’s defamation claim has not otherwise

“failed” as against Bonacum (though, as discussed below, the defamation count is due

to be dismissed because of a pleading defect). The single action rule does not apply.

Moreover, the fiduciary duty count is premised on the allegation that Bonacum

“solicit[ed] PDS customers and employees on behalf of CAA while still employed by

PDS,” and independent facts incorporated into the breach of fiduciary duty count

support this claim. Accordingly, the single publication rule does not require dismissal

of the breach of fiduciary duty insofar as it is based on a theory that that Bonacum

breached his duty of loyalty by redirecting PDS’s employees and customers to CAA

by misrepresenting to PDS employees and customers “that PDS was ‘in a lot of trouble

and probably won’t be around much longer.’” (Id. at 13)

ii. Defamation (Count VI)

PDS premises its defamation claim on its allegation that Bonacum published a

false statement, “that PDS was ‘in a lot of trouble and probably won’t be around much

longer[,]’” (Dkt. 35 at 16), to PDS’s customers and employees as part of his efforts

2 “Although the cases speak to a ‘failed defamation claim,’ . . . this phrase references instances

when the defendant successfully invoked a defense to defamation.” Emergency Recovery,

773 F. Supp. 3d at 1318 n.10 (quoting Callaway Land & Cattle Co. v. Banyon Lakes C. Corp.,

831 So. 2d 204, 208 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)). But see Tymar Distribution LLC v. Mitchell Grp.

USA, LLC, 558 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1287 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (“The underpinnings of the single-

action rule make clear that it does not matter whether the defamation claim fails, succeeds,

or is not brought at all”).

with CAA to persuade PDS’s customers and employees to leave PDS and do business

with CAA. CAA contends that PDS’s defamation claim fails as to CAA because PDS

“is unable to establish the first element as there is no allegation that [CAA] published

the purportedly false statement.” (Dkt. 49 at 15); see also Nassau v. Unimotocyclists

Soc’y of Am., Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1242 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (“To state a cause of

action for defamation in Florida, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) the defendant

published a false statement; (2) the false statement was about the Plaintiff; (3) the false

statement was published to a third party; and (4) the falsity of the statement caused

injury to the plaintiff”) (citing Valencia v. Citibank Int’l, 728 So. 2d 330, (Fla. 3d DCA

1999). Under Florida law,

a corporation may be held liable for its employees’ defamation. Schreidell

v. Shoter, 500 So. 2d 228, 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); see also Hooper-

Holmes Bureau v. Bunn, 161 F.2d 102, 104-05 (5th Cir. 1947). However,

“[t]he liability of the master for intentional acts which constitute legal

wrongs can only arise when that which is done is within the real or

apparent scope of the master’s business. It does not arise where the

servant has stepped aside from his employment to commit a tort which

the master neither directed in fact, nor could be supposed, from the

nature of his employment, to have authorized or expected the servant to

do.” Dieas v. Assocs. Loan Co., 99 So. 2d 279, 281 (Fla. 1957)

(quotations omitted) (emphasis removed); see also Thompson v. Orange

Lake Country Club, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1377 (M.D. Fla. 2002).

Tillett v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-1095-J-34MCR, 2010 WL

11507322, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2010).

CAA contends “[PDS] has [improperly] lumped [CAA] into a defamation

claim concerning alleged statements made by Bonacum, not statements made by

[CAA]. It appears that [PDS] is attempting to allege that [CAA] is vicariously liable

for Bonacum’s allegedly defamatory statements. However, this theory of liability is not

properly plead[ed].” (Dkt. 49 at 15) In its response to CAA’s Motion to Dismiss, PDS

does not dispute CAA’s assertion that PDS’s defamation claim against CAA is based

on a vicarious liability theory. (Cf. Dkt. 69 at 10 (PDS asserting that “[CAA’s] Motion

[to Dismiss] reveals that [CAA] understands that it must defend against the

defamatory statements made by Bonacum as part of his recruitment efforts for

[CAA].”)) While the Amended Complaint does not expressly state that Bonacum

made his misrepresentation while acting within the scope of his agency for CAA, the

allegation is set forth in the Amended Complaint. (See Dkt. 35 at 6 (“Bonacum left

PDS to become the branch manager for CAA[,] managing its newly created Tampa

branch”); id. at 6-7 (alleging that “prior to and after March 14, 2025[,]” the date

Bonacum informed PDS that he was resigning from PDS, Bonacum made various

false statements to PDS customers and employees to coax them to take their business

to CAA, and “Bonacum and CAA are continuing their efforts to poach PDS

employees to join CAA.”); id. at 9 (“All of the CAA customers are former PDS

customers and half of CAA’s employees are former PDS employees. Bonacum and

CAA could not have gotten to this point so quickly without Bonacum soliciting and

securing customers and employees for CAA while he was still employed by PDS.”))

