Dunaway

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

ANTHONY M. DUNAWAY, SR., : Case No. 3:26-cv-33

:

Plaintiff, :

:

District Judge Michael J. Newman

vs. :

Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

:

HELEN WALLACE, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1

This matter is before the Court upon pro se Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in

forma pauperis. (Doc. #1). Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. #1)

is GRANTED.

This matter is also before the Court sua sponte for an initial review of Plaintiff’s Complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the

Court DISMISS this action.

I. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against four Montgomery County

Juvenile Court defendants, Administrative Judge Helen Wallace, Judge Julie Bruns, Magistrate

Hope Smalls/Taylor, and Magistrate Thomas Schiff, for violations of his constitutional rights.

(Doc. #1-1, PageID #s 5-9). He alleges, “Plaintiff is the father of minor children whose custody

and access have been denied by Montgomery County court for nearly one year, with no finding of

1 Attached is a NOTICE to the parties regarding objections to this Report and Recommendation.

unfitness, no hearing with due process, and no law evidence of harm.” Id. at 8. Plaintiff explains

that he has attempted to obtain transcripts of proceedings but has been “stonewalled or denied

without basis.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff requests that the Court: (1) issue a temporary restraining order

“halting enforcement of any custody restrictions against Plaintiff”; (2) compel production of all

transcripts; (3) schedule an expedited hearing for issuance of a preliminary injunction; (4) “Enjoin

all Defendant from interfering with Plaintiff’s lawful parental rights absent a full due process

hearing with clear and convincing evidence”; (5) Order the Second District Court of Appeals to

unseal or permit appellate review free from influence or self-insulation by parties named in this

action; and (6) award further relief as the Court deems necessary to restore Plaintiff’s rights. Id.

at 9.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court may dismiss a complaint upon finding (1) the

claims are frivolous or malicious; (2) it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or

(3) it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. It is appropriate for

the Court to conduct this review sua sponte prior to issuance of process “so as to spare prospective

defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints.” Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).

In conducting this initial review, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations as true and

construes them liberally in his favor. See Donald v. Marshall, No. 84-3231, 1985 WL 13183, at

*1 (6th Cir. Apr. 5, 1985) (stating that, “[w]hen considering a pro se action for dismissal pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), the complaint should be liberally construed and the allegations of the

complaint must be taken as true and construed in favor of the plaintiff”). However, while pro se

pleadings are “to be liberally construed” and are “held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), pro se

plaintiffs must still satisfy basic pleading requirements. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th

Cir. 1989).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review

and determine the validity of state court judgments even if, as here, a plaintiff claims that his

federal constitutional rights were violated at the state level. District of Columbia Court of Appeals

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923).

In other words, Rooker-Feldman precludes federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over “cases

brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered

before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection

of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005).

Plaintiff’s complaint on its face purports to assert claims seeking to overturn and/or vacate

a state juvenile court child custody determination. Such claims are barred by Rooker-Feldman.

See Hinton v. Teodosio, No. 5:12 CV 1267, 2012 WL 5354584, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 29, 2012)

(finding under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine that Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to review

state court’s custody determination). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed.

B. Judicial Immunity

Moreover, judges are largely immune from liability for acts they commit while functioning

within their judicial capacity. Norfleet v. Renner, 924 F.3d 317, 319 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Mireles

v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9, 11-12 (1991)). A plaintiff can overcome the application of judicial

immunity only where: (1) the judge’s acts were clearly non-judicial in nature and therefore outside

the scope of the judge’s judicial capacity; or (2) the judge’s actions were taken in the absence of

all jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. The factors that are relevant to whether an act is judicial

in nature are: (1) “the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a

judge”; and (2) “whether [the parties] dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Id.

Here, Judge Helen Wallace, Judge Julie Bruns, Magistrate Hope Smalls/Taylor, and

Magistrate Thomas Schiff are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. The undersigned understands

Plaintiff’s Complaint as a direct challenge to the judicial decisions that the judges and magistrates

made in the state court case(s) over which they preside. Plaintiff does not allege any facts to

suggest that the judges or magistrates acted outside their judicial capacity. Moreover, Plaintiff

fails to allege sufficient facts demonstrating that the judges and magistrate acted “in the complete

absence of all jurisdiction.” Stern, 262 F.3d at 607. Therefore, Judge Helen Wallace, Judge Julie

Bruns, Magistrate Hope Smalls/Taylor, and Magistrate Thomas Schiff are absolutely immune from

civil liability and all claims against them should be dismissed.

C. Conclusion

As set forth above, 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) permits sua sponte screening and dismissal of a

civil action “at any time if the court determines that” the action is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails

to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief” from an immune

defendant. For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that sua sponte

dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint is appropriate in this case

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. #1)

is GRANTED.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2);

2. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the

foregoing reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and

Recommendation would not be taken in good faith and therefore

deny plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See McGore v.

Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997); and

3. The case be terminated on the Court’s docket.

May 18, 2026 s/Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections

to the proposed findings and recommendations within FOURTEEN days after being served with

this Report and Recommendation. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report

objected to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If

the Report and Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring of record at

an oral hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or

such portions of it as all parties may agree upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless

the assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections

within FOURTEEN days after being served with a copy thereof.

Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal.

See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949-50 (6th Cir.

1981).