“A plaintiff is the master of his or her complaint and may choose to proceed

under a theory of direct liability, vicarious liability, or both.” Yusko v. NCL

(Bahamas), Ltd., 4 F.4th 1164, 1170 (11th Cir. 2021). But a plaintiff cannot plead both

theories in the same count. See Hagle v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 22-23186-

CV, 2023 WL 3571292, at *6 (S.D. Fla. May 2, 2023), report and recommendation

adopted, No. 22-23186-CV, 2023 WL 3568130 (S.D. Fla. May 19, 2023) (“While

Plaintiff can travel under a theory of direct liability, vicarious liability, or both for a

given claim, they are not the same cause of action. Rather, they are distinct theories of

liability, and to assert both in one count is impermissible shotgun pleading.”); Liles v.

Carnival Corp. & PLC, No. 22-CV-22977, 2023 WL 34644, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 4,

2023) (dismissing count in part because “a claim for direct liability should be brought

in a separate count”); see also Rodriguez v. Rambosk, No. 2:23-CV-1102-SPC-DNF,

2026 WL 575098, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2026) (observing that the “[p]laintiff

improperly alleged these vicarious liability claims in the same count as his direct

claims[,]” but “the Court disregard[s] this defect[]” because the “[d]efendants never

moved to dismiss the claims on this basis, and they do not address the issue in their

summary judgment briefing.”). Accordingly, the Amended Complaint must be

dismissed because it improperly asserts both vicarious and direct theories of liability

in the same count. To proceed, PDS must cure this pleading defect.

iii. Misappropriation of Trade Secrets (Counts I and V)

Defendants contend that the claims for misappropriation of trade secrets under

federal law (Count I) and Florida law (Count V) are inadequately pleaded. (Dkts. 47;

49) CAA also contends that the Court lacks jurisdiction over any remaining claims

because the DTSA cause of action is the only cause of action in the Amended

Complaint that arises under federal law.3 (Dkt. 49 at 2, 9)

PDS and Defendants do not dispute that the federal law and Florida law

misappropriation claims may be analyzed together. (Dkts. 49 at 9; 69 at 7; see also

Dkt. 47 at 2-5 (analyzing misappropriation claims together)) Indeed, “DTSA4 and

FUTSA5 can be analyzed together.” Freedom Med., Inc. v. Sewpersaud, 469 F. Supp.

3d 1269, 1275 n.6 (M.D. Fla. 2020), order clarified, No. 6:20-CV-771-ORL-37GJK,

2020 WL 3487642 (M.D. Fla. June 25, 2020). A trade secret misappropriation claim

requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that “(1) the plaintiff possessed secret information

and took reasonable steps to protect its secrecy and (2) the secret it possessed was

misappropriated by one who knew or had reason to know that the secret was

improperly obtained or by one who used improper means to obtain it.” RxStrategies,

Inc. v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 3d 1341, 1351 (M.D. Fla. 2019). To state a

DTSA claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate further that “the misappropriated trade

secret is related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or

foreign commerce.” WWMAP, LLC v. Birth Your Way Midwifery, 711 F. Supp. 3d

1313, 1319 (N.D. Fla. 2024) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1)). To properly plead

misappropriation of trade secrets, a “plaintiff need only allege sufficient facts to

plausibly show a trade secret was involved and to give the defendant notice of the

3 The Court does not further address CAA’s jurisdictional argument because the Court finds

that the misappropriation claims are adequately pleaded.

4 Defendant Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1836, et seq.

5 Florida Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Florida Statue § 688.001 et seq.

material it claims constituted a trade secret.” Sentry Data Sys., Inc. v. CVS Health,

361 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1294 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (quoting DynCorp Int’l v. AAR Airlift

Group, Inc., 664 F. App’x. 844, 848 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam)6).

“Under Florida law, customer lists are generally considered trade secrets

provided: (1) the list was acquired or compiled through the industry of the owner of

the list and is not just a compilation of information commonly available to the public;

and (2) the owner shows that it has taken reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of

the information.” Sentry Data Sys., Inc. v. CVS Health, 361 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1293

(S.D. Fla. 2018) (quoting Digital Assurance Certification, LLC v. Pendolino, No.

6:17-CV-72-ORL-31TBS, 2017 WL 320830, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2017)). And

“under Florida law, where an employee acquires trade secret information during the

course of [his] employment, the employee is under a duty, even in the absence of an

express contractual provision, not to disclose that information in [his] new

employment for [his] own or another’s benefit to the detriment of [his] previous

employer.” Marlite, Inc. v. Eckenrod, Case No. 09-22607-CIV, 2011 WL 39130 at *7

(S.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2011) (citing Premier Lab Supply, Inc. v. Chemplex Indus., Inc., 10

So. 3d 202, 206 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009); Southeastern Mech. Servs., Inc. v. Brody, No.

8:08–CV–1151–T–30EAJ, 2008 WL 4613046, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Oct.15, 2008)).

The Amended Complaint identifies PDS’s alleged trade secrets as “PDS’s

6 The Court notes that “[a]lthough an unpublished opinion is not binding on this court, it may

be considered as persuasive authority. See 11th Cir. R. 36-2.” United States v. Futrell, 209

F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2000). Where cited herein, any unreported decision of a panel of

the Circuit is considered well-reasoned and is offered as persuasive, not binding.

customer list and associated confidential customer order history.” (Dkt. 35 at 9-10, 14)

Trade Secrets derive economic value from not being ascertainable by competitors and

the general public who could use this information to poach customers and adopt PDS’s

business strategies. See New Country Motor Cars of Palm Beach, LLC v. Beresford,

No. 17-80856-CIV, 2019 WL 3890456, at *7 (S.D. Fla. May 3, 2019) (customer list

and sales charts detailing every sale constitutes trade secret); Sethscot Collection, Inc.

v. Drbul, 669 So. 2d 1076, 1078 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (active customer list which also

contains a detailed purchasing history constitutes trade secret). Accordingly, dismissal

is not due to be granted on the basis that the Trade Secrets do not hold independent

economic value.

PDS alleges that it took reasonable steps to protect the secrecy of the alleged

trade secrets by, among other things, “maintaining the Trade Secrets on a password

protected server, [and] providing confidential password access to only ten of PDS’s 88

employees on a need to know basis.” (Dkt. 35 at 10, 15) Defendants contend in their

Motions to Dismiss that PDS should have employed additional measures to protect

the privacy of the Trade Secrets. (See Dkts. 47 at 3; 49 at 5-6) The Court finds that the

resolution of this disputed matter is more properly resolved at the summary judgment

stage of the proceedings, after the completion of discovery. Cf. Flagstone Island

Gardens, L.L.C v. Ser, Case No. 11-21865-CIV-GRAHAM/GOODMAN, 2011 WL

13223685 at *5 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2011) (plaintiff pleaded claim under FUTSA where

alleged its trade secrets “were stored on Plaintiff's computer network, which requires

a username and password to gain access.”); Treco Intern, S.A. v. Kromka, 706 F.

Supp. 2d 1283, 1287 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (allegation that plaintiffs, among other things,

“carefully limited dissemination of the information only to those trusted employees

and others who needed to know” supports that plaintiffs took reasonable steps to

protect the information). As such, the Motions to Dismiss are due to be denied insofar

as they premise dismissal of the misappropriation claims on the insufficiency or

sufficiency of the measures employed to maintain the secrecy of the Trade Secrets.

The Amended Complaint adequately alleges that Bonacum and CAA

unlawfully used and disclosed the Trade Secrets. According to PDS, “Bonacum

opened and manages CAA’s new Tampa branch, competing with PDS and providing

drilling services to many of PDS’s former customers.” (Dkt. 35 at 2) PDS alleges that

“Bonacum . . . disclosed the Trade Secrets to CAA.” (Id. at 15) PDS also alleges that

“Bonacum unlawfully used and is continuing to use the Trade Secrets on behalf of and

as an agent of CAA to unfairly compete with PDS . . . .” (Id.) PDS alleges that

“Bonacum downloaded the PDS Schedule Calendar and the PDS customer list to use

in his employment with CAA as its Tampa branch manager.” (Id. at 8) At this stage

of the proceedings the allegations sufficiently put Defendants on notice of PDS’s

theory that Bonacum, on behalf of CAA, relied on the Trade Secrets to convert PDS

customers into CAA customers. Whether Bonacum actually used or disclosed the

Trade Secrets to CAA, and whether CAA knew or had reason to know that that the

Trade Secrets were derived from or through a person who owed a duty to PDS to

maintain the secrecy of the Trade Secrets, see 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5); Fla. Stat. §

688.002(2), are issues more properly resolved at the summary judgment stage.

CAA also contends that the DTSA claim is due to be dismissed because

“Plaintiff has failed to plead any relevant facts claiming that the alleged trade secrets

will be used in interstate or foreign commerce.” (Dkt. 49 at 8-9) “To state a claim for

misappropriation of trade secrets pursuant to the [DTSA], a plaintiff generally must

allege . . . [that] the misappropriated trade secret is related to a product or service used

in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.” WWMAP, 711 F. Supp.

3d at 1319 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1)). PDS alleges that it “provides environmental

drilling, sonic drilling, direct push sampling and remediation services throughout

Florida and the southeastern United States . . . .” (Dkt. 35 at 1 (emphasis added)) The

Trade Secrets are related to these drilling services because the Trade Secrets “narrow

the universe of potential customers for specialized drilling services to those who have

contracted with PDS and are likely to need such services again, and . . . [t]he customer

contact information identifies the key persons to contact to successfully bid for new

projects and to coordinate performance of the drilling work.” (Dkt. 35 at 10, 14)

Accordingly, a requisite interstate commerce connection is alleged. Accord WWMAP,

711 F. Supp. 3d at 1324; KOVA Com. of Naples, LLC v. Sabin, No. 2:23-CV-614-

JES-KCD, 2024 WL 2019872, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 7, 2024).

CAA contends that the FUTSA claim is preempted by the DTSA claim. (Dkt.

49 at 14) However, “[e]xcept as provided in section 1833(b),” the DTSA “shall not be

construed to preempt or displace any other remedies, whether civil or criminal,

provided by . . . State . . . law for the misappropriation of a trade secret . . . .” 18 U.S.C.

§ 1838. The statutory exception does not apply. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b) (immunity

from liability for confidential disclosure of a trade secret to the government or in a

court filing). Accordingly, the FUTSA claim is not due to be dismissed as preempted.

See also Compulife Software, Inc. v. Newman, 111 F.4th 1147, 1160 (11th Cir. 2024),

cert. denied sub nom. Rutstein v. Compulife Software, Inc., 145 S. Ct. 1172, 221 L.

Ed. 2d 253 (2025) (observing in a case in which the plaintiff brought claims under the

DTSA and FUTSA that “[a] plaintiff in Florida can sue a defendant who steals his

trade secret under both federal and Florida law.”).

B. Motions for Leave

The Motions for Leave request the filing of supplemental pleadings concerning

PDS’s October 20 and 23 statements. The October 20 and 23 statements were

published months after the Court’s August 22, 2025 deadline for motions to add parties

or to amend pleadings, as set forth in the Case Management and Scheduling Order

(“CMSO”). (Dkt. 54 at 1)

A CMSO deadline “may be modified only for good cause . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P.

16(b)(4). “This good cause standard precludes modification unless the schedule cannot

‘be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.’” Sosa v. Airport Sys.,

Inc., 133 F. 3d 1417, 1418 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory

committee’s note). The proposed supplemental pleadings are directed at alleged

tortious conduct that occurred after the deadline elapsed. Defendants cannot be

faulted for not moving for leave to file supplemental pleadings before the deadline

elapsed.

Bonacum’s Motion for Leave was filed on November 12, 2025, and CAA’s

Motion for Leave was filed on November 17, 2025. (Dkts. 109; 111) The Court

discerns no undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or undue prejudice associated with

the filing of the Motions for Leave. See Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329,

1340 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Under Rule 15(a)(2), courts should freely give leave to amend

the pleadings ‘when justice so requires.’ A court may consider several factors when

deciding whether to grant a motion to amend, including ‘undue delay, bad faith or

dilatory motive ..., repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously

allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the

amendment, [and] futility of amendment.’”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); Equity

Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Fla. Mowing & Landscape Serv., Inc., 556 F.3d 1232, 1241

(11th Cir. 2009)).

PDS contends that the Motions for Leave should be denied because the new

causes of action and third party defendants would “unnecessarily inject new factual

and legal issues into this case and unnecessarily complicate the case, after substantial

discovery has occurred.” (Dkt. 125 at 3) It is true that the supplemental pleadings do

not concern the same nucleus of core facts that underlie the Amended Complaint.

Nonetheless, the Court is confident that with proper instructions a jury will not confuse

the issues or become unduly prejudiced against any party. And it is true that discovery

has progressed since this case was filed about a year ago. But the addition of third party

defendants and new factual issues stemming from the October 20 and 23 statements

does not appear to jeopardize this case’s progression. The Court is confident that an

appropriate extension of remaining pretrial deadlines can accommodate the addition

of these new parties and issues without meaningfully risking a delay which might

materially reduce the availability of evidence and witnesses’ memories.

PDS contends that the Motions for Leave should be denied because “PDS sent

the retraction email as requested and has not further communicated to third parties

about the order on the motion for preliminary injunction.” (Dkt. 125 at 3) PDS

marshals no case law standing for the proposition that its publishing of a retraction

letter defeats a cause of action premised on the retracted statement, as PDS appears to

contend.

PDS contends that the Motions for Leave should be denied as futile because the

supplemental pleadings Defendants seek leave to file would fail to state a claim. (Dkt.

125 at 4-5) According to PDS, Defendants’ claims fail because PDS’s statements “are

not false.” (Id. at 5) The allegations concerning the October 20 and 23 statements do

not establish that Defendants cannot state a claim against PDS and the third party

defendants. The factual issue of the truth or falsity of PDS’s statements is not properly

determined at this juncture. PDS also contends that CAA’s claim against Martin

would be futile because “she simply transmitted a message from Dillon Bale and . . .

the content was not made by Ms. Martin.” (Id.) PDS cites no case law suggesting that

a person cannot be liable for “transmitting” to third parties a misrepresentation

initially made by another person. Accordingly, the Motions for Leave are due to be

granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. Bonacum’s Motion to Dismiss, (Dkts. 47), is DENIED.

2. CAA’s Motion to Dismiss, (Dkts. 49), is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. CAA’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED insofar as it

requests dismissal of PDS’s defamation claim (Count VI of the Amended

Complaint) on the basis that the Defamation count asserts both vicarious

and direct theories of liability in the same count. CAA’s Motion to

Dismiss is otherwise DENIED.

3. PDS shall file, within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order, a

Second Amended Complaint that addresses the pleading defects

identified in this Order. Defendants shall file an answer or response to

the Second Amended Complaint within twenty-one (21) days of the date

the Second Amended Complaint is filed and served on Defendants.

4. The Motions for Leave, (Dkts. 109; 111), are GRANTED.

5. Bonacum and CAA shall separately file on the docket their respective

supplemental pleadings within seven (7) days of the date of this Order.

PDS shall file an answer or other response to the counterclaims asserted

in the supplemental pleadings within twenty-one (21) days of the date

each supplemental pleading is filed in accordance with this Order.

Bonacum and CAA shall cause summonses to be issued and Bonacum

and CAA shall serve the third-party defendants in accordance with the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

6. The Parties may file, within fourteen (14) days of the date the last of the

third-party defendants appears or fails to file a timely answer or other

response in this action, a paper proposing revisions to the deadlines set

in the Case Management and Scheduling Order, (Dkt. 54), including a

deadline for a second mediation involving the third-party defendants, if

appropriate.

7. This case is STAYED until the last of the third-party defendants appears

or fails to file a timely answer or other response.

8. CAA’s proposed supplemental pleading, (Dkt. 110), which CAA

separately filed on the docket without leave of court, is STRICKEN from

the docket.

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on this 19th day of March 2026.

MARY\S_SGRIVEN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Counsel of record

Any unrepresented party

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